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THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to
Oklahoma City in 1927. During World
War II, he served as a first Lieutenant in
the Army. After the war, Judge Holloway
returned to complete his undergraduate
studies at the University of Oklahoma, re-
ceiving his B.A. in 1947. Judge Holloway
then attended Harvard Law School, where
he was graduated in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952,Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department ofJustice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice. Judge Holloway was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1968 and
became ChiefJudge in 1984. He is a mem-
ber of Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Gamma
Delta.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brig-
ham Young University in 1957 with high
honors. Judge McKay then received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago in 1960
and was the law clerk for Justice Jesse A.
Udall of the Arizona Supreme Court for the
1960-1961 term. From 1961 to 1974,
Judge McKay practiced with the law firm of
Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, Arizona; how-
ever, he did take a two year leave to serve
as Director of the United States Peace
Corps in Malawi, Africa. Judge McKay was
a law professor at Brigham Young Univer-
sity from 1974 until 1977. In 1977, he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge Mc-
Kay currently resides in Provo, Utah.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his B.A. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cur laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. In 1956, he became
law clerk for United States Circuit Judge
Walter Huxman and subsequently prac-
ticed with the Los Angeles law firm of Gib-
son, Dunn & Crutcher. Judge Logan was
then selected as Dean of the University of
Kansas Law School in 1961 and he served
in that capacity until 1968.
Since 1961, Judge Logan has been a
visiting professor at Harvard Law School,
the University of Texas Law School, Stan-
ford University School of Law, and the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School. He was a
special commissioner for the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas
from 1964 until 1967 and was a candidate
for the United States Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and he has co-authored
numerous books on estate planning and
administration. In 1977, he was appointed




Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan in 1940. She was gradu-
ated magna cum laude from Smith College in
1962, and from Harvard Law School in
1965. After graduating from law school,
Judge Seymour practiced law in Boston,
Massachusetts from 1965 until 1966, in
Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1967 and in Houston,
Texas from 1968 until 1969. From 1971 to
1979 she practiced with the Tulsa law firm
of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & An-
derson. In 1979, she was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa
and the American, Oklahoma, and Tulsa
County Bar Associations. Additionally,
Judge Seymour served as a bar examiner
from 1973 through 1979.
JUDGE JOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Col-
orado in 1934. He received his B.A. from
the University of Denver in 1956 and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of
Denver College of Law in 1959. Judge
Moore then practiced law with the Denver
firm of Carbone & Walsmith until 1962.
From 1962 until 1975, he worked in the
Colorado Attorney General's Office. Spe-
cifically, Judge Moore served as Assistant
Attorney General from 1962 until 1967, as
Deputy Attorney General from 1967 to
1972, and as Attorney General for the State
of Colorado from 1972 until 1975.
InJanuary, 1975,Judge Moore was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Moore was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from
1949 to 1951, and Brigham Young Univer-
sity from 1955 to 1956 when he graduated.
Judge Anderson then attended the Univer-
sity of Utah College of Law where he re-
ceived his LL.B. degree in 1960. He then
served as a trial attorney in the tax division
of the United States Department ofJustice
until 1964. Judge Anderson subsequently
joined the law firm of Ray, Quinney &
Webeker in Salt Lake City, Utah in 1964
where he practiced until he was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in 1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in seventeen courts throughout the
United States. He has served as President
and Commissioner of the Utah State Bar.
Additionally, Judge Anderson has been a
member of the Utah Judicial Counsel and
the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission,
and he has served as Chairman of the Utah
Law and Justice Center Committee.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia,
Kansas. She received her B.A. in American
Studies from the University of Kansas in
1968 and was a member of Mortar Board
and Phi Beta Kappa. Judge Tacha then
attended law school and received her J.D.
from the University of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as White
House Fellow, Judge Tacha was sent on
official trips to southeast Asia, east and
central Africa, and the European Economic
Community. After her fellowship, Judge
Tacha was an associate with the law firm of
Hogan and Hartson in Washington, D.C.
In 1973, she returned to Kansas and
entered private practice in Concordia,
Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the
faculty of the University of Kansas Law
School in 1974. In 1979, she became
Associate Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs and in 1981, she became the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1985.
JUDGE BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Baldock was born in Rocky,
Oklahoma, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico.
Judge Baldock attended the New Mexico
Military Institute where he graduated in
1956. He then received his J.D. from the
University of Arizona College of Law in
1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. In 1983,
he became a federal district judge in Albu-
querque, New Mexico and was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in 1985.
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL
Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kan-
sas in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas.
He received his B.A. in economics from
Northwestern University in 1962 and re-
ceived hisJ.D. from the University of Michi-
gan Law School in 1965, where he
graduated first in his class. While at the
University of Michigan Law School, he was
elected to the Order of Coif, the Barrister
Society, and was Editor-in-Chief of the
Michigan Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked forJustice By-
ron R. White of the United States Supreme
Court during the 1965-1966 term. From
1966 until 1988, he practiced as a trial law-
yer with the Denver law firm of Davis, Gra-
ham & Stubbs. In 1988, Judge Ebel was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include
teaching Corporations as an adjunct pro-
fessor at the University of Denver College
of Law, teaching the confirmation class at
St. James Presbyterian Church and partici-
pating in numerous Bar Association activi-
ties. He has served as vice-president of the
Colorado Bar Association and is a fellow of
the American College of Trial Lawyers, a
senior judge of the Doyle Inns of Court,
and a member of the Town & Gown cuit in 1970. In 1984, he assumed senior
Society. status.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in 1915 and grew
up in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale University in
1940. During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. In 1962, he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He served
as Chief Judge from 1977 until 1984. In
1984, Judge Seth assumed senior status.
Judge Seth has served as a director of
the Santa Fe National Bank, chairman of
the Legal Committee of the New Mexico
Oil and Gas Association, counsel for the
New Mexico Cattlegrowers' Association,
regent of the Museum of New Mexico and
as a director of the Santa Fe Boy's Club.
SENIOR JUDGE ROBERT H.
MCWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the Uni-
versity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded
an Honorary Doctor of Law degree from
the University.
During World War II, Judge McWil-
liams served in the United States Army and
was with the Office of Strategic Services.
He has served as a Deputy District Attorney
and as a Colorado District Court Judge. In
1961, Judge McWilliams was appointed to
the Colorado Supreme Court where he
served until he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
Judge McWilliams is a member of the
Judicial Conference Committee on the Ad-
ministration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta
Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta
Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIOR JUDGE JAMES E.
BARRETT
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late
Frank A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's
Congressman, Governor and United States
Senator. Judge Barrett attended the Uni-
versity of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War
II. Following the war, he attended Saint
Catherine's College at Oxford University
and received his LL.B. from the University
of Wyoming Law School in 1949. In 1973,
he received the Distinguished Alumni
Award from the University of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming. He also served as County
and Prosecuting Attorney for Niobrara
County, Town Attorney for the towns of
Lusk and Manville and attorney for the Ni-
obrara County Consolidated School Dis-
trict. From 1967 until 1971, Judge Barrett
served as Attorney General for the State of
Wyoming. In 1971, he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. In 1987 he assumed senior
status.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judi-
cial Conference Subcommittee on Federal
Jurisdiction, The United States Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court of Review,
and is a trustee of SaintJoseph's Children's
Home.
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THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT
THE HONORABLE JAMES K. LOGAN*
By a law signed by the President on February 28, 1929, and imple-
mented on April 1 of that year, the Tenth became a separate new circuit
in the United States court system. I have been asked to speak briefly on
the first sixty years of the Tenth Circuit.
Obviously that act did not bring order out of chaos. There was law
before 1929. Indeed, wherever people settle and congregate together
some method must evolve for dispute resolution. Law as we know it in
the geographic area of the Tenth Circuit probably commenced with the
settlers claims associations, or squatters courts, one of which in early
Kansas apparently determined jurisdiction by how far smoke could be
seen from the chimney of the meeting place. Some of the Indian tribes
in what is now Oklahoma had elaborate legal systems. The Cherokee
Nation's Constitution gave its Supreme Court judges immunity from a
reduction in their compensation, just like Article III judges.
The early history of the federal territorial courts, of course, was
greatly shaped by the unique history of the particular states: Kansas was
the center of a free state-slave state controversy immediately preceding
the Civil War; Colorado was influenced by the Gold Rush; Wyoming was
the real cowboy west; in Utah the controversy between the federal gov-
ernment and the Mormon settlers amounted to a kind of war; Oklahoma
was true Indian Country and its legal history was strongly affected by the
boomers and sooners attempting to settle on, claim, or steal Indian
land; New Mexico had both Hispanic and Indian heritages and some
military influence.
Our most colorful judges, from an historian's point of view, were
the territorial judges. They were sometimes uneducated in the law (one
was accused of knowing no more law than a hog). The territorial judges
had little in the way of precedent to guide them, and little to fear from
appellate review.
Some of these judges, however, were men of great erudition: for
example, Jacob Blair in Wyoming, when a witness in a homicide case
holding the murder weapon, a revolver, pointed it at the judge, he in-
quired, "Mr Witness, is that gun loaded?" Upon receiving an affirmative
answer, he responded, "Point it towards the lawyers. Good judges are
scarce."
I also think of Delana Eckels of Utah, for his actions when a witness
was cited before him for contempt for failing to appear and for giving
* Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. This speech
was delivered at the Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference in Sante Fe, New Mexico, on Sep-
tember 7, 1989.
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evasive answers. The witness' only justification for his behavior was that
he was about half sick. The judge, apparently with great gravity, re-
sponded as follows: "The court is disposed to excuse the half of you
that was sick, but the well half will be fined one dollar and costs and both
halves will be committed until this is paid."
No one can beat the rhetoric of "HangingJudge" Isaac Parker, sen-
tencing murderers in Oklahoma Indian Country with words like these:
"The crime you have committed is but another evidence, if any were
needed, of your wicked, lawless, bloody and murderous disposition....
The many murders that you have committed in a reckless and wanton
character show you to be a human monster from which innocent people
can expect no safety.... May God, whose laws you have broken and
before whose tribunal you must appear, have mercy on your soul."
Judge Parker actually did not sentence as high a percentage of the
defendants to hanging in the murder cases he tried as did some other
judges. For example, the first American court to convene in Taos, New
Mexico in 1847 tried seventeen men for murder, fifteen were convicted,
and everyone convicted was hanged before even a transcript for appeal
could have been written. The court tried all of these seventeen murder
cases, as well as five high treason and seventeen larceny cases, in fifteen
working days. Perhaps such speed was essential in New Mexico, and
understandable, because at one trial the judge was warned that if he sat
on a case he would not leave the courtroom alive. That judge took the
precaution of having the sheriff search not only all spectators but the
court attendants and officers as well. When the search was completed
forty-two pistols were piled on the table before him, some of them taken
from the attorneys.
The era of political judges-where the judges wielded as much
political as judicial authority-largely came to an end as each of the six
territories achieved statehood. Thereafter, there was a period of great
stability in the courts. Judges typically served for very long periods of
time (I should say they "sat" because they did a lot of that too!), and
generally there was only onejudge per state, except in Oklahoma where
they managed to have three federal districts. There were some colorful
judges after statehood, of course.
To avoid slander suits I will speak only of the long dead. There are
a great many stories about Judge Moses Hallet of Colorado, who once
kept his poise in a situation that caused everyone but the judge to flee
the courtroom: when an overzealous defense counsel in a murder case
picked up the rifle that was the murder weapon, pointed it at the jury,
and then charged them while whooping an Indian yell. When the sheriff
looked into the courtroom, where only the judge sat, Judge Hallet asked
him to ask the jury to return as they would be under the court's
protection.
Also, I think of Judge Colin Neblett of New Mexico, who when he
was under consideration for appointment as district judge, in response
to questions by the interviewer, acknowledged that he liked liquor and
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playing poker, and when asked whether he also liked women he said,
"Sir, if you are looking for a gelding, I am not your man."
It was said that Judge Neblett, after a hard trial, went to a local bar,
ordering the Marshal to have all of the defendants ready for sentencing
when he returned. Because space was limited, the Marshal put the de-
fendants in thejury box. When the judge resumed his seat on the bench
he looked at the filled jury box and said, "Gentlemen, have you reached
a verdict?" When the Court Clerk hastily whispered to him that the men
in the jury box were the defendants, with no loss of composure, he pro-
ceeded to read the sentences, which fortunately he had written out
beforehand.
Of course, we circuit judges do not like "colorful" district judges
because they generate more appeals. We ask only that the district
judges be so erudite, so respected by the bar, so absolutely perfect in
form and substance, that no one appeals, or, if an appeal is demanded
by a client, the district court's judgment can be affirmed summarily.
Since the beginning of our country there have been circuit courts.
But the "circuits" were different back then. The circuit court, for pur-
poses of appeals, in the early days consisted of two United States
Supreme Court justices and one district judge. Apparently recusal was
unheard of, and the district judge might be the one who had decided the
case and whose judgment was being appealed. The American Bar Asso-
ciation characterized that situation in these words: "Such an appeal is
not from Philip drunk to Philip sober, but from Philip sober to Philip
intoxicated with the vanity of a matured opinion and doubtless also a
published decision."
The circuit in the modern sense came into existence in 1891. All of
the states of the present Tenth Circuit became a part of the old Eighth
Circuit. The Eighth contained thirteen states and was huge geographi-
cally. It was bounded on the north by Canada and on the south by Mex-
ico, on the east by the Mississippi River and on the west by the eastern
edge of Nevada.
The number of appeals was also large for the time. In the last years
before the Tenth Circuit was established, the Eighth and the Second
(which contained New York) averaged a little more than four hundred
appeals per year. The next highest among the circuits had only three
hundred, and four had less than two hundred appeals. The combination
of the number of appeals and the incredible distances to travel, in an age
with no commercial airline service, no doubt constituted the principal
impetus for creation of the Tenth Circuit.
One psychological problem was that there were only nine justices of
the United States Supreme Court, and with the creation of the Tenth
one justice would have to serve as circuit justice for more than one cir-
cuit. But by this time the circuit justice's role was much easier than in
the early days of the country, and this proved not to be a major impedi-
ment. (I am sure Justice White is happy that as circuit justice he does
1990]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LIW REVIEW
not have to sit on all of the more than two thousand appeals we decide
each year.)
The $64,000 question was how to split the Eighth Circuit. One plan
had Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Colorado and
Utah in a separate circuit. This apparently was supported by those con-
cerned with the travel, because the railroads ran generally east and west
and would more easily serve that alignment.
What ultimately'won- out was the present alignment, which sepa-
rated the western and southwestern states from -the others in the old
Eighth Circuit. Apparently the principal argument for this was the no-
tion that agriculture and manufacturing cases would dominate in the
Eighth, whereas water and mineral cases would dominate in the Tenth.
(These people had apparently never driven through Kansasl) Water law
particularly had judges and lawyers as afraid then as they fear patent and
tax cases now. Supporters of our current configuration seemed to want
to have the western water law developed principally through one circuit,
the Tenth.
The creation of the Tenth caused little difficulty for the district
courts-their appeals simply went to a different court. As to the appel-
late function, there was already a courtroom in Denver, which had
served the old Eighth. Denver was designated as the seat of the court,
with sessions to be held also in Oklahoma City and Wichita.
Robert Lewis of Colorado and John Cotteral of Oklahoma were al-
ready serving on the Eighth Circuit, and by act of Congress their ap-
pointments were transferred to the Tenth. Two new judges were to be
appointed; they turned out to be Orie Phillips of New Mexico and
George McDermott of Kansas. Both were nominated by President Coo-
lidge, but their appointments were allowed to die in the transition to the
administration of President Hoover. Hoover then renominated them.
At the banquet the Denver Bar held celebrating the commencement
of the circuit, Judge McDermott said that this problem had happened to
him twice. His district judge appointment in 1928 in Kansas by mistake
had originally designated him as successor to a judge who was still on
active status, so he had to be twice nominated for that also. Like a vacci-
nation, he said, the first nomination would not take.
From that beginning, our circuit commenced its work. The Denver
Bar had a banquet to honor the new judges. The newspaper reported
that with all that erudition in one room one would "expect the air to
sizzle with law and learning, but [it said] that is not so." The occasion
was one apparently for the telling of anecdotes.
Some hint ofJudge Lewis' personality may be seen in the subhead-
line of the newspaper account which said, "EvenJudge Lewis joins hilar-
ity." Despite the fact that the first Tenth Circuit case had yet to be filed,
Judge Lewis managed to get in a stem criticism of the bar, saying that
"the constant practice of asking for rehearing has become intolerable."
(It was a prediction, I suppose, but one to which we current judges
would say "amen.")
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Judge John Cotteral, whose career on the Tenth Circuit was some-
what dampened by the fact that he had become deaf, managed still to
make a speech advising "against any further tinkering with the Constitu-
tion and any further encroachment by the federal government on the
rights of the several states." So I guess the sublimation of political views
among judges was not yet complete in 1929.
Some eighty to ninety cases were transferred over to the Tenth Cir-
cuit from the Eighth. The first case actually, filed in the Tenth Circuit
involved income taxes allegedly owed by a man named Penrose, builder
of the Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado Springs, who was identified by the
newspapers simply as a Colorado Springs "capitalist."
By all accounts the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the district
courts within the circuit, were relatively quiescent during the thirties and
forties. All of the descriptions indicate the judges did a kind of dull,
workmanlike job, with few dissents in appellate cases. I have not tried to
read all of the cases, but that is hard to believe considering some of the
personalities on the bench and in the bar.
This period was not long after the dedication of the Denver Court-
house, in which the dedicating speaker described some leaders of the
Colorado Bar who tried cases in the federal courts in the following
terms: One was a person "who could grill, a witness until the lid of Sa-
tan's cook stove seemed cool to the touch." Another was spoken of as
one who "never put forth his best efforts until he came to a petition for
rehearing, [and] that if he represented the defendant the case was never
tried until both parties were dead, and generally not then." A third was
described as "cold as the icicle on Deon's temple, but bold as a lion
when aroused to righteous wrath." We still havelawyers like that, but
control them with Rule 11 sanctions!
There were some hints of individual idiosyncrasies on the part of
judges. For example, in one major action in New Mexico in which Swift
& Company tried to have the New Mexico sales tax declared unconstitu-
tional, eminent local counsel appeared for each side. Swift also sent a
lawyer from Chicago. When the decision was announced by Judge
Neblett, local counsel explained that his Chicago counterpart could not
be present but had asked that a recording be made of the judge's deci-
sion because Swift intended to appeal if the judgment was adverse.
Judge Neblett's decision was simple: "Well gentlemen, you just tell
your Chicago lawyer that he done lost the case. Case dismissed."
And surely there were some philosophical discussions at the circuit
level also, since, of course, by the mid-thirties and forties the circuit had
some judges appointed by Coolidge and Hoover and some judges ap-
pointed by Franklin Roosevelt.
No doubt some of the quiet existed because in most states there was
only one judge per district, and in the circuit the judges got along well
personally and had plenty of time to do their work. Less than two hun-
dred cases were filed per year during that time, and there were four cir-
cuit judges to handle them.
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During the thirties and forties, cases were largely routine litigation
which the courts have traditionally handled. The first reported decisions
of the Tenth Circuit, in 33 F.2d, involved procedure, criminal law, and
bankruptcy, the same stuff we see a lot of today.
Administrative law became much more important in the thirties
with the advent of the New Deal. But not until 1954 and the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education did the courts become
immersed in the type of cases bound to create major headlines and
arouse controversy. The Brown case, of course, originated in this circuit
and is still with us.
When in Brown the Supreme Court declared school segregation un-
constitutional, it introduced the era in which the courts had to supervise
the dismantling of unconstitutional systems. Now we oversee prisons,
mental institutions, and apportionment of legislatures, seemingly for-
ever and ever.
When the Supreme Court applied the Bill of Rights to the states
through the fourteenth amendment we got into the habeas corpus busi-
ness in a big way. As the court found substantive rights of privacy we
got into such politically explosive areas as abortion.
Indeed, the most intractable problems facing society have become
legal problems for the courts to resolve. Congress passes laws, some-
times poorly worded; and leaves to the agencies and the courts the task
of making them work. The courts may have become popular because in
almost every case one side wins, and one side loses. Lately such clear
outcomes seem reserved to the courtroom and the sports arena.
Somehow the courts in our circuit have weathered the 1929 stock
market crash; the 1930's depression; the forties with World War II and
the postwar expansion; the quiet fifties; the rebellious sixties with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; and the seventies and most of the eighties, with
the economic rollercoaster of interest rate fluctuations, oil embargos,
price controls, tax law changes, the rise and fall of the energy busi-
nesses, new age and sex discrimination laws, and all of the other
problems of modem living.
The expansion of the numbers of judges has approximately paral-
leled the expansion of the activities of the federal courts. We obtained
our fifth circuit judge in 1949. Everyone expected that judge to be a
Republican, as Governor Dewey was supposed to win the presidency in
1948. Rumor has it that Orie Phillips thought he might wield some in-
fluence in the determination of who that might be. When Truman won,
Phillips was supposed to have confronted Judges Bratton, Huxman and
Murrah with the words: "Do any of you damned Democrats have any
influence?" Of course that was when we acquired the only circuit judge
who ever fanned Babe Ruth, Judge John Pickett.
Our sixth circuit position came in 1961, another in 1968, an eighth
in 1979, and the ninth and tenth in 1985. Twenty-seven people have
served as circuit judges in our sixty-year history. Fourteen of them are
alive today and all fourteen are here at this conference.
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The district courts' expansion has been quite similar. Most districts
had a single judge until about 1949, then began picking up additional
judges. There have been eighty-eight district judges who have served in
the Tenth Circuit since its formation. Of that total more than half, forty-
seven, are still living (three-Delmas Hill, John Moore and Bobby
Baldock-now serve as circuit judges).
In the history of the circuit, as near as the Administrative Office can
calculate, there have been 411,479 cases filed in the district courts. In
the life of the circuit there have been 39,399 appeals filed-almost ex-
actly one-half filed in the last eleven years. We have issued 14,321 pub-
lished appellate opinions-as of last week. Contrary to popular belief, not
all the other appeals are still pending! About 25,000 appeals have been
disposed of by unpublished dispositions, and even a few have settled.
Our circuit court and the Colorado District Court occupied the old
Post Office and Federal Courthouse at 18th and Stout Streets in Denver
until 1965. We then shifted over to a new courthouse. Most of you
know that pursuant to recent congressional legislation the circuit court
will move back into the old courthouse, hopefully by 1992. Architects
have been hired and the restoration process will soon be underway. We
circuit judges look forward to returning to our ancestral home. That
will leave our present quarters to the district of Colorado, which also
has, and will continue to have, an enclave in -the old courthouse in the
person and courtroom ofJudge Richard Matsch. The case figures I have
recited demonstrate that our work load is increasing at, an exponential
geometric rate-which makes one of the inscriptions in the old Post Of-
fice and Courthouse Building particularly appropriate. It says, "If thou
desire rest, desire not too much."
While I have occasionally mentioned a judge by name in this short
presentation or identified one with an anecdote, I have not singled out
any individual circuit or district judge as particularly noteworthy or spe-
cial. Eventually this court's history project, so long in process, will be
completed. It will discuss all territorial, district, and circuit judges who
have ever served the area of the Tenth Circuit, hopefully with at least a
modicum of the attention these judges deserve.
Once President Kennedy is supposed to have asked Professor Paul
Freund of Harvard to become his solicitor general. Freund is said to
have declined because of his commitment to write the Supreme Court
history under the Oliver Wendell Holmes bequest. When given that an-
swer President Kennedy is supposed to have then said to him, "Profes-
sor Freund, I would rather make history than write it." Well, we judges
both make history and write it in the form of our dispositions of the
cases.
All of the judges who have served the circuit-as magistrates, bank-
ruptcy, district or circuit judges-have been noteworthy servants of the
law. It is sometimes said that a lawyer is one who can eat a ton of saw-
dust without butter. That goes in spades for a judge.
It is also sometimes said that a federal judge is a lawyer who knew a
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senator well. That is often true, but the lawyer has to be a good one to
obtain the nomination and the approval of the U.S. Senate. It is fact that
many federal judges formerly were U.S. senators, governors, state attor-
neys general, U.S. attorneys, or candidates for those offices-individuals
who have dedicated a significant portion of their lives to public service.
Some people seem astounded that these ex-politicians do such a great
job as judges. But it should be no surprise that intelligent, public-
minded men and women, mellowed by age and long dealing with a de-
manding populace, and forged by the combat that is the daily fare of
lawyers, succeed when given life tenure and a charge to do justice within
the confines of the law.
It is a characteristic of the judges of this circuit that they devote
themselves to the job completely and in almost every instance until age
takes such a toll on their bodies and minds that they are no longer up to
the task. It is not because of the money, because in this day and age our
law clerks willing to go to the big cities will make more than the judge,
sometimes even in their first year of practice. It is certainly not the
fame. After all, a survey was released recently that said that a lot more
people recognize television's Judge Wapner than Chief Justice Rehn-
quist. Only the lawyers know what we do. It is the intellectual challenge
and the opportunity to perform service that pushes us on.
We are proud that scandal has been almost a total stranger to the
judges of the Tenth Circuit. The history of the circuit is really the his-
tory of these dedicated judges who have spent their lives making the
decisions in the thousands of cases, and of the lawyers who have pro-
vided them with the material from which they have made the decisions.
That is the history of the circuit in the few years it has existed, and it will
continue to be the history of the circuit in the future.
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DURABLE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT: A FOCUS ON EFFECTIVENESS IN THE
REMEDIAL STAGE
DANIEL MCNEEL LANE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Two players begin a game of chess. Each player knows the moves
each piece can make, how to capture her opponent's pieces, and other
rules of chess. But neither player knows how to win - neither player
knows the definition of checkmate. Is it the King she is after, or the
more powerful Queen? Need she capture the bishops and knights as
well? Now suppose -the game lasts not for hours, but for decades. At
times, the players are hostile and frustrated, at other times they seem
almost cooperative, working.only to bring the game to an end.
The game described above is not unlike the school desegregation
litigation experience of the last three decades. Skilled lawyers struggle
relentlessly over such issues as the need for a desegregation plan, the
terms of the plan, the particulars of its implementation, and so forth.
Yet they have no clear definition of the end result they seek - unitary
status - because the courts have yet to define "checkmate" for school
desegregation purposes. Both sides are kept off-balance. Neither side
knows what remedies the plaintiff is entitled to, or what showing the
school district must make to satisfy its duty to desegregate.
Without establishing a clear definition of unitary status, in three re-
cent cases the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed the way to-
ward checkmate, announcing endgame rules for school desegregation
contests.1 These decisions touch on every facet of school desegregation
remedial measures, yet a single message emerges: school districts oper-
ating under a duty to desegregate must take steps that will effect lasting
changes in the school system. Understanding the scope and import of
the Tenth Circuit's decisions requires a brief overview of federal school
desegregation doctrine. In Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown I"),2 the
starting point, the Supreme Court established that segregation of public
school students on the basis of race violates the equal protection clause
* Associate, Paul, Weiss, Riikind, Wharton & Garrison, New York; The University
of Texas School of Law, J.D., 1988; Columbia College, B.A., 1984. The author is grateful
to Britt Banks for his thoughtful criticism of earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990),petition for cert filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1990)(No. 89-1698); Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851
(10th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1990)(No. 89-1681);
Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1521
(1990).
2. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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of the fourteenth amendment.3 The following year the Supreme Court
stated in Brown II4 that school authorities operating segregated school
systems 5 bore the "primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and
solving" local school problems that prevent the transition to a "racially
nondiscriminatory school system." 6 Subsequent school desegregation
doctrine has divided, like the Brown decisions, into liability and remedial
phases, in some cases more neatly than in others.
Supreme Court school desegregation doctrine has undergone a
legal mitosis of sorts, as right and remedy issues have grown more and
more distinct, remaining connected only at the root - the equal protec-
tion clause. In Green v. County School Board, for example, the Court stated
that school boards operating a dual school system are charged with the
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to
a unitary system in which racial desegregation would be eliminated root
and branch."' 7 Moreover, the Court added that each instance of a failure
or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty constitutes a further violation of
the fourteenth amendment. 8 But, after taking the necessary steps to
eliminate racial segregation, the school board need do no more, even if
shifting demographic patterns resegregate the schools. 9 The conun-
drum should be obvious: after implementation of the "remedy," the
school district may, in all essential respects, be identical to the school
district at the time the remedy was ordered.' 0
A variety of factors may explain this apparent gap between the right
initially declared and the remedy eventually obtained.' I Professor Free-
man argues that the courts improvidently settled on an approach to the
problem of race discrimination from the perspective of the perpetrator
rather than the perspective of the victim. Consequently, the courts have
focused on school boards' discriminatory actions rather than on the in-
ferior conditions under which minority students often must seek an
education. 1 2
The perpetrator perspective presupposes a world composed of
atomistic individuals whose actions are outside of and apart
from the social fabric and without historical continuity. From
this perspective, the law views racial discrimination not as a so-
cial phenomenon, but merely as the misguided conduct of par-
3. For a scholarly, yet moving, account of the events leading up to the decision, see
R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISToRY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EqUALrrY (1975).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5. In Brown I, the Court consolidated appeals from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia
and Delaware. 347 U.S. at 486.
6. Brown, 349 U.S. at 299, 301.
7. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
8. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979).
9. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
10. See Branton, The History and Future of School Desegregation, 109 F.R.D. 241, 248
(1986).
11. See generally Note,Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YA.E LJ.
1741 (1985).
12. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978).
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ticular actors. It is a world where, but for the conduct of these
misguided ones, the system of equality of opportunity would
work to provide a distribution of the good things in life without
racial disparities and where deprivations that did correlate with
race would be "deserved" by those deprived on grounds of in-
sufficient "merit."' 3
In the years following Brown, the Supreme Court has viewed the equal
protection clause as a means of righting discrete wrongs rather than as a
means of doing right.'
4
Professor Strauss characterizes this phenomenon as the "taming" of
Brown. Courts tend to focus on discriminatory intent because they per-
ceive it as a sharply defined limit that least threatens social order.' 5
Practical considerations are also at work--courts may respond to intense
political and economic strains associated with complete remedies by
"narrowing the right to match the remedy."' 6 Finally, while courts are
quite adept at recognizing and defining rights, they may be wary of en-
gaging in protracted affirmative management of complex social
problems.
17
The antidiscrimination model of equal protection creates problems
of proof that may bar liability altogether. Those who were instrumental
in creating segregated conditions are often long gone. In their place are
officials whose commitment to equality may be quite genuine, but who
are equally committed to local control of schools and an end to bussing.
More importantly, segregated conditions in the schools usually result
from broader patterns of discrimination in housing and employment.
Only a piece of the pattern is within the purview of the court, which can
hardly hold school boards solely responsible for apartheid-like social
conditions that contribute to inequality in the schools.
The Court has sought to relax these problems of proof, not by re-
laxing the discrimination requirement itself, but by instituting proce-
dural mechanisms to aid the plaintiff in establishing discriminatory
intent.18 For instance, in Keyes v. School District No. 1,19 the Court stated
that when intentional segregative actions take place in a significant part
of the school district, unconstitutional intent will be presumed in the
13. Id. at 1054.
14. See Strauss, Discriminatoy Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 935,
940-51 (1989).
15. Id at 954-56.
16. Judicial Right Declaration, supra note 11, at 1762-63.
17. Institutional features of the courts, such as law of the case and stare decisis, some-
what justify this wariness. Each decision of a court binds, to a greater or lesser degree,
subsequent decisionmaking on the same subject. Government agencies, on the other
hand, are relatively free to shift directions radically. Ironically, shifts in the Justice Depart-
ment's civil rights agenda, particularly under William Bradford Reynolds, most dearly
demonstrate this principle. See, e.g. Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2191-93 (1989)(Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
18. See Days, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing?, 95 YALE
LJ. 1737, 1746-53 (1986). Professor Days characterizes the school board's continuing
affirmative responsibility to desegregate as one of these hurdles.
19. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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district as a whole.20
Adopting the approach of the Supreme Court's remedy cases, the
Tenth Circuit's recent school desegregation cases at times purport to be
no more than procedural housekeeping. In truth, the equal protection
rights at stake are inextricably intertwined with the court's holdings
which clarify the parties' burdens and dust off injunctive relief doctrines.
In these cases, the Tenth Circuit sought to resolve the prior doctrine's
emphasis on discriminatory intent with the need to provide minority
schoolchildren with more than transitory vindication of their equal pro-
tection rights. The result of these cases is that once the plaintiffs estab-
lish the school district's segregative intent, they need not fight that
battle over again with every subsequent challenge to district actions.
In each case before the Tenth Circuit, the school district attempted,
in response to plaintiffs' objections to district policy, to establish that it
had satisfied its duty to desegregate. Consequently, each school district
urged the district court to terminate jurisdiction over the matter. Usu-
ally, termination ofjurisdiction entails declaring the school district "uni-
tary," which, in simplest terms, means that the district is no longer
operating a "dual" school system. In effect, any decree under which the
school district is operating is dissolved, and total control over school
matters is returned to the school district. The issues on which these
cases turned involved demonstrating the school district's entitlement to
a declaration of unitariness or termination of jurisdiction.
This article discusses Keyes, Brown, and Dowell in the order in which
the issues they address would likely arise in the course of school deseg-
regation litigation. In Keyes, a vigorously litigated case, the district court
denied the school district's motion for a declaration of unitariness and
termination of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, 'agreeing that
the Denver desegregation plan, incorporated in the district court's de-
cree, was not complete by its terms. In Brown, the district court declared
the school district unitary after the plaintiffs challenged school condi-
tions following a period of dormancy. The Tenth Circuit reversed on
the basis of clear error. Finally, in Dowell, the district court terminated
jurisdiction eight years after it declared the school district unitary. The
Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the protection of the court decree
was still necessary to protect desegregation gains in Oklahoma City.
II. KEYES V. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
A. Background
By the Tenth Circuit's own count, its third opinion in Keyes v. School
District No. 121 was the eighteenth federal court opinion published in
this case.2 2 Keyes began in 1969, when a group of Denver schoolchil-
dren, by and through their parents, sued to enjoin the school board
20. Id. at 203.
21. 895 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1990).
22. Id. at 661 n.1.
[Vol. 67:4
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
from rescinding three previously adopted resolutions. The intent of
these resolutions was to facilitate desegregation of the Denver school
system.23 The district court ultimately found that the school board pur-
sued a policy which maintained, encouraged, and continued segregation
in the public schools. 24 In 1974, the district court ordered a desegrega-
tion plan, 25 which, with slight modifications, remains in effect today.
26
In 1984, the school district moved for an order declaring the Denver
schools unitary, dissolving the injunction with respect to student assign-
ments, and terminating the district court's jurisdiction in the case.2 7
Plaintiffs opposed the motion and moved for an order directing the
school district to produce plans and policies to remedy perceived short-
comings in the district's desegregation efforts.
28
At the hearing, and on its motion, the district argued that a decade
of compliance with the court-ordered desegregation plan entitled the
district to a declaration of unitariness. 29 In a lengthy opinion, the dis-
trict court considered the board's policies, attitudes, and understanding
with respect to desegregation of the Denver schools. The court also
considered statistical evidence that it found troubling.3 0 The court de-
nied the district's motion for declaration of unitary status, and instead
ordered the district to submit a plan for achieving unitary status. The
plan was to address faculty assignment, student transfer policies, and
desegregation of three minority elementary schools. The school district
submitted the plan as ordered.3 '
In 1987, the district court issued an "interim decree" intended to
"relax the degree of court control over the Denver public schools." Es-
sentially, the decree eliminated reporting requirements and allowed the
school district to make changes in the desegregation plan without prior
court approval.8 2 The court characterized the interim decree.as a step
toward terminating the court's jurisdiction. The school board appealed
the denial of unitary status and the entry of the "interim decree."3 3
On appeal, the district made several arguments, using as a basis the
Supreme Court's opinion in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler.
3 4
First, the district argued that long-term compliance with the court-or-
dered desegregation plan, which it characterized as complete in design
and not contemplating later judicial reappraisal, entitled the school dis-
trict to a declaration of unitariness.3 5 The district argued that the
23. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D. Colo. 1969).
24. IME at 287.
25. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974).
26. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 661.
27. Id at 661-62.
28. I at 662.
29. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1498 (D. Colo. 1985).
30. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 662-63.
31. Id at 662.
32. Id at 663.
33. Id.
34. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
35. See id at 435-37; Keyes, 895 F.2d at 664-66.
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school system should be declared unitary with respect to student assign-
ments even though it may not be unitary with respect to either faculty
assignments or its student transfer policy. 3 6 The school district argued,
citing Spangler, that the district court erred in focusing on the racial iden-
tity of three elementary schools, and in demanding future maintenance
of a racial balance. The school district argued that there was no consti-
tutional right to a particular racial balance in a school's student body,
3 7
and that segregative effects of future board actions were irrelevant to the
unitariness determination. Finally, the school district argued that there
was no evidence indicating that future boards would act with segregative
intent.3 8
B. The Unitariness Inquiry
The court in Keyes recounted school desegregation law from Brown
v. Board of Education, recognized the district court's broad equity powers,
and noted that such remedial measures are reviewed only for an abuse
of discretion.3 9 Recognizing that the Supreme Court "has not defined
precisely what facts or factors make a district unitary," the Tenth Circuit
considered the elements which cause the segregation of a school sys-
tem.40 Racial balance in student assignments is but one factor. Courts
must also consider the existence of individual discrimination in trans-
portation of students, integration of faculty and staff, equality of finan-
cial support to different schools and integration of school activities, and
the presence or absence of a discriminatory pattern in the construction
and location of new schools.
4 1
The court then set forth the definition of unitariness newly minted
in Dowell and Brown.42 "This Court has defined 'unitary' as the elimina-
tion of invidious discrimination and the performance of every reason-
able effort to eliminate the various effects of past discrimination." 43 In
light of this standard, "when a school board has a duty to liquidate a
dual system, its conduct is measured by 'the effectiveness, not the pur-
pose, of [its] actions in decreasing or increasing segregation caused by
the dual system.' ",44
36. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 664.
37. Id.
38. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae in a brief submitted by former Assis-
tant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds, argued that the district court must ter-
minate jurisdiction over a case when it finds the district to be unitary. The district was
unitary here, in the government's view, because it had fully implemented a court-approved
desegregation plan in good faith. Id
39. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 664-65.
40. Id. at 665. Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School
Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 653, 662 (1987) (asserting that the Supreme
Court has declined to provide a definition because "it has recognized that no single, inflex-
ible formula could apply to all school systems").
41. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 665.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88, 144-54.
43. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 665-66 (citing Dowell v. Board of Educ., 895 F.2d 1483, 1491 &
n.15 (10th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 859 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 666 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)).
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The court reviewed the district court's finding that the Denver Pub-
lic School System was not unitary under a dear error standard. 4 5 The
school district, however, failed to identify or even assert dear erroi in
the district court's decision. 4 6 The school district instead argued that
"as a matter of law three racially identifiable elementary schools out of
about eighty cannot prevent a school district from attaining unitary sta-
tus." 4 7 This is a factual argument dressed up as a legal argument to
obtain a standard of review less deferential to the trial court. The court
of appeals rejected this argument, observing that the existence of even
only three racially identifiable schools, "especially when they once have
been eliminated and then resurface as a result of board action, is strong
evidence that segregation and its effects have not been eradicated."
48
With respect to such schools, the district must show that they "are non-
discriminatory and that their composition is not the result of present or
past discrimination."'4 9 A showing merely that the resegregation of the
schools is not the result of new, intentional segregation did not satisfy
the district's burden.
The court then turned to the district's argument that compliance
with the court-approved plan for ten years entitled it to a declaration of
unitary status. The court rejected this argument, agreeing with the
court below that the desegregation plan adopted in 1974 "was not in-
tended to be complete in itself; rather, the court and the district had 'the
expectation that changes would be required in future years.' -50 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the evidence adequately supported the
finding that student assignments were not unitary, rendering harmless
the district court's error in failing to recognize that a school district may
be declared unitary in some respects and not others.5 '
Finally, the court deferred to the district court's finding that the
school district "was both without the ability and without the will to en-
sure that the effects of prior segregation [would] not resurface."
' 52
C. The Interim Decree
The district court crafted its decree to meet the specificity require-
ments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d),53 yet remain broad
45. Id. at 666.
46. i at 666-67.
47. Id at 667.
48. Id See also Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After A Finding of Unitariness in School
Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 653, 662-63 (1987) (noting that the Supreme
Court has never "produced a single, comprehensive statement defining unitariness" be-
cause "U]ust as the methods for desegregating dual school systems necessarily vary with
the circumstances, so does the determination whether desegregation has been
successful").
49. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 667.
50. Id at 667 n.2 (quoting the district court, 609 F. Supp. at 1506).
51. Id, at 667.
52. Id
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 states, in relevant part:
(d) Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order.
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the
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enough to allow the school district to operate free of direct court inter-
vention.54 The decree did not prescribe racial balance targets for stu-
dent or faculty assignments, nor did it require prior court, approval of
student or faculty assignment changes by the district. Instead, the de-
cree conferred broad authority on the district to operate the schools
while, at the same time, it prevented adoption of discriminatory school
policies. 5 5
On appeal, the school district challenged the decree, arguing that
its lack of clarity violated Rule 65.56 In a meticulous review, the court
eliminated only one paragraph of the fourteen paragraph order. The
court reasoned that the paragraph only required the school district to
obey the law.5 7 On the whole, the court disagreed with the school dis-
trict, approving of the order as "a commendable attempt to give the
board more freedom to act within the confines of the law."5 8 Despite
the district's "frustration with not knowing its precise obligations under
the Constitution," the court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that
the school district "has not accomplished all desegregation possible and
practical," though it remains under a continuing duty to db so.5 9
III. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
The Tenth Circuit's recent opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,
6 °
contrasts starkly with the landmark opinions of the same name.6 1 Long
and complex, it delves into the intricate factual setting from which the
case evolved. 6 2 The proposition upon which Judge Seymour based the
opinion, however, was straightforward: plaintiffs bringing a school de-
segregation action against a former dejure segregated school system are
entitled to a presumption "that current disparities are causally related
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable
detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts
sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in
active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise.
54. Keyes, 895 F.2d at 663.
55. See id at 668 n.5.
56. Id at 668.
57. Id
58. I d at 669.
59. I d at 670.
60. 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989).
61. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown '); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown II").
62. The majority and dissenting opinions in Brown are marked by contentious ex-
changes, including numerous references to "revised" opinions. See, e.g., Brown, 892 F.2d
at 862. References to "revised" opinions also appear in Dowell, and are unfortunate in
both decisions. First, of course, earlier opinions have little meaning for the reader, who
has access only to the "revised" opinion released. Second, and more importantly, the
references imply that the original opinion was flawed, and any revision was merely cos-
metic. To the extent a judge seeks to avoid such sniping, the judge, is discouraged from
revising his opinions in response to criticism of earlier drafts. Such revisions, however,




to past intentional conduct."63
A. Backgound
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, the Topeka Board of Education operated segregated schools
at the elementary level only.64 State legislation allowed segregation be-
low high school level, and the Kansas Supreme Court had already de-
clared segregation in Topeka junior high schools unconstitutional.
65
Oliver Brown and other black citizens of Topeka filed a class action chal-
lenging the statute's authorization of school segregation below the high
school level, and in the Supreme Court's decision secured the sweeping
rejection of the "separate but equal" doctrine. The board took immedi-
ate steps to desegregate, permitting black students to attend former
white schools even before the Supreme Court's decision in Brown I. On
remand, the district court approved the board's "Four Step" desegrega-
tion plan, but did not terminate jurisdiction over the case.66
In the mid-1970s, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") initiated administra-
tive enforcement proceedings against the Topeka School District,
alleging that the school district was not in compliance with Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67 The board obtained a preliminary in-
junction against the administrative proceeding,6 8 but both the adminis-
trative proceeding and the injunction action were dismissed when the
board submitted a plan acceptable to HEW in 1976. The board subse-
quently implemented the plan.
69
In 1979, a group of black parents and children filed a motion to
intervene in the original proceeding as additional named plaintiffs.
They asserted that the school district failed to desegregate its schools in
compliance with the Supreme Court mandate, and they alleged that the
school district maintained and operated a racially segregated school sys-
tem.70 The district court granted the motion to intervene and, after a
period of discovef y and motion practice, conducted a trial in October
1986.71. The Court decla'ed the school district an integrated, unitary
school system. 72
63. Brown, 892 F.2d at'854.
64. Id.
65.'IM
66. Id. at 885. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468,,470 (D. Kan. 1955).
67. -42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982). The Topeka School District was required to comply
with section. 601 of the Civil Rights Act because it received federal funds through the
Kansas Department of Education. Brown, 892 F.2d at 855 & n.2.




72. Id. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987). The court also
held that the school district did not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
addition, the court dismissed the Governor of Karisas from the case and exonerated the
State Board of Education from liability for racial conditions in the school district. Brown,
892 F.2d at 855.
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Despite population growth, today, as in 1950, Topeka's population
remains approximately 10% black.73 Hispanics comprise about 5% of
the population; other minorities comprise less than 1.57. 74 Since the
1950s, the white population has spread westward, the black population
has mostly spread eastward, and the inner city has declined. 7 5 Mean-
while, the percentage of black and minority76 children in the Topeka
schools has grown steadily since 1952, with black students representing
8.4% of the Topeka student population. During the 1985 school year,
18.4% of the students in Topeka were black, and 25.95% were members
of a minority group.
77
In 1951, Topeka operated four black and eighteen white elementary
schools. Under the Four Step plan, which was adopted to eliminate the
effects of de jure segregation in 1955, two elementary schools became
more than 20% black, while three remained more than 99% black.
Through the late 1950s and early 1960s, Topeka annexed outlying ar-
eas, and various schools were closed and opened. By 1966, Topeka no
longer had any all-black elementary schools, though three schools re-
mained all white, and nearly half of all minority elementary school stu-
dents attended schools with minority populations of more than 50%'.
7 8
The 1976 reorganization of Topeka elementary schools, prompted
by the OCR proceedings, took place after the minority population in
Topeka schools climbed to 20.9%. Even after the reorganization, more
than a third of minority elementary school students attended four
schools with minority populations of more than 50%. Nearly 60% of
the white elementary school students attended elementary schools with
white populations of more than 807. 79 The racial balances in the
schools remained approximately the same when the district court heard
the case in 1985.80
The 1979 action challenged conditions in the junior high and high
schools for the first time. The student populations of the junior high
and high schools of Topeka were not segregated by race at the time of
the Supreme Court's decision in 1954. At the time, however, five of the
six junior high schools had white populations of more than 80%; the
sixth had a minority population of 307.81 By 1966, after a period of
annexation and expansion, eight of the eleven junior high schools had
white populations of more than 80%; one junior high had a minority
73. Brown, 892 F.2d at 855.
74. Id
75. Id at 855-56. This pattern is similar to that in Oklahoma City. See infra text ac-
companying note 179.
76. The parties agreed that distinguishing between blacks and other minority students
would serve no purpose.
77. Brown, 892 F.2d at 856.
78. Id at 856. One elementary school had a minority population of nearly 50%, while
four schools had minority populations of more than 50%, ranging as high as 93.1%.
79. Id at 856-57. Almost a quarter of all white students attended 90+7 white
schools.
80. Id at 857. The only notable difference was that the lowest percentage of minority
students in any elementary school rose to 7.2%.
81. Id The lowest percentage of minority students in any school rose to 7.2%.
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population of 61.80.82 The high school minority populations ranged
from a high of 25%, to a low of .4%.
At the time of the trial in 1985, the percentage of minority students
in Topeka middle schools was 26.9%, and the level in high schools was
23.8%.83 Two of six middle schools had white populations of more
than 90%; one had a minority population of nearly 49%.84 Two high
schools had minority populations near 30%, and one had a white popu-
lation of more than 90%.
B. Determining Unitary Status
Before it could consider the central issue in Brown - whether or not
the Topeka school system was unitary - the court had to establish a
touchstone definition of unitariness. Essentially, the court of appeals
adopted the district.court's definition: a unitary school system is "one in
whichthe characteristics of the 1954 dual system either do not exist or,
if they exist, are not the result of past or present intentional segregative
conduct of [the school district]." 85 The court added that "[a]n addi-
tional essential requirement of unitariness is whether, however, 'school
authorities [made] every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the
situation.' ",86
Judge Seymour rejected a snapshot approach in determining
whether the school district attained unitary status - that is, one which
considers the state of the school system only at the time of trial. Rather,
"a court must consider what the school district has done or not done to
fuLfill its affirmative duty to desegregate, the current effects of those ac-
tions or inactions, and the extent to which further desegregation is feasi-
ble."18 7 But, once the plaintiff establishes intentional segregation in the
past by the school district, and a current condition of segregation, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that "its past acts have elimi-
nated all traces of past intentional segregation to the maximum feasible
extent."88
In a case such as Brown, where past intentional segregation by the
school district has long since been established, the plaintiff's principal
burden is to prove a current condition of-segregation. The court held
that to satisfy this burden the "plaintiff must prove the existence of ra-
cially identifiable schools, broadly defined." 8 9 Student assignments
alone may identify a school as racially identifiable, as in the case of vir-
tual one-race schools. But racial identifiability may also turn on other
82. Id at 858. Minority students comprised 15.3% of the junior high school student
population and 14.9% of the high school student population.
83. From 1976 to 1981, Topeka adopted a middle-school/high-school system.
84. Brown, 892 F.2d at 858 & n.13.
85. Id at 859 (quoting Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1293).
86. Id (quoting Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971)).
87. id
88. Id
89. Id at 859-60.
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factors, such as faculty assignments or community and administration
attitudes towards the school. 90
The court next focused on the issue of one-race schools. While
such schools are not per se unconstitutional, their existence in a school
system with a history of dejure segregation gives rise to a presumption
that they result from discrimination. 9 1 The existence of one-race
schools thus satisfies the plaintiff's initial burden of showing a current
condition of segregation. As a result, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the school system. 9 2 The court in Brown, of course, did not confront a
school system in which the district maintained schools with 90+7o mi-
nority student populations. 93 In 1985, however, minority students
made up only 25.95% of the student population.
9 4
The question then is how to determine the existence of racially
identifiable schools in Topeka. The Tenth Circuit refused to focus
solely on the distribution of minority students among district schools.
The court stated that whatever the percentage of minority students in a
school district, "[i]t is dear that a school with 90+7o students of one
race is a predominantly one-race school.., whether the students at the
school in question are white or minority."9 5 The court's reasoning
yields a straightforward rule: proof of the existence of 90+7 white
schools, in a school system that mandated segregation in the past, shifts
to the school district the burden of proving that the existence of the
essentially all-white schools is not the result of past intentional
conduct.
9 6
Judge Baldock, dissenting, sharply differed with the majority over
this burden-shifting mechanism. In particular, the majority and dissent
differed on what the plaintiff must prove to shift the burden of persua-
sion to the school district.9 7 The dissent argued that in a former dejure
segregated school system, the plaintiffs must "establish the prima fade
case by proving that there is a current condition of intentional segrega-
tion, [and] that the dejure system or its vestiges remain or were reestab-
lished in part of the school system."9 8 The burden then shifts to the
school district to prove that "segregative intent was not among the fac-
90. Id. at 860.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir. 1989).
94. Brown, 892 F.2d at 856.
95. Id at 860.
96. The court further observed that, even absent racial imbalances, it may determine
that schools are racially identifiable based on demography, geography, history of particu-
lar schools, and areas of the city. Id. at 860-61. Given the existence of 90+7o white
schools in Topeka, the presence of these factors in Topeka only bolstered the court's ulti-
mate conclusion.
97. Not satisfied with demonstrating the majority's asserted error of laii', however,
Judge Baldock seemed intent on showing that the majority's every point, every statement,
and every observation, were wrong. Judge Baldock criticized the majority for making "its
own factual findings after an ad hoc evaluation of the evidence." Id. at 889 (Baldock, J.,
dissenting). Yet, he engaged in his own tedious review of the record. Id
98. Id. at 892.
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tors that motivated their actions." 99 UnderJudge Baldock's approach, if
the school district cannot disprove segregative intent, it may satisfy its
burden by showing that "past. segregative acts did not create or contrib-
ute to the current segregated condition." 10 0 Essentially, the dissent's
proffered burden-shifting scheme entails a search for segregative intent
at every level.
The majority, on the other hand, concluded that the inquiry into
intent was resolved when the court initially found an equal protection
violation. Consequently, the district was required to negative any con-
nection to the previously established discriminatory intent. "Once a
plaintiff has proven the existence of a current condition of segregation,
the school district bears the substantial burden of showing that that con-
dition is not the result of its prior dejure segregation."' 0'1 The school
.district does not satisfy its substantial burden merely by showing an "ab-
sence of invidious intent," or even by showing a "firm commitment to
desegregation."' 1 2 Rather, the school district must show that it has
taken steps to satisfy its affirmative duty to desegregate - it must show
"action that in fact produces a unified school district."' 0 3 Any action
that perpetuates the dual system, therefore, violates the school district's
duty to desegregate.'
0 4
Judge Seymour emphasized that the plaintiff need not prove that
the current condition of segregation is the result of intentional segrega-
tion-that is, that the school district intended to segregate the students
by race in pursuing its policies.' 0 5 Instead, any action that perpetuates a
dual system violates the school district's duty to desegregate.'
0 6
"Where plaintiff has established segregation in the past and the present,
it is 'entitled to the presumption that current disparities are causally re-
lated to prior segregation, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on
the defendants.' ,07 The court justified this approach on the basis of
fairness and also found it necessary to ensure that "subconscious racial
discrimination does not perpetuate the denial of equal protection to our
nation's schoolchildren."'
10 8
There is also an institutional consideration not mentioned by the
court. The school district is in the position to establish the absence of
cause or connection between prior segregative conduct and a current
99. Id. (quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973)).
100. Id.
101. Brown, 892 F.2d at 861.
102. Id at 861-62.
103. Id at 862 (emphasis in original).
104. Id. (quoting Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir. 1985)).
105. Id
106. Id at 862 (quoting Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1427 (11th Cir. 1985)).
107. Id at 863 (quoting School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1311 (4th Cir. 1987)).
108. Id. The court's use of the term "subconscious racial discrimination" has an unfor-
tunately contentious psychoanalytic ring to it. The term conjures up a vast shared subcon-
scious which somehow spins forth school policy through the unwitting actions or inaction
of school administrators. For support, the court refers to one law review article, rather
than to any evidence in the record. See Lawrence, The ld, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 327 (1987).
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condition of segregation, and properly bears the burden of so doing. 0 9
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, typically have no meaningful access to evi-
dence which affirmatively establishes a connection. Aside from being
fundamentally fair, placing the burden on the school district comports
with traditional notions of logic and efficiency in duty allocation.
The court next examined the means by which a school district can
negate the cause or connection between past segregative conduct and a
current condition of segregation. The passage of time alone may sup-
port the district's argument that any relationship between the two is too
attenuated for one to have caused the other.1 10 But the school district
must also show the measures it has taken to integrate. Absent proof of
affirmative action, the court will presume that the current condition of
segregation results from prior intentional segregative conduct. "A
showing that the school district has not promoted segregation and has
allowed desegregation to take place where natural forces worked to that
end is insufficient.""' While "[n]eighborhood schools are a deeply
rooted and valuable part of American education," a neighborhood
school plan must be scrutinized carefully where the neighborhoods are
themselves segregated, because such a plan tends to prolong the exist-
ence of segregation in schools. 12 A neutral neighborhood school plan,
administered "in a scrupulously neutral manner," will not fulfill the af-
firmative duty to desegregate if it fails to enhance racial balance. 113 The
court should also consider the school district's decision not to take cer-
tain actions that either promote or discourage segregative effects.' 14 Fi-
nally, evidence of the school district's intent is important to determine
how the district's actions have shaped current conditions in the school
district.' 15
Beyond the absence of a cause or connection, the defendant school
district must demonstrate that it has done everything feasible to achieve
maximum practicable desegregation. 116 Judge Seymour warned that,
while courts should be practical, they "must not let long standing racism
blur their ultimate focus on the ideal."
' 17
C. A Current Condition of Segregation in Topeka
Because the district court improperly allocated the parties' respec-
tive burdens of proof, Brown would seem ripe for remand. 18 After all,
109. Cf. Missouri v.Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651, 1654 (1990) ("Authorizing and directing
local government institutions to devise and implement remedies not only protects the
function of those institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for
the problems of segregation upon those who have themselves created the problems.").
110. Brown, 892 F.2d at 863.
111. Id. at 863-64.
112. Id. at 864.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 865.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 866.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 890 (Baldock, J., dissenting).
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the court identified an error of law that goes to the very heart of the
district court's finding of facts. The majority noted that "the court fo-
cused too greatly on the school district's lack of discriminatory in-
tent."1 19 The district court's error was in "limiting the school district's
burden merely to showing that it had nondiscriminatory reasons for act-
ing as it did." 120 Not having the burden at trial to come forward with
evidence negating the causal connection between its past conduct and
the school district's current condition, the district did not attempt to do
so. But, rather than remanding the case to allow the school district to
make such a showing, the court of appeals launched into a "more spe-
cific review of the record" to determine whether the district court's find-
ing of unitariness was clearly erroneous. The court justified this
approach first by noting that "much of the record evidence consists of
statistics and other undisputed facts," and second by disclaiming any
reliance on disputed expert testimony. This is a troubling approach, for
Brown is not a case in which the statistics speak for themselves. Judge
Seymour conceded that this case is a close one in which "statistics alone
do not appear as egregious" as in other cases. 12 1 But, the court none-
theless adopted the mantle of expert.
The court then turned to the conditions in Topeka to determine
whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated a current condition of segrega-
tion which would shift the burden of proof to the defendants. The court
first noted that in a school system such asTopeka's, where the minority
student population is relatively small, the concentration of minority stu-
dents is the "hallmark of discrimination." 122 The court observed that,
whether measured in absolute percentage terms or measured as a func-
tion of relative deviation from district-wide minority student population,
a number of schools in Topeka are racially identifiable by student as-
signment. 123 The court also concluded that a number of schools were
racially identifiable by faculty and staff assignment. 124 Looking at these
factors together, the court discerned "a clear pattern of assigning mi-
nority faculty/staff in a manner that reflects minority student assign-
ment. This correlation is fatal to the school district's effort to show a
lack of current segregation." 1 25 The court also found that the racial
identifiability of the schools is supported by their geography, the resi-
dential population in the areas surrounding the schools, and the history
of the schools. 126 For instance, the district located schools in the outly-
ing white areas of Topeka; which were traditionally attended by almost
exclusively white student populations. 127
The presence of racially identifiable schools shifted the burden of
119. Id. at 867.
120. Id. at 868.
121. Id. at 867.
122. Id. at 869.
123. Id. at 870.
124. Id. at 871.
125. Id. at 872.
126. Id. at 873.
127. Id.
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proof to the school district. The court held that the school district failed
to meet its burden in proving the absence of a causal link between the
former dejure segregation in Topeka and the current condition of segre-
gation.1 28 The court noted that any lessening of segregation in the
school district since the initiation of the district's Four Point plan in the
1950s, which the district argued was sufficient to satisfy its duty to de-
segregate, was due to demographic population shifts rather than any ac-
tion by the district to promote integration.
1 29
The court ultimately found a causal link between the former dejure
segregation and the current segregative condition. First, the court
chronicled the desegregative efforts or lack of efforts through the de-
cades since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. °30 Next, the court
looked to various individual factors that over time "most clearly demon-
strate the continuing causal link between past and present segrega-
tion." - 1 These factors included student and faculty/staff assignments
over time, attendance boundary determinations, and the locations of
schools that the district has both opened and closed over the years. Fi-
nally, the court considered a number of schools it believed illustrated
the causal link.
After deciding that Topeka could do more to eradicate the effects of
past segregation and segregative acts, the court recognized the district
court's error in declaring the Topeka system unitary.' 32 The court,
though reluctant to ascribe ill motives to the school district, found fault
in Topeka's failure to "actively strive to dismantle the system that ex-
isted." The court also found fault in the district's investment of "little
or no thought" to the effects of its actions on the segregative character-
istics that remain from the 1950s. "Where prior dejure segregation ex-
ists . . .we are convinced that permitting white schools and minority
schools to remain racially identifiable as such without significant efforts
to the contrary is in effect to permit the continuation of a dual system of
education." 1 3 3
128. Id. at 874.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 874-77.
131. Id. at 877.
132. Id. at 886.
133. Id. The court also reversed the district court's holding that the school district did
not violate section 601 of Tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) and
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b). The court concluded that the same actions or inactions that violated
the equal protection clause also violated Title VI. The court affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Governor of Kansas on both the constitutional
and Title VI claims, and the court's finding that the State Board of Education was not
responsible for racial conditions in the school district. The state constitution granted him
no authority to remedy the circumstances existing in the Topeka school district. Id. at 887.
Nor did the plaintiff show that the State Board of Education had the power to act to rem-
edy the constitutional regulations. Id at 888. Kansas statutes authorized only the local




IV. DOWELL v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Dowell v. Board of Edu-
cation,'3 4 and in reviewing the decision- may for the first time map out
the steps necessary to terminate federal jurisdiction. Thus, Dowell may
be associated with the close of the desegregation era, as Brown is associ-
ated with its birth, and Keyes with its maturity.1 3 5
A. Background
The unusual procedural context in which the district court decided
Dowell distinguishes it from Keyes and Brown. The district court declared
the Oklahoma City School District unitary in 1977, but did not terminate
jurisdiction over the case at that time. When the school district imple-
mented a new student assignment program in 1984, the plaintiffs moved
to reopen the case.13 6 The plan resulted in dramatic racial imbalances
in the elementary schools: eleven of the sixty-four elementary schools
enrolled 90+7 black student populations, and twenty-one enrolled
90+7 non-black student populations.1 3 7 In the district as a whole,
whites comprised 47% of the student population, blacks comprised
40%, and nonblack minorities comprised 137.138
In 1985, the plaintiffs filed a motion to intervene and to reopen the
case. This occurred after the school board adopted the Student Reas-
signment Plan ("the Plan"), without first seeking court approval. 139
Although the subsequent hearing was ostensibly limited to the issue of
whether the intervenors could reopen the case and intervene, the court
considered numerous substantive issues, including the constitutionality
of the Plan. 140 The district court dissolved the 1972 decree and termi-
nated jurisdiction over the case.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that the court
abused its discretion in failing to reopen the case and- in prematurely
reaching the merits of the Plan's constitutionality. 14 1 The court's man-
date to the district court on remand was quite specific. The court found
that once the plaintiffs proved that the defendants- violated the 1972
mandatory order by adopting the Plan, the burden shifted to the defend-
ants to prove either that changed conditions required modification of
134. 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989).
135. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1057-1102 (1978).
136. 1&. at 1486.
137. Id at 1487.
138. Id at 1495 n.30. The plan affected only elementary schools; student populations
in grades five through twelve were undisturbed. 'These drcumstances contrast ironically
with those in Brown, in which the original plaintiffs attacked segregation in the elementary
schools of Topeka, Kansas. Thejunior high and high schools were not subject to dejure
segregation. Only in the most recent proceedings did the intervenor-plaintiffs attack the
condition of segregation in those schools. See supra text accompanying notes 64-72.
139. Id. at 1486.
140. Id at 1487.
141. See Dowell v. Board.of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1523 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 938 (1986).
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the order or that the facts or law no longer required the enforcement of
the order.
14 2
The Tenth Circuit in 1986 expressly declined to consider the issue
of the Plan's constitutionality. Instead, the court confined remand to a
determination of whether the order would be enforced or whether and
to what extent it would be modified. 14 3 The eight-day hearing on re-
mand focused largely on the issue of whether substantial demographic
changes in the Oklahoma City School District rendered inequitable and
oppressive the desegregation plan under the prior order.144
At issue was the 1972 decree, which required the school district to
comply with the Finger Plan in making student assignments.145 Under
the Finger Plan, black elementary school students in grades one through
four were bussed to previously all-white elementary schools. Moreover,
white fifth-grade students were bussed to "fifth year centers" located in
previously black elementary schools.' 46 A number of "stand-alone"
schools, located in racially balanced neighborhoods, served as neighbor-
hood elementary schools not subject to bussing.
14 7
The Finger Plan was in effect until the board adopted the Student
Reassignment Plan for the 1984-85 school year. 148 The Plan assigned
all students in grades one through four to their neighborhood schools,
thereby eliminating compulsory bussing of those students entirely.
149
The Plan also provided several features, such as a "majority-to-minor-
ity" transfer option. This option was implemented to prevent inequities
in the neighborhood school approach.15 0 The fifth year centers, middle
schools, and high schools continued to maintain racial balance through
bussing under the Plan.15 ' In the sixty-four elementary schools subject
to the Plan, however, blacks comprised 90+ 7o of the student population
in eleven district schools, and less than 10.7%o in 21 others.'
5 2
The court considered a demographic analysis of the school district
population, the history of the Plan's preparation and adoption, the views
of the various community members on issues relating to the Plan, and
the numerous programs the district adopted to promote contacts be-
tween black and white students in grades one through four. The district
defended the neighborhood schools program on the bases that it pro-
moted parental involvement in the elementary schools, and that it
avoided subjecting children to long bus rides in the morning. More-
over, the district stated that "educationally, it is better for a child to have
142. Id
143. I
144. Id at 1487-88.
145. Id. at 1486 & n.1. The Finger Plan was named for its author Dr.John A. Finger,
Jr., a Rhode Island College Professor of Education.






152. Id. at 1487 & n.2.
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a family nearby." 1 53
Ultimately, the district court concluded that demographic changes
rendered the Finger Plan inequitable because black students in the first
through fourth grades would have to travel longer and longer distances
to attend integrated schools as new areas of the district qualified for
stand-alone status. According to the district court, these demographic
changes were legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors that motivated adop-
tion of the Plan. The Plan, in the school district's view, effectively main-
tained a unitary district while promoting increased parental and
community involvement in the schools. 154 Accordingly, the court dis-
solved the 1972 decree mandating compliance with the Finger Plan. 155
B. Modifying Court-Ordered Desegregation Plans
Constrained by a prior panel's decision in review of the district
court's decision, Judge Moore, writing for the majority, resorted to well-
established black letter law regarding modification of injunctions.
15 6
The court embraced the standard enunciated in United States v. Swift &
Co.,157 which required "[niothing less than a clear showing of grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions" to justify modifying
an injunction. Swift's exacting standard recognizes that modification
based on anything less than a compelling showing of change would al-
low the parties to repeatedly assault the injunction. In effect, the parties
could reverse the judgment of the trial court based on evidence unavail-
able or not presented when the court made its decision. The court also
considered "whether the changes are so important that dangers, once
substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow."'
15 8
[T]o pass muster under this test, the party seeking relief from
an injunctive decree 'must demonstrate dramatic changes in
conditions unforeseen at the time of the decree that both
render the protections of the decree unnecessary to effectuate
the rights of the beneficiary and impose extreme and unexpect-
edly oppressive hardships on the obligor." 59
Judge Baldock, dissenting, took issue with the court's reliance on
Swift. He stated that "principles specifically concerning the process of
desegregation have been enunciated by the Supreme Court." 160 First,
the dissent distinguished Swift and the other injunction cases relied
upon by the majority, noting that those cases involved injunctions which
153. Id at 1488.
154. Id at 1489. The court also rejected the plaintiff's alternative plan, the Foster
Plan, as unnecessary and not feasible.
155. Id
156. See id at 1489-91.
157. 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
158. Dowel!, 890 F.2d at 1490 (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 119).
159. Id (quotingJost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond- Modifiation of Injunctions in the Fed-
eral Courts, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1101, 1110 (1986)).
160. Id at 1513 (Baldock, J., dissenting).
1990]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
forbade or limited only private commercial conduct. 161 The dissent fur-
ther pointed out that different considerations may apply when a court
decides whether to modify prohibitory injunctions from when a court
considers modification of a primarily mandatory injunction involving
complex affirmative duties. 162 Finally, the dissent stated that desegrega-
tion decrees typically contemplate modification as circumstances
change, and that the Swift standard deprived the court and school dis-
trict of the "practical flexibility" contemplated by the Supreme Court
where a school district is seeking to establish a racially nondiscrimina-
tory school system.' 63
Judge Baldock's criticism echoes the late Judge Friendly of the Sec-
ond Circuit, who rejected a rigid interpretation of Swift in King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries,'" opting instead for an approach that
allowed the trial court to rely on the parties' experience under the
decree:
While changes in fact or in law afford the dearest bases for al-
tering an injunction, the power of equity has repeatedly been
recognized as extending also to cases where a better apprecia-
tion of the facts in light of experience indicates- that the decree
is not properly adapted to accomplishing its purposes.' 65
The Second Circuit has since employed this more flexible standard in
institutional reform litigation that requires ongoing judicial supervi-
sion.' 66 Judge Baldock's proffered approach differs from the Second
Circuit approach in that it would turn on the type of case in which the
injunction was entered, and might have the unfortunate effect of creat-
ing a patchwork doctrine under which dubious and legalistic distinctions
between cases determine whether injunctions should be modified.
Whatever the merits of the dissent's position, the Tenth Circuit has
yet to adopt a more flexible modification standard, and a prior panel
determined the setting within which the majority had to reach its deci-
sion. The prior holding in Dowell specifically framed the issue on re-
mand in terms of the showing necessary under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b) to justify modification or dissolution of the injunction.
It was a decision rendered under this mandate from which the plaintiffs
appealed.' 6
7
Having set forth the standard, the court established a threshold
showing that must be satisfied in order to establish entitlement to a
modification of the injunction. The "condition that eventuates as a
161. Id at 1514 (quoting Spangler v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir.
1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
162. Id. at 1515.
163. Idt (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300-01).
164. 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969).
165. Id. at 35. Though King-Sely concerned a consent decree, it relied heavily onjus-
tice Fortas' opinion in United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968),
which involved a litigated decree.
166. Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1989); New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 970 (2d Cir. 1983).
167. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1487 & n.5.
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function of the injunction cannot alone become the basis of altering the
decree absent the Swift showing,"' 68 nor can compliance alone satisfy
the Swift showing.' 69 The school district must establish by dear and
convincing evidence either that the conditions which led to the original
decree no longer exist, or that the condition the order sought to allevi-
ate has been eradicated.' 70 Any change of conditions must go to the
very heart of the purpose of the decree to justify its modification.'
7 1
Under the majority's approach, a declaration of unitariness plays
little role in determining whether the decree should be modified. At
most, a declaration of unitariness addresses the goal of the injunctive
relief - the elimination "root and branch" of racial discrimination en-
forced through a dual school system. 172 Consequently, the district,
even if unitary, must show a substantial change in the circumstances
which led to the issuance of the decree, in order to justify the dissolution
of the decree.
173
C. Changed Conditions in Oklahoma City
No. one disputed that the board's adoption of the Plan violated the
express terms of the 1972 decree. 174 A prior panel held that the board's
action, in violating the decree, opened the door for the plaintiffs to chal-
lenge "the presumptions premised in the declaration of unitariness."' 7 5
The court held that the emergence of thirty-two "one-race majority" el-
ementary schools, out of a total sixty-four elementary schools, "not only
establishes a prima facie case that the decree has been violated and the
presumption of unitariness challenged, but also satisfies plaintiffs' bur-
den in reopening and shifts the burden to defendants to produce evi-
dence of changed circumstances or oppressive hardship.' 7
6
The board sought to satisfy its "heavy burden" of showing that the
Plan would not perpetuate or reestablish a dual school system by dem-
onstrating that substantial demographic changes established conditions,
unforeseen at the time of the decree's entry, which created hardships so
"extreme and unexpected" as to render the decree oppressive. 17 7 The
court agreed that the board showed substantial changed circumstances,
but concluded that the school district failed to establish that the dangers
to which the decree was directed had disappeared. 178
168. Id at 1490.
169. Id- at 1491.
170. Id. (distinguishing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437-38
(1976)).
171. See id. at 1492. Though it should seem obvious from this course of analysis, the
intent of the parties in proposing changes in the decree or adopting changes that violate
the decree has little or no relevance.
172. Ia at 1491.
173. Id- at 1490.
174. Id. at 1492-93.
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Essentially, the school board sought to show that at the time the
decree was entered, most blacks lived in the inner-city areas of
Oklahoma City, but that in intervening years, many blacks moved from
the inner city to the north, east and south portions of Oklahoma City,
thereby lengthening the bus ride for black elementary school students.
The court scrutinized the district's evidence, including the district's
study of the population movement within seven inner-city tracts, includ-
ing the district's study identifying "substantial turnover" in the black
inner-city population of Oklahoma City.
179
The plaintiffs attacked the district's study as too narrowly focused.
The plaintiffs claimed that the study failed to consider either predomi-
nantly black neighborhoods just to the north of the study area, or the
effects of highway construction that forced a portion of the population
out of the study area. Moreover, while the district established popula-
tion turnover within the tracts studied, it failed to distinguish between
those who moved within the neighborhood and those who moved from
the neighborhood to other parts of the city.
The court also considered the parties' conflicting evidence on the
impact of bussing elementary school children.18 0 Obviously, demo-
graphic changes in the school district would be of less import if the dis-
tance the district bussed students had no effect on their education. The
school district offered evidence that black children who were bussed to
school tested lower than those who attended neighborhood schools.' 8 '
The district also argued that bussing had an adverse emotional impact
on the child. 182 Again, the plaintiffs attacked substantial deficiencies in
the district's study, including the study's failure to take into account so-
cioeconomic differences between the children bussed and the children
attending school in their neighborhoods.'
8 3
The court concluded that the substantial body of conflicting evi-
dence in the case pointed to' differing explanations and potential solu-
tions, but that the most significant uncontradicted evidence in the
record was the emergence of lopsided enrollment patterns in the ele-
mentary schools. "Of the approximately 6,464 black students attending
the District's elementary schools K-4, 2,990, or 46.2% of all black ele-
mentary schoolchildren in the District attend the eleven 90%+ black
elementary schools."' 8 4 The conflicting evidence in the record simply
failed to satisfy the district's heavy burden ofjustifying such a condition
of racial imbalance.
The court also rejected the district's argument that the stand-alone
schools' emergence under the Finger Plan created an extreme and unex-
pected hardship that justified modifying or dissolving the decree. The
179. Id at 1494.
180. Id at 1496.
181. Id
182. Id
183. The court also considered racial balance, racial contact indices (such as the "dis-
similarity index"), and census data.
184. Id at 1497.
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district argued that as elementary schools in racially balanced neighbor-
hoods became stand-alone schools, black children who had been bussed
to those schools were bussed even farther to attend elementary
school.185 Because stand-alone schools offer kindergarten through fifth
grade classes, their growth shrinks the pool of students for fifth-grade
centers located in black communities. Consequently, these centers
would have to close. The court concluded, however, that the emergence
of stand-alone schools is hardly inevitable. Indeed, eight of the original
stand-alone schools which opened in 1972 have lost their stand-alone
status. Other schools entitled to stand-alone treatment were not desig-
nated as such because of capacity problems, budget constraints, and lo-
cal politics. 186
D. The Failures of the Student Reassignment Plan
Though the evidence of changed circumstances failed to convince
the court that the decree should be modified, the court was convinced
that the Finger Plan mandated by the decree should be modified.'
8 7
The court's order contemplated changes in the Finger Plan from the
beginning, requiring only that the school board obtain prior court ap-
proval before altering or deviating from the Plan.' 8 8 The court ex-
amined the Plan to determine whether it "encompasses the changed
circumstances and maintains the continuing prospective effect of the de-
cree," in which case dissolution of the decree would be appropriate.' 8 9
As framed by the court, the central question was whether the Plan re-
lieved the effects of changed circumstances and potential hardship or
whether it made the district "un-unitary" by reviving effects of past dis-
crimination. 190 The court utilized three factors to determine whether
the Plan maintained unitariness in student assignments-the number of
racially identifiable schools that emerged under the Plan, the school offi-
cials' good faith in the desegregation effort, and whether the district had
attained the "maximum practicable desegregation of student bodies at
the various schools."'19 1
The court of appeals expressed its concern that implementation of
the Plan "has the effect of reviving those conditions that necessitated a
remedy in the first instance."' 9 2 The district court had concluded that
even though the Plan created one-race schools, it did not violate the
equal protection clause unless the board adopted it with discriminatory
intent. The district court had also dismissed racially identifiable faculty
assignments as the product of teacher preference and seniority policies,
and had relied on the district's projection that it would soon bring ele-
185. Id
186. Id at 1498.
187. Id
188. See Dowell v. Board of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1273 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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mentary faculties into racial balance. The majority instead focused on
evidence in the record that racial imbalances in faculty assignments were
becoming more rather than less pronounced. Predominantly black ele-
mentary schools were increasingly staffed by predominantly black
faculties.
1 93
The majority doubted the efficacy of the Plan's majority-to-minority
transfer option. Few parents knew of the option, which was also subject
to the capacity limitations of transferee schools. Thus, even if parents
were aware of the transfer option, their child might not obtain a space in
the parents' preferred school. Nor did the majority credit other features
of the Plan, such as the Effective Schools, Student Interaction, and
Adopt-A-School programs, which focused respectively on improving
test score performances, bringing together students of different races
from different schools, and raising private funds for educational pur-
poses. The court concluded that the Equity Committee and Equity Of-
ficer established under the Plan were ineffective to achieve meaningful
equality among the elementary schools because of limitations on the of-
ficials' discretion to make substantial expenditures. These programs,
the court concluded, were merely "cosmetic trappings" that impeded
the district's ability to achieve unitary status.194
Finally, the court concluded that the district court erred in focusing
on the issue of whether the board adopted the Plan with discriminatory
intent. The court found that the district court invited incompetent evi-
dence through its persistent inquiries of witnesses, lay and expert,
whether they believed the Plan was adopted with discriminatory
intent. 195
The district court misperceived the inquiry mandated by Swann in
determining whether the Plan achieved or maintained unitary status.
The district court was obligated to determine whether the Plan counter-
acted the continuing effects of past school segregation. The court
looked to the Plan's effectiveness in maintaining unitary status, and con-
cluded that the Plan failed. 196 Accordingly, the court directed the dis-
trict court, on remand, to modify the Finger Plan in order to
accommodate the changed circumstances, maintain racially-balanced el-
ementary schools, and assure that faculties achieve racial balance. 19
7
V. CONCLUSION
The two chess players with whom we began characterize the frustra-
tion and uncertainty that often attend school desegregation litigation.
Lack of a clearly defined goal encourages gamesmanship and intransi-
gence, and often pits one group in the community against another. The
three recent Tenth Circuit cases provide no answers to the player's
193. Id at 1500.
194. Id at 1504-05.
195. Id. at 1502-03.
196. Id at 1504.
197. I at 1505-06.
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quandary. There can be no single definition of checkmate for desegre-
gation purposes because there is no single game. Every board differs in
size and shape, and every game has different pieces with different func-
tions. Indeed, there rarely are only two players, but rather usually four
or five or more. Ultimately, Denver is not Pasadena, nor is it Topeka or
Oklahoma City.
The Tenth Circuit has provided direction. For instance, a school
district is no more entitled to declaration of unitariness for achieving
racial balance in a given percentage of its schools, as the court showed in
Keyes, than a member of the student population is entitled to a given
racial balance in her school. Nor does strict compliance with a court-
ordered plan satisfy the district's duty to desegregate if the plan itself is
not complete in its terms. The district's duty is to desegregate, not to
comply with fixed desegregation rules.
The courts in Brown and Dowell, while disdaining rigid rules for de-
termining unitary status, are more concerned with the mechanics of liti-
gating the question. To this extent the court strengthens the hand of
plaintiffs by declining to compel them to prove intentional discrimina-
tion in every challenged act of the school district. The court also looks
to a broad array of factors to determine the district's status, moving
away from a focus on student racial composition as the nearly exclusive
measure of a district's efforts. In sprawling prairie towns like Topeka
and Oklahoma City, the location and construction of new schools, and
the annexation of new areas may play nearly as large a role in the
unitariness determination as student racial composition.
Finally, these three cases could well have political ramifications at
the local level. Those officials who have persistently resisted school de-
segregation often have undermined attempts to fashion a complete rem-
edy, forcing the courts to order provisional measures. It seems clear
now that compliance with such measures, for however long, cannot en-
sure that the districts will be deemed unitary. Those most opposed to a








Questions of law are generally given full de novo review on appeal.1
Most federal courts of appeals depart from this standard, however, when
reviewing questions of unclear state law. They afford district court deci-
sions on unclear questions some degree of deference, primarily on the
ground that the district judge has special expertise with state law.
2
The Tenth Circuit generally applies an extremely deferential stan-
dard when reviewing questions of unclear state law. It is the only circuit
that reviews these questions under a clearly wrong or dearly erroneous
standard.3 This unusual practice is embodied in the court's "local judge
rule." 4 This article examines the local judge rule, its implications for
appellate practioners, its theoretical underpinnings and concludes that
the court should abandon its highly deferential standard in favor of full
de novo review.
Pinning the Tenth Circuit down, however, is difficult. While it is
accurate to say that the court has generally reviewed questions of un-
clear state law under the dearly erroneous or dearly wrong standard,
there is a great deal of confusion in the case law. Of course, the confu-
sion would not matter much if the local judge rule were unimportant.
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1. Not only are questions of federal law reviewed under the de novo standard, see
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984)("FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) does not
inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law"), but the same is true for ques-
tions of foreign law. A trial court's determination of foreign law is viewed as "a ruling on a
question of law" and is subject to de novo review. See FED. R. APP. P. 44.1.
2. For a discussion of the standard in other circuits, see infra notes 63-64 & 72-73
and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit reviews questions of unclear state law de novo.
Other circuits give some degree of deference to the district judge's conclusions.
3. For a discussion of Tenth Circuit case law, see infra notes 26-47 and accompany-
ing text. A number of themes emerge from the cases-one is confusion. The Tenth Cir-
cuit has applied numerous inconsistent standards. See infa notes 27-38 and accompanying
text. Another theme which is in some tension with the first, is that the court has generally
applied an extremely deferential standard of review, whether enunciated as a clearly wrong
or dearly erroneous standard. See infa note 26.
4. The phrase "local judge rule" is taken from various Tenth Circuit opinions. See,
e.g., Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 912 n.7 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1006 (1988); Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (10th
Cir. 1985)(McKayJ., concurring).
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But the rule has great significance. It essentially condones departure
from the normal de novo standard of review for issues of law.5 The rule
applies only to issues of unclear state law-that is, issues on which the
pertinent state supreme court has not yet ruled.6
While the Tenth Circuit has fervently applied its local judge rule, it
has failed to establish conclusively just how much deference it will give
to district court determinations of unclear state law. Instead, it has ap-
plied inconsistent standards, providing little authoritative guidance and
leaving appellate practitioners a full menu of choices. 7
Part I of this article examines the local judge rule as applied by the
federal courts of appeals. The discussion highlights the Tenth Circuit's
unique position with regard to the rule and addresses the implications
for appellate practitioners.
Part II considers the various theoretical justifications for the rule.
These include the notion that deference to the federal district court is
mandated by Erie v. Tompkins8, the expertise of the federal district court
judge in matters of state law,9 and the United States Supreme Court's
practice of deferring to determinations of state law by lower federal
courts. 10 None of these justifications withstands scrutiny. Part III sug-
gests that the Tenth Circuit thoughtfully reconsider its local judge rule
en banc and argues that issues of unclear state law should be given full
de novo review.
I. THE LOCAL JUDGE RULE IN THE CIRCUrrS
A. Some General Obseruations
Before launching into the intricacies of Tenth Circuit law some gen-
eral observations are in order. The local judge rule applies only to de-
terminations of state law. It does not apply to questions of federal law
or determinations of foreign law. 1 Even in the realm of state law, how-
ever, the rule has limited application. It applies only when state law is
unclear. 1 2 Questions of state law are considered unclear when the state
5. As the standard of review becomes less exacting, the court gives up part of its
important function as a court of appeals. Beyond reviewing for correctness, a court of
appeals provides some degree of certainty and uniformity when declaring law.
6. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra notes 75-107 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 108-145 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 146-159 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 1.
12. See, e.g., Black v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 582 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir.
1978)("[W]hen state decisional law... affords no guidance, the interpretation of the dis-
trict judge, who is well versed in the intracacies and trends of local law, is entitled to great
deference."); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237, 239 (10th Cir.
1973) ("The views of a district judge on the unsettled law of his state are.., ordinarily
accepted.")(citing Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619, 621 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971). But see Hauserv. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir.
1986) (applying the rule where the Colorado Supreme Court had ruled on a closely related
issue).
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supreme court has not yet ruled on an issue.13 The local judge rule
applies not only to diversity cases but it also applies to all cases where
state law supplies the rule of decision.
14
While focusing the inquiry on matters of unclear state law is impor-
tant, it is also simplistic and misleading, since one unclear question of
state law may differ radically from another. Confronting an issue of un-
clear state law might mean confronting conflicting state court deci-
sions. 15 It might mean that there are no state decisions on point at all,
or at least none which provide clear guidance. 16 It might mean that the
only relevant law to which the federal district court can look in predict-
ing how the state supreme court would rule 17 is from other jurisdic-
tions. 18 Finally, it might even mean that the only relevant decisions are
from other federal courts. To say only that an issue is unclear, there-
13. See, e.g., Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 925 (10th Cir. 1987)(Mc-
Kay, J., dissenting)("[t]he rule is written for and applies only to cases ... in which there is
no direct state supreme court precedent regarding the matter of state law in dispute, for
the rule is unnecessary when the state supreme court has already spoken."), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1006 (1988). The reason for the rule's inapplicability in the face of state supreme
court precedent is dear. When a state supreme court has ruled on an issue, the frderal
courts are generally bound to follow the high court's ruling and the task of ascertaining
state law is relatively simple. See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 4507, at- 91-94 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter
WRIGHT & MILLER].
There are exceptional circumstances in which a federal court might be justified in
disregarding a state high court decision, but these circumhstances are rare. See, e.g.,
Dawkins v. White Prods. Corp., 443 F.2d 5.89 (5th Cir. 1971); Mason v. American.Emery
Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957)(federal courts may anticipate a change in state
law based on dictum from the state's highest court), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957).
14. This is a critical point. The difficulty of ascertaining unclear state law transcends
diversity jurisdiction. It also exists in federal question cases. Federal law is interstitial in
nature; it seldom if ever occupies a field in its entirety. "Congress acts, in short, against
the background of the total corpusjuris of the states in much the way that a state legislature
acts against the backdrop of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legis-
lation." See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
533-34, 861 & n.6 (3d ed. 1989)[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. See generally Hart, The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954). See also'infra note 77.
15. See, e.g., Taxpayers for Animas-La Plata v. Animas-La Plata, 739 F.2d 1472, 1476-
77 (10th Cir. 1984).
16. See, e.g., An-Son Corp. v. Holland-America Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 700, 704 (10th Cir.
1985)(applying the local judge rule in the absence of dear state precedent); Caspary v.
Louisiana Land and Explor., 707 F.2d 785, 788-89 (4th Cir. 1983)(district judge familiar
with the state law is accorded substantial deference when state law provides no clear prece-
dent); Lamb v. Briggs Mfg., 700 F.2d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 1983)("IWlhere no authorita-
tive resolution of a legal issue ha[s] been rendered by the state courts, the district court's
construction of state law entitled to great weight."); Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 686 F.2d
642, 648 (8th Cir. 1982).
17. See infa notes 96-97 and accompanying text. Erie mandates that federal courts
ascertain how the highest state court would rule on a state matter. Nolan v. Transocean
Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1961). See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§§ 55-60 (4th ed. 1983)[hereinafter WRIGT]; Note, The Ascertainment of State Law in a Fed-
eral Diversity Case, 40 IND. LJ. 541, 553 (1965)[hereinafter Note, The Ascertainment of State
Law].
18. See, e.g., Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (ldth'Cir' l 987)(district
court's application of well-settled law of other jurisdictions entitled to deference); Fox v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 780-83 (10th Cir. 1978); Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1019-23 nn.4-8 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973)(the
district court noted specifically that the issue was one of first impression in South Dakota
and that there were conflicting lines of authority from outside the state).
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fore, is to say something with a variety of potential meanings. This point
is central to Part II, Section B, which considers in detail what it means to
say the district judge is an expert in matters of unclear state law.
Nevertheless, when an unclear issue of state law presents itself, the
local judge rule applies unless it is trumped by an exception.1 9 Excep-
tions have been recognized when both the district judge and a member
of the appellate panel have experience with the applicable state law,20 or
where a district court judge is sitting by designation.2 1 Courts have de-
clined to apply the rule where there are conflicting opinions from lower
federal courts. 2 2 A number of courts have also held that the rule should
not be applied if the district court inadequately analyzes state law or fails
to articulate dearly the basis for its decision. 23 Exceptions have also
been recognized where the district judge is interpreting the law of an-
other state.
24
If the local judge rule applies, the Tenth Circuit and most other
circuits will give some deference to the district court's determination of
state law. Just how much deference is given is the subject of the remain-
der of Part I. Three different standards emerge and may be broadly
categorized as: (1) extreme deference, in which case the court of ap-
peals will not reverse the district court's determination of state law un-
less it is "clearly erroneous" or "clearly wrong"; (2) intermediate
deference, in which case the court of appeals will not reverse the district
court's determination of state law unless it is convinced to the contrary;
and (3) no deference.
B. The Standard in the Tenth Circuit
One thing can be said with certainty about the Tenth Circuit's stan-
dard of review for unclear determinations of state law: whatever it is, it
19. For a brief general discussion of a number of recognized exceptions see Note, In
re McLinn: De Novo Review of District Court Interpretations of Unclear State Law, 6 BRIDGEPORT
L. REv. 271, 281 nn.51-53 (1985)[hereinafter Note, In Re McLinn].
20. See Caspary v. Louisiana Land and Explor., 707 F.2d 785, 788 n.5 (4th Cir.
1983)(where both the district judge and two members of the appellate panel have experi-
ence with applicable state law the deference accorded the district court's decisions is
neutralized).
21. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 911 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (it is inappropriate to defer to the district court's views' where
another district judge has expressed contrary views)(citing Maughn v. SW Servicing, Inc.,
758 F.2d 1381, 1384 n.2 (10th Cir. 1985)); see also Big River Grain, Inc. v. SBA, 718 F.2d
968, 970 (9th Cir. 1983)(abandoning the "clearly wrong" standard where bankruptcy
judge and district court judge disagreed on Idaho law).
23. See Weiss v. United States, 787 F.2d 518, 525 (10th Cir. 1986); Rabon v. Guard-
smark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.1 (4th Cir. 1978)(refusing to accord any weight to
district court's oral determination of unclear state law on the ground that the court had
given no citation to authority except a passing reference to a case identified at argument
by counsel and that the novel issue of great importance deserved greater treatment), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 656 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1981)(deference
accorded a district judge not given when interpreting the law of another state). But see
supra note 18 and cases cited therein.
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has been vigorously enforced. 25 Commentators have generally placed
the Tenth Circuit in the first category discussed above. 26 Closer analysis
reveals, however, what might be described as a schizophrenic, but
wholehearted, application of the local judge rule.
In 1952, the Tenth Circuit held that a district court's determination
of unclear state law would not be overturned unless "clearly errone-
ous."'2 7 Recently, the court placed itself near the other end of the spec-
trum, holding that because "an issue of state law is presented here, we
give some deference to the resident district judge's interpretation, but
ultimately review de novo whether the district judge applied the proper
legal standards."'2 8 What happened between 1952 and 1989? Just
about everything that could happen to one modest procedural rule.
During those years, the court relied on its local judge rule nearly
one hundred times with an enormous variety of expression. 29 In addi-
tion to the two extremes just mentioned, the court has accorded state
law determinations "extraordinary persuasive force,"3 0 "extraordinary
force,". 1 "great weight," 3 2 "substantial.weight,"
3 3 "great deference," 3 4
"deference," 3 5 "'some deference,"3 6 "a degree of deference,"3 7 and "at
25. See infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
26. See WxGHr & MILLER, supra note 13, at 108-10 n.60. See also lAJ. MooRE, W.
TAGGART &J. WICKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309[2], at 3125-29 & n.28 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter MooRE] (stating that "some appellate courts--and we think erroneously
so-will not interfere with the trial court's interpretation of local law unless 'clearly erro-
neous'" and citing Tenth Circuit cases).
There is undoubtedly abundant 'support for placing the Tenth Circuit in the dearly
erroneous camp, as citation to 1980 cases alone demonstrates. See, e.g., Weatherhead v.
Globe Int'l, 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1987); Hauser v. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d
876, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); Corbitt v. City of Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir.
1985); Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir. 1985)(applying FED R. Civ. P.
52(a)); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984); King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983);
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982)(applying FED. R. Cirv. P.
52(a)). For a comprehensive list of citations see Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d
908, 923-25 (McKay, J., dissenting).
27. Mitton v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 196 F.2d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 1952).
28. Midamerica Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Shearson/Am. Express, 886 F.2d 1249,
1253 (10th Cir. 1989)(citing Wilson v. McCord, Inc., 858 F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir.
1988)).
29. For a partial listing of pre-1987 cases, see Judge McKay's dissent in Rawson, 822
F.2d at 923-25, where he string-cites seventy-two cases, referring to the rule as one "sanc-
tified by use and citation."
30. Neu v. Grant, 548 F.2d 281, 287 (10th Cir. 1977); Stevens v. Barnard, 512 F.2d
876, 880 (10th Cir. 1975); Stafos V. Jarvis, 477 F.2d 369, 373 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 944 (1973).
31. Campbell v. Joint Dist. 28-J, 704 F.2d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 1983).
32. Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. 1975).
33. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 567, 571 (10th Cir.
1979).
34. Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985); Mus-
tang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 561 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir. 1977).
35. Taxpayers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water Conser-
vancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984).
36. Corbit v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985); Colonial Park Country
Club v. Joan of Arc, 746 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984).
37. Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1980).
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least a modicum of deference."3 8 These are only a few expressions of
the rule.
Given the significant differences between the standards (for exam-
ple, the "clearly erroneous" standard and the "ultimately review de
novo" standard),3 9 one might reasonably expect someone on the court
to speak up. She did. In Carter v. City of Salina,40 Judge Seymour con-
curred to "indicate [her] disagreement with the majority's application of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ... " and to point out "the confusion over this issue
within [the Tenth] circuit."' 4 1 Reviewing various expressions of the stan-
dard, Judge Seymour went on to say "[a]t best we are inconsistent; at
worst, we are confused, and, in my view, this time we are just plain
wrong."
4 2
What followed is interesting. In Wilson v. Al McCord, Inc.,43 the ma-
jority boldy stated, in reviewing the district court's interpretation of an
Oklahoma statute, "[o]ur review of an interpretation of state law is de
novo." 44 In support of that new version of the local judge rule, the ma-
jority cited Judge Seymour's concurring opinion in Carter.4 5 Ironically,
Judge Seymour had specifically (and appropriately) stated in her concur-
rence in Carter, "I do not urge that we adopt a new standard without en
banc consideration .... "46 To compound the irony and dispel any be-
lief that Judge Seymour's concurrence in Carter could by itself change
the standard, post-Carter cases continued to enunciate the "clearly erro-
neous" standard along with a variety of other standards.
47
Pinning the court down to a firm position on the local judge rule is
38. Cedar v. Daniel Int'l Corp., No. 82-2574, slip op. at 5 (10th Cir. April 26, 1983).
39. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
40. 773 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 256 (Seymour, J., concurring). However inappropriate the majority's cita-
tion to FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) in other respects, it is supported by Tenth Circuit case law.
Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 1982)(applying FED. R. Civ. P. 52 to
the review of the district court's interpretation of state law); Rasmussen Drilling v. Kerr-
McGee Nuclear Corp., 571 F.2d 1144, 1148 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862
(1978).
42. Carter, 773 F.2d at 257.
43. 858 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1988).
44. Id. at 1477. The district court interpreted an Oklahoma statute which provided
that "no commission or other remuneration [may be] paid or given directly or indirectly
for the solicitation of any such sale excluding any commission or remuneration paid or given
by and between parties each of whom is engaged in the business of exploring for or pro-
ducing oil and gas .... Id. Agreeing with the defendant's construction of the statute, the
court held that the exclusion applied. See Wilson v. Al McCord, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 621
(W.D. Okla. 1985).
45. Wilson, 858 F.2d at 1477.
46. Carter, 773 F.2d at 256. Judge Seymour's unwillingness to urge adoption of a new
standard by the three-judge panel is perfectly appropriate. A panel is not at liberty to
ignore or reject a prior decision by another panel. Only the en banc court may reject
established circuit authority. United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1450 (1oth Cir.
1987)(en banc)(rehearing granted to "consider the propriety of changing established
rule"); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 425 (10th Cir. 1963)(en banc)(en banc court
convened "to reexamine our prevailing rule"), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964).
47. See, e.g., Hauser v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 797 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir.
1986)(citing King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983)). Judge Sey-
mour again filed a concurring opinion, this time explicitly stating, "I do not believe that
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difficult, if not impossible. Tenth Circuit law is just as confused today as
it ever was. But does the confusion matter? Are the standards really
that different? The answer is yes. In fact, when conscientiously applied,
the local judge rule may be dispositive.
Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.48 exemplifies how the standard of re-
view may affect the outcome of the case. Gary Rawson was employed by
Sears for thirty-three years and served as manager of the Pueblo, Colo-
rado store from 1965 through 1979, the date of his termination. He
argued that Colorado statutes provided him with an implied right of ac-
tion for discharge based solely on age.49 The district court agreed and
issued a number of thoughtful published opinions. 50 After separate jury
trials on liability and damages, Rawson was awarded $580,500 for lost
wages and benefits, $264,410 for future wages, $5,000,000 for pain and
suffering, and $10,000,000 in punitive damages, for a total of more than
$19,000,000.51 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
Sears' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, vacated the
judgments, and remanded for dismissal of the complaint. 52
Prior to the district court's decision, no court, state or federal, had
addressed whether the statutes provided an implied cause of action for
age discrimination. 53 The district court considered certification, but
concluded that it should decide the issue.54 After the district court's
[the dearly erroneous] standard is the appropriate one for our review of the district court's
conclusion [of state law]." Hauser, 797 F.2d at 881 (Seymour, J., concurring).
ChiefJudge Holloway, in Huffman v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., Nos. 86-2630 and 86-
2658, slip op. at n.19 (10th Cir. April 18, 1990), states correctly that "we have applied a
variety of standards in the past to describe the degree of deference to be accorded-to a
local judge's interpretation of state law . J. " judge Barrett, in what may be the most
confusing statement in the Tenth Circuit's case law on the issue states that "in our de novo
review, we have recognized different degrees of deference we must give... we shall pro-
ceed under the 'some deference' standard." Phico Ins. Co. v. Providers Ins. Co., 888 F.2d
663, 666 (10th Cir. 1989); see also American Coleman v. Intrawest Bank, 887 F.2d 1382,
1387 (1989).
48. 822 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988).
49. Rawson's suit was removed by Sears from state to federal court on diversity of
citizenship grounds. Id. at 910. Rawson argued that Colorado penal statutes provided
him with an implied cause of action for wrongful discharge. One of the statutes provided,
inter alia, that "[n]o ... corporation... shall discharge any individual between the ages of
eighteen and sixty years solely and only upon the ground of age, if such individual is well
versed in the line of business carried on by such person... or corporation." See CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 8-2-116 (1973)(repealed 1986).
50. In response to Sears' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district
court ruled that the legislature intended to create an implied cause of action under CoLo.
Rxv. STAT. § 8-2-116 (1973)(repealed 1986) and that such a right of action was consistent
with Colorado's labor relations legislation. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 530 F.
Supp. 776, 778 (D. Colo. 1982).
51. Following the trial on liability, the district court again held that private damage
awards were proper under the statute. See Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 585 F. Supp.
1393 (D. Colo. 1984). See also Rawson, 822 F.2d at 910.
52. Rawson, 822 F.2d at 922.
53. Id. at 911.
54. See id. at 910 & n.4. Sears requested certification in the district court. On appeal,
both parties opposed certification. This illustrates an important point. Certification is one
way federal courts can avoid questions of unclear state law. If the question is certified and
the state court decides it, the federal court will simply apply the state law. The Supreme
Court encouraged certification in Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974), when
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decision, but before the decision, on appeal, lower state and federal
courts split almost evenly on the issue.55 Acknowledging the local judge
rule, the majority recited the "some deference" standard, but went on to
note that where "another resident district [court] judge has expressed
views contrary to those expressed by the trial court in the case... 'it is
inappropriate to defer to the district court's views.' ",56 The majority
then analyzed in agonizing detail the merits of the implied right of ac-
tion, looking both to Colorado law and the law of other jurisdictions.
The Tenth Circuit ultimately disagreed with the district court and con-
cluded that Colorado's statute did not provide Rawson with a remedy.
57
There can be little doubt, as Judge McKay points out so powerfully
in his dissent, that the majority's refusal to apply the local judge rule was
dispositive.5 8 Had the "clearly erroneous" standard been applied-in-
deed, had any version of the local judge rule been applied-the district
court's judgment would have been affirmed.5 9
Rawson demonstrates the rather unremarkable proposition that the
outcome of a case may turn on the standard of review applied by the
court of appeals. Rawson is but one illustration of the importance of the
it said certification "save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judi-
cial federalism." Others have pointed out that certification is a partial solution to the
problem of ascertaining unclear state law. See Woods, The Erie Enigma: Appellate Review of
Conclusions of Law, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 755, 766-67 (1984)[hereinafter Woods]; Note, State Law
In Federal Courts: The Implications of De Novo Review, 60 WASH. L. REv. 739, 750-55
(1985) [hereinafter Note, The Implications of De Novo Review].
Not all states have certification procedures. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13,
§ 4248 (discussing the growing popularity of certification and listing the states which have
certification statutes). Additionally, some litigants, as in Rawson, will oppose certification,
for whatever reason. Although opposition may not bind the court, it will influence the
decision.
Finally, a subtle but important point is that the process of certification is only about
thirty years old. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 4248. The local judge rule devel-
oped before certification was available. The perceived need for reliance on the local judge
rule may have been more pronounced before difficult questions could be shuttled from
state to federal court and may explain to some extent the eagerness of federal appellate
courts to defer to district court determinations of unclear state law. I am indebted to Mark
Spencer for this observation.
55. See Rawson, 822 F.2d at 911 & nn.5-6.
56. Id. at 911 (quoting Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1384 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1985)). See also McGehee v. Farmers Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 1422 (10th Cir. 1984). The
majority thus invoked the exception to the local judge rule for conflicting opinions from
the lower federal courts. See supra note 22.
57. See Rawson, 822 F.2d at 914-22.
58. Judge McKay said that "the majority proceeds to make its 'own independent in-
quiry into the proper interpretation of state law,' maj. op. at 911-912, unabashedly adopt-
ing a de novo standard of review." Id. at 925 (McKay, J., dissenting). He further stated
that the answer to the legal question "given by the local district judge sitting in Colorado
in this case is not reversible under a disciplined application of the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review." Id. Judge McKay noted that he would happily seek "the en banc aban-
donment of the clearly erroneous standard of review," but emphasized that the panel was
without power to "ignore, rewrite, or reject it." Id. at 925 & n.1.
59. Judge McKay wrote that absent the local judge rule, he was "persuaded that the
district court's extensive and specific analysis of Colorado law with respect to express and
implied statutory rights of action is correct." Id. at 928 (McKay, J., dissenting). Whether
correct or not, the split of authority combined with the district court's persuasive reason-
ing demonstrates at the least that the district court's decision would not have been re-
versed had it been given any deference.
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local judge rule to litigants and appellate practitioners, and suggests
that the rule deserves thoughtful consideration.
60
Ironically, the Tenth Circuit's local rules require practitioners to in-
clude the standard of review in their appellate briefs.6 1 Given the ex-
isting confusion in the Tenth Circuit, articulation of the applicable
standard could be a difficult task. Other circuits have have given clearer
guidance to litigants and appellate practitioners.
C. The Standard in Other Circuits
If the Tenth Circuit can be fairly characterized as both confused
and, in most cases, highly deferential in its application of the rule,62 the
Ninth Circuit has adopted a polar position by comparison. Prior to
1984, the Ninth Circuit, like the Tenth, reviewed unclear determinations
of 'state law under the clearly erroneous or clearly wrong versions of the
rule.63 In In re McLinn,6 4 however, the en banc court distanced itself
from all other circuits by deciding to give full de novo review to determi-
nations of unclear state law.
McLinn was a wrongful death action involving the collision of two
skiffs near Kodiak, Alaska. 6 5 The question was whether a fishing skiff
that was being used temporarily for recreation was "devoted to recrea-
tional pursuit" within the meaning of an Alaska statute which the Alaska
Supreme Court had not yet interpreted. 66 The trial court held that the
statute did not apply. On appeal, the three-judge panel found the stan-
dard of review under the local judge rule dispositive and therefore
unanimously requested en banc review of the issue.
6 7
McLinn is important for two reasons. First, the outcome of the case,
60. For other cases where the rule was dispositive, see infra notes 67 & 137 and ac-
companying text.
61. See 10TH Cm. CT. R. 28.2(c).
62. See supra notes 27-47 and accompanying text. Accurate characterization of the
Tenth Circuit's rule is difficult. If one were forced to pick among the various standards
though, one would probably pick, if for no other reason than sheer citation to authority,
the clearly erroneous rule. See supra note 26.
63. See, e.g., Jablonski By Pauls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 1983);
Fleury v. Harper & Row, 698 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 149
(1983); Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1982).
Prior to 1984, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits stood alone in their application of the dearly
erroneous or dearly wrong standards. See WRIGTrr & MILLER, supra note 13, § 4507, at
108-10 & n.60.
64. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc).
65. The federal court had jurisdiction over the admiralty case under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) (1982) and Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 669 (1982)(holding that
collision of vessels on navigable waters is within federal admiralty jurisdiction). It is inter-
esting to note this application of the local judge rule in a federal question case. See supra
note 14.
66. The statute, ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.040 (1981), made the owners of watercraft
civilly liable for injury or damage caused by the negligent operation of their watercraft.
The plaintiff's claim turned on whether the defendant's skiff was a watercraft within the
meaning of the statute. See In re McLinn, No. A80-038, slip op. at 6-7 (D.C. Alaska Nov. 4,
1982).
67. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397. The panel refused to certify the question, noting that
the plaintiffhad not requested certification in the trial court. "We believe that particularly
compelling reasons must be shown when certification is requested for the first time on
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like the outcome in the Tenth Circuit's Rawson decision, turned on the
application of the local judge rule. If the circuit court afforded defer-
ence to the district court's decision, it would affirm; if the court did not
defer, it would reverse.68 This again highlights the importance of the
local judge rule. Second, in rejecting the dearly erroneous or clearly
wrong standard and deciding to review de novo, the Ninth Circuit be-
came the first circuit to reject the notion that some degree of deference
to the district court is justified.69 In doing so, it created a split between
the circuits.
70
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits now occupy opposite ends of the
spectrum, employing the no deference and extreme deference stan-
dards, respectively. 7 1 And they occupy those extreme positions alone.
The other federal circuit courts all fall in the intermediate category and
give some deference (something more than no deference, but some-
thing less than review under the clearly erroneous standard) to federal
district court determinations of unclear state law. 72 Notably, the Eighth
Circuit, like the Ninth, explicitly addressed the issue and replaced its
"clear error" standard with a "great weight" standard.73
This brief survey provides a sort of landscape of the circuits high-
lighting the truly unique position of the Tenth Circuit in its application
of the local judge rule. The Tenth Circuit now stands alone, giving ex-
treme deference to district court determinations of unclear state law.
appeal by a movant who lost on [the] issue below." Complaint of McLinn, No. 82-3644,
slip op. at 4441-43 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1984).
68. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397.
69. The court's reasoning for rejecting the rule is particularly important and is dis-
cussed throughout Parts II and III in conjunction with the various theoretical justifications
for the rule.
70. Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision there was disagreement among the circuits
regarding the degree of deference to give to determinations of unclear state law. All of the
circuits, however, agreed that the district court's decision was entitled to some deference.
See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
71. See supra notes 26-47 and 64-69 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Shipes v. Hanover Ins., 884 F.2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 1989)(entitled to
deference); Millerv. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523, 531-32 (1st Cir. 1989)(much deference);
Balliache v. Fru-Con Constr. Corp., 866 F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1989)(great deference);
National Bank v. Pearson, 863 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1988)(substantial deference); An-
derson v. Marathon Petroleum, 801 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1986)(some deference); Rudd
Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co. 735 F.2d 974, 978 (6th Cir. 1984)(considerable
weight); Leasing Consultants, Inc. v. Feldman, 592 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1979)(accepting rea-
sonable and careful analysis).
73. See Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 n.6 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). See also Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449,
1451-52 (8th Cir. 1986)(considerable deference). Prior to Luke, the Eighth Circuit had
stated that "where the trial judge arrives at a permissible conclusion with respect to the
law of his state, such conclusion will be binding on appeal." Luke, 476 F.2d at 1019 n.6.
The court abandoned its highly deferential standard in favor of the "great weight" stan-
dard, noting that the rule had been much criticized, that its application precludes appellate
consideration of significant questions, and that other circuits had not bound themselves to
the district court's conclusions of law. Id. The Eighth Circuit did not review the issue en
banc. The confusion in the Tenth Circuit, as well as the Tenth Circuit's rule requiring an
en banc panel to reverse panel authority, calls for an en banc review of the issue. See supra
note 46.
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No other circuit continues to apply a "dearly erroneous" standard. Part
II considers whether the Tenth Circuit is justified in maintaining its
unique position.
II. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE LOCAL JUDGE RULE
The local judge rule alters the normal de novo standard of review
for questions of law. Three primary justifications for the rule have been
advanced: (1) that Erie v. Tompkins74 compels deference to district court
determinations of unclear state law; (2) that district courts have some
special expertise in ascertaining unclear state law; and (3) that the
United States Supreme Court defers to lower court determination of
state law. Part II considers whether departure from the de novo stan-
dard is justifiable under any of these theories.
The analysis begins with a discussion of Erie, not on the ground that
Erie is the most compelling justification for the rule, but because it pro-
vides a logical springboard into questions of ascertaining and following
state law. Notwithstanding recent commentary to the contrary, Erie is
not a justification for, or against, the rule.
Section B considers the primary justification for the rule-that fed-
eral district court judges have expertise in matters of state law which
entities their decisions to deference. This justification, although broadly
accepted, is highly problematic and in the end does not warrant depar-
ture from the de novo standard of review. This part ends with a discus-
sion of the Supreme Court's practice of deferring to lower federal courts
on matters of state law, concluding that this practice does not justify
deference.
A. Erie as a Justification for the Rule
Erie has many faces which, while enormously fascinating, are not
pertinent here. 75 The relevant portion of Erie is its familiar command
that federal courts follow state law whether "declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court .... 76 Including state decisional law
in this command was a departure from previous interpretations of the
Rules of Decision Act.7 7 Two important assumptions are implicit in
Erie. One is that statejudges, not unlike state legislators, have some role
74. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
75. See, e.g., Ely, The Irrepressible Myth Of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693 (1974)(discussing
Erie's implications under the Constitution, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules En-
abling Act).
76. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
77. Erie held that § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1934, which commands federal courts to
follow the "laws of the several states," includes state decisional law. Originally enacted as
§ 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of Decision Act provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). Prior to Erie, federal courts were free to disregard state court
decisional law in following the laws of the several states, although they were bound to
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in making law. 78 The other is Erie's recognition that federal courts can
ascertain state law.
7 9
In the post-Erie world, the problem of ascertaining* state decisional
law presented itself in a series of now infamous 1940 cases. The nadir
was Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field.8 0 A brief discussion of Field is neces-
sary to understand the argument that Erie mandates some form of the
local judge rule.
Prior to 1932, the state of New Jersey had not permitted "Totten
trusts" by which a person could make a deposit in a savings bank for
himself as trustee for another and create a tentative trust, revocable at
any time before death. That changed in 1932 when the NewJersey leg-
islature passed four statutes which, in dearest terms, permitted Totten
trusts.8 1 In 1935, Miss Peck made a deposit in trust for Miss Field. Miss
Peck died thereafter and Miss Field sued the bank, which had denied the
validity of the trust, to collect the funds.
In the meantime, NewJersey's Court of Chancery had been at work.
The 1932 legislation came before the court in 1936 in two unrelated
cases in which "two vice-chancellors had more respect for the law than
to believe it could be made imperfect by a mere legislature, and so they
had construed the statute away by decision."
8 2
follow state constitutions, statutes and decisions construing them. Thompson v. Consoli-
dated Gas Utils., 300 U.S. 55, 74-75 (1937).
As noted earlier, Erie not only applies to diversity cases, but also applies to all cases
where state law controls. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 14, at 858 n.2. See also Kur-
land, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court And The Erie Doctrine In Diversity Cases, 67 YA.E
LJ. 187, 204-05 (1957)[hereinafter Kurland]. This is not a trivial point. Even before Erie,
federal courts struggled to ascertain and follow state law. Any difficulties ushered in by
Erie in following state law were not new in nature; they were only new in kind. See, e.g.,
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933)(in a case involving an indeterminate toll-bridge
franchise, the federal court is required to follow definition of perpetuities as dearly and
unequivocally expressed in dictum of the state supreme court); Portneuf-Marsh Valley Ca-
nal Co. v. Brown, 274 U.S. 630 (1927)(in the absence of decision by the highest court of
the state, independent construction of state statute is made by the federal court).
78. As one commentator has noted:
Implicit in the Erie doctrine is the recognition that courts make "laws." Each time
a court, whether state or federal, speaks it not only affects the rights of the parties
before it, but it also sets down a rule by which prospective litigants might expect
to be governed.
Note, Unclear State Law in the Federal Courts: Appellate Deference or Review?, 48 MINN. L. REv
747, 751 (1964)[hereinafter Note, Appellate Deference or Review]. Erie might be thought of as
a natural extension of the then budding school of legal realism.
Indeed, Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Black and White Taxicab had been written
just years before. Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co., 276
U.S. 518 (1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes wrote, "If there were such a transcen-
dental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until
changed by statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using their independ-
ent judgments as to what it was. But there is no such body of law." Id. at 533-34. See also
Kurland, supra note 77, at 189-90.
79. See Kurland, supra note 77, at 216-17 (the essence of Erie is that a federal judge can
find state law almost as well as a state judge).
80. 311 U.S. 169 (1940). This discussion of the Field case and of the development of
Erie generally tracks the discussion in WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 13, § 4507, at 81-88.
81. Field, 311 U.S. at 175.
82. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: Th Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,
55 YALE LJ. 267, 292 (1946)[hereinafter Clark]: The NewJersey Cotirt of Chancery was a
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The Third Circuit, in Miss Field's case, recognized that the case
before it was indistinguishable from the cases, decided by the two vice-
chancellors. Nevertheless, the court applied the statute, finding the
1932 legislation constitutional and unambiguous, and awarded the
funds to Miss Field.
83
The Supreme Court reversed. The Third Circuit, it said, was bound
to follow the NewJersey Court of Chancery, notwithstanding the legisla-
tion.8 4 "An intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state
law is acting as an organ of the State and its, determination, in the ab-
sence of more convincing evidence of what the state law is, should be
followed by a federal court in deciding a state law question."'8 5 The
Court recognized that the decisions of 'the two vice-chancellors would
not have been binding on the state's highest court.8 6 Miss Field was not
awarded the money Miss Peck wanted to leave her.
8 7
A number of other cases were decided at about the same time, con-
tributing to whatJudge Friendly referred to as the "excesses of [Field] as
to the respect that federal judges must pay to decisions of lower state
courts."8 8 Perhaps the high water mark of these decisions, enunciating
what has become known as the Field doctrine, is a Sixth Circuit case fol-
lowing the unreported decision of an intermediate Ohio court in the
face of a statute providing that "[o]nly such cases as are hereafter re-
ported in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be recog-
nized by and receive the official sanction of any court within the state."'8 9
Not surprisingly, a host of criticism followed these decisions. Judge
Jerome Frank said that federal judges were now "to play the rule [sic] of
the ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state."9 0
Professor Clark said that the Field doctrine is "the most troublesome, the
court of original jurisdiction, though it had statewide jurisdiction and standing in equity
comparable to an intermediate appellate court in law.
83. Field, 311 U.S. at 177.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 177-78.
86. Id. at 179. Professor Corbin notes that the vice-chancellors are judges of a "court
of first instance." All that the Court says about the Vice-Chancellor as a law-making "or-
gan" of the state (Holmes' "quasi-sovereign") can also be said about any other court of
first instance, from a justice of the peace up. In addition, it may be asked whether the
judge is not as much an "organ" of the state when he decides the issues of a case without
writing (or without publishing) an opinion as when his opinion is published. Corbin, The
Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE LJ. 762, 767 & n.10 (1941)[hereinafter Corbin].
87. Ironically, later NewJersey cases followed the decision of'the Third Circuit in Miss
Field's case, upholding Totten trusts under the statutes. Hickey v. Kahl, 19 A.2d 33 (NJ.
Eq. 1941). The court noted that the Third Circuit decision had been "reversed on other
grounds" by the Supreme Court and that NewJersey law is what the Third Circuit thought
it was rather than what the two vice-chancellors had declared it to be. Id. at 38.
88. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Comton Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv.
383, 400 (1964). The other Supreme Court cases were Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); and Six
Companies v.Joint Highway Dist. No. 13,311 U.S. 180 (1940). A good discussion of these
cases may be found in Corbin, supra note 86,, at 766-72. See also Clark, supra note 82, at
292, discussing Field.
89. Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 154 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
866 (1946).
90. Richardson v. C.I.R., 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
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most unsatisfying in its consequences, of all the rules based upon the
Tompkins case." 9 1 Professor Corbin said:
When the rights of a litigant are dependent on the law of a par-
ticular state, the court of the forum must do its best (not its
worst) to determine what that law is. It must use its judicial
brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste pot. Ourjudicial pro-
cess is not mere syllogistic deduction, except at its worst. At its
best, it is the wise and experienced use of many sources in com-
bination-statutes, judicial opinions, treatises, prevailing mo-
res, custom, business practices; it is history and economics and
sociology, and logic, both inductive and deductive. Shall a liti-
gant, by the accident of diversity of citizenship, be deprived of
the advantages of this judicial process? Shall the Supreme
Court, by what superficially appears to be an unselfish and self-
denying ordinance, foreclose the use of such a process by fed-
eral judges? It is in fact a denial ofjustice to those for whom a
court exists.
92
The Field doctrine was too mechanical and led to absurd results, evoking
strong criticism from judges and scholars alike.
As one might expect, the Court's rather extreme position was modi-
fied so that federal judges, in ascertaining the law of the state, were free
to look to all the sources to which state judges looked. The erosion of
the Field doctrine's almost blind adherence to state law began in 1948.
93
By 1956 the Court had recognized that federal district courts should be
sensitive to possible changes in state law.
9 4
In Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,95 the Court acknowledged that in-
termediate state appellate decisions, like state trial court decisions, are
91. Clark, supra note 82, at 290.
92. Corbin, supra note 86, at 775.
93. See, e.g., King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153
(1948). In King, the court of appeals had considered but did not follow an unreported
state trial court decision which, while directly on point, would not have been binding on
other trial courts within the state. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of
appeals was 'justified in holding the decision not controlling and in proceeding to make
its own determination of what the Supreme Court of South Carolina would probably rule
in a similar case." Id. at 161.
94. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). In Bernhardt,
the Vermont Supreme Court had held, in a 1910 decision, that arbitration agreements
were unenforceable. Mead v. Owen, 83 Vt. 132, 74 A. 1058 (1910). The Court found the
1910 decision controlling, but specifically noted that "there appears to be no confusion in
the Vermont decisions, no developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the es-
tablished ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont judges on the
question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the judicial rule." Bern-
hardt, 350 U.S. at 205. The Court recognized implicitly that federal courts should be sensi-
tive to changes in state law. For a more full discussion of Bernhardt, see Note, A
Nondeferential Standard For Appellate Review of State Law Decisions By Federal District Courts, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1311, 1319-21 (1985)[hereinafter Note, A Nondeferential Standard].
95. 387 U.S. 456 (1967). Bosch involved disputed federal estate tax assessments. One
issue was the proper regard to be given to state court determinations of certain property
rights. The Court held that "under some conditions, federal authority may not be bound
even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling." Id. at 465. The Court went on to
say that the "State's highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no
decision by that court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law
after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State." Id.
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not definitive pronouncements of state law. Today, federal courts are
free to look not only to state court decisions, but also to relevant deci-
sions by other jurisdictions, restatements of law, decisions by federal
courts interpreting state law, scholarly treatments of law and any other
pertinent authority.9 6
But what does this now familiar post-Erie history have to do with the
local judge rule? And how can Erie and its progeny be thought tojustify
deference to a cistrict court's interpretation of unclear state law? The
argument goes like this: Erie recognized that state judges make law, so
that state court decisions are part of the laws of the several states.9 7 In
the post-Erie world, it soon became clear that a federal judge trying to
ascertain state law, should not be a "ventriloquist's dummy," blindly re-
acting to any twist in state law, but should be free to use his "judicial
brains."9 8 The ascertainment of state law is a creative process and when
a district judge has the difficult and uncertain duty of ascertaining unclear
state law, it is appropriate for the court of appeals to accord his decision
some degree of deference.
Why? Because the ascertainment of unclear state law is a creative
process, as opposed to the Field doctrine's rigid adherence to any state
court pronouncement. As Professor Woods argues, the district court
has not been engaged in some kind of "homocentric three dimensional
process" of legal reasoning in such cases, but rather, has entered into
the "fourth dimension" of legal reasoning, which involves the "relation-
ship of transcendental values such as truth and justice." 9 9 When the
district court is operating in the "fourth dimension" it has "a better pre-
dictive 'feel' for the processes of the state judicial system." 10 0 Thus, it is
argued that when unclear state law is involved, Erie requires deference
96. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 4507, at 94-103. See also Note, The
Ascertainment of State Law, supra note 17, at 553 (in predicting what the highest state court
would rule, federal court should strive to duplicate the judicial method of the state court);
C. WRIGrr, supra note 17, § 58, at 375.
The role of the court is not to choose the rule that it would adopt for itself, if free
to do so, but to choose the rule that it believes the state court, from all that is
known about its methods of reaching decisions, is likely in the future to adopt.
Id.
97. See Note, Appellate Deference or Review, supra note 78, at 751.
98. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
99. See Woods, supra note 54, at 756-59. Woods further states:
When the state common law is clear, the role of the district courts is equally dear
and ministerial. But when the common law is vague, blurred, or nonexistent, the
district courts' role becomes more difficult. Indeed, the decision in regard to
what the state's highest appellate court would do in regard to a matter it has not
,yet considered often involves the exercise of 'fourth dimensional' reasoning.
Id. at 759.
100. Id. If there is room for doubt as to state law, Professor Woods argues:
The analytic nature of the Erie mandate precludes a conclusion of clear error.
One cannot assert the truth or nontruth of the results of such analysis. Rem-
brandt wits not a clearly better painter than Picasso. William 0. Douglas was not
a dearly betterjudge than Felix Frankfurter, and oranges do not taste better than
apples. So too, decisions regarding the unknowable state of state law are 'wrong'
only when it is clear that they are so.
Id. at 760.
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to the decision of the district court. 1 1
Professor Woods is not alone. Others have similarly concluded that
failure to defer to the district court's determinations of unclear state law
"abandons the Erie goal of conformity" and "reduces the ability of the
federal courts to accurately ascertain and apply state law."' 102 These ar-
guments connect post-Erie case law repudiating the Field doctrine to the
idea that the district court has special expertise when ascertaining un-
clear state law.
These are weighty arguments. Erie implicates important federalism
concerns.' 0 s No federal court wants to ignore Erie's command. Are,
however, these assertions justified? Does it follow that a circuit court's
decision (such as McLinn) not to afford deference to a district court's
determination of unclear state law, rejects Erie's goal of conformity to
state law?
Perhaps. The answer depends entirely on whether federal district
courts are in fact in a better position than the courts of appeals to ascer-
tain unclear state law and whether that position justifies deference. If
the federal district courts can discover state law in a way that the courts
of appeals cannot and if this ability justifies deference, then Erie suggests
deference. Indeed, not to defer would seem an abandonment of Erie's
mandate to follow state law. Whether Erie has been abandoned, or ad-
hered to, however, turns entirely on one's assumptions about the district
judge's expertise on matters of unclear state law.
It is only by assuming that district courts are in a superior position
to ascertain state law that Professor Woods and others reach the weighty
conclusion that Erie mandates some form of the local judge rule.'0 4 The
point here is not to dispute the proposition that federal district courts
have some special ability to ascertain unclear state law.' 05 Rather, the
point is simply to demonstrate that asking whether Erie mandates some
form of the local judge rule begs the question. The real question is
101. Id. at 759-60.
102. See Note, The Implications of De Novo Reviw, supra note 54, at 755. It is conceded
that Erie does not explicitly "acknowledge the role of local expertise in federal treatment
of state law because it assumes that federal courts can accurately apply state law without
it." Id. at 744.
Another commentator, also responding to the Ninth Circuit's McLinn decision, stated
that the "deference given to district court interpretations of unresolved state law comple-
ments the Erie doctrine directive of accurately predicting the highest state court's ruling.
The McLinn case represents the first break with the rule of deference and exemplifies an
erosion in federal-state comity." Note, In re McLinn, supra note. 19, at 284.
103. Erie tells federal courts to follow state law and rejects the notion of general federal
common law. Professor Woods correctly notes that there is wide agreement that the Erie
doctrine "is 'one of the modem cornerstones of our federalism.'" Woods, supra note 54,
at 757-58 (quoting Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965)). See also Ely, supra note
75, at 695.
104. Professor Woods, for example, asserts that when district courts ascertain unclear
state law they engage in "fourth dimensional" analysis and have some "predictive feel"
which is apparently beyond the capacity of the court of appeals. Seesupra notes 99-101 and
accompanying text.
105. This issue is analytically distinct and is addressed below. See infra notes 108-145
and accompanying text.
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whether district court judges have special expertise in matters of unclear
state law. Only after that question is answered can one begin making
assertions about what Erie mandates.
It is no surprise then to find that some, contrary to Professor
Woods and those in agreement with him, have suggested thatErie man-
dates de novo review, stating that to afford district courts deference is to
abandon Erie's goal of conformity to state law.10 6 The proponents of de
novo review, however, also rely on assumptions-namely, that the ap-
pellate court, because of its composition, is in an equal or better posi-
tion than the district court to ascertain unclear state law.10 7 If the
underlying assumptions are changed, then Erie's mandate changes with
them.
Stripped of assumptions, Erie is not a justification for or against the
local judge rule. Erie tells federal courts to follow state law but says
nothing about deference to district court.judges. If we agree with Pro-
fessor Woods that district courts have some special expertise in ascer-
taining unclear state law, then like him we may conclude that Erie
mandates deference. But if we decide to the contrary, we cannot say
that Erie mandates deference.
B. The Expertise of Federal District Judges
The real question is whether district court judges possess special
expertise in matters of unclear state law. There is general agreement
among commentators that the answer is yes. The answer is apparently
not supported by anything more than an assumption-that federal dis-
trict court judges are familiar with the law of the state in which they sit
because they have practiced in the state, or because they deal regularly
with issues of state law.1
0 8
One might wonder whether the assumption makes sense. For ex-
106. See Note, Appellate Deference or Review, supra note 78, at 760. The author takes the
position that deference to the district court is not justifiable and that de novo review gives
"full recognition to the Erie mandate that state courts be treated as law-making organs of
the states." Id.
107. "The appellate court is composed of a greater number of [judges] of at least pre-
sumably equal competence in precisely the same field as the district judge. Their collec-
tive opinion as a panel is more likely to reflect 'state law' than the opinion of a single trial
judge." Id. at 759.
108. Professor Wright succinctly stated this view shared by others:
As a general proposition, a federal court judge who sits in a particular state and
has practiced before the courts may be better able to resolve complex questions
about the law of the state than is some other federal judge who has no such per-
sonal acquaintance with the law of the state. For this reason federal appellate
courts have frequently voiced reluctance to substitute their own view of the state
law for that of the federaljudge. As a matter ofjudicial administration, this seems
defensible.
C. Wright, supra note 17, § 58, at 375-76. See also WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 13, § 2588,
at 752-53; Note, Deference to Federal Circuit Court Interpretations of Unsettled State Law, 1982
Dum LJ. 704, 711 (appellate judges may lack district judges' experience with state law);
Note, Appellate Review of Unclear State Law in the Ninth Circuit After In Re McLinn, 9 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 391, 399-400 (1986)[hereinafter Note, Appellate Review After In Re McLinn]
(federal district judges deal regularly with state law and are more often than not better
acquainted with the law of the state in which they sit).
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ample, suppose the district court judge had served as a United States
Attorney prior to taking the bench. In his first months as a judge, he is
confronted with a question of unclear state law regarding newly estab-
lished water conservancy districts.' 0 9 Although the local judge rule
would apply with full force in such a situation, there is plainly no reason
it should.
The Tenth Circuit explicitly relies on the rationale that federal dis-
trict court judges have special expertise in state law, however, 1 0 and no
attempt is made here to demonstrate empirically that its reliance is mis-
placed. Rather, it is argued that even if one accepts the notion that dis-
trict court judges are familiar with the law of the state in which they sit,
one is not led to the conclusion that deference should be afforded. Two
quite different questions must be asked. Do local judges have expertise?
If so, does it follow that the court of appeals should afford them some
degree of deference?
It must be remembered that the local judge rule only applies when
state law is unclear, that is, when the state supreme court has not explic-
itly ruled on an issue. 1I How, one might ask, can anyone be considered
an expert at ascertaining unclear law? Is it not odd to think that a
judge's previous experience with state law would bring a special level of
expertise to unclear questions? What would that expertise be? Is it the
sort of expertise desired? Why not subject a district court's opinion,
based on such expertise, to full de novo review? The answer to these
questions depend on the kind of unclarity a court faces.
Part of the effort here is to examine the claim that when state law is
unclear, appellate courts are engaged more in speculation than legal
reasoning so that appellate review can add little to the district court
judge's determinations of state law.112 By dissecting the phrase "un-
clear state law," an attempt is made to demonstrate that such claims are
109. Other situations for consideration include, for example, a district court judge
who, prior to taking the bench, had specialized in federal law of some kind and had no
experience with state law at all; or a state judge who is appointed to the Tenth Circuit to
review an inexperienced district judge. See Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d
1416, 1421 (McKay, J., concurring) (Judge McKay argues that the expertise rationale for
the local judge rule is suspect). Judges might also come to the bench following a teaching
career. It cannot be said that these judges have special familiarity with the law of the state
in which they sit. Perhaps the rule should not be applied to such judges. Or perhaps it
should apply only after some period of time on the bench, after the judge has had the
opportunity to become familiar with state law. Id. And might not the district judge also
have special expertise in federal law?
110. See, e.g., Rhody, 771 F.2d at 1419 ("Where there is no authoritative decision of a
state court on an issue under purely local law, great deference must be paid to the view of
a federal judge who is familiar with the local law and practice.").
111. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The phrase not "clearly ruled" upon
yet is used here because there may often be situations in which a state's supreme court has
ruled on closely related issues but has not offered definitive guidance. See infra notes 116-
118 and accompanying text.
112. See Woods, supra note 54, at 759-61 (arguing that when state law is unclear a trial
judge's determinations should not be overturned on appeal unless dearly wrong because
state law is unknowable); Note, Appellate Review After In Re McLinn, supra note 108, at 410-
11 (When state law is unclear "an appellate court is engaged more in speculation than in
legal reasoning as to how it thinks the state's courts eventually will decide the issue.").
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overbroad, that even where state law is unclear, the district judge still is
engaged in legal analysis that is perfectly susceptible to appellate review.
1. Conflicting State Court Opinions
Suppose there are apparently conflicting state court opinions on an
issue, as was the case in Taxpayers For Animas-La Plata v. Animas-La
Plata.'13 The question there was whether a bill passed by the Colorado
legislature violated Colorado's constitutional prohibition of laws "retro-
spective in operation."' 114 The bill "validated" and "recreated" every
water conservancy district organized under Colorado's Water Conser-
vancy Act to undercut the plaintiffs' challenge to the creation of a water
conservancy district. The district court said that the bill did not violate
the Colorado Constitution and dismissed the complaint. The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 15
Before mentioning the local judge rule, the court discussed the vari-
ous state court opinions and the district court judge's interpretation of
those opinions. One Colorado case had rather clearly held that any leg-
islative attempt to prohibit a previously authorized remedy was a per se
confiscation of the plaintiffs' rights in violation of state constitutional
provisions, suggesting that the district court had erred in dismissing the
complaint. 1 6 Relying on more recent opinions, however, the district
court held that the "right" being denied had to be "vested" or "substan-
tial" and reasoned that the right to pursue a legal remedy is not such a
vested right. 1 7 It was after reviewing these cases, some from the Colo-
113. 739 F.2d 1472 (10th Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 1472. Colorado's legislature passed the Water Conservancy Act to assist
communities in financing water projects. Id. at 1474. Under the Act, conservancy districts
could be established by petitions signed by landowners. Those opposed to the creation of
a district could seek a general election on the establishment of a district by filing a petition
in opposition. Id. Concerned with adverse environmental impact, the plaintiffs filed such
a petition in state court. The state court judge found the petition insufficient to force an
election. Id.
Displeased with the procedures in state court, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal
court, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). At this point the lawsuit "ballooned
into a matter of great consequence," calling into question the validity of the Act's proce-
dures for establishing conservancy districts. Id. It was at this point that the Colorado
legislature passed the bill which "validated" and "recreated" every conservancy district
created under the Act.
115. Id. at 1475-76. Abstention was apparently not considered. Abstention, like certi-
fication, may in some cases be a way of avoiding unclear issues of state law. Federal courts
may abstain to avoid needless conflict with a state's administration of its affairs. See Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Federal courts may also refrain from deciding
constitutional issues if there are unsettled questions of state law. See Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally WRIGHT & MIL.ER, supra note 13, §§ 4242-
4246. Courts, however, may not abstain simply because state law is difficult to ascertain.
See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). Thus, abstention, while
relevant, does not eliminate the difficulties posed by questions of unclear state law. See
Note, The Implications of De Novo Review, supra note 54, at 750 (noting that abstention is
costly and time-consuming).
116. See Brown v. Challis, 23 Colo. 145, 46 P. 679 (1896). Brown involved a legislative
attempt to prohibit the previously authorized sale of mining activity. Construing the same
state constitutional provision raised in Animas-La Plata, the court ruled that denying the
plaintiffs' remedies was a violation of their rights.
117. The district judge relied on Vail v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 108
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rado Supreme Court, that the Tenth Circuit cited the local judge rule, in
its "entitled to deference" version. 18
Animas-La Plata raises an interesting question: What does it mean to
say that the district court judge has special expertise in construing con-
flicting state court opinions? Surely, it rarely means, and apparently did
not mean in Animas-La Plata, that the judge brings to bear some special
knowledge beyond the scope of those opinions. 119 Relying on the ex-
pertise of the district judge is dubious when state law is considered un-
clear because there are conflicting nondispositive state court opinions.
The court of appeals is in just as good a position, or a better one, to
construe conflicting opinions. Three heads are better than one. 120
2. No State Court Opinions
Sometimes state law is unclear not because there are conflicting
state court opinions, but because there are no state court opinions what-
soever. That was the situation in Fox v. Ford Motor Co. 12 1 In Fox, the
district court held that Wyoming would adopt the crashworthiness or
second collision doctrine. 12 2 One might say that this is a case where the
expertise of the district judge, who had been a member of the Wyoming
bar and a practitioner, should be considered particularly important.' 2
Fox illustrates, however, that deference to the district court is unneces-
sary where no dispositive state court authority exists.
At the time of the decision, there was a split of authority on the
crashworthiness question in other jurisdictions. The majority of those
jurisdictions had adopted the crashworthiness doctrine but a small mi-
nority had not.1 24 It was apparent that the trend was toward adoption of
Colo. 206, 115 P.2d 389 (1941). In that case, the court held that article II, section 11 of
the Colorado Constitution applies solely to statutes which take away or impair vested
rights, but did not specify what it meant by vested. Noting that the term "vested" was
conclusory, the court of appeals stated that the term probably did not include the right to
pursue legal remedies and any rights which attach during the pendency of a lawsuit are not
vested rights. Animas-La Plata, 739 F.2d at 1477 (citing Continental Title Co. v. District
Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1314 (Colo. 1982)).
118. Animas-La Plata, 739 F.2d at 1472-73.
119. The duty to ascertain state law would seem to prevent reliance on the district
court's expertise where, as in Animas-La Plata, there are numerous state appellate opinions
which have some bearing on the issue. Those opinions would serve as the source of gui-
dance to a federal district court judge, and to the court of appeals as well. This is not to
say that district courts are bound by state appellate court opinions. Those opinions, how-
ever, are to be given "proper regard." See supra note 95.
120. The point here is a simple structural one. See, e.g., Note, A Nondeferential Standard,
supra note 94, at 1313-14 (noting not only that courts of appeals have three judges as
opposed to one, but also that they have more time to consider legal issues because they do
not hear evidence).
121. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
122. Wyoming state courts had neither adopted nor rejected the rule. Id. at 781.
123. The court of appeals, again near the end of its analysis, noted that "the trial judge,
having been a member of the Wyoming Bar and a practitioner, is presumed to be in a supe-
rior position to predict from the evidence available whether Wyoming would follow the
majority or minority doctrine on this subject." Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
124. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), represents the
majority view. Noting that accidents are foreseeable in the course of normal automobile
use, the court held that the manufacturer was liable for failing to eliminate unreasonable
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the doctrine 125 and scholars had endorsed it as sound. 126 Moreover,
while Wyoming had not directly considered the issue, it had described
products liability as a dynamic and expanding field and had shown, as
the court said, no tendencies to modify or make exceptions to the gen-
eral rules surrounding liability for negligence. 127
It was against this backdrop that the district court held that Wyo-
ming would recognize the crashworthiness doctrine. This is hardly a
case where special deference seems necessary or desirable. Indeed, the
meaningful review given by the court of appeals in Fox,128 its discussion
of the development of the crashworthiness doctrine in other jurisdic-
tions, and its recognition that scholars had endorsed the doctrine, as-
sured the accuracy of the district court's decision, made in the absence
of dispositive state court authority.
The point here is twofold. First, even in the absence of state court
decisions, a district court judge does not simply intuit state law. He fre-
quently looks to decisions from other jurisdictions, scholarly treatments
of the law, and other pertinent authority. 129 Second, the application of
that authority leads not to some sort of mystical conclusion, but rather
to a reasoned analysis which is subject to precisely the same kind of re-
view that courts of appeals give in cases not. involving issues of unclear
state law.
3. Failure to Articulate an Analysis
Animas-La Plata demonstrates that there is no reason to afford spe-
cial deference to the district court's interpretation of conflicting state
court opinions. Indeed, quite the contrary seems true. 130 Fox demon-
strates that special deference is not warranted where state law is consid-
ered unclear because there are no state court opinions on point. A
district court will often look elsewhere for guidance and review of its
analysis if it is helpful. Together, Animas-La Plata and Fox generally indi-
cate that even where state law is unclear the district court engages in an
risks of foreseeable injury. The minority view was represented by Evans v. General Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). Ford relied on Evans
and a line of cases which followed it. See Fox, 575 F.2d at 780-81. At the time of appeal,
however, Evans had been overruled by Huffv. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1977).
125. The court noted this trend in its opinion. "Acceptance of the crashworthiness
doctrine has increased since Larsen was announced." Fox, 575 F.2d at 781 (citations
omitted).
126. The court cited Professor Prosser and also noted that law reviews had criticized
Evans. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 780-83.
129. Fox is but one example of the Tenth Circuit's reliance on out-of-state authority.
There are many similar cases. See, e.g., Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226,
1228 (10th Cir. 1987)(Kansas courts had not addressed the issue of group libel and the
district court applied the "well settled" law of other jurisdictions); An-Son Corp. v. Hol-
land-America Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 700, 703-04 (10th Cir. 1985)(in construing Oklahoma
statute the court cited law from other jurisdictions as well as scholarly treatises).
130. See supra note 117-120 and accompanying text.
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analytical process, the review of which is both meaningful and
important.
This conclusion would appear to advocate the ascertainment of
state law by a rigid doctrinal analysis of statutes, precedents and the
like-analysis that would leave no room for Professor Woods' "predic-
tive feel"'13 1 or Judge Jerome Frank's "hunch flash of intuition"'13 2 in
the ascertainment of unclear state law. Has this whole debate has boiled
down to an argument against that sort of inarticulate judging?
What of cases unlike Animas-La Plata and Fox, however, which do not
lend themselves to any particular analysis of case law or statutes? What
do district courts do when the law is such that it is difficult or impossible
for the judge to articulate the process of decision? The law still requires
full de novo review.
The Tenth Circuit and others have created an exception to the local
judge rule when the district court fails to articulate the basis for its deci-
sion. In Weiss v. United States, i33 the issue was whether a landowner
owed a duty of reasonable care under Colorado law where artificial con-
ditions (an aerial tramway cable about 150 feet above the ground) not
owned or controlled by a property owner caused injuries to another.
134
The district court said no duty was owed and granted summary judg-
ment for the United States. 135 The Tenth Circuit held that where the
district court fails to cite to authority or "set out its analysis in predicting
how the state's highest court would rule on a novel question of state
law," it will not defer.' 3 6
131. Professor Woods distinguished between "homocentric three dimensional pro-
cess" of legal reasoning and the "fourth dimension," which involves the relationship of
"transcendental values such as truth and justice." See supra notes 98-101 and accompany-
ing text. Professor Woods draws here from Terrel, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of
Legal Reasoning and the Development of Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 288
(1984). Professor Terrel states:
Perhaps we shall never be able to comprehend in full measure that which is by
definition beyond our logical capacities. In other words, it may be inevitable that
the best understanding of the fourth dimension we can achieve-the best picture
of the elusive tesseract ofhypercube of legal reasoning we can make-is one with-
out substantive content. But this conclusion cannot simply be assumed. Instead,
we must ask these fundamental questions: What is the best approximation of
multidimensional reality that we can make in our world? And what effect does the
debate about this approximation have on legal argument?
Id. at 328 (emphasis in original).
132. Professor Woods' point relates to judge Frank's argument against conceptualizing
legal reasoning as discerning answers from clear prior principles. See J. Fwx, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1963).
133. 787 F.2d 518, 525 (10th Cir. 1986).
134. Joseph Weiss was piloting a helicopter on a search and rescue mission when one
of the blades struck an aerial tramway cable, causing the helicopter to crash. One passen-
ger was killed and Weiss was seriously injured. Id. at 520.
135. The suit was filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Weiss alleged that the
United States had failed to depict the aerial cable as an obstruction and that under Colo-
rado law the United States, as owner of the land, was negligent in failing to remove the
cable or to attach warning devices to it. Id. at 520-21. Colorado law applied under 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) because the accident occurred in Colorado. Id. at 524.
136. Id. at 525. The Tenth Circuit is not alone here. See Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc.,
571 F.2d 1277, 1279 n.1 (4th Cir. 1978)(refusing to accord weight to the district court's
oral articulation of the law where the issue was one of great importance).
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There was no question that state law was unclear and therefore the
local judge rule applied.137 Because the district court had not articu-
lated its analysis, however, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the issue de novo.
The court looked to state court decisions, policies and principles in
analogous areas of state law, like Colorado's landlord and tenant law,
and concluded that the United States, on the facts of thecase, owed a
duty to the plaintiffs to protect them from the aerial cables.'
3 8
Weiss fills the gap left by Animas-La Plata and FOx. If the district court
is at a loss when it attempts to ascertain state law and therefore cannot,
or does not, articulate the basis for its decision, the local judge rule will
not be applied. At least the Tenth Circuit does not seem willing to allow
district courts to ground a decision regarding unclear state law on Pro-
fessor Woods' notion of "predictive feel" in the "fourth dimension." If
deference is not desirable in cases like Animas-La Plata and Fox, where
there are conflicting state law opinions or none at all, and if deference is
not allowed in cases like Weiss, where the district court fails to articulate
its analysis, there may be little reason left for deference.
4. Problematic Exceptions to the Local Judge Rule
The preceding arguments have focused on the expertise of the dis-
trictjudge, the most persuasive justification for the local judge rule, and
on various types of unclear state -law which bring the local judge rule
into play. It has been shown that the court of appeals has an important
role even where it is reviewing unclear state law and that district court
decisions should be afforded full de novo review. A number of excep-
tions to the local judge rule are -mentioned here to illustrate various
problems with the rule.
In abandoning its local judge rule in In re McLinn, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that giving great weight to- the district court's decision, apart
from the authorities cited by the district judge, is unsound because it
invites exploration of each judge's experience and "shifts the focus from
the appropriate legal authorities to the biography of the judge."'
3 9
This observation is closely connected to the recognized exception
to the local judge rule where both the district court judge and a member
of the appellate panel have experience with the applicable state law) 40
The district-courtjudge is just as much an expert and'yet no deference is
afforded. The standard of review, which changes from some form of
deference to no deference, is then dependent on the fortuity that one
member of the appellate panel happens to have some experience with
the applicable state law. 14 1
137. Weiss, 787 F.2d at 525. In reversing the district court's interpretation of Colorado
law, the court of appeals noted that it had "not found any Colorado decision which ad-
dresses this precise issue." Id. There is little doubt here, as in Rawson, that application of
the rule would have resulted in affirmance.
138. Id. at 526.
139. In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc).
140. See supra note 20.
141. Who keeps track of biographical data? When appellate panels are not announced
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Consider also the exception where conflicting opinions on state law
have issued from lower federal courts. 142 The local judge rule does not
apply, again leading to awkward and arguably arbitrary results. Why
should the rule not apply here when it clearly applies in the face of con-
flicting state court opinions, which are entitled to as much or more con-
sideration in ascertaining state law?
14 3
This was the majority's reason for not applying the local judge rule
in Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 144 After the district court recognized a
private right of action for age discrimination under Colorado's statute,
the issue came up in a number of other federal courts in Colorado and
those courts split on the issue. 14 5 For this reason, the Tenth Circuit did
not apply the local judge rule, opting instead for a full de novo review of
the issue. The application of this exception and the subsequent de novo
standard of review, however, was fortuitous. If no other district court
had ruled on the issue before the appeal in Rawson had been decided,
the local judge rule would have applied and Rawson's judgment would
not have been reversed.
It is dubious whether district court judges can be considered ex-
perts when state law is unclear. If, in some cases, the judges can be
considered experts, it does not follow that their decisions should be af-
forded deference. They may, as in Animas-La Plata, be interpreting con-
flicting state court opinions. Or they may, as in Fox, be relying on law
from other jurisdictions. In both situations, district courts are engaged
before the briefs are filed (as in the Tenth Circuit), how can lawyers know whether the
local judge rule will apply? How can lawyers know what standard of review to articulate in
the briefs?
It may well be that the same fortuity will be at work, as a matter of practice, even if the
local judge rule is abandoned and no deference is afforded district court decisions. If a
panel knows that a district court judge has special expertise in a field of state law, it may
afford some deference. Alternatively, ifa panel member has special expertise in a particu-
lar field, that member may be assigned the opinion.
142. See supra note 22.
143. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text, discussing the application of the
rule where there are conflicting state court opinions.
One reason that the rule is not applied when lower federal courts have reached con-
flicting results is based on stare decisis. There is little doubt that an opinion of the Tenth
Circuit affirming a district court's interpretation of unclear state law would be regarded as
the circuit's interpretation of state law and would be followed by lower federal courts (and
even lower state courts) absent an indication to the contrary by the state court. See, e.g.,
MOORE, supra note 26, 0.309(2). It would be odd to think that the first of two conflicting
interpretations of state law (both the interpretations of "experts") would end up the law of
the circuit simply because it reached the appellate panel first.
This point raises important questions. If the court of appeals were to affirm one inter-
pretation over another, would that affirmance be a binding pronouncement on state law,
or would it only be a holding that the district court's interpretation was not "dearly erro-
neous" or "clearly wrong?" The Ninth Circuit in McLinn was troubled by these questions
and their implications for circuit precedent. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1402 & n.2.
144. 822 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988).
145. Two courts recognized the private right of action and one court did not. See Raw-
son, 822 F.2d at 911 & nn.5-6. Compare Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 664 F. Supp 1395 (D.
Colo. 1985) and Grandchamp v United Air Lines, Inc., 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. 34,987 (D.
Colo. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1534 (1989) (found a cause of action under the statute) with Taylor v. K-Mart Corp., No.
85-M-2336, slip op. (D. Colo. Jan. 13, 1986) (found no cause of action).
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in legal analysis which should be subject to meaningful review. If there
is nothing for the district court to say because state law is enormously
unclear, the local judge rule is inapplicable. Lastly, the exceptions to
the local judge rule highlight the rule's preoccupation with judicial biog-
raphies and its arbitrary tendencies.
C. Supreme Court Deference
The Supreme Court has recognized the expertise of lower federal
courts in ascertaining state law. The Tenth Circuit has cited this practice
as ajustification for its local judge rule. 14 6 But the Supreme Court does
not defer only to federal district courts; it defers to the courts of appeals
as well. 14 7 While the Court has deferred explicitly to a district judge,
148
its practice of deference is most accurately described as a two-court rule,
recognizing the expertise of both the district courts and the courts of
appeals in matters of state law.149 Because the Supreme Court's rule of
deference is grounded on the expertise of both lower courts, its two-
court rule is not a justification for deference by the court of appeals.' 5 0
Here we come to an oddity. The local judge rule is presumably
justified in the courts of appeals largely on the ground that federal dis-
trict court judges are the experts in state law because they are closer to
and more familiar with the law of the states in which they sit.15 1 Yet
when the Supreme Court defers to determinations of lower federal
146. See, e.g., Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1985).
147. See, e.g., Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 395 (1988)(the
Court rarely reviews a construction of state law agreed upon by the two lower federal
courts); Brocket v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1985)(Court normally
defers to the construction of a state statute to reflect its belief that district courts and
courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respec-
tive states); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
In Butner, the court of appeals reversed the district court's determination of state law.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it would "decline to review the state law ques-
tion." Id. at 57-58. The Ninth Circuit noted this in In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir.
1984)(en banc), concluding that Supreme Court practice is not to give weight to the dis-
trict court or to the court of appeals, but rather, to deny review of state law questions that
have been fully reviewed by an intermediate court. Id. at 1399. From this, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that implicit in the Supreme Court's practice is the assumption that full and
independent review will be given by the court of appeals. Id.
For an excellent discussion of some older Supreme Court cases look to Kurland, see
supra note 77, at 215-18.
148. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Court deferred to the
judgment of the federal district court on the state law issue and remanded the case to the
district court, not the Second Circuit, for an interpretation of state law. Id. at 204-05.
More recently, in United States v. Kimbell Food, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), the Court
remanded to the district court for a state law determination.
149. See supra note 147. Commentators agree that Supreme Court precedent is best
read to indicate deference not to the federal district court, but to both lower federal
courts. See, e.g., Note, A Nondeferential Standard, supra note 94, at 1319-21; Kurland, supra
note 77, at 216-17 ("Although the Court has indicated that it will ordinarily be guided by
the lower courts' construction of state law, it has usually not distinguished with any care
between the district court and the court of appeals.").
150. If this conclusion seems to have been reached rather cryptically, it is only because
it appears to this author, as it has to previous commentators, that the conclusion is a clear
one. See supra note 149.
151. See supra note 108.
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courts, it does so on the ground that the courts of appeals are also ex-
perts in state law.152 Thus, both the courts of appeals and the district
courts are the designated experts in state law when an issue is before the
Supreme Court for review, but not when the issue is before the courts of
appeals for review.
There is a not too surprising explanation for this apparent enigma.
The special function of the Supreme Court is the construction and appli-
cation of the Constitution and legislation of Congress.' 53 Scholars have
agreed that the real reason for Supreme Court deference lies not with
the expertise of the lower federal courts at all, but rather, with the need
for judicial economy. 54 If this explanation is accepted, the riddle is
solved. The courts of appeals need not be viewed as experts in state law
at all tojustify Supreme Court deference. Deference makes sense on the
separate ground that the Court must attend to weightier matters.
It might be sensible to extend this rationale to the courts of appeals,
to say that courts of appeals, like the Supreme Court, should defer to
save time for more important matters of federal law.155 Indeed, it seems
that this is the most logical explanation for the local judge rule. Nearly all
federal question appeals are decided at the federal appellate level.
Moreover, there is a current crisis in the work load of the federal courts
of appeals. 
1 5 6
152. Brocket v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491,499-500 (1985) (We normally defer to
the construction of a state statute to reflect our belief that district courts and courts of
appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective
states).
153. See Friendly, supra note 88, at 407. See also infra note 154.
154. See Kurland, supra note 77 ("The real reason for the Supreme Court to bow, and it
usually does, to the decisions on state law of the lower federal courts rests not on the
premise of expertness but on one of economy of judicial administration."); WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 13, § 4036 (Supreme Court deference reflects a concern with achieving
an efficient judicial appellate structure); Note, A Nondeferential Standard, supra note 94, at
1322 (the Court's deference to lower courts in state law matters reflects the Court's need
to conserve its judicial resources); Note, Appellate Deference or Review, supra note 78, at 755;
Note, In Re McLinn, supra note 19, at 284 & n.65.
155. It has been argued that all federal courts are experts primarily in federal law. Pro-
fessor Amar contends that the structural superiority of the federal courts in federal ques-
tions cases is supported by the text, history, and structure of article III of the Constitution.
Also supporting the superiority of federal courts in federal question cases is Erie's implica-
tion for federal judicial responsibility: If "Erie says state courts are the unique and definite
expounders of state law, why isn't the most plausible corollary that federal courts are the
unique and definitive expounders of federal law?" Amar, Law Story Book Review, 102 HAtv.
L. REv. 688, 697 (1988). See also Amar, A Neo Federalist View of Article III: Separating The Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985).
156. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 17, § 3 at 11 (Professor Wright states that the last "two
decades have seen a sudden and sharp increase in the work load of the courts of appeals
that poses a major crisis injudicial administration."). This crisis is part of what drives the
arguments for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. See generally Bork, Dealing With the
Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 236-37 (1976); Rowe, Abolishing DiversityJurisdic-
tion: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REv. 963, 969 (1979);
Sherman & Isaacman, State Law Belongs in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 57
(1978)(while the application of Erie may appear simple, it has confused the law); FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY CoMMrrTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE § 10
(1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE] ("The most acute problems of
overload are at the appellate rather than the trial level.").
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Why not justify the local judge rule on the ground ofjudicial econ-
omy? Some have argued that such a justification would be an abroga-
tion of the statutory right of appeal. 15 7 It is true that such ajustification
for a less exacting standard of review does not sufficiently address the
natural effect on the parties' statutory right to review.' 58 Another
profound objection, however, is that such a justification makes the rule
and the courts' standard of review into a stopgap of sorts, not indepen-
dently justified, but created by the courts to address the deeper and
more fundamental crisis in their work load. If change is justified it
should come in more direct ways, such as the abolition of diversity juris-
diction. 159 If the courts of appeals have too much work, that is a sepa-
rate problem with its own set of implications and it should be separately
addressed.
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
As this article was on its way to the printer the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Russell v. Salve Regina College,160 to decide whether a
157. FED. R. APP. P. 3 provides: "An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district
court to a court of appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal ...." Additionally, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction from all final decisions of the
district courts ofthe United States. One author states that if"an appellate court reviewing
the case for errors dogmatically refuses to reconsider the rule of law, the parties' day in
court is not meaningful." See Note, Appellate Deference or Review, supra note 78, at 758-59.
158. This is not an issue in the Supreme Court because parties do not have a statutory
right to review in that Court. Unlike the statutory right to appeal to the circuit court, the
Supreme Court, in most cases, reviews decisions by statutory right of certiorari. Review
may be granted to forestall possible emergence of a conflict between lower courts, to de-
termine whether the courts of appeals have decided an issue contrary to Supreme Court
decisions, to reexamine the court's own decisions and to exercise supervisory power over
the lower federal courts. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, at 4035.
The Ninth Circuit, in In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc), was par-
ticularly concerned that affording deference to the district court was an abdication of its
appellate responsibility. See id. at 1398 (there is "no justification for being less thorough,
for abdicating any portion of our appellate responsibility, or for curtailing the parties'
appellate rights simply because the law involved is state law"). The court noted, ironically,
that "if the parties were to proceed in a state court to litigate a state law issue, they would
have the right to an independent de novo review of the trial judge's determination ....
The parties should be entitled to the same appellate consideration in the federal court
system." Id. at 1401.
159. As noted above, see supra note 156, the current crisis in the federal court work load
has fueled arguments for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. The Federal Courts Study
Committee recently recommended to Congress that diversity jurisdiction be limited to
complex multi-state litigation, interpleader and suits involving aliens. See FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMrrrEE, supra note 158, at 38-42. The Committee noted "crisis of volume" in
the courts of appeals and advocated fundamental changes to the appellate courts. Recom-
mendations include quick congressional approval of additional appellate judgeships, sig-
nificant procedural and structural reform of the circuit courts and a pilot project for
dealing with intercircuit conflicts. Id. at 109.
160. 890 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3827 (1990). In Russell, the
First Circuit held that "in view of the customary appellate deference accorded to interpre-
tations of state law" the district court's determination that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court would apply standard contract principles is not reversible error. Id. at 489. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a party is entitled to de novo review,
not merely whether de novo review is the most compelling or desirable standard. The
Court may focus its inquiry, therefore, on the statutory right of appeal. See supra note 157,
one among many important considerations.
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party is entitled to de novo review of questions of unclear state law in
diversity actions. Should the Court answer in-the affirmative, the Tenth
Circuit and others would be compelled to abandon their practice of def-
erence, a welcome result. However, even if the Court decides that full
review is not required, the Tenth Circuit would nevertheless be free to
afford full de novo review.
One thing is certain. Unless the Supreme Court decides that de
novo review is required, the Tenth Circuit must thoughtfully consider its
local judge rule en banc. 16 1 Given the current state of the rule, virtually
any formulation of the standard could be supported by citation to Tenth
Circuit authority. 16 2 Because only an en banc court may reject panel
authority, 163 the various articulations of the rule by different panels,
however inconsistent, are all valid precedents for appellate practition-
ers. As noted throughout, whether the court is reviewing a question de
novo or under some less exacting standard, the standard applied may be
dispositive. 6 4 The current state of the rule leaves both practitioners
and appellate panels at a loss.
A. Full De Novo Review
Assuming the court grants en banc review, it should abandon its
highly deferential standard and give full de novo review to questions of
unclear state law. None of the justifications which have been advanced
for the local judge rule withstand scrutiny. Erie commands only that
state law be.followed. It offers no support for or against the rule. To
read Erie as ajustification for the local judge rule, one must assume that
federal district courts have special expertise in state law which justifies
deference on appeal.' 65
The assumption the Erie justification requires is enormously prob-
lematic. 166 To say that an issue of state law is unclear is not to say that
the district court is left without authority to construe and apply.' 6 7 Any
161. The riost direct precedent for considering this issue appropriate for en banc con-
sideration is the Ninth Circuit's McLinn decision where the panel itself requested en banc
review. Judges Seymour and McKay have stated their willingness to review the issue en
banc. See, e.g., Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 822 F.2d 908, 925-26 & n.1 (10th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1989) (McKay, J., dissenting)("I would happily join the
panel in seeking the en banc abandonment of the clearly erroneous standard of review of
state law issues."); Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251, 256 (10th Cir. 1985) (Seymour,
J., concurring)("Although I do not urge that we adopt a new standard without en banc
consideration, I believe that application of the dearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) is
inappropriate and reflects the confusion over this issue within our own circuit."). Natu-
rally, the Tenth Circuit would be prudent to await a decision by the Supreme Court before
considering this issue en banc.
162. See supra notes 26-47.
163. See supra note 46.
164. See supra notes 58, 67-68 & 137 and accompanying text.
165. Erie can and has been read to require de novo review by assuming that appellate
courts are in a better position to ascertain state law. See supra note 107 and accompanying
text.
166. See supra note 109.
167. Both in cases where state law conflicts and in cases where there is no state law
directly on point, the district court may nevertheless engage in traditional legal analysis
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expertise held by the district court is best expressed in a thoughtfully
reasoned and persuasive opinion which demonstrates, on the basis of
the authorities presented, that it is entitled to respect. 16 8 Moreover, the
Supreme Court's practice of deference, because it is not grounded solely
in the expertise of the district court,1 69 is not a justification for defer-
ence in the court of appeals.
The most logical argument for deference by the court of appeals is
one which cannot be endorsed, namely, that courts of appeals as experts
in declaring federal law, should defer to district courts on matters of
state law to save time, given the current crisis in the appellate work
load. 170 The work load of the courts of appeals is a separate problem
which should be, and is being, separately addressed. A deferential stan-
dard of review is not justifiable simply as a timesaving device.
B. An Alternative Solution
If a majority of the court disagrees with the arguments for full de
novo review (and concludes that some degree of deference is justifiable,
and deference is not prohibited by the statutory right to appeal) which
of the various articulations of the rule should be adopted as an alterna-
tive solution to full de novo review? One thing can be said with confi-
dence: reliance on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a) should be
abandoned. 17 1 As Judge Seymour pointed out in Carter v. City of Salina,
citation to Rule 52(a) as a standard of review for questions of law is just
"plain wrong."' 72 Rule 52(a) applies to questions of fact and makes lit-
tle sense when applied to questions of law.
17
In the same vein, the Tenth Circuit should give up its lone position
of reviewing questions of state law under the dearly wrong standard.
Even if some degree of deference is thought to be justifiable, the dearly
wrong standard goes too far. No other circuit affords such a great de-
which is perfectly susceptible to review on appeal. See supra notes 113-128 and accompany-
ing text.
168. See In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984)(en banc) (noting that it is
unsound to give deference to the district court apart from authorities presented because
such deference depends on ad hominem factors not part of the record). The Tenth Circuit,
by virtue of its recognized exception to the local judge rule which precludes deference
when the district court has not articulated its analysis, has tacitly endorsed this view. See
supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
170. As mentioned earlier, scholars have generally agreed that the Supreme Court de-
fers to lower federal courts on matters of state law to save time for the construction and
application of the Constitution and legislation of Congress. See supra note 154.
171. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
172. 773 F.2d 251, 256-57 (10th Cir. 1985). Both Judges Seymour and McKay have
indicated they would favor en banc review and would reject the dearly erroneous stan-
dard. See supra note 161. See also Hauser v. Public Serv. Co., 797 F.2d 876, 881 (10th Cir.
1986) (Seymour, J., concurring).
173. The Supreme Court has stated that a "finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Scholars have rightly criticized the
Tenth Circuit for applying FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) to questions of law. See MooPx, supra note
26, at 3125-29 & n.28.
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gree of deference. 174 The dearly wrong standard does not allow suffi-
cient room for courts of appeals to thoughtfully review questions of
state law.' 75 The standard also has the effect of leaving questions of
state law unsettled.
176
If the court retains its local judge rule, it should be retained in its
intermediate form. The decisions of district courts would receive "sub-
stantial deference," but would nevertheless be subject to meaningful re-
view. 17 This would align the court with a majority of other circuits
while providing for meaningful review of questions of state law.
CONCLUSION
Tenth Circuit decisions articulate conflicting and inconsistent ver-
sions of the local judge rule and can fairly be described as chaotic. The
rule has important consequences for litigants and appellate practitioners
and should be clarified. The court should thoughtfully consider the rule
en banc. It should abandon its extreme practice of reviewing determina-
tions of unclear state law under the clearly erroneous or clearly wrong
standards and should instead afford full de novo review.
174. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
175. In its important opinion in Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973), the Eighth Circuit abandoned its ex-
tremely deferential standard in favor of a great weight standard. It reasoned that under
its old standard, so long as the trial judge arrives at a permissible conclusion, the court of
appeals is bound. Id. at 1019-20 & n.6. That application of the rule, the court noted,
precludes appellate consideration of important questions. Id.
176. As noted earlier, under the clearly wrong standard, the court of appeals decision
theoretically can be viewed only asa decision that the district court was not clearly wrong.
It cannot be viewed as a decision on the merits. See supra note 143. Judge McKay has
stated that extreme applications of the local judge rule, such as the dearly erroneous or
dearly wrong standards,
[N]ot only would undermine the obvious purpose of appeals to a collegial court,
where collective consideration is one of the underlying notions, but would have
the wasteful effect of leaving an issue unsettled when subsequently considered by
parties, lawyers, and other district judges. If, as is true in many cases, either of
two interpretations of state law would be rational, we would be required to affirm
consecutive conflicting interpretations by two judges sitting in the same state, the
untenable effect of which would be to leave the issue of law unsettled until the
state court of appropriate authority finally has an opportunity to rule on the issue.
Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 1416, 1421 (10th Cir. 1985)(McKay, J.,
concurring).
177. For a discussion of the various articulations of the intermediate standard see supra
notes 7273 and accompanying text.
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THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
I. INTRODUCTION
No person shall "be deprived of life,' liberty, or property, without
due process of law."' This simple-sounding command and the notion
of protection of liberty interests have been the focus of much contro-
versy since congressional enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (Act). 2 The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission
(Commission) charged with establishing sentencing guidelines3 for fed-
eral judges to rely on when sentencing convicted offenders. The intent
of the guidelines was to promote uniformity in sentencing in the face of
what had been described as "shameful disparity" in sentences which
were granted to similarly situated individuals;4 however, individual dis-
cretion which had traditionally resided with the sentencing judge was
eroded by the application of these guidelines.5 The guidelines went into
effect on November 1, 1987.6
OnJanuary 18, 1989, the Supreme Court decided Mistretta v. United
States7 which ruled that the sentencing guidelines were constitutional in
that they amounted to neither excessive delegation of legislative power
nor violation of the separation of powers principle. The Court did not
address, among other possible issues, the wisdom of fixed prison
sentences. The guidelines have been accused of being a mechanical sen-
tencing system which fails to be a satisfactory substitute for an exper-
ienced trial judge who can consider both compassion and skepticism
when passing sentence. 8 Since the Mistretta decision, the lower courts
have been plagued with challenges to the guidelines on different consti-
tutional grounds.
The Tenth Circuit has not been immune in the past year from chal-
lenges to these guidelines. Several cases argued before the court have
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (Supp. III 1985); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (Supp. III 1985).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1).
4. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 65, rerinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225]; see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
5. See Recent Develonents, 42 ARK. L. REV. 1117 (1989).
6. The Act states:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range referred to in
subsection (a)(4), unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consider-
ation by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. IV
1986).
7. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
8. L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, § 5 (Opinion), at 4, col. 1.
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charged that the guidelines were improperly applied to the facts.9 The
cases of most interest after Mistretta are based on constitutional due pro-
cess challenges to the guidelines. The issue was raised several times
before the Tenth Circuit but was disposed of without a ruling.10 Fi-
nally, in United States v. Thomas,1I the court rejected a due process chal-
lenge to the guidelines.
Following a brief discussion of the history, of the guidelines, this
article examines the Tenth Circuit's holdings regarding the constitution-
ality of the federal sentencing guidelines and the future implications of
these holdings on subsequent constitutional challenges to this determi-
nate sentencing structure.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to the changes that occurred through implementation of these
guidelines, sentencing in federal criminal cases was based on an indeter-
minate sentencing system. Under this past system, judges, while guided
by statutes specifying penalty ranges for individual crimes, had much
discretion to decide how severely or leniently to apply the statutory pen-
alty. 12 Parole was used as a supplement to this system, whereby an of-
fender was "returned to society under the 'guidance and control' of a
parole officer."1
The basis of sentencing under the old system was to foster and
potentiate the rehabilitation of the offender. The rationale underlying
this rehabilitative model was to minimize the risk to society that the of-
fender would resume criminal activity once he had completed his sen-
tence.1 4 In the 1970's, in the face of growing skepticism over the
rehabilitative purpose, discretionary sentencing structures became the
target of much criticism.' 5 Congress became aware that the rehabilita-
tion model had become "outmoded" and that the goal of rehabilitating
offenders was not being reached.' 6 The two negative consequences of
the indeterminate sentencing system noted in the Senate Report were
that there was disparity in sentences imposed on similarly situated indi-
viduals and that, consequently, uncertainty existed as to the time an of-
fender would spend in prison.' 7 As a result, in 1984, while public
concern was mounting about the increase in drug-related and violent
9. See United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465 (1oth Cir. 1990); United States v.
Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (1oth Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720 (1oth Cir.
1989); United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253 .(10th Cir. 1989).
10. See Lewis v. Martin, 880 F.2d 288 (1oth Cir. 1989); United States v. Goldbaum,
879 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1989).
11. 884 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1989).
12. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 650 (1989).
13. Id. (citation omitted).
14. Id. See also A. VON HIRSCH, K. KNAPP & M. TONRY, THE SENTENCING COMMISSION
AND ITS GUIDELINES 3.4 (1987)[hereinafter HIRSCH].
15. HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 3.




crimes, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
198418 which contained the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
The. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the United States
Sentencing Commission to draft guidelines to standardize sentences
imposed by federal courts upon similarly situated individuals for compa-
rable criminal conduct.1 9 The Commission was established "as an in-
dependent commission in the judicial branch of the United States."
'20
Congress mandated that the Commission be comprised of seven voting
members and one non-voting member. The members are appointed
through Senate approval of Presidential nominations. 2 1 One of the re-
quirements for composition of the Commission is that three members
must be federal judges and no more than four members are permitted to
be from the same political party.
22
The Commission was charged with promulgating determinative
sentence guidelines and periodically reviewing and revising the guide-
lines. 23 Furthermore, it was required that the Commission must, at least
annually, submit to Congress an analysis of the operation of the
guidelines.
24
Practically, the guidelines are based on a grid system. A sentencing
range is given based on the "offense level," which is calculated by ad-
justing the "base level" of a particular criminal offense through applica-
tion of some offense and offender characteristics. 25 The base level is the
assigned value associated with a particular offense before any adjust-
ments are made. The mitigating and aggravating'factors to be consid-
ered in adjusting the base level have been surrounded by controversy.
The guidelines have been accused of failing to adequately consider im-
portant offender characteristics "such as age, prior drug history, and ex-
tent of the individual offender's blameworthiness for the specific crime
for which he is being sentenced."
'26
The Commission had been encouraged by Congress to explore the
"relevancy to the purposes of sentencing of all kinds of factors, whether
they are obviously pertinent or not; to subject those factors to'intelligent
and dispassionate professional analysis; and on this basis to recommend,
18. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 2. This act was a bipartisan congressional effort to change and
recodify the federal criminal code. Changes made by this law included: (1) changes in the
areas of sentencing, bail reform, drug trafficking, computer fraud, and criminal forfeiture;
(2). establishment of a fund for compensation of victims of violent crimes; (3) revision of
the insanity defense; (4) substantive changes to some of the federal statutes that dealt with
the commission of violent or nonviolent serious offenses; and (5) some amendments to
criminal code procedures to facilitate smoother operation of the federal criminal justice
system. See also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
20. Id. § 991(a).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 994(o).
24. Id. § 994(w).
25. Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1949 (1988).
26. Id. at 1951.
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with supporting reasons, the fairest and most effective guidelines it can
devise."' 27 Yet, the Commission determined only three general catego-
ries of factors to be relevant: (1) the defendant's criminal history; (2) the
defendant's dependence upon criminal activity for livelihood; and (3)
the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for the wrongdoing. 28
While the rigidity of the sentencing guidelines has resulted in re-
cent challenges in the Tenth Circuit, a preliminary challenge - whether
the Commission itself was constitutional - was decided in 1989 by the
United States Supreme Court.
B. Mistretta v. United States
1. Facts
Mistretta, under indictment for three counts arising from a cocaine
sale, challenged the constitutionality of the Commission's guidelines on
the grounds that the Commission was formed in violation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, and that Congress had delegated excessive au-
thority to the Commission to structure the guidelines.29 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the face of varying holdings
on this same issue by different circuit courts. In fact, certiorari was
granted while an appeal was still pending on the case in the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 30 On both issues the Court rejected the constitu-
tional challenges, holding that Congress did not delegate excessive
legislative power to the Commission and did not violate the separation
of powers doctrine by placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch.
27. See S. REP. No. 225,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 175, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3220, 3358.
28. Ogletree, supra note 25, at 1953. Other factors which Congress recommended be
considered relevant to the sentencing procedure include age, education, mental and emo-
tional condition, criminal history, dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood, and
community ties.
All of these factors are not considered. Specifically, Chapters Three and Four of
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, Guidelines Manual (1989), in several parts, list the
adjustments to be considered in altering the offense level.
There are victim-related adjustments (§ 3A). These include victim characteristics
such as whether the victim was vulnerable or was an official. Also included is a considera-
tion of whether the victim was restrained.
There are adjustments to be made depending on the offender's role in the offense.
To be considered under this Part (§ 3B) is whether the offender played an aggravating
role, a mitigating role or if he abused a position of trust or special skill.
Under Part C (§ 3C) is a consideration of whether the offender willfully obstructed or
impeded proceedings during the investigation or prosecution of the offense.
Part D of Chapter Three guides the sentencing judge in adjustments to be made when
there are multiple counts of conviction against the offender.
The final Part of Chapter Three (§ 3E) authorizes the sentencing judge to adjust the
offense level based on the offender's acceptance of responsibility for his/her criminal con-
duct.
Chapter Four allows for adjustments to the base level sentence based on the of-
fender's criminal history and reliance on criminal activities for livelihood.
29. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 653.




a. Excessive Delegation of Legislative Power
The Court found excessive authority was not delegated because
Congress had provided the Commission with an "intelligible principle"
to use in establishing the guidelines. 3 1 This intelligible principle is a
specific delineation of the bounds of discretion, by the delegating party
(Congress), within which the body exercising delegated power must
act.3 2 The boundaries placed upon the Commission by Congress (relied
upon by the Court) included congressional specifications of the goals of
the Commission, 33 the "'purposes' of sentencing that the Cpmmission
must pursue in carrying out its mandate"3 4 and the specific tool, for the
Commission to use in promoting its prescribed'goals - the guidelines
system. 35 In finding that the criteria which Congress supplied the Com-
mission were adequate to reject a challenge based on excessive delega-
tion of legislative authority, the Court discussed the fact that Congress
also provided the Commission with criteria on how the Commission
should promulgate the guidelines.
3 6
b. Separation of Powers
Despite the importance of the principle that each of the three
branches of government must remain free of the control of the other
branches, the Court recognized that there is no requirement that the
branches must be completely distinct and separate.3 7 Further, the
Court reasoned, except in the cases of "most compelling constitutional
reasons," a congressional act that has become law and that addresses a
"deeply vexing national problem" will not be invalidated.
3 8
A further argument was advanced that, because the Act requires
there be a Presidential appointment of federal judges to serve on the
Commission, the Act undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch.
3 9
The Court recognized, however, that Congress has the authority to au-
thorize a federal judge, in an individual capacity, to perform an execu-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 654-58.
33. The Court quoted 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1), supra note 2: "[To 'assure the meeting
of the purposes of sentencing as set forth' in the Act; to 'provide certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records ... while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit indi-
vidualized sentences,' where appropriate; and to 'reflect to the extent practicable, advance-
ment in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.'" Id. at
655-56.
34. "'[To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense'; 'to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct'; 'to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant'; and 'to provide the
defendant with needed ... correctional treatment.'" Id. at 655-56 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2), supra note 2).
35. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 656.
36. Id. at 656-58.
37. Id. at 659.
38. Id. at 661.
39. Id. at 667.
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tive function without violating the separation of powers doctrine.40 The
judges' roles on the Commission, reasoned the Court, are that of com-
missioners or administrators, separate and distinct from their judicial
roles.
4 1
A due process challenge was not raised in Mistretta. After Mistretta
was decided, a challenge to the guidelines, based on a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine and an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative authority, was brought before the Tenth Circuit.4 2 These argu-
ments were, naturally, quickly rejected based on the Mistretta precedent.
III. TENTH CIRCurr OPINIONS
A. United States v. Thomas
1. Facts
Thomas was found guilty by jury verdict of possession with intent to
distribute marijuana. After the verdict, but prior to sentencing, he filed
a motion to have the sentencing guidelines declared unconstitutional.
The trial judge implicitly denied this motion by sentencing Thomas
under the guidelines; however, the judge did assign an alternative sen-
tence in case the guidelines were found to be unconstitutional on
appeal.
4 s
Thomas charged that the guidelines violated his due process right
to have a judge make a discretionary individualized determination of an
appropriate sentence, that the guidelines deprived him of "meaningful
participation" in the sentencing process by limiting his ability to present
evidence relevant to sentencing, and, finally, that the guidelines unlaw-
fully allowed the prosecutor and the Commission, rather than the sen-
tencing judge, to determine his sentence. 44 The court rejected all of
Thomas' due process arguments, joining the other circuit courts4 5 in
refusing to find a due process violation. 46 Since Thomas, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has not readdressed the due process issue in the context of the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines.
4 7
2. Substantive Due Process
a. Holding
The first holding of Thomas was that there exists no federal substan-
40. Id. at 671.
41. Id.
42. United States v. Goldbaum, 879 F.2d 811, 812 (10th Cir. 1989).
43. United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 541 (10th Cir. 1989).
44. Id.
45. See United States v. Bolding, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Pinto,
875 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15 (Ist Cir. 1989); United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827 (8th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. White,
869 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989); United
States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989).
46. Thomas, 884 F.2d at 542.
47. See United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1990).
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tive liberty interest in an individualized determination of an appropriate
sentence. The court found that the recognition of an inherent human
right to individualized treatment in sentencing would be
inconsistent with the generally accepted notion that both retri-
buition, which focuses on the interests of the victim rather than
the status of the defendant, and general deterrence, which fo-
cuses on the interests of society at large rather than the status
of the defendant, are appropriate societal versions for imposing
sanctions.
48
In finding the nonexistence. of a constitutional right to judicial dis-
cretion in individualized sentencing, the Tenth Circuit cited the Second
Circuit. The Second Circuit had articulated that, if such a right existed,
it would surely be recognized by now, given the varying mandatory mini-
mum sentencing practices the federal government and the states have
used in our nation's history.49 In further support of the nonexistence of
a constitutional substantive due process right to individual determina-
tion in sentencing, the court relied on the reasoning in Mistretta. It rea-
soned that, since Mistretta upheld Congress' power to divest the courts
of their sentencing discretion and establish exact, mandatory sentences
for all federal offenses, that Congress may also constitutionally circum-
scribe the discretion of the court in sentencing through the imposition
of these guidelines. 50
Even though the court found that no right to individualized treat-
ment in sentencing exists, the court stated that the guidelines do allow
for some discretion by the sentencing court:
Under the Guidelines, sentencing judges retain discretion to
accept or reject a plea bargain, to resolve factual disputes about
the appropriate base offense level, to consider adjusting that
base level for mitigating and aggravating circumstances, to
choose from a range of sentences, to set probation conditions,
and to determine when to depart from the Guidelines. 51
b. Analysis
At its inception, the Act identified the basic purposes of sentencing
as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 52 Yet,
Congress, in its hearings, acknowledged that rehabilitation alone, the
previously unsuccessful underlying sentencing theory, was not "an ap-
propriate basis for sentencing decisions."1
53
Sentencing could arguably fulfill its purposes of retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation without denying a defendant
the right to individualized sentence determination. The victim's and so-
ciety's interests could be brought more to bear upon the sentence if the
48. Thomas, 884 F.2d at 542-43 (citation omitted).
49. United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1989).
50. Thomas, 884 F.2d at 543. -
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827- 828 (8th Cir. 1989)).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
53. S. REP. No, 225, supra note 4, at 40 n.16.
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judge were allowed greater latitude in determining an appropriate sen-
tence through consideration of the defendant's character, the victim's
losses, and the risk posed to society by that particular individual.
The court's reliance on the argument that if a right to individual
sentencing existed, it would have been articulated by now in the face of a
history of variety in mandatory minimum sentencing schemes is not sur-
prising given the reluctance of thejudiciary to expand the realm of fun-
damental rights. Sentencing schemes with only mandatory minimum
sentencing requirements vary, and, assuredly, some provide for much
more discretion than others. Discretionary sentencing practices were
prominent until the 1970's when rehabilitation was considered to be a
primary goal.54 American statutes typically set only maximum penalties
for each crime, and the judge had the choice of any sentence within the
limit: a fine, probation, jail sentence or a shorter or longer term in state
prison.55 Judicial discretion under these sentencing patterns did vary,
but was greater than the discretion now sanctioned under the federal
guidelines. Thejudge could usually impose any maximum or minimum
sentence within the statutorily defined limits. 56 It is possible that the
only reason that a right to individualized sentencing was not brought to
light previously is because, under indeterminate sentencing structures,
sentences were much more, albeit not totally nor consistently, individu-
alized. It is interesting to note that, although the court failed to find a
federal substantive liberty interest in an individualized determination of
an appropriate sentence, the court did discuss the fact that the guide-
lines allow for some judicial discretion. 57 Thus, a close reading of this
case uncovers an underlying tension. If no entitlement to individualized
sentencing exits, the court need not defend the guidelines on the
ground that they allow for some individualization.
3. Procedural Due Process
Thomas' procedural due process arguments charged that the guide-
lines deprived him of meaningful participation in the sentencing process
because they limited the factors relevant to sentencing. He claimed his
liberty interest was violated as a result of this procedure. The court had
little trouble rejecting this argument, finding it to be substantially the
same as the individualized sentencing substantive due process
argument. 58
B. United States v. Roberts
1. Facts
Recently, the Tenth Circuit rejected another constitutional attack
54. J. MILLER, M. ROBERTS & C. CARTER, SENTENCING REFORM: A REVIEW AND ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 (1981).
55. HIRSCH, supra note 14, at 3.
56. Id. at 3-6.
57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
58. Thomas, 884 F.2d at 544.
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on the guidelines. A vagueness challenge to the term "more serious
offense" was raised in United States v. Roberts5 9 by the defendant, Rob-
erts, who was sentenced under a provision using this term. Roberts pled
guilty to a charge alleging one count of assault with intent to commit a
felony within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.
60
Under the challenged provision, a defendant convicted pursuant to
a guilty plea "containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a more
serious offense than the offense of the conviction," must be sentenced
under the standards for the more serious offense. 6 1 A stipulation ex-
isted in Roberts' plea agreement concerning the circumstances of the
offense. It established that the defendant's acts constituted the more
serious crime of robbery even though his plea bargain resulted in a con-
viction for a less serious offense of assault with intent to commit a fel-
ony. 62
2. Holding
The Tenth Circuit rejected Roberts' vagueness argument, holding
that the guidelines adequately define what constitutes a more serious
offense. 63 Due process, therefore, is not offended by utilization of this
term because the guidelines' assignment of numeric values to a base of-
fense and possible adjustments set explicit standards, preventing arbi-
trary or discriminatory interpretation of a "more serious offense."
64
3. Analysis
The vagueness argument raised by Roberts was a futile attempt in
light of the sophisticated grid system of sentence determination enacted
precisely to eliminate ambiguities and govern with certainty the sentenc-
ing determination.
Not addressed by the court in Roberts and relevant to the application
of the sentencing guidelines in the presence of a plea bargain, was the
issue of who actually decides the sentence. It has been argued that the
sentencing discretion in this instance shifts from the judge to the prose-
cutor.65 This issue has been a major source of contention since the im-
plementation of the guidelines. 66 The basis of the argument is that not
every defendant, although a majority, has access to plea bargaining.
59. 898 F.2d 1465, 1467 (10th Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 1466.
61. UNrED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, Guidelines Manual, § 1B1.2(a) (1989).
62. Roberts, 898 F.2d at 1469.
63. Id. at 1467-68.
64. Id. at 1467.
65. Comment, Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines: Difficult Choices for the New Fed-
eral Sentencing Commission, 35 CATm. U.L. REv. 181 (1985).
66. A detailed analysis of this problem, in light of the many in-depth articles and
books on the topic, is outside the scope of this article. For further information, see Hirsch,
supra note 14, at 142-76;J. MILLER, M. ROBERTS, C. CARTER, SENTENCING REFORM: A RE-
VIEW AND ANNOTATED B1BLIOGRAPHY 1 (1981). Both contain excellent bibliographies of
additional sources on this topic.
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The decision for this is left in the prosecutor's hands, not the judge's.
This theory is based on the presumption that a prosecutor, through
charging and negotiating a plea will determine the disposition of the
sentence, thereby undermining the sentencing guidelines.67 Is it right
that the sentencing reforms should, in an effort to decrease.sentencing
disparity, remove judicial discretion and place it instead in the hands of
members of the executive branch? Congress was concerned with this
problem and directed the Commission to issue policy statements to
guide judges in deciding the acceptability of plea bargaining agree-
ments.68 This is an issue not yet before the courts, but'one which the
Commission, under a directive from Congress, should be evaluating.
69
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The holding of Mistretta answers separation of powers concerns;
however, it does not solve other constitutional problems surrounding
the use of sentencing guidelines.
The argument that no fundamental right to individualized sentenc-
ing exists because it has not existed historically in the presence of mini-
mum sentencing requirements seems to beg the question. In light of
changed circumstances, the courts should more fully evaluate whether
constitutional protection of liberty interests should be expanded to in-
clude a constitutional right to individual sentencing.
70
Procedural due process guarantees defendants the right to a fair
hearing. Whether it also guarantees an individual a right to a fair hear-
ing on sentencing, after a fair hearing on conviction, is a question to
consider. Instructing judges how to weigh the circumstances of their
cases turns a sentencing hearing into a mere formality, where individual
attributes (except those provided for in the guidelines) can neither hin-
der nor aid an individual's case.
The holding in Thomas, and other circuit court holdings which ap-
prove the guidelines, will not promote reform. Rather, the issue will be
further obscured as later courts use these holdings as precedent.
It has been suggested that the sentencing guidelines should be
amended so that an individual's motivation for committing an offense is
considered in the sentencing decision. 7 1 This suggestion could be taken
a step further so that all of the factors originally suggested to the Com-
mission by Congress would be given consideration in the formation of
the sentencing guidelines.7 2 This model has been termed the guided
67. See Comment, supra note 65, at 200.
68. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 63.
69. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
70. For example, the right of privacy, a liberty interiest, was expanded in 1973 to in-
clude the right of a woman to choose abortion in the face of changed public sentiment and
changed technology. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. See Legal Times, Aug. 28, 1989, at 21, col. 1 (comment by Judy Clarke, Federal
Defender).
72. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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discretion model.73 Until the time that new reforms are implemented,
the duty of-the judiciary is to focus the Commission on the practical
effects of these guidelines. Trial judges should write sentencing opin-
ions in cases where the guidelines present problems. Ideally, these
opinions would include the process used to determine the sentence, the
exercise of discretion within the guidelines and the basis of that exer-
cise, and the reasons for any departure from the guidelines. 74 Then, in
the face of these opinions and through a reevaluation process, the Sen-
tencing Commission would have a framework-upon which to institute
needed reform.
V. CONCLUSION
Fairness in sentencing is the concern of the judiciary. When Con-
gress empowered the United States Sentencing Commission to establish
federal sentencing guidelines, it also had fairness in mind. Unfortu-
nately, the guidelines have overcbred the problem. Now, two defend-
ants whose conduct is the same but whose character and potential for
rehabilitation appear to be greatly different are subject to identical
sentences. By declaring the guidelines constitutional, the Tenth Circuit,
along with other circuits, has foregone the opportunity to modify the
guidelines. This, however, need not end the discussion. Findings of
constitutionality do not mean that the goal of consistent, yet fair, sen-
tencing has been achieved. The creation of the Commission, and there-
fore the guidelines, was a legislative action. Through the political
process, if not the judicial process, necessary reform can and should be
achieved.
Maureen Juran
73. As a guide for instigation of this revised model, Ogletree, supra note 25, at 1956-
57, suggested that the Commission examine the Supreme Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence. In the death penalty area more than any other, the Court struggled with proce-
dural and due process issues in criminal sentencing. Even though the nature of the
sanction differs, the Court's efforts to achieve equity in that area are relevant to the goal of
achieving equity in other sentencing areas.
74. Legal Times, supra note 72, col. 3 (comment ofJudge Robert Sweet, U.S. Dist. Ct.
for Southern Dist. of N.Y.).
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IN THE WAKE OF PATTERSON V. McLEAN CREDIT UNION: THE
TREACHEROUS AND SHIFTING SHOALS OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no circuit better exemplifies the current chaos that reigns
among the lower federal courts in the interpretation of Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union I than Colorado's Tenth Circuit. In the wike of Patter-
son, judges within the same Colorado district have issued contradictory
rulings on discriminatory firings,2 while another Colorado judge has
gone against the national grain by holding that retaliation may consti-
tute discrimination in the enforcement of an employment contract
within the protection of 42 U.S.C. section 1981.3
While the uncertainties left by these conflicting opinions may be
answered later this year by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,4 there
still exists the unmeasurable consequences of those employment dis-
crimination cases that will never be brought.5 Concerns over the impact
of the Patterson decision and other recent Supreme Court rulings cutting
back the scope of employment discrimination protections have
prompted civil rights groups to call fori newlegislation. Currently, Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy and Representative Augustus Hawkins have intro-
duced and begun hearings on the Civil Rights Act of 1990,6 legislation
designed to negate Patterson and several other recent decisions involving
1. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
2. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit is not alone in its apparent lack of con-
sensus. In the Seventh Circuit, two judges, one day apart, took radically different positions
on whether employees fired in retaliation for complaints about racial discrimination ould
sue. See generally English v. General Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (retalia-
tion claim allowed); Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (retaliation
claim no longer actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Prompted by this conflict, Richard
Posner, a judge for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and leader of the conservative
"law and economics" movement, expressed concern over what he deemed the "treacher-
ous and shifting shoals" of employment discrimination law since the Patterson decision. See
Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
4. Padilla v. United Airlines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1990), appeal docketed, No.
89-1246 (10th Cir. Aug. 9, 1989).
5. The chilling effect on lawsuits has been well documented by the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund which conducted a study of cases decided since June 15,
1989, when the Patterson decision was announced. The study found that At least 158 claims
of intentional race discrimination have been dismissed in federal courts without any sub-
stantive ruling on the claims themselves. The dismissed cases included complaints of ra-
cial harassment on the job, failure to promote on the basis of race, and discriminatory
discharge. See Gordon, Last Hired, THE NATION, Jan. 29, 1990, at 113.
6. H.R. REP. No. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 362 (1990) and S.
REP. No. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 990 (1990). "The Supreme Court
has issued a series of rulings marking an abrupt departure in the Supreme Court's historic
vigilance in protecting civil rights," stated Senator Kennedy at a February 7, 1990, press
conference to announce the bill's introduction. "The Supreme Court has erected artificial
barriers for minorities and women. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 is intended to remove
these barriers and restore and strengthen basic rights for all Americans." The Kennedy
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employment discrimination. 7 Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has
introduced its own, more limited, civil rights legislation.8 While the ulti-
mate impact of the Patterson decision is being debated on the floors of
Congress, the expectations are starting to be realized as the fallout from
the rulings begins to reach the lower federal courts, such as Colorado's
Tenth Circuit.
II. PATTERSON V. McLEAN CREDIT UNION
In order to fully understand the quagmire within which the federal
district courts of the Tenth Circuit are currently embroiled, it is impor-
tant to understand the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson. In the
most closely watched civil rights case of the 1989 term, the Court was
faced with the plight of Brenda Patterson, a black woman who alleged
hostile and demeaning treatment by racist supervisors. Mrs. Patterson
claimed that from 1972 to 1982 she was harassed, denied promotion,
and eventually dismissed by her former employer, the McLean Credit
Union in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. She testified that the com-
pany president, who had hired her as a file clerk, warned her that she
would be working with white women who would not like her because she
was black. She alleged that he made her do menial chores not required
of white co-workers, gave her an oppressive workload, denied her merit
raises and promotion, and told her when she fell behind that "blacks are
known to work slower than whites by nature."9 The company, however,
denied that any discrimination took place.
Mrs. Patterson invoked the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which guaran-
tees to all persons the same right "to make and enforce contracts" as Cis
enjoyed by white citizens." 10 In its 1976 Runyon v. McCrary 11 decision,
the Court ruled that the 1866 law barred private parties from discrimi-
nating on grounds of race in determining with whom they would enter
into contracts, including employment contracts.
Specifically, in Runyon, the Court held that section 198112 was vio-
lated when a private school refused to admit a black child because of the
child's race. The Court held that section 1981 applied to making and
enforcing purely private contracts and that it was illegal for the school to
and Hawkins bills would appear to remedy the effect of the Patterson decision by clarifying
that § 1981 prohibits all racially-motivated employment discrimination.
7. For an excellent survey of the shifting directions taken last term by the conserva-
tive Reagan Supreme Court majority, see Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New
Generation, 67 DEN. U.L. Rv. 1 (1990).
8. H.R. REP. No. 4081, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 426 (1990) and S.
REP. No. 2166, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 1497 (1990).
9. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2392 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
11. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other."
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use race as a basis for refusal to contract with the parents of the child)13
The Runyon ruling was based on legislative and judicial history cited in
the 1968 case, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 14
Originally, the Supreme Court agreed to review whether the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in dismissing Mrs. Patterson's racial
harassment claim on the ground that section 1981 bars employers from
discriminating only in hiring, firing and promotions.' 5 After hearing ar-
guments on that point in February 1988, the majority (Justices Rehn-
quist, Scalia, White, O'Connor and Kennedy), on April 25, 1988, raised
the stakes by questioning whether the post-Civil War Congress had in-
tended the law to cover racial discrimination in private transactions at
all.16
The reargument order transformed the case into a cause celabr. Civil
rights advocates organized a broad-based coalition of support. Numer-
ous amicus curiae briefs were submitted to the Court' 7 arguing that the
Runyon interpretation of section 1981 correctly expressed the intent of
the Reconstruction-era Congress, and that Runyon should be reaffirmed
as an important embodiment of the modem consensus against racial
discrimination.'
8
In Patterson, the Court unanimously'upheld the 1976 decision of
Runyon v. McCrary which had interpreted a Reconstruction-era civil
rights law (later codified as 42 U.S.C. section 1981) to bar private, as
well as officially sponsored, acts of racial discrimination. 19 The Patterson
decision is grounded in the notion of stare decisis, and the "fundamental
importance" of preserving a judicial system not based upon arbitrary
discretion.
2 0
By a five-to-four vote, however, the majority then placed sharp lim-
13. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 173 (seven-to-two decision).
14. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), a black man had been de-
nied the right to buy a house in a white neighborhood on the basis ofhis race. He sued to
enforce another post-Civil War civil rights statute known as 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964) which
provided that all persons shall have thersame right to lease, buy or convey real property as
is enjoyed by white persons. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to section 2 of the
thirteenth amendment, Congress has the power "to determine what are the badges and
the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective
legislation." Id. at 440. The Court went on to hold that § 1982 and § 1981 are legitimate
exercises of that congressional authority. Id.
15. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 1981
applied to Mrs. Patterson's claims for failure to promote and discriminatory discharge, but
that § 1981 did not apply to her claims for racial harassment. Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989).
16. The Court requested that the parties submit written briefs and argue the addi-
tional question: "Whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this
Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be reconsidered." Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
17. Contributors included 66 United States senators; 145 House members; 47 of the
50 state attorneys general; prominent historians; over 100 civil rights, religious, and civic
groups.
18. Taylor, Rehnquist's Court: Tuning Out the White House, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1988
(Magazine), at 98, col. 5.
19. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
20. Id. at 2370.
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its on the case's precedential value.21 In a majority opinion by Justice
Kennedy, the Court adopted an extremely narrow reading of section
1981, holding that the statute is only applicable at the initial hiring stage
and could not be used to bring a lawsuit over racially biased treatment
occurring on thejob.22 The Court reasoned that the "making" of a con-
tract23 covers only the contract's formation, and could not be construed
to reach subsequent problems arising from the conditions of continuing
employment.24 The Court also adopted a strict construction of the term
"enforcement," 25 holding that section 1981 can be invoked only when
discrimination occurs along those legal process "access routes" which
exist to resolve contract claims. 26 Under this formalistic interpretation,
Brenda Patterson's claims of racial harassment and discrimination
clearly fell outside the purview of making or enforcing her employment
contract.
In the wake of Patterson there have been over one hundred decisions
in the lower courts which have tried, with varied results, to interpret the
meaning of the case. While judges are searching for the Supreme
Court's meaning, however, there is one trend that cannot be ignored;
the courts "uniformly have rejected attempts to redress discriminatory
discharges and demotions" under section 1981.27
It should be noted that some employees whose claims have been
invalidated by the Patterson decision may be able to sue under state law.
In fact, concern about duplication of the remedial scheme of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196428 appears to have influenced the Patterson
majority in its reluctance to read section 1981 broadly. Most employees
retain the option of suing under Title VII, a federal statute that prohib-
its race and sex discrimination in hiring, promotions, discharges and
conditions of employment.
An individual, however, who establishes a cause of action under Ti-
tle VII is entitled to a dramatically more limited remedy than under sec-
21. In the words ofJustice Brennan, "What the Court declines to snatch away with
one hand, it takes with the other." Id. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 2372.
23. Id. at 2373.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2772-73.
27. See Alexander v. New York Medical College, 721 F. Supp. 587, 587-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) ("[C]ourts construing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 since Patterson uniformly have rejected at-
tempts to redress discriminatory discharges and demotions, among other things, under
§ 1981.... [L]imiting the availability of § 1981 comports with Patterson by harmonizing the
procedures and remedies for civil rights violations within the rubric of Title VII."); see also
Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 87-0840 (D. Haw. Apr. 24, 1989) ("It is true that the
Patterson court was not faced with the question whether a constructive discharge motivated
by racial animus is actionable under § 1981. However, the Court did hold that § 1981
only protects two rights, contract formation and contract enforcement.").
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (effective July 2, 1964). "By
reading § 1981 not as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of con-
tract relations, but as limited to the enumerated rights within its express protection, specif-
ically the right to make and enforce contracts, we may preserve the integrity of Title V1I's
procedures without sacrificing any sigificant coverage of the civil rights laws." Patterson,
109 S. Ct. at 2375.
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tion 1981. Successful Title VII plaintiffs may obtain only back pay and
affirmative job relief.29 Employees who are harassed but not forced off
the job cannot win money damages.30 In contrast, employees who sue
under section 1981 may obtain broad equitable and legal relief, includ-
ing punitive damages.3 ' Section 1981 suits are also tried before a jury,
unlike Tide VII actions which are decided by a judge.3 2 As a result of
these diminished incentives, Tide VII has been much less attractive to
plaintiffs and their lawyers than section 1981. Patterson has cut off these
section 1981 advantages from all but those plaintiffs alleging discrimina-
tion in the "making" of, or in the "enforcement" of, an employment
contract.
III. FEDERAL DisTRicT COURT OPINIONS WITHIN THE TENTH CIRcUrr
The federal district court opinions within the Tenth Circuit constru-
ing section 1981 since the Patterson decision have been sensitive to the
concerns which apparently influenced the Supreme Court majority. The
reported section 1981 cases have consistently dismissed employees' alle-
gations of post-contract harassment, including purposeful discrimina-
tory demotion. There is, however, a very definite split of opinion among
Colorado's federal judges as to the validity of section 1981 claims for
discriminatory discharge, including instances of retaliation.
A. The Discriminatory Discharge Cases
1. Padilla v. United Airlines
In Padilla v. United Airlines,33 Alan Padilla ("Padilla"), a black male,
filed a lawsuit against his former employer, United Airlines ("United"),
contending that his termination was a violation of section 1981. Padilla
had been employed as a temporary ramp serviceman with United for a
short period of time in 1985. From June 1984 to April 1986, United's
policy dictated that supervisors should terminate employees involved in
safety violations. Padilla's supervisor terminated him on April 8, 1985,
for leaving a vehicle parked in an improper area allegedly in violation of
a safety rule.
3 4
Judge Arraj entered judgment in favor of Padilla on June 14, 1989,
finding that United had discriminated against Padilla because of his race.
Specifically, the court held United responsible for terminating Padilla
29. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds,
424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
30. See Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363'64 (11th Cir. 1982).
31. SeeJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
32. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2391 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, Title VII's stat-
ute of limitations is substantially shorter than the customary two or three year statute of
limitations applicable to § 1981 daims; § 1981 requires n'o complex administrative proce-
dures prior to suit; and § 1981 reaches conduct by any person, while Title VII covers only
employers of fifteen or more persons, labor organizations, and certain conduct by employ-
ment agencies. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a) to (c) (1982).
33. 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989).
34. Padilla v. United Airlines, No. 88-A-400, slip. op. at 4 (D. Colo. June 14, 1989)
(unpublished slip opinion dealing with the merits of the case).
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without conducting an investigation aimed at determining whether he
had committed the safety violation for which he was allegedly disci-
plined.3 5 As a result of the disparate treatment undertaken by United,
the court awarded Padilla back pay in the amount of $4,117.68. This
amount constituted lost earnings for the period beginning April 19,
1985, the day after Padilla was terminated, and ending June 16, 1985,
the end of an eighty-nine day temporary employment period.
Both parties filed post-trial motions. In his first post-trial motion,
Padilla requested that the court amend its prior judgment for purposes
of determining the amount of time for which he was entitled to back pay.
Padilla argued that the defendant had the burden to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that Padilla would not have been hired as a per-
manent full-time employee but for the discrimination by the
defendant.36 The court was not persuaded; instead, it found that in the
absence of any credible evidence that Padilla would have applied for a
permanent position, United was not required to prove that Padilla
would not have been hired as a permanent employee but for race
discrimination.
3 7
Padilla's second post-trial motion sought to expunge the "not eligi-
ble for rehire" notation on his employment record.3 8 The court granted
this part of Padilla's motion, holding that United must eliminate its "not
eligible for rehire" notation from Padilla's employment record.3 9 The
court reached its decision by invoking its equitable discretion in order to
remove the vestiges of past discrimination: "Where racial discrimination
is concerned, 'the [district] court has not merely the power but the duty
to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discrimina-
tory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future.' "40
United's post-trial motion was the direct result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Patterson.4 1 Citing Patterson, United contended that
section 1981 did not establish liability for termination. United re-
quested the court to amend its judgment to hold that Padilla's claims
were governed solely by Title VII and that his racial discrimination claim
should therefore have been dismissed. Alternatively, United requested
a new trial to make new findings of fact and conclusions of law that Pa-
dilla's claims were not cognizable under section 1981.
United argued that Patterson limits the application of section 1981 to
cases involving either the "formation" or the "enforcement" of the em-
ployment contract. According to United, because Padilla asserted that
his termination was based upon his race, his section 1981 claim should
35. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 489.
36. Id. at 486-87.
37. Id. at 487.
38. Id. at 488.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
41. The Patterson opinion was announced on June 15, 1989, one day after the Padilla
court set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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have been dismissed because the incidents of allegedly discriminatory
behavior arose in the post-contract formation stages of his employment
contract.
Judge Arraj decided that the holding in Patterson did not apply to the
Padilla case. The court distinguished Patterson on the ground that the
Supreme Court "did not say that termination of an employee does not
involve the formation process" because the issue of whether Brenda Pat-
terson's claim for discriminatory firing was actionable under section
1981 was never before the Patterson Court.
4 2
In limiting the Patterson holding to a section 1981 claim for discrim-
inatory harassment, Judge Arraj reasoned that
Termination is part of the making of a contract. A person who
is terminated because of his race, like one who was denied an
employment contract because of his race, is without ajob. Ter-
mination affects the existence of the contract, not merely the
terms of its performance. Thus, discriminatory termination di-
rectly affects the right to make a contract contrary to section
1981.
4 3
The court's ratio decidendi was based almost exclusively on two
United States Court of Appeals cases, including the lower Patterson deci-
sion.4 4 The Padilla court apparently found solace in the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals rendering that "[c]laims of racially discriminatory hir-
ing, firing, and promotion go to the very existence and nature of the
employment contract and thus fall easily within section 1981's protec-
tion."14 5 Similarly, an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in-
volving "work environment" discrimination bolstered the Padilla court's
broad interpretation of what Patterson did not say.
46
The Padilla court also expressed its belief that Padilla's claim could
fit int the opening left by the Supreme Court's statement that discrimina-
tory conduct involving "promotions" may be actionable under section
1981 "where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a
42. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 489 (emphasis in original). Only one other post-Patterson
opinion has held that § 1981 is applicable to actions based on discriminatory terminations.
In Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 570 (D. Kan. 1989), the plaintiff
alleged discrimination in the termination of his employment contract. The Birdwhiste
court found that Patterson did not affect the plaintiff's claim, stating that the Supreme
Court "was not asked to address, and did not address, whether alleged discriminatory
discharge is actionable under § 1981." Id. at 575. The court stated in light of Patterson,
"We believe that discharge is directly related to contract enforcement and thus is still
actionable under § 1981." Id.
43. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490.
44. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989).
45. Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
46. The Eleventh Circuit rejected an employer's argument that racial harassment
claims were not actionable under § 1981 by stating: "We need not reach the issue of
whether § 1981 covers 'pure' harassment claims, because [the plaintiff] presented evi-
dence that the harassment caused her to stop working at Western Way, thereby impairing
her ability to make and enforce her employment contract." Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1509 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989).
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new and distinct relation between the employee and-the employer."'4 7
From this perspective, Judge Arraj reasoned that United's allegedly dis-
criminatory actions prevented Padilla from obtaining future employ-
ment with United, thereby constituting a direct barrier to his ability to
"make" a new contract.4 8 Based on the facts before the court, Judge
Arraj apparently was convinced that by terminating Padilla's temporary
employment, United abruptly ended any possible future opportunities
to contract for full-time employment.
4 9
In reaching this conclusion under the Padilla circumstances, how-
ever, Judge Arraj ignored the very fact upon which he had relied in de-
nying Padilla's first post-trial motion;5 0 that is, at no time did Padilla
ever produce any credible evidence that he would have applied for a
permanent position, and thus "make" a new contract.51 In the absence
of this evidence, it hardly seems plausible to assert that United discrimi-
nated against Padilla because of his race when United impaired his abil-
ity to make an employment contract by terminating him and by
preventing him from obtaining future employment with United. 52
The Patterson Court specifically cautioned against straining the clear
meaning of the language in section 1981. Here, Padilla neither alleged
that United discriminated against him when it entered into the employ-
ment relationship with him, nor that United impaired his ability to en-
force through legal process his established contractual rights. Padilla's
only allegation in his original complaint to support his section 1981
claim was that he was terminated. Logically, the termination of an em-
ployment "contract" comes after the employment relationship has been
established, and is therefore post-contract formation conduct of the type
no longer covered by section 1981. As it stands, Judge Arraj's opinion
reads contrary to the Patterson command.
47. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377. It should be noted that the Supreme Court's ruling,
suggesting that allegations of discriminatory promotions may also lie outside the rubric of
§ 1981, was made even though the defendant credit union had not put the issue before the
Court.
48. Padilla v. United Airlines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 490 (D. Colo. 1989). In Luna v. City
and County of Denver, 718 F. Supp. 854 (D. Colo. 1989), another discriminatory promo-
tion case, Judge Babcock made a similar argument. In finding the claim of an Asian-Amer-
ican employee against his municipal employer to be actionable under § 1981, Judge
Babcock was persuaded by the argument that his promotion, from the position of Project
Inspector I to Engineer III, would have provided the employee with the opportunity to
"enter" into a new and distinct contractual relationship with the municipal defendants. Id.
at 856. In reaching his decisionJudge Babcock relied on the same language from Patterson
as did Judge Arraj.
49. Apparently, Judge Arraj was persuaded by the fact that the "Ineligible for Rehire"
status assigned to Padilla would effectively preclude him from entering into any future
employment with United. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490 n.4.
50. See supra text accompanying note 37.
51. Judge Arraj even states that "Padilla's own self-serving testimony that he intended
to make a permanent career with United does not persuade me to the contrary." Padilla,
716 F. Supp. at 487 n.2.
52. Id. at 490.
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2. Rivera v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc.
In Rivera v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc.,53 Dorothy M. Rivera
("Rivera"), an Hispanic female, alleged that she was subjected to dispa-
rate treatment based upon her national origin when AT&T Information
Systems, Inc. ("AT&T") terminated her employment in violation of sec-
tion 1981. Rivera had been employed by AT&T in Salt Lake City, Utah,
beginning in 1973. In January of 1984, Rivera transferred to AT&T's
Denver facility. On December 22, 1986, Rivera was terminated for theft
of a base telephone set. Rivera did not dispute the actual theft; rather,
she alleged that AT&T treated non-Hispanics more favorably in in-
stances of theft, thus giving rise to her claim of disparate treatment. In
its dispositive pre-trial motion, AT&T contended that summary judg-
ment should be granted in its favor on Rivera's claim under section 1981
because her claim was barred by the Patterson decision.M
The court addressed Rivera's national origin discrimination claim
under section 1981 by construing the Patterson command in its most nar-
row circumstance. According to Judge Babcock, the first prong of the
Patterson opinion dealing with the right to "make" contracts effectively
precluded any use of section 1981 in the post-contract formation stage
where, by definition, a "termination" would occur:
55
The Supreme Court's rationale in Patterson. . . leads me to con-
clude that under the plain language of section 1981, discrimi-
natory discharge, like racial harassment amounting to a breach
of contract, is post-contract formation conduct. Discriminatory
discharge occurs after the commencement of the employment
relationship and does not affect the employee's right to make
or enforce contracts.
5 6
The Rivera court was convinced that the scope of section 1981 had
been clarified by the Supreme Court in its confirmation that the right to
make contracts "extends only to the formation of a contract, but not to
problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employ-
ment."' 5 7 The rationale in the Rivera decision is in accord with the
53. 719 F. Supp. 962 (D. Colo. 1989).
54. AT&T argued for summary judgement claiming that Rivera's state law breach of
contract claim was preempted by the Labor-Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1982). On this issue, Judge-Babcock decided that Rivera was entitled to more dis-
covery as to whether her claims against AT&T existed outside of the collective bargaining
agreement. Rivera, 719 F. Supp. at 965.
55. Apparently, Judge Babcock's position is the majority one. See Busch v. Pizza Hut,
Inc., No. 88-C-8241 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("Although
Patterson did not directly address the question whether constructive discharge claims are
still actionable under § 1981, given the narrow scope of the statute defined in Patterson, it
appears that constructive discharge claims are similarly excluded from § 1981's cover-
age."); Bush v. Union Bank, No. 88-0252-CV-W-9 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 12, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) ("Although racial harassment and failure to promote, not termi-
nation, were involved in Patterson; the Supreme Court's explanation of its ruling furnishes
guidance in determining whether plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1981.... [P]laintiff's
claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race because she was dis-
charged [does not] involve the rights to make or to enforce contracts.").
56. Rivera, 719 F. Supp. at 965.
57. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372.
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Supreme Court's command that the "right to make contracts does not
extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the em-
ployer after the contract relation has been established, including breach
of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working
conditions."' 58 Under this analysis, and because Rivera did not allege
that AT&T discriminated against her when it entered into their employ-
ment relationship, it was not difficult for Judge Babcock to find that Ri-
vera's alleged discriminatory discharge claim was not actionable under
section 1981.5
9
What is most intriguing about Judge Babcock's decision is its dia-
metric opposition to the stance taken by Judge Arraj in Padilla.60
Although Judge Babcock agreed with Judge Arraj's assertion that the
Patterson Court never specifically addressed the issue of discriminatory
discharge, he concluded that the express language of Patterson and the
clear implication of its holding bar a Padilla-like holding:
[R]acial harassment amounting to breach of contract, like racial
harassment alone, impairs neither the right to make nor the
right to enforce a contract. It is plain that the former right is
not implicated directly by an employer's breach in the perform-
ance of obligations under a contract already formed. Nor is it
correct to say that racial harassment amounting to a breach of
contract impairs an employee's right to enforce his contract.
To the contrary, conduct amounting to a breach of contract
under state law is precisely what the language of section 1981
does not cover. That is because, in such a case, provided that
plaintiff's access to state court or any other dispute resolution
process has not been impaired by either the State or a private
actor.... the plaintiff is free to enforce the terms of the con-
tract in state court, and cannot possibly assert, by reason of the
breach alone, that he has been deprived of the same right to
enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens. 6 1
Accordingly, Judge Arraj's assertion that "termination" is part of
the "making of a contract" had no place in Judge Babcock's formalistic
section 1981 analysis. In fact,Judge Babcock's view represents the over-
whelming majority of post-Patterson opinions addressing this issue.
62
58. Id. at 2372-73.
59. It should be noted that Rivera still retained her rights under Title VII. As such,
and because the Patterson decision was announced nearly six months after Rivera filed her
original complaint, Judge Babcock granted her leave to file an amended complaint to as-
sert a claim for relief under Title VII.
60. Apparently, Judge Babcock is not alone in his criticism of the Padilla decision. In
Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1989), Judge Rovner stated: "After
careful consideration of the Supreme Court's opinion in Patterson, this Court has deter-
mined that it must respectfully disagree with the Colorado court. If there were any indica-
tion that the right to make a contract under § 1981 should be construed broadly as the
right to enjoy the benefits of that contract, the Colorado court would no doubt be correct
in its reasoning. But the Court in Patterson did not interpret the right to make a contract
under § 1981 in this manner." Id. at 723.
61. Rivera v. AT&T Information Sys., 719 F. Supp. 962, 964-65 (D. Colo. 1989)
(quoting Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2376).
62. See Singleton v. Kellogg Co., No. 89-1073 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1989) (The court, in
affirming the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's § 1981 claim, noted that the plaintiff
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Under the majority view, once an individual has sectired employment,
the protection of section 1981 ceases. With respect to conduct that oc-
curs after the formation of the contract, including discharge, the em-
ployee must look to the remedial scheme of Title VII for protection. As
such, it would appear that Rivera is the properly decided decision, in that
a plaintiff's claim of racially discriminatory discharge is no longer ac-
tionable under section 1981.
B. Retaliatory Discharge: Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co.
The second protection referenced under section 1981 prohibits dis-
crimination in the legal process that prevents the enforcement of estab-
lished contract rights. In Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co.,63 Judge Carrigan
wrestled with the issue of whether a retaliatory discharge claim could
still fall within the rubric of section 1981 protection, notwithstanding
the Patterson Court's determination that section 1981, by its plain terms,
can only protect the narrow right "to make contracts" and "to enforce
contracts."
In Jordan, Timothy Jordan ("Jordan") filed a lawsuit against his for-
mer employer, U.S. West Direct Company ("U.S. West"), alleging work-
place harassment and retaliatory discrimination under Title VII and
section 1981. U.S. West submitted two motions to dismiss, contending
in the first that Jordan's Title VII claim asserting retaliatory demotion
could not survive because he had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. In response, Jordan asserted that he was retaliated against
because he spoke out against discrimination and instigated an internal
investigation of U.S. West. According to Jordan, his "Discrimination
Statement" filed with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission set forth
sufficient information to indicate that the internal Equal Employment
Opportunity investigator' intentionally misrepresented Jordan and
others in her investigation ofJordan's discrimination charges.
The court was not convinced that Jordan's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission ne-
did not contend that the alleged discriminatory discharge involved impairment of her right
to "make" or "enforce" contracts. It stated that, in light of Patterson, plaintiff's claim of
racially discriminatory discharge is no longer cognizable under § 1981.); see also Thompson
v. Johnson &Johnson Mgmt. Infor. Ctr., 725 F. Supp. 826 (D.NJ. 1989); International
City Mgmt. Ass'n Retirement Corp. v. Watkins, 726 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1989); Guerrero v.
Preston Trucking Co., No. 87-C-3036 (N.D. Ill. Dec.21, 1989); Crader v. Concordia Col-
lege, 724 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Ill. 1989); James v. Dropsie College, No. 89-4429 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 22, 1989); Dumas v. Phillips College of New Orleans, Inc., No. 89-0526 (E.D. La.
Nov. 21, 1989); Owens v. Foot Locker, No. 88-8279 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1989); Matthews v.
Northern Telecom, Inc., No. 88-0583 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1989); Eklofv. Bramalea Ltd., No.
89-5312 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 1989); Carroll v. Geneial Motors Corp., No. 88-2532-0 (D. Kan.
Oct. 27, 1989); Williams v. Edsal Mfg. Co., No. 88-C-10341 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1989);
Brown v. Avon Products, Inc., No. 88-C-4459 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1989); Gonzalez v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 87-2264 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1989);Jones v. Alltech Assoc., Inc.,
No. 85-C-10345 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 1989); Copperidge v. Terminal Freight Handling Co.,
No. 89-2198 (W.D. Tenn. July 27, 1989); Jackson v. Commonwealth Edison, No., 87-C-
4449 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 1989).
63. 716 F. Supp. 1366 (D. Colo. 1989).
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cessitated dismissal of the Title VII claim. The court reasoned that be-
cause the two related charges of discrimination and retaliation were so
closely intertwined, the failure to exhaust the discrimination charge was
not fatal to Jordan's proceeding with his federal court retaliation charge.
In its second motion, U.S. West contended that Patterson precluded
Jordan's utilization of section 1981 as a means to address allegedly dis-
criminatory conduct which occurred after the formation of his contract
and which did not interfere with his right to enforce the contractual obli-
gations. Specifically, U.S. West sought to use Patterson to dismiss two of
Jordan's claims: his claim of purposeful discrimination arising from his
demotion to a nonmanagerial position on February 16, 1987, and his
assertion of retaliatory demotion.
Judge Carrigan held in U.S. West's favor with regard to Jordan's
allegations of harassment, including the purposeful discriminatory de-
motion claim. In dismissing this claim, the court distinguished Jordan's
situation from those instances alluded to in Patterson in which a failure to
promote might rise to an actionable level of discriminatory conduct
under section 1981. In considering Jordan's situation, the court rea-
soned that because this was a case of a "wrongful demotion, as opposed
to a failure to promote, there is no refusal by the employer to enter into
a new contract with the employee. Wrongful demotion allegations thus
are included in racial harassment at the workplace." 64 As such, Jordan's
discriminatory demotion claim clearly fell outside the purview of the
"making" or "formation" of the employment contract.
With regard to U.S. West's motion to dismissJordan's allegations of
retaliatory discrimination, Judge Carrigan was not convinced that Patter-
son mandated preclusion. In Patterson, the majority declared:
The second of these guarantees, "the same right . . . to ...
enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens," embraces
protection of a legal process, that will address and resolve con-
tract law claims without regard to race. In this respect, it pro-
hibits discrimination that infects the legal process in ways that
prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by reason of his or
her race .... 65
In concluding that Jordan's retaliation charges fell within the cover-
age afforded by the right to "enforce" contracts contained in section
1981, Judge Carrigan reasoned that:
The right to enforce contracts extends to private efforts to obstruct
nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes involving discrim-
ination. Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against because
he complained of discrimination and instigated an investigation
regarding his charges. These allegations fall within the cover-
age afforded by the right to enforce contracts contained in sec-
tion 1981.66
64. Id. at 1368.
65. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
66. Jordan, 716 F. Supp. at 1368-69 (emphasis in original).
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Judge Carrigan's decision represents a minority view among the
federal courts thai have addressed the issue of retaliatory discharge.
67
For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a plaintiff's
retaliatory discharge claim was post-formation conduct not actionable
under section 1981.68 The Ninth Circuit explained that the plaintiff's
right to make a contract Was not implicated, nor did he allege that the
defendant obstructed his access to courts or to any other dispute resolu-
tion process. 69 Most of the other courts dealing with the retaliatory dis-
charge issue have found that, because such behavior is specifically
proscribed by section 704(a) of Title VII,7 it is unnecessary "to twist
the interpretation of another statute (section 1981) to cover the same
conduct."
'7 1
Apparently, Judge Carrigan was not convinced that such a pinched
view of Patterson was required under the particular circumstances ofJor-
dan's discharge.72 Instead, Judge Carrigan interpreted U.S. West's con-
duct as a direct effort to "impede" Jordan's right to enforce his contract
in violation of section 1981. This interpretation is consistent with Patter-
son if section 1981 is construed not as an absolute proscription of dis-
crimination in all instances of retaliation, but rather to include only
those forms of direct obstructive behavior that discriminate against an
employee's right to enforce a contract. 73
IV. CONCLUSION
The confusion surrounding the Patterson case, in which the Supreme
Court held that federal law prohibiting racial discrimination in private
contracts does not apply to "conduct which occurs after the formation of
a contract," is readily apparent in Colorado's Tenth Circuit. Based on
67. A partial list of recent cases that have construed Patterson to preclude § 1981
claims for retaliatory discharge includes Alexander v. New York Medical College, 721 F.
Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 716 F. Supp. 49
(D.D.C. 1989); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989);
Kolb v. Ohio, 721 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1989). For a case supportingJudge Carrigan's
view see English v. General Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
68. Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 473.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
71. Overby, 884 F.2d at 473 (quoting Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375).
72. However, in another case whose fact pattern did not involve conduct directly in-
fringing on a plaintiff's right to "enforce" an employment contract, Judge Carrigan
granted summary judgment for defendants on a § 1981 claim because the plaintiff had
asserted the claim as a result of being fired. "While it might be argued that the § 1981
right to non-discriminatory procedures to 'enforce' a contract is hollow if there is no §
1981 protection against termination of the contract because of ethnicity or race, the
Supreme Court's rationale is inconsistent with such reasoning. Because employment ter-
mination dearly constitutes post-formation conduct not impinging on procedures to enforce the
contract, the plaintiff's claim cannot stand post-Patterson." Trujillo v. Grand Junction Re-
gional Center, No. 88-C-1423, slip op. at 7 (D. Colo. 1990) (emphasis in original).
73. It should be noted, however, thatJudge Carrigan invited the parties to bring to his
attention any pertinent case authority that would shed light on his Patterson interpretation:
"I would not look with disfavor on either party asking for reconsideration as long as that
request is supported by pertinent case law." Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co., 716 F. Supp.
1366, 1369 (D. Colo. 1989).
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the facts in Padilla, it appears thatJudge Arraj misconstrued the Patterson
command when he found that discriminatory discharge is directly re-
lated to contract formation, thus falling within the rubric of section 1981
protection. In all likelihood, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals will
follow other recent opinions, including Judge Babcock's decision in Ri-
vera, and will overturn the Padilla decision. 74 The clear weight of post-
Patterson authority holds that an employee's claim of discriminatory ter-
mination in violation of section 1981 is no longer actionable.
Conversely, Judge Carrigan's holding in Jordan that a section 1981
retaliatory discrimination claim can stand post-Patterson appears to be
correctly decided based on the narrow circumstances of the case. That
is, when retaliation clearly impinges on an employee's ability to enforce
the employment contract, then section 1981 can still be utilized.
Decisions such as Padilla andJordan are indicative of the difficulties
confronting the lower federal courts which are caught in the ground
swell of criticism surrounding the Patterson decision. Even Justice Ken-
nedy was sensitive to the impending fire storm of debate, writing at the
end of his opinion in the Patterson case: "Neither our words nor our
decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from
Congress' policy to forbid discrimination."' 75 From some perspectives,
Justice Kennedy's remarks were merely a restatement of the obvious.
Others, hearing a defensive tone in Justice Kennedy's words, prepared
to brave the treacherous and shifting shoals of post-Patterson employ-
ment discrimination law, to hold Congress, if not the Court, to its
promise.
Harvey L. Cohen
74. In the only post-Patterson decision issued by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge Ebel decided that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claim under
§ 1981. In reaching that decision, the court stated that "[s]ection 1981's contract clause
protects only the right to enter into and enforce contracts." Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Bea-
con, 886 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109
S. Ct. 2363 (1989)). While this decision is not dispositive of the issues on appeal in Padilla,
it appears to be a harbinger of things to come.
75. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379.
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EMPLOYER LIABILrrY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER
SECTION 1983: A COMMENT ON STARRETT
V. WADLEY
I. INMRODUCTION
Sexual harassment' of women in the workplace has been and con-
tinues to be a widespread problem. It has been estimated that 49% to
90% of working women in various occupations have suffered from sex-
ual harassment.2 The harassment is not limited to lewd sexual com-
ments and jokes on the job, but includes unsolicited touching and
requests for sexual favors as well.3 In response to this widespread prob-
lem, courts have begun to recognize sexual harassment as a cause of
action under both section 19834 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.5 A crucial issue in sexual harassment claims under either section
1983 or Title VII is employer liability for the misconduct of employees.
In particular, when sexual harassment suits are brought pursuant to sec-
tion 1983, one question is whether municipalities can be held liable for
their public officials' misconduct.
The issue of municipal liability under section 1983 was addressed in
Starrett v. Wadley. 6 In Starrett, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
a sexual harassment victim recovery against the municipal employer
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defines sexual harassment as
follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or phys-
ical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual,
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
29 C.F.R. §§ 1604-1611 (a) (1985).
Moreover, two types of sexual harassment have been recognized by the courts: quid
pro quo and hostile environment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when terms of
employment are conditioned on the female employee's submission to sexual demands.
Hostile work environment sexual harassment, on the other hand, occurs when the em-
ployee's work environment has become hostile or offensive, or the misconduct has unrea-
sonably interfered with the employee's work performance. C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-47 (1979).
2. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 26-32.
3. See Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1989); Starrett v. Wadley,
876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989); Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627
(10th Cir. 1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). An action brought under section 1983 is available only
to the public sector employee. See Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989);
Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) (1982). See Meritor Savings Bank v. Venison, 477 U.S. 57
(1986)(holding that an abusive work environment is a form of sexual harassment prohib-
ited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (Meritor was also the first sexual harass-
ment case considered by the Supreme Court.); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979)(recognizing sexual harassment as a cause of action under Title VII).
6. 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989).
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under section 1983. This occurred despite the municipality's knowledge
of the official's misconduct. 7
This comment examines the significance of the Starrett decision. It
further discusses the history of section 1983, and it looks at when a mu-
nicipality, as employer, can be liable for the actions of its officials. More-
over, this article argues that a more liberal construction of section 1983
should be taken in sexual harassment cases in order to hold municipali-
ties, with notice, liable for the unlawful acts of their officials.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Section 1983 and Municipal Liability
The Supreme Court first interpreted section 19838 in Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services.9 Unfortunately, however, Monell has resulted in
much confusion regarding the limits of municipal liability.10 In particu-
lar, confusion surrounds a municipality's liability for the tortious acts of
its employees." I
In Monell, a group of female employees brought a class action under
section 1983 against the Department of Social Services, its Commis-
sioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the City of New York and its
Mayor. The pregnant employees argued that their federal rights were
violated when they were forced to take unpaid leaves of absence before
medical reasons demanded the leaves.
12
The Court held that local governments, municipal corporations,
and school boards are "persons" under section 1983 and, therefore, are
not immune from suit. 13 The Court further held that local govern-
ments, such as municipalities and counties, can be sued directly for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief.
14
7. Id. at 812-19.
8. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
9. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
10. See Brown, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court
Federalism: A Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The
"Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C.L. REv. 883, 883 (1986) (citing Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doc-
trinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 482-83 (1982)). See also
Kramer & Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 6 Sup. CT.
REv. 249, 250 (1987).
11. See generally City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). In
each of these cases, the Court was unable to reach a majority opinion.
12. Monell, 436 U.S. at 660-61.
13. Id. at 690 (Monell overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which held that
municipal corporations are not "persons" within the meaning of the statute.).
14. Id. (stating that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 intended
section 1983 to apply to municipalities and other local government units).
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The Monell Court also ruled, however, that a municipality cannot be
held liable for simply employing a tortfeasor. 15 Consequently, a munici-
pality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory. 16 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, instead "articulated
a new standard" of municipal liability under section 1983. Justice Bren-
nan stated:
[A] local government may not be sued for an injury inflicted
solely by its employees or agents; it is when execution of a gov-
ernment's policy or custom-whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may firmly be said to represent
official policy-inflicts the injury that the government as an en-
tity is responsible under section 1983.17_
The Court's "policy and custom" rule has, in effect, limited the cir-
cumstances in which a municipal employer can be held liable for its em-
ployees' tortious acts.18 A municipality is liable for its employee's
actions when a plaintiff "connect[s] the constitutional or federal statu-
tory violation to an 'official policy' or 'governmental custom' of the mu-
nicipality."' 9 Consequently, municipal liability occurs only when a tort
has resulted from action pursuant to municipal policy or custom. 20
The Monell Court's official policy and custom decision has not only
created confusion for lower courts, but it has also created a heavy bur-
den for the plaintiff.21 The confusion surrounding municipal liability
has resulted from the Court's failure to define what constitutes official
policy or custom. 22 In Monell, the Court announced broad, vague stan-
15. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
16. The majority in Monell believed that the statute's legislative history compelled the
conclusion that "Congress did not intend respondeat superior to form a basis for section 1983
municipal liability." This decision was based on Congress' rejection of the Sherman
amendment, which was a proposed addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
First, the Court suggested that similar policies-deterrence and insurance-lie
behind both respondeat superior and the Sherman amendment, so that allowing
respondeat superior liability would give rise to the same constitutional objections
that were raised by the opponents of the amendment. Second, the Court rea-
soned that Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious liability presented to
it demonstrated congressional opposition to respondeat superior.
Rothfeld, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. Ci. L.
REv. 935, 943-44 (1979) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 692 n.57 (1978)). See also
Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under
Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 539, 555-56 (1989); Blum, From Monroe to MonelL Defining
the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409, 412 n.14 (1978) (stating
that the Court also relied on the language of section 1983 as a basis for rejecting respondeat
superior ... the "subject, or cause to be subjected" language precluded all forms of vicari-
ous liability).
17. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The Court's rejection of respondeat superior, and its adop-
tion of a new standard for municipal liability has resulted in much criticism. In particular,
commentators have argued that the legislative history of section 1983 supports the conclu-
sion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be liable
on a respondeat superior theory. See generally Brown, supra note 10; Kramer & Sykes, supra
note 10; Rothfeld, supra note 16.
18. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 250.
19. Brooks, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati: Refining the "Official Policy" Standard for Section
1983 Municipal Liability, 29 ARIZ. L. REv. 323, 328 (1987).
20. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 255.
21. Brooks, supra note 19, at 328.
22. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 250; Brown, supra note 10, at 884.
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dards which have resulted in conflicting applications by many lower
courts. 28 The Court explained that a formal ordinance, regulation, deci-
sion, or policy statement adopted or put in force by officials would con-
stitute official policy.2 4 Moreover, informal practices which are
permanent and Well settled, or persistent and widespread may constitute
custom.
2 5
Commentators have argued that these vague standards announced
by the Court "[tell] us only that municipal liability must rest on more
than respondeat superior, and all of the competing definitions of policy sat-
isfy this requirement.... Indeed, every definition of policy that in any
way limits the ordinary scope of respondeat superior will satisfy Monell by
not imposing liability.. ." simply because the municipality employs the
torffeasor.
26
As a result of the Court's imprecise standards concerning municipal
liability, interpretation of the Monell Court's policy and custom rule was
left to future development. 2 7 The lower courts, therefore, are left with
the task of determining what actions constitute official policy or custom
under section 1983. Consequently, lower courts that take a conservative
view of municipal liability may define policy or custom quite narrowly,
thereby making it difficult for plaintiffs to recover against municipalities.
Moreover, the Monell decision has placed a double burden on plain-
tiffs. 28 First, the plaintiffs must show that their constitutional or federal
rights were violated by an official action. Then, the plaintiffs must prove
that the act complained of was a result of municipality policy or custom.
The Court's purpose in imposing this heavy burden on the plaintiffs is
to prevent municipal liability for an official's private acts. 29
III. STARREIT V. WADLEY
A. Facts
In Starrett v. Wadley,8 0 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of mu-
nicipal liability under section 1983. In Starrett, a female employee
brought a sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge suit under section
1983 against her supervisor, Wadley, and his employer, Creek County. 3 1
23. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 254-55 (stating "[b]y limiting municipal liability
to acts pursuant to 'policy' without saying anything more than policy is something different
from respondeat superior, the Supreme Court established a vague category susceptible to
many plausible definitions").
24. Mone!, 436 U.S. at 690.
25. Id. at 691.
26. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 10, at 254.
27. Id. at 250.
28. Brooks, supra note 19, at 328.
29. Id.
30. 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989).
31. Id. at 808. Starrett also sought damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1982), and she claimed that her first and fourteenth amend-
ment rights were violated. Id. Moreover, she claimed that Wadley and the county violated
the following provision of Tide VII:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
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Plaintiff Starrett worked as a deputy assessor for Wadley, who was
elected to his post as County Assessor.3 2 Starrett claimed that during
her one-and-a-half year tenure at-the County Assessor's office, Wadley
continually made sexual advances toward her and toward other female
employees.33 Starrett alleged that Wadley pinched her on the buttocks
with his full hand, made obscene gestures towards her, and requested
that she meet him at his house and other locations.34 On one occasion,
Starrett claimed that Wadley asked her to go with him to a motel.3 5 Af-
ter Starrett declined his offers, Wadley retaliated. He suggested to Star-
rett that her job might be terminated for "budgetary" reasons.
3 6
Starrett subsequently complained to Wadley, Wadley's attorney and
to the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners ("Board").
3 7
Despite her complaints, the Board did not take prompt remedial ac-
tion.3 8 The Board did not conduct an investigation, nor did it take any
corrective action against Wadley.3 9 The harassment and threats of ter-
mination continued. Thereafter, Starrett contacted her own attorney
who wrote a letter to Wadley stating that his acts of sexual harassment
violated Title-VII. 40 Approximately two months after receiving this let-
ter, Wadley terminated Starrett.
4 '
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of.employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
ongin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a) (1982).
32. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
33. Id. At trial, three different women, who previously worked under Wadley, testified
that they had also been sexually harassed by Wadley on the job. The former employees
testified that Wadley repeatedly called them at work asking them to meet him outside of
the office. Transcript of the Proceedings at 503-66. Starrett, 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir.
1989) (No. 84-695). In particular, Ola Stroud, who worked under Wadley at the assessor's
office, recalled a harassing phone call from Wadley. Wadley asked Stroud if she missed
being married. Thereafter, Wadley stated, "I can do something about that." Record at
564, Starrett (No. 84-695). In fact, on direct examination at trial, Wadley admitted that a
claim of sexual harassment had previously been made against him by a former employee.
Record at 52, Starrett (No. 84-695).
34. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
35. Id. at 814-15. This proposition occurred when Wadley and Starrett were assessing
a property. On the return trip, the two passed a motel, at which time Wadley suggested
they stay there for the afternoon. Record at 81, Starrett (No. 84-695).
36. 876 F.2d at 812. Starrett testified that Wadley would call her repeatedly saying,
"I'm going to let someone go, I've got to let someone go." Record at 98, Starrett (No. 84-
695).
37. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
38. The Board of County Commissioners has the authority to begin ouster proceed-
ings against a county official under certain circumstances. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1181
(1988).
39. The Board commenced ouster proceedings against Wadley two years after Star-
rett complained to its Chairman. In fact, the proceedings began only after Wadley re-
ceived his third D.U.I.. Moreover, the petition for ouster failed to mention any sexual
harassment complaints brought against Wadley. Telephone interview with Gregory Bled-
soe, plaintiff's attorney (Apr. 3, 1990).
40. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
41. On October 3, 1983, Starrett received a phone call from Wadley saying that she
was fired. Starrett testified that Wadley "told me to leave," and he also said that "I don't
like you going to an attorney." Record at 120, Starrett (No. 84-695). Moreover, Starrett
had more seniority in the assessor's office than other employees. Accordingly, she should
1990)
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B. Holding
The Tenth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that Wadley's act of sexually harassing Starrett was a
violation of her right to equal protection.4 2 The court further affirmed
the lower court's holding that the county was liable for Wadley's act of
firing Starrett.43 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding,
however, that the county was liable for Wadley's sexual harassment of
Starrett.
44
The court used the Monell holding as a basis for its decision.4 5
Judge Ebel, writing for the panel, reasoned that under Monell, a munici-
pality cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.4 6 Instead, a municipality is only liable for acts of its officials if
those acts constitute official policy or custom. 4 7 Furthermore, under
Monell, a municipality can only be liable for the acts of an official who has
final policymaking authority with respect to the acts in question.48 Mere
exercise of discretion by a county official is not sufficient to create mu-
nicipal liability.
49
Because Wadley had the final authority concerning hiring and firing
of personnel, his acts in this area constituted the official acts of the
county. Wadley's actions of hiring and firing carried official sanction.
The court, however, held that Wadley's private acts and personal urges
did not carry official sanction or authority. According to the court, these
acts did not concern any terms of employment and were, therefore, not
the official acts of the county.50 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that
the county could be liable for the acts of Wadley if they were part of a
custom or policy within the office. 5 1
In addressing the "custom and policy" issue, the court stated that
Wadley's acts of sexual harassment were sporadic and few. His actions
not have been the first employee fired had there truly been layoffs due to budgetary rea-
sons. Record at 118, Starrett (No. 84-695).
42. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 814.
43. Id. at 818 (reasoning "that Wadley's act of firing plaintiff was an act of the County
because Wadley had final authority to set employment policy as to the hiring and firing of
his staff").
44. Starrett's section 1983 claims were tried to a jury and her Title VII claims were
tried to the district court. The jury returned a verdict in Starrett's favor and against de-
fendants Wadley and the county. Thereafter, the county moved for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict ("JNOV") on the issue of municipal liability for the abusive work
environment created by Wadley. The district court denied the motion forJNOV. Id. at
819. Moreover, the district court dismissed Starrett's Title VII claim based on the "per-
sonal staff" exemption found in Title VII definition of "employee." Title VII states:
"[t]he term 'employee'... 'shall not include' any person elected to public office.., or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff .... Id. at 821 n.17.
45. Id. at 818-20.




50. Id. at 820 (stating the sexual harassment did not concern "job title or description,




were directed towards only a few members of his staff.52 Furthermore,
the court said that there was no evidence that any other officials in the
County Assessor's office sexually harassed the female employees. As a
result, the evidence did not support a view that there was widespread
practice of sexual harassment. Consequently, the court held that the
sexual harassment did not rise to the level of policy or custom.
53
Moreover, the court noted that Starrett did not attempt to bring her
grievance to the attention of the Board by placing it on the agenda, as
she could have done.M The court suggested that this failure had the
effect of shielding the county from liability for Wadley's acts of sexual
harassment.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Official Action Constituting Custom or Policy
Contrary to the Tenth Circuit's holding, Wadley's acts of sexual
harassment did rise to the level of official policy or official custom.55
Wadley's actions, therefore, violated Starrett's constitutional rights
thereby creating municipal liability. In order to establish that the mis-
conduct rose to a level of policy or custom three requirements must be
satisfied. The plaintiff must: (1) prove that the policymaker chose to
pursue a particular course of action or custom by proof of notorious
practice; (2) attribute the misconduct to the municipality; and (3) prove
that there is a causal connection between the policy or custom and the
constitutional deprivation.56 In Starrett, these three requirements were
satisfied.
First, Wadley, as policymaker, deliberately chose to follow a course
of action in the County Assessor's office. Wadley chose to create an en-
vironment of sexual and retaliatory harassment. Four women who
worked under Wadley testified that they had all been sexually harassed
by Wadley. 57 All four claimed, for example, that Wadley repeatedly
called them at work and asked them to meet him in secluded places.
Moreover, there was evidence that two other female employees were
sexually harassed by Wadley subsequent to Starrett's termination.
58
Consequently, not only was sexual harassment a deliberate course of
52. Id. Moreover, the court noted that Wadley's harassment of the female employees
usually only occurred while he was intoxicated. Id. at 812.
53. Id. at 820.
54. Id. at 812 n.1.
55. Commentators have criticized the courts for not distinguishing between policy
and custom. See Gerhardt, supra note 16, at 584.
56. Gerhardt, supra note 16, at 583 (citing Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1386-88
(4th Cir. 1987) and Bennett v. Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984)).
57. Transcript of the Proceedings at 503-66. Starrett, 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989)
(No. 84-695).
58. The plaintiff attempted to introduce this evidence at trial. The trial court, how-
ever, did not admit the evidence because the harassment occurred after Starrett was fired.
Record at 553, 572. Starrett, 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989) (No. 84-695). This evidence is
relevant in establishing that sexual harassment rose to a level of custom or policy at the
assessor's office.
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action in the assessor's office, but it was a notorious and pervasive prac-
tice as well.
Second, this misconduct is easily attributed to the county. For ex-
ample, after Starrett complained to Wadley and his attorney, she then
made a complaint to the Chairman of the Board of County Commission-
ers. 59 The Board did not conduct an investigation, nor did it take
prompt corrective action against Wadley.60 Essentially, the county ac-
quiesced in Wadley's sexual demands on Starrett.
6 1
Third, the county's policy of acquiescence caused a deprivation of
Starrett's equal protection rights. The county's deliberate indifference
towards Wadley's acts of sexual harassment is considered "supervisory
encouragement" of the sexual harassment. 6 2 Since it is unconstitutional
for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on sex, the
county violated Starrett's constitutional rights. 63 The county's policy of
acquiescence, in effect, amounted to encouragement of sexual harass-
ment. The third element is, therefore, satisfied because there is an "af-
firmative link" between the policy and the constitutional right
deprivation.
Sexual harassment rising to the level of official policy or custom was
addressed in Bohen v. City of East Chicago.64 In Bohen, a female dispatcher
for a fire department, brought a sexual harassment action pursuant to
section 1983.65 The plaintiff claimed that her immediate supervisor was
59. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812.
60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. See Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
Tomkins considered whether the failure to take prompt action after receiving notice of mis-
conduct constitutes acquiescence in the misconduct. Id. at 1046. In Tomkins, a female em-
ployee filed an employment discrimination suit under Title VII against her employer and
male supervisor, complaining of sexual harassment. Id. at 1045. In deciding whether the
employer could be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its supervisor, the court
considered whether the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the sexual har-
assment. Moreover, the court considered whether the employer promptly remedied the
situation after receiving notice. Id. at 1048-49. The court held that:
[a person's equal protection rights are violated] when a supervisor, with the ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or de-
mands toward a subordinate employee and conditions that employee's job status
• * on a favorable response to those advances or demands, and the employer
does not take prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such
knowledge.
Id. See also Husband, An Overview of the Law of Semual Harassment, 1983 CoLo. LAw. 1459,
1460.
62. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). A state
official is liable for the acts of his or her subordinates if (1) the subordinate's behavior
results in a constitutional violation and (2) the official's action or inaction was connected to
the behavior in the sense that it could be considered as encouragement, condonation, or
acquiescence. Essentially, to establish a link between the state official and the employee's
misconduct, the plaintiff must prove that the official acquiesced in the behavior "by re-
maining impassive before complaints of such discriminatory and harassing conduct or by
refusing to acknowledge and investigate a strikingly obvious pattern of sex discrimination
and harassment... or that such discriminatory treatment was part of a policy sanctioned
by them." Id. at 902.
63. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
64. 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 1187.
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the "source of most of the abuse." 66 Bohen claimed, for example, that
on her first night of work, she took a nap and awoke to find that her
supervisor had his hands pressed against her crotch. She complained to
the appropriate personnel but no remedial action was taken. 6 7 Bohen
stated that this was the first of many sexual harassment incidents and the
first of many complaints.
6 8
The Seventh Circuit held that the city was liable under section 1983
for ongoing sexual harassment when management officials knew of the
harassment and no corrective action was taken. 69 The court reasoned
that "[e]vidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination . . . is of
course strong evidence supporting a plaintiff's claim that she herself has
been the victim of discrimination." 70 Moreover, the court stated that
sexual harassment is attributable to the employer under section 1983 by
showing the employer failed to protect the plaintiff from the abusive en-
vironment.7 1 Finally, the court stated that "[a]n entity may be liable
even for 'informal actions, if they reflect a general policy, custom, or
pattern of official conduct which even tacitly encourages conduct depriv-
ing citizens of their constitutionally protected rights.' "72
B. Wadley Is the County and His Actions Are the Actions of the County
Alternatively, Wadley's actions as a top official and policymaker are
the actions of the county. Under Monell, for example, the Court held
that a policymaker's actions are considered the actions of the municipal-
ity73 because the official is the agent of the municipality. Essentially,
therefore, a municipality is responsible for the misconduct of its top
public officials.
Since Wadley was a public official and top policymaker, the county
is responsible for his actions, including his acts of sexual harassment.74
Wadley qualified as a policymaker because under Oklahoma Statute title
19, section 161, 75 the County Assessor is a county officer. Generally, a
66. Id. at 1182. The plaintiff, however, also stated that other male employees at the
fire department also sexually harassed her. Bohen stated that her supervisor constantly
spoke to her in a lewd way. In particular, he described to her his preferred sexual posi-
tions. He also touched her by rubbing his pelvis against her and spreading his legs so that
he touched her when she sat. Moreover, when Bohen used the bathroom, the supervisor
forced her to leave the door open. Id.
67. Id. at 1187.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1189.
70. Id. at 1187.
71. Id. (stating that the "officials knew of the sexually oppressive working conditions
even before Bohen was hired .... The department, however, considered the abusive
environment to be the female employees' problem").
72. Id. at 1189 (quoting Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 870 (7th Cir. 1983)).
73. Mone/!, 436 U.S. at 694.
74. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985)("[A judgment against a public
servant 'in his official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents .. ");
McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1981)("[O]fficial-capacity suits generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.").
75. OK.A. STAT. tit. 19, § 161 (1981) (1) states that "'County Officer' means the
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public officer is considered one whose official "position requires the ex-
ercise of some portion of the sovereign power .. ."76 Moreover, essen-
tial characteristics of public office are: (1) a portion of the sovereign
power is delegated to the position; (2) the duties and powers are de-
fined; (3) the duties are performed independently without control of su-
perior power other than law; and (4) the position has some permanency
and continuity.77 In effect, a public official with sovereign authority is a
top policymaker.
Based on these definitions, Wadley, acting in his official capacity,
was a top policymaker. First, Wadley was empowered with independent
authority to perform certain governmental functions. The County As-
sessor, for example, has the sovereign authority to ascertain the amount
of value of property. 78 Moreover, Wadley had the sovereign authority
to determine and set the quality of atmosphere and environment in the
assessor's office. Second, Wadley's duties and powers were statutorily
defined. For example, Wadley was empowered with the authority to af-
firm that the value of property coincided with statements made by the
property owners. 79 Third, Wadley had the power to perform his duties
independently. Under Oklahoma law, an Elected County Assessor is the
supreme official in his office. Essentially, only the Board of County
Commissioners had power over Wadley. This power, however, was very
limited. The Board could only commence ouster proceedings against
Wadley in certain circumstances.8 0 Fourth, Wadley's position had per-
manency and continuity. As an elected official, Wadley held his office
for four years. 8 1 Consequently, Wadley's position satisfied the require-
ments of a public officer and top policymaker. Therefore, Wadley's acts
"may fairly be said to represent official [county] policy .... ,,82
In Brandon v. Holt,88 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of a
public official's actions imposing "liability on the entity that he repre-
sented .... -84 In Brandon, the plaintiff brought suit pursuant to section
1983 against a Memphis police officer, the Director of the Memphis Po-
o
county clerk, county commissioner, county assessor, county superintendent of schools
76. Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 909 (10th Cir. 1984)(quoting Town of Arling-
ton v. Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976)).
77. Dutrlinger, 727 F.2d at 890 (quoting State v. Taylor, 260 Iowa 634, 639, 144
N.W.2d 289, 292 (1966)). See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1107 (5th ed. 1979) ("Essen-
tial characteristics of public office are (1) authority conferred by law, (2) fixed tenure of
office, and (3) power to exercise some portion of sovereign functions of government; key
element of such test is that the officer is carrying out sovereign function.").
78. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 2435 (1988).
79. Id
80. The Board could only initiate ouster proceedings if it found, for example, that
Wadley: (1) habitually or wilfully neglected his duties; (2) exercised gross partiality; (3)
used oppression; (4) used corruption; (5) practiced extortion; and (6) practiced willful
maladministration. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1181 (1988).
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 131 (B) (1988).
82. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
83. 469 U.S. 464 (1985).
84. Id. at 471.
580 [Vol. 67:4
STARRETT V. WADLEY
lice Department, and the city.85 The plaintiff claimed that the director
acted improperly in his official capacity. According to the plaintiff, the
director "should have known [that an officer in the department had]
dangerous propensities [which] created a threat to the rights and safety
of citizens."8 6 The district court attributed this lack of knowledge to
policies in effect at the department.
8 7
In Brandon, the Court "equated" the director's actions, in his official
capacity, with the actions of the city.88 The Court quoted Monell in say-
ing "[o]fficial capacity suits generally represent an action against an en-
tity of which an officer is an agent ... ."89 Consequently, the Court
reversed and remanded stating that the city was not entitled to a "shield
of qualified immunity from liability under section 1983."96
Moreover, in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,9 1 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a single action taken by a policymaker can
result in municipal liability. In Pembaur, the Supreme Court stated that a
single incident of unconstitutional activity may constitute official policy
if the activity is consistent with formal rules or established practices of
the municipality, or if the activity is directed by officials responsible for
formulating government policy. 9
2
The Court in Pembaur specified three circumstances in which a sin-
gle action or decision creates municipal liability under section 1983.93
First, a decision made by a properly constituted governing body'such as
a city council or legislature would qualify.94 Second, the Court stated
that a single decision made by a municipal official when that decision is
85. Id. at 464-65. Originally, the city was not named as a dfendant in the action
because the complaint was filed before Monell was decided. Consequently, at the time of
filing, municipalities were not considered "persons" under section 1983. Thus, cities were
immune from suit for the tortious acts of their officials. The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari, however, after Monell was decided. Consequently, the Court allowed the plaintiff to
amend the pleadings. The plaintiff amended the pleading and claimed a right to recover
against the city. Id. at 469.
86. Id. at 467.
87. Id. at 467 n.6 (stating that "when complaints were filed by citizens, little discipli-
nary action was apparently taken.... Instead, a standard form letter.., was mailed to each
complainant, assuring the person that appropriate action had been taken..
88. Id. at 472.
89. Id. at 469-70 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
90. Id. at 473. See also McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984). In McKay,
the plaintiff brought suit under section 1983 against Routt County, the Colorado Sheriff's
Office, the sheriff and a deputy sheriff, the Ruidoso, New. Mexico Police Department, and a
police officer. Id. at 1369. The plaintiff alleged his due process rights were violated when
he was wrongfully arrested. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that the Sheriff, as an official
officer, was responsible for the policies and procedures of Routt County. Id. at 1375.
Consequently, the county is liable under Monell for implementing "an unconstitutional act
if [the Sheriff] knowingly was involved in an intentional constitutional deprivation." Id. See
also Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980)(holding the county liable for
a county judge's misconduct).
91. 475 U.S. 469 (1986). The plurality in Pembaur agreed that one decision made by a
policymaker could constitute policy. Id. at 484. There were, however, five different opin-
ions as to what legal standard should be applied in determining which official's actions
may be considered policy. Gerhardt, supra note 16, at 568.
92. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 484.
93. Brooks, supra note 19, at 330.
94. Pemnbaur, 475 U.S. at 480.
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made according to formal rules or understandings constitutes official
policy.9 5 Third, the Pembaur plurality held that municipal liability can
occur when a single decision is made by the government's authorized
decisionmakers or by those who generally establish policy. 9 6 Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality stated:
[i]f the decision to adopt that particular course of action is
properly made by that government's authorized deci-
sionmakers, it surely represents an act of official government
"policy" .... [W]here action is directed by those who establish
governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible
whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken
repeatedly.
9 7
The Court consequently expanded municipal liability under section
1983.98 One unconstitutional act by an official with decisionmaking au-
thority constitutes official policy.
Using the Pembaur plurality's rationale, therefore, Wadley's actions
were actions of the county, thereby creating municipal liability for Wad-
ley's misconduct. As County Assessor, Wadley was an authorized deci-
sionmaker who established policy for the office. Essentially, a single
unconstitutional act taken by Wadley, in his official capacity, represented
official government policy. Thus, Wadley's sexual harassment of Star-
rett amounted to government policy, and therefore, the county is re-
sponsible for this misconduct.
C. Failure to Use Proper Grievance Procedure Does Not Insulate the Employer
from Liability
In Starrett, the court noted that even though the plaintiff personally
complained to the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners
about the sexual harassment, she did not bring her complaint to the
Board's attention by placing it on the agenda, as she could have done.9 9
In essence, the court implied that Starrett's failure to use the proper
grievance procedure insulated the county from liability.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 00 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a plaintiff's failure to utilize a complaint procedure
precludes or shields an employer from liability.10 1 In Meritor, a female
bank employee brought a sexual harassment suit against her supervisor
and his employer, the bank.' 0 2 The plaintiff claimed that her supervisor
asked her to have sexual relations with him since she "owed him" for his
95. Id. at 480-81.
96. Id. at 480. See generally, Griffin, Civil Rights-Municipal Liability Extended to Include Sin-
gle Acts of Official Decsionmakers, 21 SuffoLK U.L. REv. 237 (1987); Krulewitch, Civil Rights-
Under the Civil Rights Act, Municipal Liability May Be Imposed Under Appropriate Circumstances, 36
DRAKm L. REV. 465 (1987).
97. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481.
98. Id.
99. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 812 n.1 (1989).
100. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
101. Id. at 71.
102. Id. at 59.
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help in getting the job. She initially declined but eventually yielded to
his demands out of fear that continual refusal would result in termina-
tion.1 03 Thereafter, he made continual sexual demands on her both
during and after business hours. ° 4 The plaintiff claimed that she never
reported this harassment to any supervisor and never attempted to use
the complaint procedure because she was afraid of her supervisor. 0 5
In Meritor, the Supreme Court rejected automatic immunity for the
employer because the plaintiff failed to use an existing grievance proce-
dure.10 6 The Court stated that "the absence of notice.., does not nec-
essarily insulate [an] employer."'
0 7
In making its decision, the Court relied extensively on the Solicitor
General's Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC").'0 8 The Court drew upon the EEOC's belief that:
[i]f the employer has an expressed policy against sexual harass-
ment and has implemented a procedure specifically designed to
resolve sexual harassment claims, and if the victim does not
take advantage of that procedure, the employer should be
shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of the sexually
hostile environment .... In all other cases, the employer will
be liable if he has actual knowledge of the harassment or if,
considering all the facts of the case, the victim in question had
no reasonably available avenue for making his or her complaint
known to appropriate management officials. 10 9
Consequently, using the rationale in Meritor, Starrett's claim against
the county does not fail because she did not place her grievance on the
Board's agenda. Rather, Starrett's complaint to the Chairman of the
Board of County Commissioners was enough, standing alone, to notify
the appropriate officials.
Moreover, neither the county nor the County Assessor's office had
an expressed policy against sexual harassment. 10 In addition, a proce-
dure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment claims had not
been implemented by the county. As a result, the county should not
have been shielded from liability for Wadley's acts of sexual harassment.
103. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reh'g denied, 760 F.2d 1330
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (en banc), aft'd, 477 U.S. 59 (1986).
104. Mer/tor, 477 U.S. at 60 (stating that the supervisor fondled the plaintiff in front of
other employees, followed her into the women's rest room, exposed himself to her, and
forcibly raped her on several occasions).
105. Id. at 61.
106. Id. at 72-73. See also Equal Employment Opportunty Commission v. Hacienda Ho-
tel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the existence of a grievance procedure and
policy against sex discrimination, coupled with employees' failure to invoke procedure, did
not insulate employer from liability for sexually harassing conduct).
107. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
108. Note, Employer Liability Under Title VIIfor Sexual Harassment After Meritor.Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1266-71 (1987) (noting that the EEOC entered as ami-
cus cIriat).
109. Mentor, 477 U.S. at 71.
110. Telephone interview with Gregory Bledsoe, plaintiff's attorney (Apr. 3 1990).
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D. Policy Dictates Employer Sanctioning Employer or Conferring Liability
Sexual harassment on the job pervades all areas of business. The
victims not only suffer humiliation and embarrassment, but they suffer
fear as well. Many victims realize that the loss of their job is a very real
consequence they might face for making a complaint about the harass-
ment. Consequently, many female employees simply remain silent.
One way to remedy this problem, however, is to sanction and hold em-
ployers liable for not establishing policies aimed at preventing sexual
harassment in the work place.
In Starrett, for example, had the county adopted a firm policy against
sexual harassment and had the County Commissioner's office accepted
this policy, Starrett would not have had to endure one-and-a-half years
of suffering. Instead, however, it appears as though the Board and the
county did not consider sexual harassment a problem in today's society.
The county's brief on appeal demonstrates its permissive attitude to-
ward sexual harassment. The county wrote:
It is somewhat astonishing that in the most materialistic, if
not hedonistic, culture ever created by man's ingenuity that
rules of sexual conduct as stringent as any imagined by the Pu-
ritan fathers have suddenly been erected in the workplace. A
pair of novelty glasses which picture a nude female when prop-
erly filled with water become relevant in determining whether a
judgment should be rendered for sexual harassment. This in a
culture whose highest court struggled with the difficulty of even
defining obscenity and where billion dollar businesses (en-
tertainment, advertising, publishing) are soundly founded
upon female nudity and salaciousness. But if an improper re-
mark is passed in the office or if the boss gets drunk and makes
a pass at a secretary, whether serious or not, it's ajury question
and a feast of lawyer's fees. No wonder our courts complain of
being overworked.
How much is it worth to a plaintiff if her boss flips her the
finger? How much if she "thinks" he made an obscene ges-
ture? How much for saying lets spend the afternoon at the
Blue Top Motel in circumstances in which it would be almost
impossible to take him seriously? How much per pinch on the
rear? How much for spending an afternoon at the Cue Spot in
Mannford drinking a few beers when he probably should have
been working? Is this the sort of raw meat that should be
thrown to a jury with no more education and instruction than
to do right? And what more is an instruction that "sexual har-
assment is unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature."
What the jury is really invited to do under such circum-
stances is to conduct a popularity poll. Do they approve or dis-
approve of the particular public official on trial. And of course,
counsel are aware of this. It becomes a question of can we
throw this thing on the wall and will it stick? Can we get
enough of the opinions and rumors of his enemies, political op-
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ponents and dissatisfied employees through the hedge of the
rules of evidence to make him look bad. If we can, we may walk
away with a verdict."'
In Arnold v. City of Seminole, 1 12 the Oklahoma district court discussed
a group of city officials' complete lack of understanding and awareness
of sexual harassment. The district court stated that:
[Many of the city officials] did not appear to recognize or admit
that harassment was more than good fun or regular and ex-
pected behavior .... The [city officials] were clearly unwilling
to confront the problem and the problem maker in particular
.... It would have been relatively simple to put an end to the
harassment of the plaintiff had anyone in authority chosen to
do so." 13
As a result, the court ordered the city to "raise affirmatively the subject
of sexual harassment with all employees and to inform all employees
that sexual harassment...,, 114 violates a person's constitutional rights.
Moreover, the court required the city to develop a plan whereby em-
ployees who are subject to sexual harassment may complain immediately
and confidentially. The court stated that "[a]n important part of a pre-
ventative plan is an effective procedure for investigating, hearing, adju-
dicating and remedying complaints of sexual harassment and
discrimination."115
V. CONCLUSION
Exploiting and taking advantage of female employees has extreme
negative consequences. The female employees experience both physical
and psychological effects. The victims suffer from stress, feelings of
powerlessness, fear, anger, and diminished ambition. One way to com-
bat this sex discrimination is to take a more liberal stance towards em-
ployer liability, especially towards employers who have notice of their
employee's misconduct. This would, in effect, force employers to take
precautions against sexual harassment in the workplace. In particular, a
policy against sexual harassment will suggest to employees that such
conduct in the workplace will not be tolerated.
Kristin D. Sanko
111. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 815 n.9.
112. 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985).





THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: HEAD V. LITHONIA,
SCRUTINY OF THE UNDERLYING BASES OF AN
EXPERT OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of "science" and scientific evidence in the courtroom can
be traced as far back as fourteenth century England.' "Scientific evi-
dence has always posed special problems for the law, and in recent years
these problems have become increasingly difficult."1
2
In today's litigious society, individuals are clamoring to find some-
one to blame for all the evils that beset their lives. In the course of their
quest, these individuals are consistently turning to experts as a source of
support for their positions. The complexity of lawsuits is continuously
increasing. More and more lawsuits are being brought in the area of
products liability and toxic torts by individuals who feel victimized.
There is also growing concern over the evolution of cases based on the
fear of contracting cancer or another disease years after the alleged ex-
posure to a chemical or other agent.3
In the face of this current trend, courts are being presented with
complex issues requiring the use of scientific evidence in greater
frequency.
4
The use of statistics, risk assessment, animal studies, epidemio-
logical data, regulatory or statutory findings, and various theo-
ries of carcinogenesis in the courtroom have revolutionized
tort litigation practice, resulting in a proliferation of... judicial
pronouncements and rulings on the value, use, and misuse of
science and science policy in the courtroom.5
As a result, being an expert has become big business. Courts are
becoming increasingly concerned that, for a price, litigants can hire an
expert to say virtually anything that is advantageous to the litigant's
claim or defense. There is a growing suspicion that experts can be
found to support any position in a trial.6 Against this backdrop, reliance
on expert witnesses is increasing in legal decision making.
7
1. Black, A Unified Theoy of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 597 at n.1
(1988).
2. Id.
3. Summary of Developments, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1448 (Apr. 12, 1989)
(comment by Rene Tatro, partner in the law firm of Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe).
4. Note, Diferent Standards and Conflicting Results: A Re-Evaluation of the Frye Test for
Admitting Novel Scientific Evidence in Light of Decisions Involving Spectrographic Evidence Introduc-
tion, 5 REv. oF LrnG. 327, 329 (1986).
5. Courtroom Science: Toxic Tort Battleground, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1336
(Mar. 22, 1989) ("Because of the complexity and uncertainty inherent in toxic tort cases,
the role of scientific and statistical evidence has become increasingly important.").
6. Summary of Developments, supra note 3, at 1444 (comment by judge H. Lee Sarokin,
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York).
7. R. GIVENS, DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE § 7.07, at 197 (1989).
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Judicial concern about the reliability of expert opinions also ap-
pears to be on the rise, especially in the face of scientific uncertainty.8
Additionally, the judiciary is concerned that the perceived erosion of im-
partiality in the use of experts is lowering confidence in the credibility of
the judicial system. 9
To curb this "expert shopping" and the abuses caused by the use of
expert witnesses who are paid to assert the position most advantageous
to the litigant who has hired them, courts are looking behind expert
opinions.' 0 It is becoming commonplace for courts to scrutinize the un-
derlying sources and bases of expert opinions to determine whether any
factual foundation exists for an opinion the expert is espousing.' I
The tendency of lay jurors to give considerable weight to scientific
evidence presented by experts with impressive credentials also causes
the judiciary concern. 1 2 "Where is always a danger that a jury may at-
tach too great a weight to expert testimony because of the person offer-
ing it."' 3
Lay people also have the idea that science is reliable and often infal-
lible. 14 The traditional view of the scientific method is that it is exact
and certain. Examples of this mentality can be seen every day. How
many people stopped eating bacon because of the scientific reports that
the nitrates in bacon cause cancer? This is just one example of society's
willingness to accept as truth whatever scientists say. "The court[s] will
have to evaluate the degree to which the jurors might be overimpressed
by the aura of reliability surrounding the evidence, thereby leading them
to abdicate their role of critical assessment."' 5 Appellate courts have
routinely manifested a thorough, ongoing skepticism of the jury's ability
to cope with the complexities of scientific evidence.'
6
This Comment examines the history of the admissibility of scientific
evidence beginning with Frye v. United States 17 and explores the solutions
and alternatives modern courts have adopted to deal with the concerns
attendant with the increased use of scientific evidence. This background
is the precedent for the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Head v.
Lithonia,'8 which enunciates this circuit's answer to the problems associ-
8. Id.
9. Summary of Developnents, supra note 3, at 1447.
10. R. GIVENS, supra note 7, § 7.07, at 197-98.
11. See Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987); Lynch v. Merrel-
National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (summary judgment granted con-
trary to experts' contentions).
12. See Arnett v. Dow Chem. Co., 6 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE LrIG. REP. No. 3, at
383 (Aug. 1983) (Cal. Super. Ct. 1983). In Arnett, the court made an inquiry into the
underlying facts and data upon which the expert based his conclusion.
13. F. Haddad, Admissibility of Expert Testimony, I FORENSICS SCIENCES 1-4 (1987).
14. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientific evi-
dence may "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen").
15. 3J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 702[03], at 702-42 to -43
(1982).
16. Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79, 92 (1987).
17. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
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ated with the use of scientific evidence. It can reasonably be expected
that this decision will resolve the confusion and abuses that permeate
the use of expert testimony based on scientific evidence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fye v. United States
Historically, courts have been suspicious of scientific evidence, even
when it is supported by expert opinion. Prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rules"), the practice was to screen pur-
ported scientific studies and expert testimony in order to determine
whether such evidence had "general acceptance" in the scientific com-
munity.1 9 This became known as the Fye rule, or the "general accept-
ance test."
2 0
Frye was decided in 1923 by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia and marked the first judicial recognition of the
need for special rules for scientific evidence. 2 1 The defendant in Frye
attempted to introduce results of a systolic blood pressure deception
test, an early form of the lie-detector test, and an expert's opinion that,
when tested, the defendant had been truthful in denying any involve-
ment in the crime for which he was charged.
22
Under Frye, if the proponent failed to establish the "general accept-
ance" of the evidence, it was not considered reliable evidence for the
jury to consider.2 3 In the court's words:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principal must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.
2 4
Although the Frye court did not cite authority or offer any explana-
tion for adopting the general acceptance theory, it was the dominant test
for admissibility of scientific evidence from the early twentieth century
until the last quarter of that century.
2 5
Since the advent of Frye, scientific knowledge has expanded signifi-
cantly. This growth has eroded the simplistic notion that the most im-
portant scientific facts are known and accepted by everyone in a
19. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. Id.
21. Black, supra note 1, at 629.
22. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. R. GIVENS, supra note 7, § 7.02, at 187. See generally Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197
(1980).
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particular field, whereas facts outside this realm are too speculative to be
considered. 26 Because of this growth, whether Frye remains as the con-
trolling standard for scientific evidence is hotly debated among courts
and commentators alike.
Even before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Frye did
not stand uncriticized. Emerging as the chief critic of the general ac-
ceptance standard, Professor McCormick wrote:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking
judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions
which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. Particu-
larly, probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers
of prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption
of time. If the courts used this approach, instead of repeating a
supposed requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere
imposed, they would arrive at a practical way of utilizing the
results of scientific advances.
27
Professor McCormick, therefore, advocated a relevancy approach to de-
termine the admissibility of scientific evidence, which was later adopted
in the Rules. 28 One of the questions debated by the courts today is
whether the Rules supersede the Frye test.29 The Rules are silent on this
point, which only complicates the controversy surrounding Fye's cur-
rent status.3
0
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence Relevancy Approach
When the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 1975,31
they further complicated the standards for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. Neither the advisory committee notes nor the legislative his-
tory of the Rules specifically discuss Frye, nor do they mention the gen-
eral acceptance test.32 Both courts and commentators are divided over
whether the Rules supersede Frye's general acceptance test.33 While
some circuits continue to apply Frye, others have either expressly re-
jected Frye as the test for determining admissibility of scientific evi-
dence3 4 or have not made a determination one way or the other.3 5
26. R. GIVENS, supra note 7, § 7.02, at 185.
27. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972).
28. Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
app. (1982)).
29. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
30. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 330.
31. Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595,88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
app. (1982)).
32. See Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1228-29.
33. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKLEREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5(f), at 28 (1986)
[hereinafter GIANNELLI & IMWINKLEREID]. Compare 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACICE AND PROCEDURE 92 (1977) (Frye has been abandoned and repealed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence) with 1 D. LourSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 818 (1977)
(Frye has survived the Federal Rules of Evidence).
34. See United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 (8th Cir. 1980) (court stated
that it had not adopted "generally accepted explanatory theory"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939
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It can be argued that the Rules' silence as to Frye is tantamount to
abandonment of the general acceptance test. On the other hand, it also
can be argued that because Frye was the established rule prior to enact-
ment of the Rules, and no statement repudiating Frye appears in the leg-
islative history, the general .acceptance standard remains intact.
3 6
Regardless of which position a court may choose, the language of the
Rules adopts the reasoning of Professor McCormick, who advocated the
relevancy approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence.
3 7
The relevancy approach of the Rules is the primary alternative to
the Frye test.3 8 This approach examines scientific evidence as it would
any other evidence3 9 by determining relevance and then applying the
balancing test of Rule 403.40 Those who advocate that the Rules super-
sede Frye focus on the language of the Rules.
4 1
Rule 402 specifically states that "[a]U relevant evidence is admissi-
ble, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules proscribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."'42 Rule 401 de-
fines relevant evidence as evidence "having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
' '43
Because scientific evidence can be reliable and therefore relevant
under Rule 401 without regard to general acceptance in the scientific
community, the Rules provide a standard of admissibility inconsistent
(1980); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (court held that the gen-
eral acceptance test of Frye did not survive enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
that the court should assess reliability and helpfulness, and balance these against counter-
vailing considerations expressed in Rule 403), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United
States v. Baler, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1974) ("Unless an exaggerated popular opin-
ion of the accuracy of aparticular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead
the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other
expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refuta-
tion."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
35. See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 304 n.15 (4th Cir. 1984) (de-
spite expressed concerns about Frye, the Fourth Circuit continues to apply it in certain
circumstances); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031
n.9 (5th Cir. 1984) (Fifth Circuit continues to apply Frye even if its applicability after the
Federal Rules of Evidence is unresolved); United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084, 1087-88
n.3 (I th Cir. 1983) (theEleventh Circuit has yet to decide whether Frye survives the Fed-
eral Rules).
36. See Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1229.
37. See supra note 27, and accompanying text.
38. See GIANNEui & IMWINKLEREID, supra note 33, § 1-6, at 31.
39. Defending Immunoloxicity Claims, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1223 (Mar. 1,
1989).
40. Id. The Rule 403 balancing test involves weighing the probative value of the evi-
dence against the countervailing considerations expressed in the rule. Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 specifically provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
41. See Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1230.
42. FED. R. EVID. 402.
43. FED. R. EvID. 401. -
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with the Frye test.44 Under the clear language of the Rules, Frye is inap-
plicable. Rather, it is a relevancy test which is employed to determine
whether expert opinion based on scientific evidence is admissible.
In United States v. Downing,45 the court opined that the Rules sug-
gest, if not mandate, a relevancy approach:
In our view, Rule 702 requires that a district court ruling upon
the admission of [novel] scientific evidence, i.e., evidence
whose scientific fundaments are not suitable candidates for ju-
dicial notice, conduct a preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the
soundness and reliability of the process or technique used in
generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the
evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and
(3) the proffered connection between the scientific research or
test result to be presented, and particular disputed factual is-
sues in the case.
46
This is akin to the balancing test of Rule 403. 47 The premise espoused
in Downing is further supported by Rule 702, which governs the admissi-
bility of expert testimony. Rule 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, techni-
cal or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue, a witness may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
'48
In sum, the relevancy approach of the Rules can be broken down
into three steps. 4 9 The first step is to assess the probative value of the
proffered scientific evidence. 50 The next step is to identify any counter-
vailing dangers. 5 ' The final step is to balance the probative value of the
proffered evidence against the identified dangers or other considera-
tions. 52 A similar balancing test is used by courts that follow the relia-
bility approach to determine admissibility of scientific evidence.
C. The Reliability Approach
The reliability approach is a third method of determining the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence via expert opinion. The massive toxic
tort litigation case In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation 53 discusses
this third method of analysis, which is a hybrid of the Federal Rules of
Evidence relevancy approach and the Frye general acceptance test. The
reliability approach involves a balancing of the relevance, reliability, and
44. GANNELu & IMWINKLEREID, supra note 33, § 1-5(f), at 29-30. See also Giannelli,
supra note 25, at 1230.
45. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 1237.
47. See FED. R. EvID. 403. See also supra note 40.
48. FED. R. EvID. 702.
49. See generally GIAuwEw & IMWINKLEREID, supra note 33, § 1-6(A-C), at 31-34.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 1-6(C), at 34. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1241 (3d Cir.
1985) (court noted that the most efficient procedure for determining admissibility under
the relevancy approach is the in limine hearing).
53. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 818 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub nora. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
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helpfulness of the evidence against the likelihood of confusion, waste of
time, and prejudice.M
This approach focuses primarily on a preliminary inquiry into the
underlying bases and sources of an expert's opinion to determine its
reliability. The inquiry does not go as far as Frye to require general ac-
ceptance of the scientific theory, but requires only that the methods
used to reach the opinion are those on which others in the scientific
community reasonably rely in reaching their own, possibly different
conclusions.
Courts that have abandoned Frye for the reliability approach stress
Rule 702's liberal attitude toward the, admissibility of relevant expert
testimony whenever it would be helpful to the jury.55 Although Rule
702 sets forth this liberal policy toward qualification of an expert wit-
ness, compliance with the rule does not automatically guarantee the ad-
missibility of such expert testimony.56 -
The Agent Orange court recognized that Rule 703 limits the bases
upon which an expert may rely in rendering an opinion to those which
are "reasonably relied" upon by "experts in the field."' 57 Rule 703
provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
58
When expert testimony is derived from novel scientific theories, the
courts will make a determination as to the admissibility of the underlying
bases and sources of the opinion.
59
The preliminary inquiry was further discussed with some vehe-
mence in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.60 Paoli involved a suit
by residents who claimed personal injuries from exposure to a nearby
railroad's storage area for polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs").61 At is-
sue was whether the court was permitted to look behind the experts'
54. In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1243.
58. FED. R. EvID. 703.
59. In a study released on March 29, 1990, the Center for Disease Control ("CDC")
specifically denied a link between Agent Orange exposure and incidence of cancer. Den-
ver Post, Mar. 30, 1990, at A2. The results of the CDC study provide further support for
the reliability approach. Specifically at issue in In re Agent Orange was whether Agent
Orange caused disease, particularly cancer in servicemen who were in Vietnam. The ex-
pert testimony on this point was focused on by the court in its discussion of scientific
evidence. It should be noted that the Agent Orange cases never proceeded to trial. See
generally In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S.
1234 (1988).
60. 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
61. Id.
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statements or whether the court was bound by the experts' assertions. 6 2
On this point, the court stated:
If Rule 703 is to be any limit on the ability of expert witnesses
to give their opinions, a court must be permitted to examine
the bases of the proffered opinions. Otherwise, any case in
which an expert was willing to use two sets of magic words
would always survive motions for summary judgment and di-
rected verdict. As long as the expert was willing to say "to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty" and "the basis of my
opinion is X, on which experts in my field reasonably rely,"
every case requiring expert testimony would get to the jury. If
a court is not permitted to examine the basis of an expert's
opinion in order to rule on the admissibility of that opinion,
then Rule 703 should read: "An expert may cite as the basis of
his opinion anything he likes."
'63
The Paoli court engaged in a preliminary inquiry and, relying on the
reasoning of Agent Orange, held that the expert testimony was
inadmissible.
Agent Orange specifically determined that "Rule 104(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence requires a court to make a preliminary inquiry
into the admissibility of expert testimony." 4 It was this limitation that
was recently recognized by the Tenth Circuit in Head v. Lithonia.
65
III. HEAD v. LiTHONi
A. Facts
In November of 1985, plaintiff Barbara Head was injured at work
when the reflector portion of a hanging fluorescent light fixture fell and
struck her on the side of her head.6 6 Although the plaintiff was neither
knocked to the ground nor knocked unconscious, she felt a knot raised
on the right side of her head. Three weeks later, she reported the inci-
dent to her employer and visited the company doctor, complaining of
dizziness, headaches, and occasional blackouts. Thereafter, the plaintiff
was placed on medical leave and was subsequently terminated.
The plaintiff brought an action against Lithonia Corporation, alleg-
ing the quarter-turn fastener on the light was defective in design and
failed to secure the reflector properly in place in its grooved channel.
She claimed that this defect made the product unreasonably dangerous.
The plaintiff sought $1,250,000 for the permanent injuries to her head
and neck, while her husband sought $100,000 for loss of consortium.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 368. In re Paoli is currently pending before the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.
64. In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1239. Rule 104(a) specifically provides in
pertinent part: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court ...."
65. 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
66. Id. at 942.
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During trial, the plaintiff called her treating neurologist, Dr.
Michael Haugh, as a medical expert to support her claims of injury to
her head and neck. Dr. Haugh testified by videotaped deposition and
explained his conclusions, which were based on the plaintiff's medical
history, clinical exam, and various tests. The results of the electroen-
cephalogram ("EEG"), computerized axial tomography ("CAT-scan"),
and clinical exam were normal. One test, however, topographical brain
mapping, apparently pinpointed the location of her injury. Dr. Haugh
concluded on the bases of the plaintiff's history and the topographical
brain mapping that she suffered from postconcussive syndrome and pre-
scribed medication to alleviate the headaches.
During his testimony, "Dr. Haugh described the topographical
brain map test he performed which, he explained, was a computerized
enhancement of the EEG, using stimulation techniques 'to bring out ab-
normalities on the EEG.' "67 When asked when he first began using
topographical brain mapping, Dr. Haugh explained that he was the first
neurologist in the Tulsa area to use the test and maintain the equipment
in his office.68 Over defense objection, the doctor offered his personal
opinion as to the value of topographical brain mapping compared with
traditional EEG methods. Aside from this testimony and his description
of the brain mapping test, Dr. Haugh offered no other information from
which, the jury could understand the reliability of the test; that is, he
offered no information on whether the scientific community had ac-
cepted topographical brain mapping.
When the plaintiff attempted to introduce exhibits representing the
results of the topographical brain map tests, the defendant objected,
contending that a proper foundation had not been offered for the test.6 9
After the jury viewed the videotape, the defense renewed its objection,
which was overruled without explanation.
On cross-examination, Dr. Haugh admitted that much controversy
surrounds topographical brain mapping.70 While recognizing that the
procedure may be beyond the experimental stage, the doctor could not
explain the methodology in the clinical setting.
Dr. Haugh also testified on cross-examination that all of his findings
based on the clinical examination and other test results were normal and
did not substantiate the plaintiff's complaint. It was only when these
results were coupled with the topographical brain mapping that the doc-
tor was able to conclude that the plaintiff suffered from postconcussive
syndrome.
7 1
Despite the propriety of the defendant's objections, the district
court did not examine the reliability of the foundation of the expert's
67. Id.
68. Id. at 944.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 942-43.
71. I at 943.
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opinion to determine its admissibility. 7 2 Ultimately, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $100,000, but did not
award anything to the plaintiff's husband.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in
permitting the plaintiff to introduce the topographical brain mapping
test results without establishing the necessary foundation for the relia-
bility of the test.7
3
B. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
At the outset of its analysis, the Tenth Circuit cited Barrel of Fun, Inc.
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,74 which held that the proponent of sci-
entific evidence "has the burden of showing as .a predicate to its admis-
sion that the proffered test has achieved scientific acceptability and that
the test has a reasonable measure of trustworthiness."' 75 The court rec-
ognized that Dr. Haugh offered no information on the test's reliability,
other than his personal opinion as to the value of topographical brain
mapping and a description of the test itself.
76
In a detailed analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court
recognized that Rule 70377 gives experts wide latitude to testify on facts
otherwise not admissible and broadens the bases on which expert opin-
ions may be offered. 78 The purpose of this broadening was to "bring
the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves
when not in court."'79 The court pointed out, however,, that although
Rule 703 performs this broadening function, the advisory.notes caution:
If it be feared that enlargement of permissible data may tend to
break down the rules of exclusion unduly, notice should be
taken that the rule requires that the facts or data "be of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field;" This
language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion
of an "accidentologist" as to the point of impact in an automo-
bile collision based on statements of bystanders, since this re-
quirement is not satisfied.
80
In commenting on Rule 703 as elaborated by the advisory commit-
tee notes, the court stated that the Rule's limitation provides courts with
a mechanism to evaluate the trustworthiness and reliability of the under-
lying data and sources on which experts rely.8 ' This does not mean,
72. Id. at 944.
73. Id. at 942-43.
74. 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1984) (expert testimony based on psychological
stress evaluation ("PSE") was offered).
75. Id. at 1032 (citation omitted). In Barrel of Fun, Inc., 739 F.2d 1033, the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the burden was not met by simply stating that the PSE test was used by the
fire marshall's office.
76. Head, 881 F.2d at 944.
77. See supra text accompanying note 58.
78. Head, 881 F.2d at 944.
79. Id. at 943.
80. Id. (quoting advisory comments to FED. R. EvID. 703).
81. Id. See also Barel of Fun, Inc., 739 F.2d at 1033.
596 [Vol. 67:4
HEAD V. LITHONIA
however, "that the expert's opinion must be generally accepted in the
scientific community to be 'sufficiently reliable and probative to support
ajury finding.' "82 The court goes on to conclude: "What is necessary is
that the expert arrived at his . . . opinion by relying upon methods that
other experts in his field would reasonably rely upon in forming their
own, possibly different opinions, about what caused the patient's
disease."8
3
Although the court acknowledged that experts are given wide lati-
tude to testify to facts that are otherwise inadmissible and "to broaden
the acceptable bases of expert opinion,"8 4 the court stated that Rule 703
implicitly requires the trial judge to make a preliminary determination
pursuant to Rule 104(a)85 as to whether the underlying data is of a kind
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.8 6
The court specifically noted that cross-examination testimony at
trial revealed that topographical brain mapping is relatively experimen-
tal and that the technique has not been accepted by other neurologists
or the American Academy of Neurology.87 Disturbed by the trial
judge's failure to make the required preliminary inquiry into the reliabil-
ity of the foundation of the expert's opinion,88 the court concluded that
this omission amounted to an abuse of discretion which mandated
reversal.8
9
In discussing the preliminary inquiry in which courts must engage,
the court pointed out that the "determination must be made on 'a case-
by-case basis and should focus on the reliability of the opinion and its
foundation.' "90 Based on this requirement, the court stated that a "dis-
trict court 'may not abdicate its independent responsibilities to decide if
the bases meet minimum standards of reliability as a condition of admis-
sibility.' "91 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment of the
trial court and remanded the case for a new trial.92
IV. ANALYsis
The debate surrounding the admissibility of scientific evidence has
been raging since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
82. Head, 881 F.2d at 943 (quoting Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, 825 F.2d 908,915
(5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).
83. Id. (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 944 (quoting Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 672-73
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
85. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
86. Id. See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M: BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, 702[03], at
703-16 (1982).
87. Head, 881 F.2d at 943.
88. Id. at 944.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 503 (5th Cir. 1983)).
91. Id. (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1245
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow
Chem. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988)).
92. Id.
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1975.93 It is clear from Head v. Lithonia94 that the Tenth Circuit joined
ranks with those who support the reliability approach, albeit the court
did not specifically state this circuit's position regarding Frye.
In fact, the Tenth Circuit has not expressly stated whether Frye is to
be followed in this jurisdiction. In Marks v. United States,95 the Tenth
Circuit had before it a criminal case where, as in Frye, the defendant
proffered the results of a lie-detector test.96 The court discussed Frye
insofar as it discussed lie-detector tests, but did not elaborate on the
general acceptance test.
9 7
In its discussion, the court noted numerous decisions from other
jurisdictions which refused to accept lie-detector evidence. 98 "We have
considered the question and are inclined to hold to the reasoning of the
courts which have refused to receive such evidence." 9 9 The Marks court
never made a determination as to whether the Tenth Circuit had
adopted Frye as the test for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence.1 00 Whether the court intended its decision in Marks to adopt
Frye as the standard to be applied when determining admissibility of sci-
entific evidence is debatable.
If Marks is construed as adopting Frye as the rule in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, Head abandons that construction. In its initial discussion in Head,
the court cited Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,l1 from
the Fifth Circuit, which continues to apply Frye even if its applicability
after adoption of the Rules is unresolved.10 2 This fact alone would
seem to lend support to the argument that the Tenth Circuit agrees with
the Fifth and also continues to apply Fryfe's general acceptance test. The
court's language in Head indicates, however, that the Tenth Circuit has
abandoned Frye for the reliability, approach. 103
Nevertheless, the reliability approach is not a pure abandonment of
Frye; rather, it is a hybrid of the general acceptance test of Frye and the
relevancy approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 4 As such, the
reliability approach is better suited for the modem court than is either
the Frye test or the relevancy test, given society's technological advances
and thejudiciary's concern with the abuses associated with using expert
witnesses.
Support for the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the reliability approach
93. Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
app. (1982)).
94. 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
95. 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959).
96. Id. at 382.
97. Id.
98. Id. at n.3.
99. Id. at 382.
100. It must be noted, however, that Marks was decided prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and, thus, the court was not in a position where it needed to
take a stand as to Ftye.
101. 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 1031, n.9.
103. Head, 881 F.2d at 943-44.
104. See supra Part II, section C.
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can be found in the language of Rule 703,105 which was discussed by the
court. Rule 703 provides as a limitation on expert opinions that the
facts and data "be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field." 10 6 This requirement is somewhat akin to the general acceptance
test of Frye, but is not as strict.
10 7
Frye requires that there be general acceptance in the scientific com-
munity of the scientific theory in order for it to be admissible.' 0 8 The
approach advocated in Head does not require that the expert opinion be
generally accepted in the scientific community in order to be "suffi-
ciently reliable and probative to support ajury finding."' 1 9 Rather, it is
only the methods used by the expert in formulating an opinion that other
experts in the field must reasonably rely upon in forming their own, pos-
sibly different, opinions. 1 0 In sum, it is not the expert's opinion itself
which must be generally accepted or reasonably relied upon by others in
the scientific community, but only the methods used in reaching that
opinion.
Head is not the first case to require a court to make a preliminary
determination' as to the reliability of the underlying bases and sources
of an expert opinion. 112 Courts are more frequently turning to the pre-
liminary inquiry to prevent litigants from hiring an expert for the sole
purpose of saying whatever is most advantageous to the litigant's claim
or defense."l 8 "Without more than credentials and a subjective opin-
ion, an expert's testimony that 'it is so' is not admissible."' 14 Several
courts have determined that the preliminary inquiry is especially impor-
tant in complex cases because of the need to rely on expert opinions to
prove the litigant's claims." 5
The trend towards scrutinizing the underlying bases and sources of
an expert opinion is appropriate in that it effectively curbs the abuses
105. FED. R. EvID. 703. See supra text accompanying note 58.
106. Head, 881 F.2d at 943.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
108. Id.
109. See generally Head, 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
110. Id. at 943.
111. See supra text. accompanying notes 60-65.
112. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Viterbo v.
Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224
(3d Cir. 1985); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th
Cir. 1984); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In rejapanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Villari v. Terminix
Int'l Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lom-
bardi v. Dow Chem. Co. 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
113. See generally Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1987).
114. Id. at 424.
115. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988) (this is
particularly important "when dealing with injuries or diseases of a type that may inflict
society at random, often with no known specific origin"); In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp.
at 1244, (" 'Rigorous examination' is especially important in the mass toxic tort context
where presentation to the trier of theories of causation depends almost entirely on expert
testimony.").
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caused by "expert shopping." If the courts undertake a preliminary in-
quiry of the underlying bases and sources of an expert's opinion, only
scientific evidence that is sufficiently reliable will be presented to the
jury for its consideration.
In Head, the Tenth Circuit found the plaintiff's evidence on topo-
graphical brain mapping to be inadmissible.' 16 The court was not con-
vinced that the trustworthiness of topographical brain mapping or its
acceptance in the relevant scientific community was established at
trial.1 7 Had the trial court engaged in the preliminary inquiry which is
the main thrust of the reliability approach, Head v. Lithonia might never
have been litigated.
V. CONCLUSION
There has been much trial and error in the evolution of the law
concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence. The reliability ap-
proach adopted by Head v. Lithonia 1"8 is an effective test for courts con-
fronted with this issue. The two alternatives, Fye's general acceptance
test and the relevancy approach, are not as complete or as thorough as
the reliability approach.' 19 The reason for this is that the reliability ap-
proach takes into consideration the concerns of both Frye and the rele-
vancy approach.
Fiye stands at one end of the spectrum and leads to harsh results,
which derive from its strict requirement that the expert's opinion be
generally accepted in the scientific community.120 If science is to be
used in the courtroom at a pace in step with scientific developments,
requiring general acceptance is overly burdensome. Presently, the gen-
eral acceptance requirement is difficult to overcome, and a litigant may
be prevented from introducing sound evidence as a result. Even though
the expert's opinion is based on methodologies which are accepted in
the scientific community, the opinions formed using those methodolo-
gies will not be admissible unless generally accepted.
The relevancy approach, on the other hand, stands at the opposite
end of the spectrum and is too lenient when it comes to admission of
scientific evidence. Under this approach, a litigant need only show that
the proffered scientific evidence is relevant and that its probative value
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 12 1 The Federal Rules of
Evidence themselves favor admissibility; therefore, establishing rele-
vance is a rather simple task. Courts will be required to spend a tremen-
dous amount of time allowing litigants to present the multitude of
evidence permitted under this method. The relevancy approach also
fails to consider the reliability of the proffered evidence, and is at the
116. Head, 881 F.2d at 944.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra Part II, sections A and B.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
121. See supra Part II, section B.
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opposite end of the spectrum from Fye, which was overly concerned
with the reliability of the evidence.
By taking what is best from each of the alternatives, the reliability
approach offers a fair, evenhanded method of determining the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence. It balances the concerns of both Fye and the
relevancy approach without abandoning the goals of either.
Because the reliability approach focuses on the underlying bases
and sources of an expert's opinion, a court can ensure that experts are
not simply espousing whatever they are being paid to say. The prelimi-
nary inquiry, which is the main thrust of the reliability approach, 12 2 has
undertones of Frye, in that a court must first determine the reliability of
the underlying bases and sources of an expert's opinion. It does not,
however, go as far as Frye to require general acceptance of the expert's
opinion in the scientific community.12 3 Rather, only the expert's meth-
odology in reaching an opinion need be of a type that experts in the
field would reasonably rely upon in reaching their own condusions.1
2 4
This is a workable approach, neither overly strict, as is Frye, nor too leni-
ent, as is the relevancy approach.
Moreover, the reliability approach borrows the balancing test of the
relevancy approach to serve the same basic function. 12 5 Even though an
expert opinion may be found to be reliable through the preliminary in-
quiry, the court will still engage in the Rule 403 balancing test.
12 6
Because the reliability approach borrows from both the Frye test and
the relevancy approach, it provides the safeguards of each. This is espe-
cially important today in light of the increase in complex cases where
scientific evidence has become commonplace as a method of proof.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Head v. Lithonia accomplishes more
than simply setting forth this circuit's position regarding the status of
Frye. Questions concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence will
now be determined using the reliability approach.' 2 7 "Rule 703 con-
templates that the court will play some role in the assessment of expert
testimony offered to ajury. While the trial process can leverage the pro-
bative value of this testimony, the process presupposes the court's
guidance."12
8
As a result of Head, the Tenth Circuit courts will conduct a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the underlying bases and sources of experts' opinions
to determine whether the testimony is sufficiently reliable to be
presented to the jury.12 9 This should bridge the gap between the overly
strict Frye test and the leniency of the relevancy approach. Since use of
122. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
126. Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th
Cir. 1984). See also supra note 40.
127. 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 944.
129. Id.
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expert witnesses seems to be a permanent feature of today's litigious
society, efforts like those of the Tenth Circuit in Head v. Lithonia will ease
thejudiciary's growing burden regarding the admissibility of expert tes-




Amisub (PSL), Inc. v. Colorado Department of Social Services, 879 F.2d 789
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Amisub (PSL), Inc. ("Hospitals"), as Medicaid providers,
appealed from ajudgment that defendant, Colorado Department of So-
cial Services ("Colorado") and its executive director did not violate a
provision of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (the "Act"), for reim-
bursement of inpatient hospital services.
The Tenth Circuit sustained the district court's holding that juris-
diction was properly based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and not on the federal
mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which does not afford relief
against states. The court also held that pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(13)(A), Hospitals had enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and had standing to challenge the reimbursement rates under
the Colorado Medicaid Plan. The court held, however, that the eleventh
amendment barred suit against Colorado since Colorado did not waive
sovereign immunity and Congress did not abrogate it by unmistakable
language in the Act. Colorado was dismissed as a defendant, but the
executive director was not.
The court held that the district court mistakenly applied the federal
agency "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review to the executive
director's findings. The appropriate standard of review for a state
agency's decision is a determination as to whether it procedurally and
substantively complied with the Act and its implementing regulations.
The court reversed the district court, and held that the executive direc-
tor should have engaged in a finding procedure that allowed her to as-
sure that all federal requirements had been met. The court also held that
the substantive results reached by the executive director did not reim-
burse Hospitals adequately. The court reversed and remanded.
Asarco, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 868 F.2d
1195
Author: Judge McWilliams
A miner was injured while working at a mine site which was oper-
ated by defendant, Asarco. An inspector from the plaintiff, Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Commission ("Commission"), issued Asarco a
citation for violating a mandatory safety standard. This citation was is-
sued despite the fact that the injured miner was the violator of the safety
standard. Asarco appealed the citation and civil penalty, claiming it was
not at fault nor were its employees. The Commission upheld the deci-
sion of the safety inspector, and Asarco appealed.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Commission's ruling, finding that
fault is not required by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.
Consequently, when a mandatory safety standard has been violated, the
operator of a mine is assessed a civil penalty regardless of fault. The Act
provides, however that lack of negligence will be considered when deter-
mining the amount of the civil penalty.
Baker v. Bowen, 886 F.2d 289
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Baker, appealed a determination by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("Secretary"), as affirmed by the district
court, that Baker was not disabled for the purposes of Supplemental Se-
curity Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-85. Baker argued that the Secretary, acting through an
administrative law judge ("A.LJ."), failed to consider certain x-rays and
that the Secretary's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, directing the A.LJ. to
procure consultative x-rays as well as Baker's medical records- from her
treating physician. The court held that the Secretary erred by not con-
sidering all relevant medical evidence and by not ordering medical tests
and records. The court found ambiguity in whether the A.LJ. consid-
ered Baker's x-rays, and reversible error in the Secretary's assumption
of what the A.LJ. considered. The Secretary failed to meet its burden to
fully and fairly develop the record.
Colorado Department of Labor and Employment v. United States Department of
Labor, 875 F.2d 791
Author: Judge Anderson
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the administrative law
judge A.L.J. ordering the Colorado Department of Labor and Employ-
ment ("Colorado") to pay the United States Department of Labor
("DOL") $405,659 for misspending of federal money granted the state
agency under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of
1973 ("CETA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 801, et seq. (repealed 1982).
Following an audit of fourteen CETA grants, the DOL Grant Officer
disallowed Colorado's expenditure of $563,271 of CETA funds.
Through negotiations, the disallowance was reduced to $405,659. Colo-
rado disputed the findings and appealed the A.L.J.'s decision ordering
Colorado to pay this amount to the DOL.
The four findings in dispute were that Colorado: (1) failed to docu-
ment certain expenditures properly; (2) failed to receive authorization
on a cost overrun covered by the federal government; (3) exceeded spe-
cific budget ceilings by more than fifteen percent without obtaining
prior approval; and (4) failed to request prior approval from the re-
gional administrator or grant officer for each purchase by a subrecipient
of video equipment exceeding $500 per unit. Upon review, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the A.L.J.'s decision on all four findings.
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Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 890
F.2d 1121
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Colorado Interstate Gas Company ("CIG"), challenged
conditions imposed by defendant, Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion ("FERC"), on FERC's approval of three of CIG's applications for
certificates of public convenience and necessity under section 7(c) of the
Natural Gas Act ("NGA"), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c). In all three cases, FERC
limited the duration of the certificates to either one year or until CIG
accepted a blanket certificate, instead of approving the longer terms
CIG had requested. Additionally, in one application, FERC required
that CIG charge a higher transport rate than it had proposed. In the
same application, FERC also refused to certify the firm transport service
CIG requested and limited CIG to providing interruptible service only.
CIG contended that all the conditions were arbitrary and capricious, and
attacked the rate conditions as beyond FERC's statutory authority under
the NGA.
The Tenth Circuit found that CIG could challenge the blanket cer-
tificate acceptance limitation on appeal because it did not argue this lim-
itation's invalidity in its requests for rehearing below. Regarding the
one-year fixed term limitation, the court held that CIG's acceptance of a
blanket certificate prior to the running of the one-year limits in all three
certificates rendered the issue moot. The rate condition imposed on one
certificate's approval was also moot since the certificate expired when
CIG accepted a blanket certificate. Lastly, the issue of denial of firm ser-
vice was moot due to CIG's acceptance of blanket certificates: The court
vacated the orders under review in each case.
Community Action of Laramie County, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 347
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Community Action of Laramie County ("CALC"), was a
grantee agency of the federally funded Head Start program. The de-
fendant, Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), funded
and set regulations for each grantee agency. HHS terminated CALC's
funding for violating federal regulation. After a series of unsuccessful
administrative reviews, CALC appealed to the federal district court
where it received a favorable ruling. HHS appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found that there was no law for the court to ap-
ply because no substantive guidelines existed for the agency to follow in
deciding whether to withdraw funding. Consequently, the court held
that it did not have the authority to review because it did not have stan-
dards against which to judge the exercise of discretion by HHS. Further-
more, the court stated that funding determinations are unsuitable for
judicial review. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to
dismiss the complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
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Dean v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 948
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Dean, sought a declaratory judgment that she is entitled to
the proceeds of her deceased husband's Federal Employees' Group Life
Insurance policy, although he had filed a change of designated benefici-
ary with his employer prior to his death. The district court found that
federal law preempts a state court order prohibiting a change of desig-
nated beneficiary, and Dean appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the Fed-
eral Employee's Group Life Insurance Act ("FEGLIA"), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 8701-8716, established a preemptive scheme. The regulation accom-
panying FEGLIA, 5 C.F.R. 870.901 (1986), contains language stating
that an employee's right to change beneficiaries cannot be waived or
restricted. The court held that since the state court order restricted the
federal insured's right to designate a beneficiary, it cannot be valid
under FEGLIA. The court affirmed the district court's summary judg-
ment in favor of defendants.
Dozier v. Bowen, 891 F.2d 769
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Dozier, sought review of the denial of his application for
Social Security disability benefits. After his application was administra-
tively denied on review by an administrative law judge A.LJ. whose deci-
sion became the Secretary's final decision in the matter. Dozier filed a
request for additional time within which to file an action for judicial re-
view in district court 125 days after the date of the Secretary's decision.
The Appeals Council denied this request. Seven months after the date
of the Secretary's decision, Dozier filed suit in district court under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the Secretary's decision. The district
court dismissed because the action had not been filed within sixty days
of the Secretary's decision as required by section 405(g).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the basis that the action was not fied
within the statutory time limit. The court also held that the Appeals
Council's denial of Dozier's request for additional time within which to
seek judicial review was itself not subject to federal judicial review. Do-
zier did not fall under the exception that there may be federal judicial
review when the Secretary's denial of a petition to reopen is challenged
on constitutional grounds. The court found that the A.LJ. did not make
his decision in an unconstitutional manner even though he used a post-
hearing medical advisor which Dozier was not permitted to cross-ex-
amine. This was not unconstitutional because the interrogatories sent to
the medical advisor were also made available to Dozier and no objection
to the medical advisor's opinion was made on the record.
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Drury Inn-Colorado Springs v. Olive Co., 878 F.2d 340
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Drury Inn, purchased a portion of a tract of land from the
defendant, Olive Company. The purchase contract contained a restric-
tive covenant which provided that Olive would not sell any portion of
the remaining land to potential competitors whose room rates were
within twenty percent of Drury's rates.
Drury filed an action for damages for Olive's alleged breach of the
restrictive covenant. The district court granted Olive's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the restrictive covenant constituted
a per se violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 6-4-101 (1973).
The Tenth Circuit held that per se violations of the Sherman Act
are found in horizontal price fixing, boycotts, and tying arrangements.
The court could not say that this particular restrictive convenant was a
per se violation against price fixing. The court reversed the district
court's order for summary judgment and remanded the case for disposi-
tion of the claim on Olive's alleged breach.
Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Fowler, appealed from an order of the district court which
affirmed the Secretary of Health and Human Services' ("Secretary") de-
termination that Fowler received an overpayment of Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance benefits. The Secretary also determined that Fowler
was not without fault in causing the overpayment and therefore, the
overpayment could not be waived. Fowler asserted that the decision was
not based on substantial evidence.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the Secretary's final decision only to
determine whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The court noted that it could not weigh the evidence nor substitute its
discretion for that of the agency. Giving great deference to the adminis-
trative law judge's (A.LJ.) determination of Fowler's credibility, the
court held that there was substantial evidence to support the Secretary's
determination that Fowler's initial application for benefits involved
fraud or similar fault. The evidence also supported the A.LJ.'s finding
that Fowler was engaged-in substantial gainful activity as an insurance
agent and as a manager of his corporation during the time he received
benefits. Consequently, Fowler was not without fault in continuing to
accept the disability benefits. The district court's decision was affirmed.
Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F.2d 788
Author: Judge Brorby
The district court issued an order of summary judgment for defend-
ant, Lyng, Secretary of United States Department of Agriculture
("Lyng"), in a complaint filed by. plaintiff, Gallegos, Secretary of New
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Mexico Human Service Department ("Gallegos"). The district court
found that the Department of Agriculture's food stamp mail loss toler-
ance regulation, 7 C.F.R. § 274.3(c)(4), was not arbitrary or capricious
and was promulgated by the Food and Nutrition Service ("FNS"), in
accordance with law. The district court also issued an order prohibiting
Lyng from charging the State of New Mexico interest on the unpaid
amounts assessed under the regulation. Gallegos appealed the summary
judgment, and Lyng cross-appealed the order prohibiting interest
assessment.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's legal conclu-
sions, but limited the review of FNS's administrative action within the
confines of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 ("APA").
This section of the APA sets the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review as not allowing the court to substitute its judgment for the judg-
ment of the agency. The court held that the mail loss regulation was
clearly consistent with the language of its authorizing statute, section
2016(f) of the Food Stamp Act, and reasonably related to its purposes.
In addition, the court held that FNS satisfied the notice and comment
requirements of the APA, and that the rule was supported by substantial
evidence when considering the record as a whole. Moreover, the court
stated that the Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3701(c), did
not abrogate the FNS's federal common-law right to assess interest on
outstanding debts incurred by New Mexico pursuant to the Food Stamp
Act. The court reversed the district court's holding regarding the inter-
est assessment issue, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment
consistent with this opinion.
Garcia v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 869 F.2d 1413
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Mrs.Garcia, sought review of a decision of the Benefits Re-
view Board ("Board") affirming the denial of black lung disability bene-
fits to her late husband, Simon Garcia. Defendant, Director of the Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs for the United States Department
of Labor, claimed that the decision of the administrative law judge A.LJ.
to deny benefits under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969 was proper because Mr. Garcia had failed to prove total disability
as required by the Act. On appeal, the Board found the A.LJ.'s decision
supported by substantial evidence and affirmed.
Under the 1969 Act, the Tenth Circuit noted that the "total disabil-
ity" requirement that triggers payment of disability benefits is satisfied
by abnormal results of either pulmonary function studies or arterial
blood gas tests. The court found that since Garcia's blood gas test re-
suits were described as markedly and grossly abnormal by two physi-
cians, and the Director failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of total disability, the Board erred in denying Garcia bene-




Hayes v. Unified School District No. 377, 87 7 F.2d 809
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant, Unified School
District No. 377 ("School District"), for the placement of their children
in "time-out" rooms for in-school suspension. The district court
granted the School District's motion for summary judgment and plain-
tiffs appealed. The School District cross-appealed contending that the
action should be dismissed because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their ad-
ministrative remedies as required by the Education of the Handicapped
Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1970).
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in proceeding to
the merits of the federal constitutional and state law claims because the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required
under the EHA. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(f) (1986), states that the EHA is not the exclusive remedy avail-
able to handicapped students seeking public education benefits. This
amendment, however, is clear in preserving the requirement that if relief
can be sought under the EHA, exhaustion of the EHA's administrative
remedies is necessary before an action can be brought in federal court.
The Tenth Circuit held that because proper conduct and education
are intertwined, the discipline of a child in the classroom, including
"time-out" periods, is a matter that relates to the public education of
handicapped children and, therefore, falls within the scope of the EHA.
Thus, the plaintiffs were required to present their complaints concern-
ing the disciplinary action according to procedures set forth by the EHA.
The court reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to dis-
miss the action for lack of jurisdiction.
Hill v. National Transportation Safety Board, 886 F.2d 1275
Author: Judge Tacha
Petitioner, Hill, sought review of a decision of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board ("NTSB") upholding a Federal Aviation Admin-
istration ("FAA") order suspending his pilot certificate due to violations
of 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(d), 91.9 (1988). Hill argued that the NTSB erred in
dismissing because both of the incidents for which he was sanctioned
involved purely intrastate flights and occurred outside the airspace con-
trolled by the FAA, and therefore the FAA lacked jurisdiction to sus-
pend his certificate.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The term "air commerce" is to be
broadly construed and not restricted to interstate flights occurring in a
controlled airspace. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(4) requires only the potential
for pilot conduct to endanger safety to support the FAA's order of sus-
pension. Hill also submitted to the FAA's jurisdiction by holding a pilot
certificate issued by the FAA. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) gives the FAA
broad discretion to suspend a pilot's certificate as a result of any exami-
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nation where the Secretary of Transportation determines that safety in
air transportation and public interest requires.
Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance v. Dole, 871 F.2d 943
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance ("Lake Hefier"), sought
a reversal of a federal highway administrative decision allowing the con-
struction of a six lane urban freeway in Oklahoma City. The district
court granted defendants'; Elizabeth Dole, joined by the City of
Oklahoma and the Oklahoma City Municipal Improvement Authority
("Oklahoma City"), motion for summary judgment. Lake Hefner ap-
pealed, arguing that the district court erred in indicating that Lake Hef-
ner had some burden of proof.
The Tenth Circuit agreed that, in resisting a motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party only has a burden to identify specific facts
posing genuine issues of material fact. In response to Oklahoma City's
motion, Lake Hefier did not set forth specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial. Because the court was not persuaded of Lake Hefner's
issues raised as grounds for reversal, and because Lake Hefier did not
raise any genuine issues of fact, the court affirmed the summary
judgment.
Lombardi v. Small Business Administration, 889 F.2d 959
Author: Judge Daugherty, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Lombardi, was terminated from his employment with the
Small Business Administration. The district court dismissed his Bivens
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Lombardi was a
federal employee whose claims were governed by the Civil Service Re-
form Act of 1978 ("CSRA").
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
established a cause of action for damages against a federal official for
unconstitutional conduct. However, based on United States Supreme
Court precedent, the court declined to create a judicial remedy when a
comprehensive statutory scheme, such as the CSRA, already provided
meaningful remedies against the United States.
Lopez v. Sullivan, 882 F.2d 1533
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Lopez, filed a motion for remand and reevaluation of his
disability claim after denial of benefits by the Social Security Administra-
tion ("SSA"). Upon reevaluation, and pursuant to the new criteria of the
Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-460, 98
Stat. 1794 ("Reform Act") (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.), Lopez was found eligible for disability benefits. Upon a
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favorable ruling by the SSA, Lopez filed a motion for attorney's fees,
which was denied. Lopez subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Reform Act did not require
remand of those cases decided before its enactment. Therefore, the
court stated that it was impossible to decide whether the remand was
due to a misinterpretation of the Reform Act, or whether Lopez's suc-
cessful remand was due to the merits of his case. Because it was impossi-
ble to decide whether Lopez's success was due to the merits of his case,
the court was unable to determine whether Lopez was a "prevailing
party" and thereby entitled to attorney's fees. The court remanded Lo-
pez's case to determine if he would have prevailed on the merits, thus
allowing an award of attorney's fees.
Mitchelson v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 880 F.2d
265
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Mitchelson, applied for benefits under the Black Lung
Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901-45 ("Act"). He alleged total disability due
to the contraction of pneumoconiosis during long-term employment in
one of the nation's coal mines. The administrative law judge ("A.Lj.")
determined that because Mitchelson met one of the four medical re-
quirements, he was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he was to-
tally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Defendant, Kemmerer Coal
Company, introduced evidence rebutting Mitchelson's claim of eligibil-
ity. Mitchelson challenged the finding that he was not totally disabled by
pneumoconiosis.
The Tenth Circuit held that the A.LJ.'s decision was supported by
substantial evidence and was in accord with the statutory and regulatory
law. Although Mitchelson was entitled to an initial presumption of total
disability, he failed to prove either total or partial disability from his coal
mine employment, as is required by the Act.
Peterson v. Wichita, 888 F.2d 1307
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Peterson, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq. (1982) (Title VII), alleging that the City of Wichita, Kansas, had ille-
gally discharged him on the basis of race. In Kansas, a deferral state, a
Title VII claimant must file a discrimination charge within 300 days of
the alleged unlawful act under oath or affirmation as required by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Peterson filed a timely complaint with the EEOC,
but he did not verify the complaint until after 300 days had elapsed.
The district court refused to apply an EEOC regulation implementing
Title VII, which provides that an amendment to cure a defect in a
charge, including failure to verify the charge, relates back to the date the
charge was first received. Peterson appealed.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit reasoned
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that the EEOC regulation does not frustrate the-purpose for the stat-
ute's verification requirement, which is to protect employers from frivo-
lous claims, because the EEOC does not investigate a charge until it is
verified. In addition, while satisfying section 2000e-5(b) is a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite, filing a timely EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit. The court held that the regulation could be applied
when, as here, the defendant alleges no prejudice from its operation.
Railroad Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 874 F.2d
1338
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff Watkins, appealed a decision of the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission ("FERC"), which stated that Watkins violated the Na-
tional Gas Policy Act ("NGPA"). The FERC found that Watkins sold
natural gas at a price in excess of the statutorily established maximum
price. Watkins objected, arguing that the FERC exceeded its statutory
jurisdiction by inquiring into geological structures underlying the sub-
ject acreage, gas-oil contact within specific wells, and properties of hy-
drocarbons from those wells. Watkins also asserted that the FERC
should not have been allowed to gather additional evidence when the
administrative law judge previously ruled that the evidence against him
was inconclusive. Watkins further asserted that the FERC's findings
were not based on substantial evidence. Moreover, Watkins claimed that
the FERC's conclusions of law were erroneous because the Railroad
Commission of Texas' ("RCT") guidelines were satisfied.
The Tenth Circuit held that the FERC inquiries into production and
gathering areas of Watkins gas-oil well operations were necessary. The
court reasoned that these inquiries enabled the FERC to enforce its re-
sponsibilities. Furthermore, the court acted within its statutory jurisdic-
tion. The court reasoned that the FERC had a duty to act on a record
that was complete. Moreover, the FERC acted correctly in conducting
an additional investigation. The FERC conclusions of law were found to
be reasonable and rationally related to the facts. Also, the court found
the FERC's decision to be based on relevant factors. The court noted
that the FERC was not required to follow the RCT procedures. Conse-
quently, the court affirmed FERC's finding of a NGPA violation.
Reppy v. Department of the Interior, 874 F.2d 728
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Reppy, appealed the district court's affirmance of the Inte-
rior Board of Land Appeals' ("Board") decision. The Board rejected
Reppy's challenge to a denial of his oil and gas lease application. The
Board reasoned that Reppy failed to comply with an administrative reg-
ulation. Reppy was the recipient of an oil and gas lease in a random
computer drawing. His lease application was rejected by the Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM") for failure to disclose the name of the filing
service he used as required by BLM regulation 43 C.F.R. § 3112.2-4.
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The Tenth Circuit first considered the Department of the Interior's
claim that the request for judicial review was time-barred by the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 226-2. This section states that no action
contesting a decision of the Secretary of the Interior involving any oil or
gas lease shall be maintained unless the action is commenced within
ninety days after the Secretary's final decision. The court reasoned that a
timely petition for reconsideration toils the ninety-day limitations pe-
riod, thus preserving the right to judicial review of an administrative de-
cision while petitioning the agency for reconsideration. In so holding,
the court overruled its decision in Geosearch, Inc. v. Hodel, 801 F.2d 1250
(10th Cir. 1986). The court next considered the merits of the case and
held that the rejection of the lease application was proper. The court
concluded that BLM's requirement of strict adherence to policies and
procedures furthered the statutory purpose of operating the public leas-
ing program in a fair and equitable manner, and was not applied to
Reppy arbitrarily.
Walker Operating Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 874 F.2d
1320
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Walker Operating Corporation ("Walker"), oil well opera-
tors, petitioned for review a ruling of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC"). This ruling stated that Walker violated the Na-
tional Gas Act ("NGA"), by diverting natural gas dedicated to interstate
commerce and selling that gas at a price exceeding the statutory maxi-
mum. Walker appealed, arguing that the FERC exceeded its statutory
jurisdiction and impermissibly impinged upon areas reserved for state
regulation. In particular, Walker argued that: (1) the FERC was pre-
cluded from inquiring into the scope of the Walker's natural gas
reserves, which were dedicated to interstate commerce; (2) the FERC
was precluded from inquiring into the scope of Texas' pricing determi-
nations covering its wells; (3) the FERC's conclusions were not based on
substantial evidence that Walker was producing oil above the gas-oil
contact line; and (4) the FERC erred in its conclusion concerning the
definition of "casinghead" gas under Texas law.
First, the Tenth Circuit found sufficient evidence to establish that
Walker violated the NGA by producing gas dedicated to interstate com-
merce and selling it at rates above the ceiling. Second, the court ruled
that the FERC reasonably interpreted the definition of "casinghead" gas
under Texas law as being gas below the gas-oil contact. Third, the court
held that the FERC had jurisdiction to inquire into the scope of an inter-
state natural gas producer's reserves above the gas-oil contact. Fourth,
the court held that the FERC had jurisdiction to inquire into the scope
of Texas' pricing determinations covering oil wells located on the same
surface. The court held that such examination was necessary back-
ground to the application of relevant federal statutes. The court, there-
fore, affirmed the FERC finding of an NGA violation.
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Wall v. United States, 871 F.2d 1540 Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Wall, filed an action in district court based on age discrimi-
nation and handicap discrimination following termination of his employ-
ment from the Department of Health and Human Services
("Department"). Wall sought review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board's ("Board") holding that Wall "voluntarily" left his employment
with the Department. The Board dismissed Wall's claim for lack ofjuris-
diction because voluntary retirement is not an adverse action which is
appealable. Wall appealed the district court's subsequent dismissal of
his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit found that Wall's voluntary retirement gave the
court exclusive jurisdiction to review the Board's ruling, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. §§ 7702-7703(b)(1)-(2). Affirming the decree, the court found
that the district court properly construed the statutes, and properly dis-
missed Wall's de novo action in the district court.
Webb v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1252
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Webb, brought an action against defendants to reinstate
her deceased husband's mining claims located on federal land. The
claims were previously voided by the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") because of Webb's employment with the BLM. Defendants
appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that to set aside the Interior Board of
Land Appeals' ("IBLA") decision, it must find that their actions were
arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. The court consid-
ered the plain meaning of the statute 43 U.S.C. § 11 in determining con-
gressional intent on the scope of control the IBILA and the BLM were
meant to have over employee spouses. The court found no such author-
ity in either the statute or regulation 43 C.F.R. § 20.735. Therefore, the
revocation of the mining claims by the IBLA under the regulation was
arbitrary and capricious as there was insufficient evidence to establish
the "indirect interest" required under the statute. Finally, the court
stated that even if the employee of BLM had the indirect interest
needed, it would grant the authority to void only the employee's claims,
and not her spouse's.
Williams Natural Gas Co. v. City of Oklahoma, 890 F.2d 255
Author: Judge Brorby
An Oklahoma state court enjoined construction of a pipeline by
plaintiff Williams Natural Gas Company ("Williams"), despite the au-
thority of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") certifi-
cate directing Williams to construct the pipeline. The federal district
court refused to contravene the state court injunction.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the district
court erred. Specifically, the court held that judicial review under sec-
tion 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b), is exclusive in the
federal courts of appeal once the FERC certificate issues. Thus, the stat-
ute barred collateral attack in either the state or federal district courts of




Richards v. Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, 866 F.2d 1570
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, appealed the district
court's decision in favor of plaintiff, Richards, alleging that the district
court improperly instructed the jury because: (1) the general liability in-
struction based on the Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 261 (1958) was not
the law of Colorado; (2) the district court improperly refused an instruc-
tion on the element of reliance; and (3) the instruction defining agency
did not contain the necessary element of control.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the instruction based upon
section 261 was proper. The court upheld the district court's refusal to
include the reliance element in the general liability instruction since the
instruction on apparent authority properly placed the issue before the
jury. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in refusing
to instruct the jury that an agency relationship is based on control be-
cause the instruction given sufficiently defined "agency."

ANTITRUST
Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Association, 884 F.2d 524
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Amateur Basketball Association ("ABA"), denied plain-
tiff, Behagen, a travel permit to play amateur basketball outside the
United States because he had previously been reinstated to amateur sta-
tus and the ABA followed a "no-second-reinstatement" rule. A jury
awarded Behagen treble damages under federal antitrust laws, as well as
damages for violation of due process. The ABA appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the antitrust issue should
not have been heard by the jury because the Amateur Sports Act makes
clear that Congress intended the ABA, as the national governing body
of amateur basketball, to exercise monolithic control. This includes con-
trolling amateur eligibility for Americans participating in basketball.
Therefore, the defendant's actions were exempt from coverage by fed-
eral antitrust law. The court further held that the actions by the ABA did
not constitute state action; thus, Behagen's fifth amendment due process
claim should not have gone to the jury.
Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipeline Corp., 873 F.2d 1357
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Cayman Exploration ("Cayman"), appealed the district
court's dismissal of its claim under FED. R. Crv. P. 12(B)(6), against
United Gas Pipeline Corporation ("United"), for violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). The district court held that Cayman failed to allege facts
sufficient that, if proved, would entitle Cayman to relief.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling. The court held
that Cayman failed to establish that United practiced unreasonable re-
straint on trade. Cayman also did not establish that United was guilty of
vertical or horizontal price-fixing. The court reasoned that Cayman
failed to allege facts showing that the parties agreed to set a price at
which the other would resell to third parties. The court also held that
there were insufficient facts to show a conspiracy to establish horizontal
price-fixing. Cayman did not identify the alleged conspirators. Cayman
also did not establish that any companies had acted in a way contrary to
the best interests of their business. In addition, the court found that
Cayman's RICO claim failed. The court stated that a RICO claim must
allege conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. Cayman failed to allege racketeering activity with sufficient
particularity.
DENVER UNIVERSITY IA W REVIEW
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Colorado Interstate Gas Company ("CIG"), was awarded
damages against defendant, Natural Gas Pipeline Company ("Natural"),
for breach of contract, attempt to monopolize in violation of the Sher-
man Act, and tortious interference with CIG's contractual relations. Nat-
ural appealed the district court's refusal to grant judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") had modi-
fied the contract terms between CIG and Natural, and these modified
terms were in fact honored by Natural. The Tenth Circuit reversed the
breach of contract verdict, reasoning that FERC's modification of the
contract preempted any breach of contract claim. The court affirmed the
tortious interference with contract verdict, finding that the FERC modi-
fication of the contract did not preclude CIG's right to bring a tort ac-
tion. The evidence showed that provisions in the modified contract
rendered CIG vulnerable to manipulations by Natural which drew away
business from CIG to a competitor business owned by Natural, and
while Natural's conduct itself was technically lawful, motive is a determi-
native factor in converting otherwise lawful behavior into conduct for
which defendant will be liable. The court reversed the antitrust verdict
because CIG failed to prove all elements necessary for a successful claim
under the statute-specifically, that Natural's predatory scheme had the
capacity to result in a high enough market share for CIG's competitor to
be classified as a monopoly.
Fox v. Mazda Corp. of America, 868 F.2d 1190
Author: Judge Barrett
In Fox I, plaintiffs, automobile dealers, were awarded damages for
violation of federal antitrust laws and the Automobile Dealer's Day in
Court Act ("Dealer's Act"). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
judgment against the defendants, automobile distributors, under anti-
trust laws, but affirmed the liability of defendant Gulf under the Dealer's
Act. Accordingly, the court remanded for a new trial on the issue of
damages. On remand, the district court, in accordance with the Tenth
Circuit's directive, limited the plaintiffs' proof of damages to those
losses attributable to Gulf's discriminatory allocation of vehicles. In Fox
11, plaintiffs appealed the decision to limit damages.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly excluded the
expert witness' testimony and damage model, which attempted to quan-
tify the plaintiffs' lost profits and loss of dealership market value from
the date of discriminatory allocation, rather than to include only those
losses attributable to Gulf's discriminatory allocation of vehicles. The
court concluded that the district court properly followed the law of the
case doctrine in deciding that the expert's testimony and damage model
did not comply with the Tenth Circuit's holding and remand in Fox I.
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In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286
Author: Judge Brorby
The states of Kansas and Missouri ("States"), asserted parens patriae
claims on behalf of their residents who purchased gas from public utili-
ties at inflated prices. The district court dimissed the claims based on
the rule that only public utilities or direct purchasers may sue for an
illegal cover charge. Consequently, residential consumers, the indirect
purchasers of natural gas, could not maintain an antitrust suit. The
States appealed, alleging that both the cost-plus and control exceptions
to this rule would allow them to bring suit on behalf of residential
consumers.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that neither exception to the general rule
governing antitrust suits would allow the States to sue on behalf of their
residents. Under the cost-plus exception, the court held that the direct
purchasers of natural gas, the public utilities, did not have fixed fee con-
tracts with consumers for fixed quantities of natural gas, as required
under the exception. Furthermore, the control exception only applies
where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customers. The
court held that the States' regulation of utility rates does not give the
States or its citizens ownership or control of the utilities. Consequently,
the requirements of this exception were not met. The judgment of the
district court was, therefore, affirmed.
Kaw Valley Electric Cooperative Co. v. Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.,
872 F.2d 931
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Kaw Valley, alleged that defendants, Kansas Electric Power
Cooperative ("KEPCO") and Kansas Electric Cooperatives ("KEC"),
had conspired to violate federal and Kansas antitrust laws. Because the
four-year statute of limitations for federal antitrust actions had run, the
district court granted summary judgment for KEPCO and KEC.
Affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that
an antitrust cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins
to run when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff's busi-
ness. Kaw Valley's first injury occurred when KEPCO adopted a policy
against providing power to nonmembers. Kaw Valley alleged subse-
quent injury because of a continuing conspiracy by KEPCO and KEC to
violate antitrust laws. If a continuing conspiracy exists, the statute of
limitations is restarted with each new independent and injurious act.
Whether a continuing refusal to deal is one cause of action, accruing
with the initial refusal, or separate causes of action, accruing with each
instance of refusal, depends on whether the initial refusal is final. If the
initial refusal is final, subsequent refusals do not restart the statute of
limitations. The court found that KEPCO's initial decision was final be-
cause its form and language clearly indicated its finality, even though
KEPCO subsequently offered service to Kaw Valley. Offers to compro-
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mise, within the context of litigation, do not destroy the initial finality
sufficiently to restart the statute of limitations.
Monument Builders, Inc. v. American Cemetery Association, 891 F.2d 1473
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiffs, a trade association of independent grave marker builders
and dealers ("Monument Builders"), brought an antitrust action against
numerous cemeteries, cemetery associations, and a bronze monument
manufacturer. Monument Builders contended that defendants con-
ducted anti-competitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2. The district court dismissed Monument Builders' claims
for lack of venue and failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Monument Builders subsequently appealed.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that venue was proper in Kansas, find-
ing that the claim could rationally be said to have arisen in Kansas as
well as Missouri. The court noted that special venue statutes, such as
section 12 of the Clayton Act, are supplemented by the general venue
provisions applicable to all civil cases. Second, the court reversed the
district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court could not
say beyond doubt that Monument Builders could prove no set of facts
supporting a claim that defendants engaged in a per se illegal tying ar-
rangement. The court stated further that the complaint did state a claim
for conspiracy to monopolize.
Smith Machinery Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Smith Machinery ("Smith"), brought this antitrust action
against defendant, Hesston Corporation ("Hesston"). Smith, a farm
equipment dealer, claimed that Hesston's requirement that Smith carry
Hesston's tractors if it wanted to carry Hesston's other products was an
illegal tying arrangement under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.
The district court granted summary judgment in Hesston's favor, and
Smith appealed.
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the dismissal, held that Hesston's line
requirement was not a per se violation of the Sherman Act because it did
not foreclose choice to the consumer. Moreover, the court held that
what existed between Smith and Hesston was not a contract for sale of
the "tied" goods, but rather a general distributorship. A franchise
agreement, defining general terms and obligations of the relationship, is




Adams v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiffs, Baker, Moore, L.A. Adams, andJohnnie Mae Adams ("In-
vestors"), appealed three separate orders of the district court. These
court orders compelled arbitration of claims arising under the Securities
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Oklahoma securities
laws, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty; breach of contract,
and negligent management. The Investors contended that: (1) Investor
Moore could not be compelled to arbitrate because she did not sign a
customer agreement with defendant Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith ("Merrill Lynch"); (2) the agreements to arbitrate could not be
enforced because they are contracts of adhesion; (3) the arbitration
agreements were procured through fraud; (4) Merrill Lynch waived its
right to arbitration; and (5) the district court erred in granting Merrill
Lynch's FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (B)(6) motion, which asked the court to recon-
sider its refusal to compel arbitration of daims arising under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court
held that the district court's finding that all the Investors had executed
customer agreements with Merrill Lynch was not dearly erroneous. The
court stated that the agreements to arbitrate were not contracts of adhe-
sion, neither were the agreements procured by fraud. The agreements
clearly and unambiguously set forth the arbitration provisions. More-
over, the law presumes that one has read that which he has signed. The
court further held that Merrill Lynch did not waive its right to arbitra-
tion when it attempted to resolve the dispute prior to suit. Also, Merrill
Lynch's failure to demand arbitration prior to suit did not waive its right
to arbitration. A party opposing a motion to compel arbitration must
show it has been substantially prejudiced by the delay; the Investors in
this case failed to meet that burden. The court then found that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in granting Merrill Lynch's FED.
R. Civ. P. 60 (B) (6) motion. The court reasoned that a change in relevant




Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Garrick, and her attorneys, Melton and Key, appealed an
order of the magistrate approving a settlement and apportioning a fund.
They alleged that the magistrate abused his discretion in reviewing and
revising attorneys' fees under two contingency fee contracts. In addi-
tion, Garrick challenged the magistrate's order directing that the funds
apportioned to the minor Garrick children be placed in a trust. Garrick
claimed that this violated New Mexico law, and violated the family's
right to freedom of religion.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the magistrate did not abuse his
discretion by awarding attorneys' fees on a quantum meruit rather than
on a contingency basis. Melton was subsequently removed for cause.
The court found that no fee agreement existed between Key and Gar-
rick. Second, the court failed to consider Garrick's objections regarding
the placement of her children's funds in a trust. The court reasoned that
the guardian ad litem, not Garrick, was the only party with standing to
represent the children's interests. Furthermore, Garrick's assertions re-
garding violation of the family's freedom of religion were held to be
premature and not ripe for adjudication. Third, the court found the
magistrate did not err in placing the settlement funds in the registry of
the court during post trial motions and during pendency of appeal. Also,
the magistrate did not err in holding he was without jurisdiction to or-
der disbursement of funds in the registry of the court where his order
concerning the disposition and apportionment of those funds was on
appeal.
Headlee v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 548
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, Headlee, appealed a denial of a cost of living adjustment to
attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d) ("EAJA"). Headlee argued that the district court abused its
discretion in not granting the cost of living increase because courts in
other circuits had granted the increase. Defendant, Bowen, responded
that the courts are split on the issue. In addition, Congress did not find a
need when recently reenacting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) to increase the stan-
dard rate.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the award of EAJA attorneys' fees was
clearly within the district court's discretion. This discretion was appro-
priate because the district court was the most familiar with the case and
prevailing attorneys' fees. The court affirmed the award of attorneys'
fees at the standard rate.
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Morris v. Peterson, 871 F.2d 948
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendants moved for an award of appellate attorney fees and costs
in a legal malpractice action, the federal district court in Kansas entered
an order awarding fees and costs for the appeal in the previous Colo-
rado litigation, and plaintiffs appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found that the federal district court does not
have authority to award attorney's fees, either pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, or under the inherent equitable power of the court for bad faith
and vexatious conduct. The court held that the determination of the
right to such sanctions against attorneys for conduct on appeal is not
within the authority of the district courts. Rather, the authority is re-
served to the court in which the conduct occurred.
Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal, 872 F.2d 335
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Research-Planning, appealed from an order of the district
court affirming the bankruptcy court's dismissal of its complaint. Funds,
which were originally held in trust by First Capital Mortgage Loan Cor-
poration ("First Capital"), pending a real estate transaction between Re-
search-Planning and a third party, were placed in First Capital's general
account in violation of an escrow agreement with Research-Planning.
The funds were then used to cover pre-existing debts, before First Capi-
tal declared bankruptcy. Defendant, Segal, trustee in bankruptcy for the
estate of First Capital, recovered a portion of these funds, which were
placed in First Capital's estate under the bankruptcy laws.
The Tenth Circuit held that the bankruptcy and district courts' dis-
position of the case was in error. The court found that the district court
erred in assuming that a metamorphosis occurred as possession of the
funds was transferred. Research-Planning was not divested of ownership
of the funds simply because the funds were transferred to cover pre-
existing debts. The court stated that the trustee in bankruptcy held the
funds not as part of the estate but for the benefit of Research-Planning.
Sheet Metal Workers Trust Fund v. Big D Co., 876 F.2d 852
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Sheet Metal Workers Trust Fund ("Sheet Metal"), com-
menced a district court action to collect delinquent payments owed to it
by defendant, Big D Service Company ("Big D"). The district court en-
tered garnishment judgments against Big D's successor, H-VAC, and
against Kirkman, an employer of Big D. The district court awarded at-
torneys' fees for garnishment proceedings against H-VAC, but refused
to grant attorneys' fees against Kirkman.
The Tenth Circuit held that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D), applied to
an award of attorneys' fees against employer Kirkman in garnishment
proceedings. The court found that Congress enacted the statute to en-
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courage enforcement of employer contributions and to protect em-
ployee funds from collection expenses. Moreover, the court stated that
the Kirkman garnishment was an integral part of the post-judgment col-
lection effort against Big D. The court remanded and ordered the dis-
trict court to determine reasonable attorneys' fees for the Kirkman
action, and for the prosecution of the appeal.
TakeCare Corp. v. TAKECARE of Oklahoma, Inc., 889 F.2d 955
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, TakeCare Corp., successfully brought suit against defend-
ant, TAKECARE of Oklahoma, Inc. ("TAKECARE"), for infringement
of its trademarked name. The district court sanctioned TAKECARE
under the Lanham Act, which permits a prevailing party to recover at-
torney's fees "in exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The district
court held that TAKECARE's continued use of the mark without expla-
nation after notice from the plaintiff amounted to a willful and deliber-
ate infringement, and thus an exceptional case meriting an award of
attorney's fees. TAKECARE appealed, claiming that its reliance on the
advice of counsel removes its otherwise willful conduct from section
1117(a) sanction.
The Tenth Circuit noted that under certain circumstances a party's
reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel may defuse otherwise will-
ful conduct. However, the court refused to exculpate TAKECARE from
the sanctions because no evidence was offered at trial as to what TAKE-
CARE's attorney had advised. Thus, TAKECARE failed to prove rea-
sonable reliance. The court held that TAKECARE could not introduce
new evidence on appeal to show that the district court abused its discre-




Downriver Community Federal Credit Union v. Penn Square Bank, 879 F.2d
754
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs, Downriver Community Federal Credit Union and Wood
Products Credit Union ("Banks"), were uninsured depositors in the in-
solvent defendant, Penn Square Bank ("PSB"). The district court found
that PSB fraudulently induced the Banks to deposit funds by issuing fi-
nancial statements that were materially misleading as to PSB's financial
condition. The district court imposed a constructive trust on PSB's as-
sets entitling the Banks to recover the full amount of their deposits,
rather than their pro rata share under the relevant provision of the Na-
tional Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 194. PSB appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that federal common law governs this case
since a federal policy or need for uniformity would be frustrated by the
application of state law as the federal rule of decision. The court further
held that fraudulent inducement of the Banks does not entitle them to
more than a pro rata share of the assets since Congress would not have
intended to deluge the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with
claims for preferences on behalf of all the uninsured depositors who
could allege that they relied upon misleading information that was avail-
able to all depositors. The judgment was reversed.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Rocket Oil Co., 865 F.2d 1158
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and
Deposit Insurance National Bank of Oklahoma City ("DINB"), appealed
the district court's order denying their claim for prejudgment interest.
FDIC also argued that the district court erred in awarding postjudgment
interest from the date the judgment was entered on remand. FDIC con-
tended that the commencement date for postjudgment interest should
be set on the date of the court's original erroneous judgment. Moreover,
FDIC sought restitution for funds overpaid to Rocket Oil following a
bank's insolvency. The district court originally denied recovery, but was
reversed and remanded. On remand, the FDIC and DINB sought pre-
judgment and postjudgment interest payments.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court was within its discre-
tion in refusing to award prejudgment interest. The court reasoned that
the congressional intent of the National Bank Act ("NBA"), was to equi-
tably distribute the assets of an insolvent bank among injured parties
who each possess a legitimate claim. The court explained that Congress
did not intend the NBA to provide a compensatory remedy. Therefore,
the district court was not compelled to grant prejudgment interest. The
court also affirmed the district court's focus on "the extent to which the
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case was reversed" as determinative of when postjudgment interest
should commence. Since this case involved a complete reversal of the
liability and substantive rights of the parties, postjudgment interest
should be awarded from the date the judgment was entered on remand
rather than the date of the original erroneous judgment.
BANKRUPrCY
C.L T. Financial Services, Inc. v. Posta, 866 F.2d 364
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, C.I.T. Financial Services, Inc. ("C.I.T."), appealed the dis-
missal of its complaint objecting to the discharge in bankruptcy of de-
fendant, Posta's debt, which was secured by a mobile travel trailor.
C.I.T. argued that Posta acted maliciously in selling the trailor in viola-
tion of the terms of the security agreement. Consequently, 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) (1978) was applied, which excepts from discharge any debt
"for.. .malicious injury by the debtor...," including conversion of prop-
erty subject to a creditor's security interest.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy court
and the district court. The court reasoned that because Posta did not
read the security agreement, they did not have any knowledge of C.I.T.'s
rights and, therefore, did not establish malicious intent. The court held
that because Posta did not knowingly violate C.I.T.'s rights by selling
the trailor, the conversion was not "malicious."
Fidelity Savings & Investment Co. v. New Hope Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172
Per Curiam
In a bankruptcy action, plaintiff, Fidelity Savings & Investment
Company ("Fidelity"), sought to recover distributions made on savings
certificates from the defendants, New Hope Baptist ("New Hope"),
claiming that the distributions qualified as preferences under 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b). New Hope asserted that the distributions were protected as
transfers made in the ordinary course of business under section
547(c)(2). The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of
New Hope and the district court, sitting as an appellate court in bank-
ruptcy, affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit rejected Fidelity's argument that the ordinary
course of business exception protected only short-term trade credit pay-
ments. The statutory language contains no express limitation, and the
legislative history of section 547(c)(2) indicates that a broader applica-
tion was intended. The court held that the payments to New Hope were
a necessary part of Fidelity's daily business and, therefore, met the re-
quirements for the ordinary course of business exception. The court af-
firmed the district court's judgment.
Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiffs filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. United States trustee, Vance, moved to dismiss asserting
that the plaintiffs' reorganization plan was deficient. The bankruptcy
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court, relying on 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2)-(4), dismissed the case with
prejudice, and the district court affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chap-
ter 11 case if the debtor is unable to effectuate a plan, meaning that the
debtor lacks the ability either to formulate a plan or to carry one out.
The bankruptcy court correctly held that Hall was unable to formulate a
plan. The court further held that dismissal with prejudice is a severe
sanction to which the courts should resort infrequently. Because plain-
tiffs were appearingpro se, their tardiness in filing reports did not rise to
the level of bad faith necessary to warrant dismissal with prejudice. The
case was remanded to the bankruptcy court for the entry of an order
vacating the dismissal with prejudice.
Holmes v. Silver Wings Aviation, Inc., 881 F.2d 939
Author: Judge McKay
Debtors appealed from the district court's order, affirming the deci-
sion of the bankruptcy court to award creditor, Silver Wings Aviation,
Inc. ("Silver Wings"), attorney fees as an administrative expense.
The Tenth Circuit found that the former rule of appellate standing
embodied in section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C.
§ 67(c) (repealed 1978), still applies to all appeals from bankruptcy
court proceedings. This rule limits the right to appellate review to those
persons whose rights or interests are directly and adversely affected pe-
cuniarily by a bankruptcy court order. Since the order awarding attorney
fees to Silver Wings did not affect the total payout the debtors agreed to
under their Chapter 13 plan, the court dismissed the appeal, holding
that the debtors lacked standing to contest the award of attorney fees.
In re Allen, 888 F.2d 1299
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Spears, trustee of the debtor in bankruptcy, appealed the
judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's decision
to grant summary judgment to the defendant, Michigan National Bank
("National"). At issue was whether Spears could avoid a preferential
transfer of the debtor's interest under a Purchase and Escrow Agree-
ment ("Agreement") pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower courts, holding that the
debtor's interest in the Agreement was a "general intangible," and that
National had properly perfected its security interest in the Agreement
under Oklahoma law. In the alternative, the conveyance from the debtor
to National met the "contemporaneous exchange" exception to Section
547(c) as found in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c).
In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp., 872 F.2d 335
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Research-Planning, Inc., appealed from an order of the
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district court affirming the bankruptcy court's dismissal of its complaint.
Funds, which were originally held in trust by First Capital Mortgage
Loan Corporation ("First Capital"), pending a real estate transaction
between Research-Planning and a third party, were placed in First Capi-
tal's general account in violation of an escrow agreement with Research-
Planning. The funds were then used to cover pre-existing debts, before
First Capital declared bankruptcy. Defendant, Segal, trustee in bank-
ruptcy for the estate of First Capital, recovered a portion of these funds,
which were placed in First Capital's estate under the bankruptcy laws.
The Tenth Circuit held that the bankruptcy and district courts' dis-
position of the case was in error. The court found that the district court
erred in assuming that a metamorphosis occurred as possession of the
funds was transferred. Research-Planning was not divested of ownership
of the funds simply because the funds were transferred to cover pre-
existing debts. The court stated that the trustee in bankruptcy held the
funds not as part of the estate but for the benefit of Research-Planning.
In re Heape, 886 F.2d 280
Per Curiam
Under 11 U.S.C. § 522, debtors may avoid having a lien put on their
property if such property is considered a "tool of the trade." The bank-
ruptcy court held that debtors' breeding stock did not qualify for lien
avoidance under the statute and the district court affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that breeding stock to a live-
stock farmer is indeed a "tool of the trade," as a means to produce agri-
cultural products. The court favored the "use" test long employed by
the state of Kansas: tools of the trade must be used for the purpose of
carrying on the trade or business. The court noted that since the term
was neither defined in the statute itself nor in its legislative history,
courts have been inconsistent in their interpretations, but Tenth Circuit
case law has followed a practical application of the statute.
In re Leonard, 866 F.2d 335
Author: Judge Brorby
Debtors, Leonard and Weiss, sought to avoid a nonpossessory, non-
purchase-money security interest that creditor, Aetna Finance Company
("Aetna"), held in their property. Both filed a motion pursuant to the
lien avoidance provision of the Bankruptcy Code asking that their prop-
erty be exempt from Aetna's lien. The district court held for Leonard
and Weiss stating that both could avoid the lien. Aetna appealed, argu-
ing that when Colorado limited the types of property that could be ex-
empted, the use of state law was mandated, thereby precluding use of
the federal lien avoidance provision.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision holding that
states may not "opt out" of the lien avoidance provision simply by limit-
ing exemptions to unencumbered property. Furthermore, the court
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stated that since the property fell under Colorado's list of exemptions,
then any nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien on the property could
be avoided under the federal provision.
In re Mueller, 867 F.2d 568
Author: Judge Moore
The bankruptcy court denied Mueller a personal exemption for the
value of a life insurance policy he purchased immediately prior to filing
bankruptcy. Mueller appealed the district court order which held that
Mueller purchased the policy to defraud his creditors.
The Tenth Circuit held that the value of Mueller's life insurance
policy was not exempt from creditor's claims because Mueller filed
bankruptcy within one year after the policy was issued, and had obtained
the policy for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. The court further
held that the district court correctly applied the "badges of fraud" test
in determining whether Mueller purchased the life insurance policy with
intent to defraud. The order was affirmed.
In re Rasmussen, 888 F.2d 703
Per Curiam
Debtor, Rasmussen, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and all his un-
secured debts were discharged except his debt to Pioneer Bank of Long-
mont. This exception was made because Rasmussen obtained the loan
from Pioneer through fraud. Rasmussen then filed a reorganization plan
under Chapter 13 to pay Pioneer 1.5% of the amount due, over a three
year period. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan and the district
court affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit de novo reviewed the legal conclusions of the
lower courts on appeal. The court stated that Rasmussen's successive
filings did not, by itself, constitute bad faith in the Chapter 13 filing.
When judged by the "totality of the circumstances," however, the court
found the Chapter 13 filing was not made in good faith. The court re-
versed the district court and dismissed the debtor's Chapter 13 reorgan-
ization plan.
In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc., 877 F.2d 32
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc. ("Robinson"), paid defend-
ant, U.P.G., Inc. ("U.P.G."), $40,000 during the ninety-day preference
period prior to bankruptcy. U.P.G. accepted the money as payment in
full for a $49,000 debt, and released valid liens totalling $7,884.97.
Lowery, trustee in bankruptcy for Robinson, brought an action to re-
cover a portion of the sum paid by Robinson as a preference under fed-
eral statute. U.P.G. claimed a complete defense to the preference action
under federal law which provided, "a transfer which is a contemporane-
ous exchange for new value is not avoidable as a preference."
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The Tenth Circuit stated that transfers are protected only to the
extent that they are contemporaneous exchange for new value. New
Value is defined as, "money or money's worth in goods, services, or new
credit." Outside the $7,884.97 in released liens, U.P.G. failed to show
anything qualifying as new value. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held,
only the $7,884.97 was protected by federal statute, and the remaining
$32,115.03 must be treated as preference and thus forfeited by U.P.G.
in re Sweetwater, 884 F.2d 1323
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Pursuant to defendant, Sweetwater's, Chapter 11 reorganization,
plaintiff, Robison, was named trustee of a fund responsible for paying
Sweetwater's administrative claimants. Robison brought an avoidance
action under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (1978). The district court dis-
missed Robison's claim despite a finding that it had subject matter juris-
diction. Robison appealed the dismissal and co-defendant, Citicorp,
Inc., cross-appealed the jurisdictional finding.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling onjuridiction,
holding that the district court's determination was thorough and proper.
The court reversed the dismissal of Robison's complaint, finding that
the district court erred in determining that Robison did not qualify as a
"representative" under section 1 123(b)(3)(B). Robison had been prop-
erly appointed and his responsibilities and authority under the plan fur-
ther qualified him as a representative. Additionally, the plan specifically
allowed Robison to enforce avoidance claims. Finally, carrying out the
effect of the plan would further the efficient and fair administration of
the Chapter 11 proceeding.
Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543
Author: Judge Moore
Debtors ("West"), filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against defendant, Lowry Federal' Credit Union
("Lowry"), to determine whether Lowry could legally repossess their ve-
hicle. Lowry claimed it had a right to repossess the vehicle since West
failed to reaffirm the debt or redeem the collateral after filing for relief
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court held for
West, and Lowry subsequently appealed.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that West's failure to fie the notice of
election, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A), did not give Lowry, a
secured creditor, an automatic right to repossess collateral. Second, the
court held that section 521 does not state that redemption or reaffirma-
tion is the exclusive means by which a bankruptcy court can allow a
debtor to retain secured property. Because the debtors were current on
their payments and maintained adequate insurance on the vehicle, the
court found that neither West nor Lowry were prejudiced. Thus, the
court conduded that the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion by
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allowing West to retain the collateral without requiring a redemption or
reaffirmation.
Porter v. Yukon National Bank, 866 F.2d 355
Author: Judge Moore
Debtor, Porter, transferred certain property to creditor, Yukon Na-
tional Bank ("Yukon"), to collateralize a preexisting debt. Subsequently,
Porter's trustee filed an action pursuant to section 547(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to recover the transferred property for the benefit of the
estate. The district court voided the transfer and Yukon appealed.
Yukon claimed that the trustee failed to satisfy two Bankruptcy Code
requirements: Porter was not insolvent at the time of the transfer, and
the transfer would not have enabled Yukon to receive more than it
would have received under Porter's Chapter 7 liquidation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, stating that
Porter's insolvency was shown and it was unnecessary to introduce ex-
pert testimony. Instead, any appropriate means would suffice. Also, the
court stated that Porter's transfer had the effect of changing Yukon's
status from an unsecured creditor to that of a fully secured creditor.
This change of status to a preferred creditor would enable Yukon to
receive more money than it would have received under Chapter 7
liquidation.
Reiss v. Hagmann, 881 F.2d 890
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Reiss, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, listing one
creditor, the Bank of Woodward. The bankruptcy trustee sought court
approval for a compromise settlement to which the bank objected and
offered to pay litigation costs. The bankruptcy court approved the set-
tlement and the district court affirmed. The bank appealed, arguing that
the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion.
The Tenth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had abused its
discretion in approving the compromise settlement because it failed to
make an informed decision based on an objective evaluation of the situa-
tion before it. Neither the trustee nor the courts did any legal research
or attempted to separate the issues and evaluate the facts. The court
further held that where there would have been no cost to the estate and
nothing to pay creditors without success of the lawsuit, the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion in approving a settlement objected to by the
sole creditor. The court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164
Per Curiam
Debtor plaintiff, Wendell Sylvester ("Wendell"), brought an adver-
sary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of certain obligations
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owed to his former spouse, Jane Sylvester ("Jane"), pursuant to a di-
vorce settlement. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's de-
termination that Wendell's monthly payments were "alimony" or
"maintenance." Consequently, the district court held that the payments
were not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the intent of the parties at
the time they entered into their agreement is determinative of dis-
chargeability under § 523(a). The court stated that the Sylvesters' agree-
ment indicated an intent that the payments be considered alimony,
maintenance or support. There was no intent that the payments be con-
sidered a property settlement. The court also upheld the district court's
refusal to analyze Jane's present need for support in order to determine
dischargeability of obligations.
Yukon Self Storage Fund v. Green, 876 F.2d 854
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Yukon Self Storage Fund ("Yukon"), filed a complaint to
determine whether a debt was dischargeable. The district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision to dismiss the complaint as untimely.
Yukon appealed, asserting that the district court erred in dismissing the
complaint. Yukon reasoned that it did not receive formal notice.
The Tenth Circuit held that a creditor who does not receive formal
notice of a petition for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7, but who had
actual notice shortly after the filing, is bound by the bar date for filing
complaints. The language of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A), allows the debt
owing to a creditor to be discharged if the creditor has actual, timely
notice, notwithstanding the failure of formal notice. When a creditor re-
ceives notice of a bar date with sufficient time to act, the requirement of





Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188
Per Curiam
Dissent: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Dunn, appealed the dismissal of his civil rights claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which alleged that prison officials forced him to sub-
mit to an AIDS blood test, without a due process hearing and against his
religious beliefs.
The Tenth Circuit held that, because of the seriousness of AIDS
and its transmissibility, the prison's interest in treating those infected
and preventing the spread of AIDS outweighed Dunn's expectation of
privacy under the fourth amendment. The prison's lack of a current
medical program for AIDS-infected prisoners did not make the blood
testing policy arbitrary or irrational. The court found Dunn's allegation
that the AIDS test violated his religious beliefs too vague and conclusory
to sustain a claim under the first amendment. Finally, the court held that
Dunn was not entitled to a due process hearing prior to being
threatened with disciplinary segregation. The court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the claim.
Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiffs, inmates of the Penitentiary of New Mexico, filed a class
action suit against the defendant state officials alleging civil rights viola-
tions in the New Mexico prison system. The district court entered a
consent decree, in full settlement of the claims, and a jury trial was
waived. Defendants later attempted to have certain portions of the con-
sent decree vacated, claiming that those portions were not directly re-
lated to plaintiffs' federal rights. The district court denied the
defendants' motion to vacate.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court order. The defendants'
arguments that the eleventh amendment barred the federal court from
enforcing the decree were unavailing, since the eleventh amendment
does not bar a suit where the state official has allegedly violated federal
law. This argument was particularly weak because the defendants con-
ceded federal jurisdiction on the underlying complaint which was the
basis for both the lawsuit and ensuing consent decree.
Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against the governor and other
state officials, including the Warden of the Penitentiary of New Mexico,
alleging abuses violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A consent decree in settle-
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ment was entered into in 1980, setting forth rules and regulations which
would govern the defendants in their operation of the prison. The con-
sent decree itself has been the subsequent cause of further litigation be-
tween the parties in the form of motions to modify or vacate portions of
the decree or motions to hold defendants in contempt for noncompli-
ance. This appeal is from two orders of the district court granting attor-
neys' fees to plaintiffs.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the orders, noting that an award of at-
torneys' fees will be upset only if it represents an abuse of discretion.
The court held that defendants' arguments against the award of attor-
neys' fees were without merit.
Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d 543
Per Curiam
Durre, a state prison inmate, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections.
The district court dismissed all of Durre's claims.
Upholding all but one of the district court's dismissals, the Tenth
Circuit held that Durre's allegations of conspiracy to deprive him of his
constitutional rights were insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Durre's complaint alleging intentional taking and destruction of
his property by a correction official also failed because the state pro-
vided an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Allegations of indigency,
lack of counsel and confinement were not sufficient to show inadequate
post-deprivation remedy. No facts were plead to show that Durre was
unable, as a result of his pro se status, to follow the claim procedure or
proceed to court. The court ruled that Durre's allegation that a correc-
tions officer instigated and directed a beating of Durre by several other
inmates in the presence of the officer did state a valid section 1983
claim, but against that officer only. The court reversed and remanded
the district court's dismissal of Durre's claim against this correction of-
ficer, and affirmed the dismissal of all other claims.
Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882
Author: Judge Seth
Charles Edwards, guardian of plaintiff Craig Edwards ("Craig"),
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendants, Rees and Da-
vis County School District ("Rees"). Craig argued that his fourth, fifth,
and fourteenth amendment rights were violated when he was taken from
class and interrogated by Rees. Craig complained that Rees questioned
him about his participation in a bomb threat. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of Rees. The district court reasoned that
Craig's constitutional rights were not violated.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision. The court
reasoned that the same relaxed fourth amendment standard involving
school searches applies in cases involving seizures at schools. The re-
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laxed standard is reasonableness under all the circumstances, rather
than probablecause. Using this standard as a basis, the court found that
Rees' conduct was justified at its inception. The court also stated that
the interrogation was reasonably related in scope to determining
whether Craig made the bomb threat. Consequently, the court held that
Rees did not violate Craig's fourth amendment rights. The court also
found that Craig was not deprived of liberty or property rights. In par-
ticular, the court stated that Craig's "right to be free from the restraints
imposed by the criminal justice system," his right to a public education,
and his right to his good reputation, without due process of law, were
not violated. Moreover, the court determined that section 1983 is not
available as a means for vindicating the honor of aggrieved plaintiffs.
Rather, it is a means for compensating substantial losses occasioned by
constitutional violations.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. General Lines, Inc., 865 F.2d
1555
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
brought a retaliatory discharge suit against defendants, General Lines
and Bi-Rite Package ("Bi-Rite Liquor"), on behalf of two liquor store
employees. The district court found for EEOC awarding back pay. How-
ever, reinstatement, front pay, and injunctive relief were not granted.
Consequently, EEOC appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment refusing to
grant reinstatement. The court reasoned that even though Bi-Rite Li-
quor did engage in unlawful employment practice, a preponderance of
the evidence showed that the employees would have been terminated
even if there had been no discrimination. The court also held that the
back pay awarded fully compensated the employees so that the award of
front pay was not necessary. Also, since the EEOC. did not prove that
there existed a cognizable danger of recurrent discriminatory violations,
there was no need for a permanent injunction.
Ewers v. Board of County Commissioners, 874 F.2d 736
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Ewers, appealed the district court's summary judgment
dismissing his daim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ewers alleged that he had
been deprived of a property interest in his.continued employment with-
out due process of law. Ewers was employed as a road superintendent by
defendant, County Commissioners. Ewers could only be terminated if
there were cause or if the position was abolished. Subsequently, the
commissioners abolished the position of road superintendent and cre-
ated a position of county manager. This position entailed accomplishing
the same tasks that Ewers accomplished in his position as road
superintendent.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment
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and remanded the claim. The court reasoned that a property interest in
continued employment may be grounded in the personnel policies of
the employer that state an employee may not be discharged without
cause. In addition, the court reversed the summary judgment holding
that there remained sufficient facts in dispute concerning whether Ew-
ers' position was terminated solely for the purpose of removing him
without cause. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Ew-
ers' property interest claim.
Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Gillihan, acting pro se, commenced this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants, Shillinger, Shantyfelt,
and Bunch, who were warden, office manager, and central services unit
manager at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Gillihan alleged that he was
deprived of his property without due process and was subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed Gillihan's com-
plaint for failure to state a claim and denied his motion to supplement
his complaint and several procedural motions. Gillihan's claims arose
from charges assessed by the prison for Gillihan's transportation and
the prison's subsequent freezing of funds in his prison trust account.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing
Gillihan's claim for deprivation of property without due process and in
denying Gillihan leave to supplement his complaint. The court affirmed
the district court's dismissal of Gillihan's claim for cruel and unusual
punishment.
The court found that Gillihan had a protected property interest in
his prison trust funds to the extent the monies were received from fam-
ily and friends outside the prison or wages he had earned while in
prison, and deprivation of property without due process gives rise to a
claim under section 1983. When deprivation of protected property oc-
curs under an affirmatively established or defacto policy, rather than ran-
dom or unauthorized deprivation, the state must provide a
predeprivation hearing. The availability of a postdeprivation remedy will
not bar a section 1983 claim. Because the record did not reveal the ne-
cessity of quick action by the prison or the impracticality of providing
predeprivation process, the district court erred in dismissing Gillihan's
deprivation claim.
The court further opined that cruel and unusual punishment arises
only upon deprivation of essential human needs. Gillihan's alleged dep-
rivation of "what little luxury" he had did not trigger the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, and the district




Jackson v. City of Albuquerque, 890 F.2d 225
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendants, the City of Albuquerque ("City") and certain city offi-
cials, appealed the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, Jackson, in this em-
ployment civil rights action. Defendants contended that the evidence
was insufficient to find thatJackson had been retaliated against or termi-
nated because of his race. Jackson appealed the refusal to order rein-
statement of his employment with the City.
Following a detailed examination of all the evidence, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found it sufficient to support the jury verdict in all respects. The
court further concluded that denial of reinstatement was improper, find-
ing that comparable positions were not easily found and those hostile to
Jackson were no longer employed by the City.
Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706
Author: Judge McKay
Dissent: Judge Baldock (dissenting in part)
Plaintiff, Melton, a police officer for Oklahoma City ("City"),
brought a civil rights action against the City and members of a Discipli-
nary Review Board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988, and
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. Melton alleged that he was deprived of liberty
and property without due process of law and that he was discharged in
retaliation for exercise of his first amendment speech rights. Defendants
entered six appeals on the judgment following ajury verdict and various
post-trial orders.
The Tenth Circuit held the following: (1) Melton's testimony on be-
half of a criminal defendant, Page, and statements to Page's counsel
dealt with a matter of public concern, outweighed the state's interest in
effective functioning of its public enterprise, and, as such, constituted
protected speech under the first amendment. (2) The court could not
affirm the jury's verdict against the defendants on the first amendment
claim. Errors in jury instructions made it impossible to determine
whether the discharge was properly based on Melton's statements to
Page's counsel or Melton's trial testimony. The defendants had no im-
munity for retaliatory action based on the trial testimony, but did enjoy
qualified immunity with regard to their recommendation of dismissal for
Melton's communications to Page's counsel. (3) Melton was given ade-
quate notice of the proceedings against him and therefore was not de-
nied his property interest in continued employment without due process
of law. (4) Melton received no due process before he was deprived of his
property interest in his status as a retired police officer. (5) The publica-
tion of charges against Melton, even without including the reasons for
his dismissal, impaired Melton's liberty interest in his good name and
reputation. Moreover, even though he was discharged on grounds other
than perjury, Melton should have been allowed to confront and cross-
examine those who charged him with perjury.
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The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a
new trial on (1) the liability of the City and chief of police for the depri-
vation of Melton's property interest in his retired officer status without
due process of law, and (2) the liability of the individual defendants for
Melton's claim that his trial testimony was a substantial motivating factor
for his dismissal.
O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F. 2d 1465
Author: Judge Brorby
In an action arising from a nighttime search of a-private residence,
the plaintiffs alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the author-
izing instrument was a daytime bench warrant for contempt. The Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court on this issue, finding that a nighttime
search without a nighttime endorsement on the warrant was unreasona-
ble under the fourth amendment because contempt is not classified as a
felony under Oklahoma law.
The Tenth Circuit then found the city and the police officers em-
ployed by the cityjointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs. The court
vacated sanctions that the district court had imposed on the plaintiffs,
stating that the suit was not frivolous. After reversing on the issue of the
constitutionality of the search, the court remanded on the issue of attor-
ney's fees and costs for the plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Phelps, brought suit alleging that defendants conspired to
publish defamatory newspaper articles about him in violation of federal
civil rights statutes, the first and fourteenth amendments, and the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court dis-
missed all claims for failure to state a claim.
Although the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 claim, the court stated that alleged discrimination of a white per-
son because of an association with blacks could be a cause of action.
The court affirmed all other matters except Phelps' equal protection
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Phelps had sufficiently alleged
racial animus in his amended complaint. Also, Phelps sufficiently alleged
a conspiracy, a discriminatory animus against blacks, acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy and deprivation of rights under the equal protection
clause so that elements of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) were satisfied. The court
reversed both of these matters.
Lastly, the court remanded the state action claim under 42. U.S.C.
§ 1983 with directions for the district court to further develop the fac-
tual record, particularly as to the precise nature of the state's involve-
ment in the publication of the articles. Among the factors to be weighed
are whether the actions of the former assistant attorney-general reflected
a discriminatory animus and whether he acted in concert with the de-
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fendants. These claims, if false, could be grounds for sanctions as re-
quested by the defendants.
Rozek v. Topolnicki, 865 F.2d 1154
Author: Judge Parker, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Rozek, filed a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Rozek alleged violations arising from an investigation that he had been
embezzling from his employer, defendant, University of Colorado (the
"University"). The district court granted summary judgment for the
University on the federal claims and dismissed the pendent state claims
based on the University's. immunity.
The Tenth Circuit found that the special prosecutor and the mem-
bers of his investigative team were entitled to absolute immunity and
qualified immunity, respectively. The court stated that this immunity ap-
plies in civil liability actions during investigation and prosecution of
charges, provided the conduct did not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights. Moreover, the court held that the Univer-
sity and the Office of the District Attorney, were agencies of the State of
Colorado entitled to claim immunity based on the eleventh amendment.
The court explained that this amendment bars damage actions against a
state in federal court. Consequently, the court disagreed with Rozek's
contention that eleventh amendment immunity for states was abrogated
by Congress in enacting § 1983. The court held that to negate claims to
immunity, Rozek must prove: (1) the existence of "dearly established"
constitutional or statutory law that could have been violated; and (2) the
defendants' conduct violated that law. There was no dearly established
constitutional violation, and Rozek did not establish the existence of
genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, the district court's grant of
summary judgment was affirmed.
Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
This suit was filed under section 2 of Voting Rights Act, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, alleging that the at-large election proce-
dure for county commissioners in Saguache County impermissibly di-
lutes hispanic votes in violation of section 2. The district court found
that plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proof for such a section 2
violation and entered judgment for defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs al-
leged that the district court applied erroneous standards and made erro-
neous factual findings.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, however, saying that a high level of his-
panic participation in the political process and the success of several his-
panic-supported candidates weighed- heavily against a finding of vote
dilution, and that where there are two permissible views of evidence, the
fact-finders choice between them cannot be erroneous.
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Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808
Author, Judge Ebel
The plaintiff, Starrett, a former county employee, alleged sexual
harassment against her supervisor, defendant Wadley, and Creek
County ("County"). The district court entered judgment for Starrett on
some of her claims. Starrett, the County, and Wadley, in his official ca-
pacity, appealed.
Following sexual advances and sexually discriminating treatment of
Starrett by Wadley, Starrett sought relief by speaking out about Wad-
ley's improper advances and his alcohol problems. The Tenth Circuit
upheld the finding that it was Starrett's exercise of her first amendment
rights that led to her discharge and affirmed the district court's judg-
ment that Wadley's conduct deprived Starrett of her constitutional
rights and entitled her to remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Finding that Wadley's termination of Starrett's employment was a
policy decision for the County, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment
for Starrett on her section 1983 claim only to the extent that it imposed
liability on the County for Starrett's termination; however, the court re-
versed the finding of the County's liability for Wadley's other acts of
harassment, determining that those acts were not officially sanctioned
and, thus, were not County "policy." The court therefore vacated the
damage award against the County and remanded for a new trial on the
issue of damages.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Star-
rett's Title VII claims and remanded for further proceedings after find-
ing that Starrett was not a member of Wadley's personal staff exempt
from the definition of employee under Title VII. The court affirmed the
district court's denial of reinstatement and front pay, and affirmed the
award of attorney's fees to Starrett pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; how-
ever, the district court's award of interest on the attorney's fees was va-
cated and remanded for recalculation.
Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Valdez, a spectator in state traffic court, was held in con-
tempt of court, arrested, and detained in Denver County Jail for four-
teen days. Valdez instituted this action for damages pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and County of Denver and various law
enforcement officers. The district court denied two of the officers' mo-
tions for summary judgment on the grounds of either "quasi-judicial" or
qualified immunity. The officers appealed.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the extent of government officials' im-
munity depends on the likely effect their exposure to liability will have
on the operation of effective government in a particular context, bal-
anced against the potential for a deprivation of individual rights in that
context. Enforcing a court order or judgment is intrinsically associated
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with ajudicial proceeding. The record indicated that every action of the
officers to which Valdez objected was taken under the direction of a state
court judge. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to dis-
miss the complaint as to the officers on the basis of absolute immunity.
Wulfv. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Wulf, was awarded damages for emotional distress, back
pay, front pay in lieu of reinstatement, and attorneys' fees in an action
grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Punitive damages were assessed against
defendant, LaMunyon. Defendants, the City of Wichita ("City"),
Denton, and LaMunyon, appealed the finding of liability, the amount of
damages awarded, and the award of attorneys' fees.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that
Wulf's termination from the police department violated his first amend-
ment rights, that LaMunyon was personally liable, and that he lacked
qualified immunity. However, the court found insufficient evidence sup-
porting the district court's award of punitive damages against
LaMunyon and reversed on that issue. The court also reversed the dis-
trict court's finding of liability on the part of Denton and the City.
Denton's actions constituted simple negligence, which cannot form the
basis for a first amendment claim. In addition, Denton, as an official
policymaker of the City, did not ratify LaMunyon's unlawful actions and
therefore created no liability for the City. The court found that
LaMunyon was not an official policymaker and thus his actions created




American Coleman Co. v. Intrawest Bank of Southglenn, 887 F.2d 1382
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, American Coleman Company ("Coleman"), brought this
action for damages after defendant, Intrawest Bank of Southglenn
("Bank"), refused to honor a request for payment pursuant to a letter of
credit. The Bank alleged that the request was not in strict compliance
with the letter of credit. Coleman argued that the request was in strict
compliance even though it contained an error. Coleman further asserted
that the Bank should be estopped from raising the strict compliance is-
sue because it was not raised at the time of the request. Applying the
strict compliance standard, the district court granted the Bank's motion
for summary judgment. Coleman appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Colorado law requires literal and tech-
nical adherence to the requirements of letters of credit and thus the dis-
trict court did not err in applying the strict compliance standard. The
court further held that the waiver-estoppel rule is limited to situations
where the statements have misled the beneficiary who would have cured
the defect but relied on the stated grounds to its injury. Here, due to
time constraints, Coleman could not have cured the error in its request
even had it been advised of the grounds.
Doyle v. Trinity Savings and Loan Association, 869 F.2d 558
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Doyle, executed an adjustable rate promissory note, se-
cured by a real estate mortgage, in favor of defendant, Trinity Savings
and Loan Association ("Trinity"). Trinity placed the incorrect interest
rate on the note, later corrected the mistake, and placed Doyle's initials
by the corrections. Trinity then sold the note to Federal National Mort-
gage Association ("FNMA"), who purchased in good faith. Doyle
brought suit against Trinity and FNMA claiming the alterations were
made without his knowledge or consent, and that his initials were
forged. Doyle was awarded actual and punitive damages against Trinity,
and the district court cancelled the note and mortgage against FNMA.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that Trinity over-
reached in a bad faith effort to gain an unfair advantage. The court fur-
ther held that the alterations were material because they changed the
legal rights and liabilities of the parties. Moreover, Trinity was liable for
its employee's acts even though Trinity did not authorize its employee
to make the alterations.
The court also held that FNMA could not enforce the note because
it was not a holder in due course. FNMA could not obtain this status
because the note did not contain a promise to pay a sum certain. In-
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stead, the note contained an adjustable interest rate tied to an external
index, causing it to be non-negotiable. As a result, FNMA was not a
holder in due course.
United States v. Kelley, 890 F.2d 220
Author: Judge Logan
Defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment by the district
court in favor of the Small Business Administration in a deficiency judg-
ment claim brought against the defendants. Defendants, having joined
Fairlawn Plaza State Bank ("Bank") as a third-party defendant, claimed
the liquidation sale by the Bank was conducted in a commercially unrea-
sonable manner in violation of the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC").
The Tenth Circuit considered whether the defendants, as guaran-
tors, could raise the UCC defense of a commercially unreasonable sale,
and, if so, whether they could and did waive the defense. Holding that
the state's interpretation of its UCC provisions should control, the court
concluded that the Kansas Supreme Court would hold that guarantors,
such as the defendants, are to be treated as debtors under the Kansas
UCC. As such, they would not be permitted to waive the commercially
unreasonable defense. The court therefore reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
Mainland Savings Association v. Riverfront Associates, 872 F.2d 955
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Mainland Savings Association ("Mainland"), brought suit
against the defendants, Riverfront Associates and its guarantors ("River-
front"), for default on a promissory note executed by defendants. River-
front claimed an offset for failure on the part of Mainland to fund a
second loan. The Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC") intervened as receiver for Mainland.
The Tenth Circuit found that the promise to fund the second loan
was not part of the note or security agreements. The court held that
there are limited defenses which can be asserted against federal authori-
ties who are seeking to collect the assets of insolvent financial institu-
tions. The court affirmed the district court's granting of summary
judgment in favor of the FSLIC.
MSA Tubular Products v. First Bank and Trust Co., 869 F.2d 1422
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, MSA Tubular Products ("MSA"), filed this action claiming
defendant, First Bank and Trust Company ("Bank"), was liable to MSA
for payment of a $104,000judgment recovered against Oil West, one of
the Bank's depositors. Although the district court found that the Bank
gave misleading information regarding Oil West's credit worthiness, it
held for the Bank, ruling that the Bank did not have a fiduciary relation-
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ship with MSA absent a specific request for a written credit report and
thus owed no fiduciary duty to disclose information concerning Oil
West's account.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Oklahoma
law would be construed to hold that when the Bank undertook to re-
spond to MSA's inquiry, the Bank assumed the duty to respond accu-
rately and could be held liable for giving misleading information if MSA
reasonably relied upon the statement of the bank employee.
Title Insurance Co. v. American Savings and Loan Association, 866 F.2d
1284
Per Curiam
The predecessor of defendant, American Savings and Loan Associa-
tion ("American"), made loans on condominiums secured by deeds of
trust. These deeds were insured by insurance policies purchased from
plaintiff, Title Insurance Company ("Title"). American foredosed on
the properties and a subsidiary eventually brought suit to recover defi-
ciencyjudgments from the borrowers. The borrowers filed a third-party
complaint against American claiming the loans were invalid under the
applicable "doing business" law, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-43-101. Ameri-
can, relying on the policies, argued Title must defend and indemnify.
Title argued it need not defend because American did not comply with
the "doing business" law. The district court denied Tide's motion for
summary judgment stating that the statute was not a "doing business"
law. Consequently, Title must defend.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of summary
judgment. The court held that the statute was a "doing business" law.
The court stated that- the statute is not distinguishable from a "doing
business" law merely because it is regulated by criminal penalties rather





American Booksellers Association v. Schiffl, 868 F.2d 1199
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, American Booksellers Association ("American"), chal-
lenged a New Mexico statute which regulated the display for sale of
materials considered "harmful to minors." No prosecution under the
law had been initiated by the Attorney General, and the district court
dismissed for lack of standing, finding no case or controversy was
presented. American appealed, alleging it had standing.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
The court found that the "threat" of a determination by the Attorney
General of "harmfulness" was substantial enough to establish standing.
The Attorney General's failure to enforce the law against American
prior to the suit's commencement made no difference. American still
may entertain a reasonable fear that the statute will be enforced and
affect its rights in the future.
Copp v. Unified School District, 882 F.2d 1547
Per Curiam
Dissent: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Copp, brought suit against defendant, Unified School Dis-
trict ("school district"), claiming that his first amendment rights were
violated. Copp argued that his right to freedom of association and free-
dom of speech were infringed after he was given an adverse transfer
from his job. The jury found for Copp, and the school district subse-
quently motioned for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV").
The district court denied the motion, and the school district appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying the
school district's motion for a JNOV regarding the freedom of associa-
tion issue. The court reasoned that the type of association claimed by
Copp was not protected under the first amendment right of association.
The court, however, found that Copp's speech was protected. Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the jury could have found that Copp's
right to freedom of speech was violated. The court applied a three-
prong test: (1) the plaintiff must show as a matter of law that the speech
deserved constitutional protection; (2) the plaintiff must show that the
protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse
decision; and (3) the defendant must then show that it would have
reached the same decision even in the absence of the protected conduct.
The court could not determine whether the jury awarded damages on
the speech claim, the association claim, or both. Consequently, the court
remanded the case for determination of whether Copp's speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in the decision to transfer him and
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whether defendants would have transferred him even in the absence of
his protected conduct.
Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Devine, who is serving life in prison for first degree
murder, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in district court. Devine
claimed that the state unconstitutionally delayed his parole eligibility af-
ter he committed the crime. The district court denied his petition and
Devine appealed. He argued that ex post facto principles preclude retro-
active restrictions on parole eligibility, that the due process clause gov-
erns ex post facto principles, and that the district court's decision to
apply a statute which was contained in the compiler's notes was unfore-
seeable and thus violative of due process.
The Tenth Circuit held for Devine and remanded the case to district
court. The court held that a law which imposes additional punishment to
that already prescribed is violative of ex post facto principles. In addi-
tion, the court held that since the ex post facto clause bars legislatures
from passing laws which impose additional punishment, then it follows
that the due process clause bars courts from achieving the same result
by judicial construction. Also, the court held that the application of an
uncodified statute was unforeseeable and thus violated the due process
clause.
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiffs, high-ranking police officers, were reprimanded by de-
fendants, police chief Munger and the City of Colorado Springs (the
"City"), for part-ownership and participation in a video rental business.
The police officers rented a small percentage of sexually explicit films.
After plaintiffs removed the adult films from their inventory, Munger
spoke to the press about the City's reprimands for violation of police
regulations. The police officers brought suit against both Munger and
the City contending that the reprimands were illegal. The district court
granted summary judgment for Munger and the City. The court found
that neither Munger nor the City violated the police officers' first
amendment, liberty, federal and state privacy, and federal and state due
process rights. Further, the district court held that the department regu-
lations were not impermissibly vague. Moreover, the district court held
that Munger did not violate plaintiff Flanagan's rights by failing to reap-
point him as deputy chief. The police officers subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Munger violated the police officers' first
amendment rights, but was entitled to qualified immunity and, thus, was
not liable. The court held that the City was liable for violating the police
officers' first amendment rights. The case was subsequently remanded
for determination of damages. The district court affirmed the court's de-
cision on both the privacy and deprivation of liberty claims because
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Munger's statements to the press were truthful and not highly personal.
The pertinent regulations of the police code were not found facially
vague, but the vagueness claim was remanded for findings regarding the
code "as applied." The charges of retaliation by Munger were found to
contain genuine issues of material fact, and summary judgment on this
issue was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge Wright, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Foremaster, brought suit alleging violations of the estab-
lishment clause by the City of St. George. The action challenged the
depiction of the Mormon temple in the city logo and the city's subsidy of
the temple's electric bills. The district court dismissed the portion of the
complaint regarding the subsidy for lack of standing, and denied
Foremaster's motion for attorney's fees. The district court subsequently
dismissed on the issue of the logo.
The Tenth Circuit held that Foremaster did have standing to sue,
based on (1) his having suffered actual injury,, (2) a causal link between
the subsidy and the injury, and (3) the likelihood that the court proceed-
ing would result in redress of the injury. In granting attorney's fees, the
court applied a catalyst test, finding that the lawsuit was a substantial
factor in the city's decision to terminate -the electric subsidy and that
Foremaster had prevailed on the merits. The court held that the subsidy
impermissibly supported the Mormon faith in violation of the establish-
ment clause.
The court held that Foremaster had standing to challenge the city
logo because he was directly and continuously confronted by it. Finding
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not an
observer would perceive the logo as a governmental endorsement of
religion, the court remanded for determination of the primary effect of
the logo.
Johnsen v. Independent School District, 891 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Johnsen, brought an action against defendant, Independ-
ent School District (the "school district"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
for violation of her first amendment rights. Johnsen contended that her
contract as a school nurse was not renewed after she spoke out against
the school district's medication policy. The district court granted judg-
ment in favor of the school district, notwithstanding the jury's $10,000
award to Johnsen. Johnsen subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court improperly submit-
ted to the jury the question of whetherJohnsen's speech was protected.
The court concluded, however, that it could independently determine
the question. The court implemented a test to decide whether an ad-
verse employment decision violated a public employee's first amend-
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ment right to free speech. Under the test, the speech must touch a
matter of public concern, and the employee's interests in making the
speech must outweigh the employer's interests in promoting the effi-
ciency of its public services. The court found that Johnsen's speech
failed the balancing test. Consequently, the court concluded that John-
sen's speech was not constitutionally protected. The court explained
that the school district's interests in promoting its public services out-
weighed Johnsen's interests, because of the manner, time, and place
which Johnsen used to express her viewpoint. The evidence revealed
thatJohnsen circumvented school district procedures, contacted outside
agencies, organized meetings, dominated and intimidated co-employ-
ees, generated discord and disruption, and made public false accusa-
tions about the medication policy.
United States v. King, 891 F.2d 780
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, King, pleaded guilty to the felony of assault with a dan-
gerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm. The district court subse-
quently ordered King to pay a special assessment fee of $50. The court
reasoned that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013, any individual convicted of
a felony must pay a special assessment fee of $50. King contended the
special assessment was in violation of the origination clause of the fed-
eral Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The district court rejected
his contention, and King appealed.
The Tenth Circuit, on de novo review, held that 18 U.S.C. § 3013
does not violate the origination clause of the Constitution. The reach of
the origination clause was held by the United States Supreme Court to
encompass only bills with the main purpose of raising revenue, not bills
which raise revenue incidentally. The court determined that the main
purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3013, is punitive. The judgment of the district
court was, therefore, affirmed.
Luethje v. Peavine School District, 872 F.2d 352
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Luethje, claimed infringement of her first amendment
rights when her employer, defendant Peavine School District ("School
District"), adopted a rule restricting employees from certain discussions
regarding school problems. Luethje dismissed the suit when the school
district removed the prohibitory language from the rule. The district
court denied Luethje recovery of attorney's fees as a "prevailing party"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled that
a plaintiff who obtains relief from a defendant qualifies as a prevailing
party if the lawsuit is causally linked to obtaining the relief and if defend-
ant's conduct in response to the lawsuit is required by law. The court
held that the district court's causation finding was clearly erroneous.
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Luethje's suit need not be the sole reason for the School District's ac-
tion; a significant catalyst or substantial factor is enough.
In de novo review, the court determined that the district court erred
in its finding that the change was not required by law. Whether the
school district's policy was unconstitutional depended on whether it sti-
fled speech of public concern, and whether the policy was nonetheless
permissible was based on a balancing of the interests of Luethje and the
School District. The court found Luethje's complaints a matter of pub-
lic concern. Luethje's speech did not impair the discipline or operation
of the school since the School District's interest in maintaining harmony
was insufficient to justify restrictions on speech of public concern. The
court held that the School District was required by law to change its rule.
Martinez v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 921
Author: Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Martinez, petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas
corpus following his conviction for second degree murder. Martinez al-
leged violation of his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to confront
witnesses, to effective counsel, to ajury fairly selected from the commu-
nity, and to severance of the trial.
The Tenth Circuit held that admission of an out-of-court declar-
ant's testimony was proper because the prosecution had exercised due
diligence in securing the witness' attendance, and the witness was "un-
available", thus meeting the requirements of the confrontation clause. A
second out-of-court declarant's testimony was also held properly admit-
ted. The witness was unavailable and reliability was based on two estab-
lished hearsay exceptions: present sense impression and excited
utterance. The district court was also correct in admitting a co-conspira-
tor's statements. Affirming the conviction, the court agreed that Marti-
nez' attorney was not laboring under a conflict of interest which resulted
in ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the court concluded without
discussion that neither the jury selection process nor the joint trial vio-
lated Martinez' constitutional rights.
In a strong dissent, Judge Seymour would have granted the habeas
corpus petition and ordered a new trial. Regarding availability of wit-
nesses, the judge would adopt a per se ruling requiring use of the Uni-
form Act as a condition precedent to finding a good faith effort to secure
the witness' attendance. He also concluded that finding the witness un-
available was not harmless error.
Meder v. City of Oklahoma City, 869 F.2d 553
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Meder, an Oklahoma City-police officer, attempted to "fix"
some traffic tickets for a third party. Meder subsequently received free
tires for his personal vehicle from the third party. Meder was informed
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at an oral interview that these were grounds for dismissal. He was given
written notice of a hearing before a disciplinary board, and he was dis-
charged following the hearing. Meder filed a suit claiming he was denied
due process. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, Oklahoma City. Meder appealed, asserting that the due
process he received was inadequate because (1) the disciplinary board
was not impartial, (2) he was not given adequate notice of the charges
against him, and (3) he was not allowed to confront or cross-examine
the witnesses against him.
The Tenth Circuit held that Meder was provided adequate due pro-
cess. The court stated that Meder had no reason to question the board's
impartiality because he admitted in his deposition that no member of
the board should be excluded. The court also held that Meder was ade-
quately informed of the charges pending against him when he received
both oral and written notice. The court further held that Meder did not
prove how confrontation and cross-examination would have changed
the board's inference that acceptance of free tires was reasonably related
to "fixing" of the tickets.
Moss v. City of Colorado Springs, 871 F.2d 112
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiffs, four family members (the "Mosses"), brought an action
against defendant, City of Colorado Springs (the "City"), contending
that the City's police officers violated their fourth amendment rights.
The Mosses argued that the police officers used excessive force and en-
gaged in an unreasonable execution of a search warrant after bursting
into their home with no warning. The Mosses also brought pendant
state claims.
The Tenth Circuit held that the jury's verdicts in the district court
action were inconsistent. The court stated that since it was unable to
harmonize the verdicts, the case was remanded for a new trial. The court
explained that the jury found against the City, but in favor of the individ-
ual officers on the "unreasonable execution of a search" charge. Fur-
ther, the court was unclear as to which constitutional claim the jury
considered when deciding in favor of the police officers. The court re-
marked that the jury instructions were ambiguous, and the resulting ver-
dicts were indicative of the jury's confusion.
National Commodity and Barter Association v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, collectively known as National Commodity and Barter As-
sociation ("NCBA"), appealed dismissal by the district court of alleged
violations of the NCBA's first, fourth, and fifth amendment rights
through unwarranted investigation and collection of unlawful penalties




The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the NCBA's daim for
alleged violations of its fifth amendment rights. Claims against the de-
fendants in their official capacity as officers of the federal government
were barred by sovereign immunity. The NCBA's attempt to avoid this
bar by compliance with the Federal Tort Claims Act was ineffective,
since 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) expressly excepts tax assessment functions
from waiver. Fifth amendment violations do not mandate court-created
damage remedies because the NCBA had recourse to challenge the le-
gality of the penalty assessments under several provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.
However, the court determined that the alleged first and fourth
amendment violations may warrant a court-created damages remedy.
Thus, the court remanded to the district court to permit the NCBA to
file an amended complaint which dearly outlines the basis for these
claims.
United States v. Neu, 879 F.2d 805
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Neu, sought review of the district court's denial of his
pretrial motion to suppress. Neu argued that a state trooper's stop and
detainment of him was pretextual and violative of the fourth amend-
ment. Consequently, Neu argued that the search of him, which yielded
weapons, was unconstitutional and thus, the weapons should not be ad-
mitted into evidence.
The Tenth Circuit stated that it must accept the district court's find-
ings of fact and uphold its ruling if there is reasonable evidence to sup-
port it. Since a traffic stop is a limited seizure under the fourth
amendment, the court applied the Tery test for constitutional "unrea-
sonableness": "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception
and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place." A traffic detention is
justified and is not a pretext for investigating unrelated criminal activi-
ties if probable cause for the seizure exists and if "under the same cir-
cumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the
absence of the invalid purpose." The court held that the facts sup-
ported the district court's conclusion that the stop was constitutionally
reasonable. The state trooper had probable cause to believe Neu had
violated the traffic laws. Therefore, the court concluded that a reason-
able officer would have stopped Neu and requested his driver's license
under these circumstances.
Oklahoma Education Association v. Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement
Commission, 889 F.2d 929
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs appealed a district court order upholding the constitution-
ality of article 28, § 8 of the Oklahoma Constitution and its statutory
counterpart, title 37, § 511(D) of the Oklahoma Statutes. These provi-
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sions prohibit state employees from working in any phase of the alco-
holic beverage business. Plaintiffs claimed that the provisions violate the
equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment
and their first amendment right to association.
In a de novo review, the Tenth Circuit found no fundamental right to
pursue government employment free from restrictions on additional
employment. Upon finding that the Oklahoma provisions are rationally
related to legitimate state purposes, the court held that the provision
violated neither the equal protection nor substantive due process rights
of the plaintiffs. The court further held that procedural due process was
not violated because the law affects a general class of persons who are
not entitled to individualized hearings and the legislative process ena-
bled the provisions to be fairly and accurately applied to the entire class.
Finally, the court did not find any violation of the right to association,
holding that the right applied only to relatively small personal affilia-
tions. The decision of the district court was affirmed.
Ortega v. City of Kansas City, 875 F.2d 1497
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Ortega, was lured across state lines by Kansas City, Kansas,
police, telling him to pick up a package. Ortega was subsequently ar-
rested in the sting operation and released on bond. At trial, the district
court instructed the jury that Ortega could find the city and officials lia-
ble under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they lured him across state lines and de-
tained him in violation of extradition laws. The jury returned a verdict
for Ortega.
The Tenth Circuit held that arrest of a non-resident suspect
charged with a crime while in Kansas does not give rise to a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the constitutional right to extradition.
Extradition rights exist only when demand is made by one jurisdiction
for the surrender of a person in another jurisdiction. Moreover, suspects
have no pre-arrest extradition rights.
Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787
Author: Judge Baldock
Dissent: Judge McKay (dissenting in part)
Plaintiffs, members of the National Commodity and Barter Associa-
tion ("NCBA"), sought to recover damages from defendants, five agents
of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), for alleged infringement of the members' first and fourth
amendment rights. The NCBA advocates opposition to the federal in-
come tax laws. The five agents, Lovell, Batson, Fortune, Pixley and Hy-
att, investigated the NCBA with the assistance of inside informant
Adams. Adams carried a concealed microphone and transmitter into the
NCBA office and presented defendants with NCBA trash. The informa-
tion obtained from the trash was provided to a grand jury investigation
tax protesters. Batson subpoenaed financial records from a bank and
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told the bank it was unnecessary to notify its customers of the
subpoenas.
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the district court should have
held that: (1) Adams was an agent of the government and therefore her
actions could be imputed to the federal defendants; (2) Lovell, Pixley
and Hyatt were not entitled to qualified immunity; and (3) Fortune and
Batson were liable for their grand jury activities, including service of the
subpoenas.
The Tenth Circuit on de novo review held that: (1) Lovell, Pixley,
and Hyatt were not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judg-
ment because whether Adams was a government agent is a question of
fact for the jury; (2) if the jury determines that Adams was a government
agent, these defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity regard-
ing information relayed by Adams, if she obtained them within the scope
of her duties within the NCBA; (3) Batson was entitled to absolute im-
munity with regard to delivery of grand jury subpoenas and had quali-
fied immunity in informing the bank that they need not notify a
customer of the grand jury subpoena of bank records; and (4) Fortune
had absolute immunity with regard to delivery of grand jury subpoenas
and qualified immunity for technical consensual monitoring assistance.
The court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Rankin v. Independent School District, 876 F.2d 838
Author: Judge Seymour
Dissent: Judge Barrett (dissenting in part)
Plaintiff Rankin, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against defendant, Independent School District ("District"). Rankin al-
leged that the District failed to renew his tenured teaching contract in
retaliation for his statements regarding school disciplinary matters. Con-
sequently, Rankin argued that his first amendment rights were violated.
Rankin also argued that the nonrenewal violated his fourteenth amend-
ment due process rights. Rankin stated that the applicable Oklahoma
statute posed an impermissible burden by requiring Rankin to pay one-
half the cost of his post-termination hearing. The district court granted
summary judgment to dhe District.
The Tenth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the statute, holding that
it was unconstitutional on its face. The court reasoned that the statute
imposed a substantial open-ended penalty on the exercise of a constitu-
tional right. The court also held, however, that due process does not
require a hearing prior to publication of reasons for dismissal. The court
held that Rankin presented enough evidence of first amendment viola-
tion to withstand a directed verdict for defendants.
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Seibert v. Oklahoma, 867 F.2d 591
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Seibert, who worked as a plumber for the defendant, Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center ("University"), persistently
voiced concerns about the safety of the University's steam pipes and
boilers. Following oral and written reprimand, Seibert left his job for
over an hour without permission. Seibert was subsequently terminated
after refusing the opportunity to resign and failed to invoke the griev-
ance procedures within ten days of his termination, as allowed by the
University's policy manual.
The Tenth Circuit held that the University's pre-termination proce-
dures were constitutionally adequate and Seibert's termination did not
violate his first amendment rights. The court concluded that the Univer-
sity's procedures were actually post-termination and not pre-termina-
tion as the district court had held. However, the court stated that Seibert
had received the requisite pre-termination notice and the opportunity to
be heard. The continued verbal and written warnings, including a pro-
bation period, provided Seibert with ample opportunity to explain his
position. Thus, the court concluded that Seibert was not denied due
process. In addition, the court ruled that the University's interest in pro-
moting the efficiency of its public service outweighed Seibert's interest
in repeating his disruptive safety complaints after the complaints had
been investigated and settled. Thus, summary judgment was proper on
Seibert's first amendment claim.
Sommermeyer v. Supreme Court of the Stateof Wyoming, 871 F.2d 111
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Sommermeyer, appealed a court order which upheld rules
of the Wyoming Supreme Court. These rules required that an attorney
be a Wyoming resident to be eligible for admission to the bar on motion
instead of by taking a bar examination. Sommermeyer argued that the
residency requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution.
The Tenth Circuit held Wyoming Supreme Court Rule 5(c) to be
unconstitutional. The case was reversed and remanded with instructions
that Wyoming admit Sommermeyer to the bar of the state.
Veronie v. Garcia, 878 F.2d 347
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, First Southern Insurance Company ("First Southern"), as
intervenor, moved for summary judgment against defendant, Garcia, for
reimbursement of all worker's compensation benefits that First South-
ern had previously paid to Veronie because Garcia settled Veronie's
claim without First Southern's written approval. A Louisiana statute, La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1102(c) (1983), provides that a third-party defend-
ant who fails to obtain such written approval must reimburse the em-
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ployer's insurer the total amount of benefits paid to the employee. The
district court denied the motion for summary judgment holding that the
Louisiana statute was unconstitutional. First Southern appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Garcia's due process rights were not
violated since he had the opportunity to contest the statutory elements.
Accordingly, the statute does not violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The court further held that the statute does not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. While
recognizing that section 23:1102(c) imposes a harsh penalty on third-
party tortfeasors who settle without employer or insurer approval, the
court concluded that the purposes behind the statutory right of reim-
bursement are legitimate ends of government and section 23:1102(c) is
rationally related to those ends. The court reversed and remanded for
consideration of the merits of First Southern's claim against Garcia.
United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Wolf, appealed the district court's ruling that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251 is constitutional as applied to his conviction for sexual exploita-
tion of a child. Specifically, Wolf contended that the photograph at issue
was not within the contemplation of the statute because the sleeping
child was not exuding sexual suggestiveness and, therefore, the photo-
graph was not a "lascivious exhibition" under the statute.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's application of the
factors to determine the definition of "lascivious exhibition" as set forth
in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 830 (S.D. Cal. 1986). The court
further stressed that it was the photographer's conduct and the depic-
tion of the child that was defined as lascivious, and that lasciviousness is
not a characteristic of the child photographed. The court held that 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a) as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256 was constitutional as




Bill's Coal Company v. Board.of Public Utilities, 887 F.2d 242
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Bill's Coal Company ("Bill's"), brought this action claim-
ing defendant, Board of Public Utilities ("Board"), had breached and
repudiated a contract by which Bill's was to supply coal to the Board.
The district court of Oklahoma applied Missouri law to defeat an award
of attorney's fees, applied U.C.C. § 2-708(1) to measure damages by the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time
and place of tender, and denied interest charges and other expenses to
plaintiffs under U.C.C. § 2-710. The court also denied reimbursement
for a mistake in overpayment of depredation credit. Bill's appealed and
the Board cross-appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that application of Missouri law was proper.
In diversity cases generally, attorney's fees are determined by state law
and are substantive for diversity purposes. The application of U.C.C.
§ 2-708(1) to calculate damages was also proper. U.C.C. § 2-708(2),
which allows for lost profits, was not available because Bill's could not
qualify as a lost volume seller. The purpose of U.C.C. § 2-7 10 is to reim-
burse the seller for expenses reasonably incurred as a result of the
buyer's breach. Here, Bill's interest expenses were incurred as the result
of preparing for litigation. The district court correctly denied interest
charges and other expenses. The judgment was affirmed as to all but the
overpayment of the depredation credit and remanded to make neces-
sary adjustment.
Boyd Motors, Inc. v. Employers' Insurance of Wausau, 880 F.2d'270
Per Curian
Plaintiff, Boyd Motors ("Boyd"), sued defendant, Employers' Insur-
ance of Wausau ("Wausau"), for the diminished value of automobiles
damaged by hail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Wausau, based on an exception in the insurance policy for loss result-
ing from "loss of market." The district court found the diminution of
value to be within this market loss exception. Boyd appealed, arguing
that the repairs did not put the vehicles in the same condition as they
were and that an insurer is obligated to return the damaged property to
substantially its original condition.
Distinguishing between a "loss of market" and a "loss of market
value," the Tenth Circuit ruled that this case fell within the latter. Thus,
the insurance policy covered the post-repair diminution in value of
Boyd's vehicles, and such coverage was not defeated by the "loss of mar-
ket" exclusion.
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Business System Leasing v. Foothills Automotive Plaza, 886 F.2d 284
Per Curiam
Defendant, Foothills Automotive Plaza ("Plaza"), appealed a district
court decision in a breach of contract action involving a computer sys-
tem which had been leased to it by plaintiff, Business Systems Leasing
("BSL"), and serviced by plaintiff, Display Data Corporation. Plaza ap-
pealed on three grounds.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. First, the court held that Plaza ex-
pressly waived by agreement any claim it might have had regarding
BSL's failure to mitigate damages. Moreover, BSL simply chose one of
its statutory remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code when it
chose to proceed toward a judgment, and, in electing this course of ac-
tion, BSL was under no duty to further mitigate its damages. Secondly,
the court ruled that Display Data Corporation was entitled to recover for
breach of the maintenance contract on both third party beneficiary the-
ory and unjust enrichment theory. Lastly, Plaza objected to attorneys'
fees, but the court concluded that the record clearly supported the dis-
trict court's determination that Plaza had engaged in delaying tactics.
Thus, attorneys' fees were correctly awarded.
Chase v. Dow Chemical Co., 875 F.2d 278
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Chase, brought this action to recover damages allegedly
caused by defendant, Dow Chemical Company's ("Dow"), product,
Sarabond. Dow moved for summary judgment, citing a Release and In-
demnification Agreement executed with Chase as part of an earlier set-
tlement. Chase objected, claiming that: (1) Dow fraudulently induced
him into signing the release; and (2) the release is void as the product of
a mutual mistake. The district court granted summary judgment in
Dow's favor. The district court reasoned that Chase did not, as a matter
of law, satisfy three of the five elements necessary to establish fraud
under Colorado law. Chase subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Chase satisfied the first element of
fraud. In essence, Chase proved that Dow falsely represented or con-
cealed a material fact with evidence of affirmative misrepresentations
and misleading half-truths. Chase also satisfied the second element of
fraud. Chase proved that he was ignorant of Dow's false representation.
In particular, Chase demonstrated that he was unaware of Dow's misrep-
resentations regarding research that showed Sarabond causes corrosion
and cracking. The third element of fraud required that action be taken
on the representation or concealment causing damages. The court dis-
agreed with the district court's position that Chase was unjustified in
relying on the veracity of Dow's representations, in light of the adver-
sarial relationship. The court held that a party is not categorically barred
from relying on an opposing party's representations when negotiating
the settlement of a dispute which involves a claim for fraud. Conse-
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quently, the court held that Chase satisfied three of the five elements
necessary to establish fraud. Finally, the court affirmed the district
court's finding that Chase bore the risk of a mistake under the release
agreement terms. Absent fraud, Chase is bound by the release's terms
and is barred from bringing suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Guaranty National Insurance Co.,
868 F.2d 357
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Guaranty National Insurance Company ("Guaranty"),
insured an interstate motor carrier licensed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC"), and the policy contained a special endorsement as
required. The special endorsement stated that Guaranty could not be
relieved from liability or from paying a final judgment. The motor car-
rier leased a truck from a company insured by the plaintiff, Empire Fire
and Marine Insurance Company ("Empire"). After an accident and
Guaranty's refusal to defend, Empire settled the case with the third
party. Empire sued Guaranty to recover the settlement amount.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment in
Empire's favor. The court concluded that the ICC endorsement in Guar-
anty's policy negated limiting language in the body of the policy, such as
an "excess coverage" clause, but it did not establish primary liability
over other policies *as a matter of law. The court held that after reading
out the limiting language of Guaranty's policy, the two policies must be
compared pursuant to traditional state insurance and contract law prin-
ciples to determine how liability should be allocated.
Fischer v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 868 F.2d 1175
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
The plaintiff, Fischer, filed his first complaint in 1985, alleging in-
jury from asbestos exposure including possible malignant mesothe-
lioma. The claim was settled and Fischer, with advice of counsel, signed
a release relieving the defendant, Owens-Coming, from all future ac-
tions, known or unknown. Twenty days after the release was signed and
the parties had stipulated to an order of dismissal with prejudice,
Fischer was diagnosed as having malignant mesothelioma. Shortly there-
after, Fischer filed a second complaint alleging he suffered malignant
mesthelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos. Owens-Coming
moved for a motion to dismiss, alleging the action was barred by the
release. Fischer argued that the release was based on a mutual mistake
of fact and should be set aside. The district court ruled as a matter of law
that the release barred the second complaint and Fischer appealed.
Upholding the district court's ruling and the validity of the release,
the Tenth Circuit held that when Fischer signed the release he surren-
dered any cause of action for mesothelioma caused by exposure to as-
bestos. The language of the release relinquished actions for both known
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and unknown claims. Applying Oklahoma law, the court found that the
release was a contract. The language in the release was dear and the
type of harm Fischer suffered was foreseeable. Morever, the court ruled
that Fischer was undeniably aware that he had a possible claim for
mesothelioma when he signed the release. Any other conclusion would
make it impossible to settle claims prior to trial.
Grayson v. American Airlines, 864 F.2d 712
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Grayson, a discharged employee, appealed dismissal of his
suit against American Airlines for breach of an employment contract and
promissory fraud.
The Tenth Circuit held that American Airlines was under no legal
obligation to accept Grayson's offer to be demoted or transferred in ex-
change for keeping his job. Moreover, American Airlines' refusal to ac-
cept such offer did not constitute a breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.
High Plains Natural Gas Co. v. Warren Petroleum Co., 875 F.2d 284
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Warren Petroleum Company ("Warren"), moved for
summary judgment against plaintiff, High Plains Natural Gas Company
("High Plains"). Warren contended that the remedies sought by High
Plains could not be awarded as a matter of law. Warren reasoned that
the contract executed by both limited the remedies available for its
breach. The remedies were limited to rejection of the natural gas to be
delivered by Warren, or termination of the contract. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Warren. High Plains appealed,
asserting three errors. First, High Plains asserted that it was entitled to
pursue its claim for breach of implied warranty because the limitations
of remedies provision did not modify the implied warranties. Second,
High Plains asserted that the limitations of remedies clause in the con-
tract did not prohibit High Plains from pursuing its remedies under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA").
Finally, High Plains asserted that Warren breached its implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
The Tenth Circuit applied Texas law. First, the court held that
when the contract dearly demonstrates an intent to limit the seller's lia-
bility, the provisions limiting remedies also apply to the remedies for
breach of implied warranties. The court defined the second issue as one
of an apparent conflict in Texas law. Under the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C."), as adopted by Texas, remedies for breach of warranty
can be limited. Under the DTPA, however, a "no waiver" provision pro-
vides that any waiver of the provisions of the DTPA is unenforceable
and void. The court, therefore, concluded that a limitation of remedies
for breach of an express or implied warranty, created under the Texas
U.C.C., is valid as long as it is not an enumerated violation under the
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DTPA. High Plains did not specify any enumerated violation. Third, the
court held that High Plains failed to make a factual showing that Warren
did not act in good faith. Accordingly, the district court properly
granted summary judgment on this claim. The judgment of the trial
court was affirmed.
Kaiser-Francis Oii Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Kaiser-Francis.Oil Company ("Kaiser"), entered into con-
tracts for the sale of natural gas to defendant, Producer's Gas Company
("PGC"). PGC was required to purchase minimum amounts at minimum
prices under the contracts. The price of natural gas subsequently fell
below the minimum contract price, and PGC refused to purchase the gas
from Kaiser pursuant to the contracts. PGC argued that it paid Kaiser's
co-owners for the gas at reduced prices. Kaiser sued for breach of con-
tract, and the district court granted its motion for summary judgment.
PGC appealed arguing that theforce majuere clause in the contracts
was applicable to the lack of demand for natural gas and decrease in
price, and operated to relieve PGC from its obligations under the
contracts.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court
stated that neither a decline in demand nor an inability to sell gas at or
above the contract price constituted aforce majeure event. PGC must bear
the risk of the market demand and, thus, was not relieved of its obliga-
tion to pay. The court also discounted PGC's argument that payment to
Kaiser's co-owners satisfied its obligation to pay. The court stated the
contracts' intent was that PGC must pay Kaiser in accordance with the
latter's percentage ownership in the wells. The court also upheld the
district court's findings of fact and the summary judgment based upon
those facts.
MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 880 F.2d 286
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, MAI Basic Four, Inc. ("MAI"), sued defendants, Basis,
Inc., ("Basis"), for breach of a patent waiver agreement and a confiden-
tiality and nondisclosure agreement, following the marketing by defend-
ants of two software products markedly similar to MAI's. The district
court granted summary judgment to Basis based on the decision that the
agreements were restrictive covenants, comparable to agreements not to
compete, and were void for lack of sufficient consideration.
The Tenth Circuit held that the agreements at issue were not re-
strictive covenants. The agreements were confidentiality agreements
protecting and preserving trade secrets and other valuable confidential
information and were necessary to ensure the commercial viability of
companies competing in the development of technology. Because the
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district court erred in finding the agreements void for lack of considera-
tion, the judgment was reversed and remanded.
Thompson v. Shelter Mutual Insurance, 875 F.2d 1460
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company ("Shelter"), ap-
pealed an award in favor of plaintiffs, Thompsons, for breach of contract
and bad faith relating to insurance payments for a fire at the Thomp-
sons' home. Shelter asserted that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to
submit the claim of bad faith to the jury; (2) there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's awards for dwelling repair and personal
property damage; and (3) the fee awarded to the Thompsons' attorneys
was erroneous.
The Tenth Circuit applied Oklahoma law. Regarding the insuffi-
ciency of evidence and bad faith claims, Shelter argued that it had no
duty to pay living expense money until the parties agreed upon Shelter's
liability for repair costs. The court held that an unresolved dispute as to
other policy claims does not, as a matter of law, excuse the insurer's
failure to pay living expense benefits, when the liability for such benefits
is undisputed. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to create
ajury question for bad faith. Second, the damages awarded for personal
property exceeded the proofs of loss for the personal property. The
court held that when the damages awarded are unsupported by compe-
tent evidence, the plaintiff may be ordered to remit the amount above
that which is supported by the evidence. Accordingly, a remittitur was
ordered with affirmance of the modified award conditioned upon the
Thompsons' agreement to the reduction. Finally, the court held that
under OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3629 (B), the award of attorneys' fees was
proper. The court determined that this statute allows fees for time spent
preparing and trying a claim of bad faith, provided the plaintiff succeeds
on his claim of bad faith and also meets the statutory requirement of
obtaining a total judgment larger than the greatest settlement offer
made by the insurer.
Triad Systems Corp. v. Alsip, 880 F.2d 247
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Triad Systems Corporation ("Triad"), brought this action
to recover the full purchase price for a computer system plus payment
for maintenance and service of the system. Defendant, Alsip, counter-
claimed seeking a refund due to alleged revocation of acceptance. The
district court found for Alsip, awarding him a refund less setoff value for
his use of the system. Triad asserted that the district court erred in sub-
mitting the issue of Alsip's purported revocation of acceptance to the
jury. Triad also contended that the express contract language precluded
Alsip's revocation of acceptance. Last, Triad argued that certain state-




First, the Tenth Circuit held that the effectiveness of a revocation of
acceptance is a question of fact and, therefore, the issue was properly
left to the jury. Second, the court viewed the contract language as simply
expanding upon normal consumer remedies under the. U.C.C., in line
with the presumption that clauses prescribing remedies are cumulative
rather than exclusive. Finally, evidence of pre-contract oral representa-
tions and warranties made by Triad were not precluded under the pa-
role evidence rule. This evidence was introduced merely to explain or
supplement the contract terms, a purpose expressly sanctioned by the
rule.
Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. v. Shoshone River
Power, Inc., 874 F.2d 1346
Author: Judge McKay
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association ("Tri-
State"), brought an action to enjoin the sale of defendant, Shoshone
River Power's ("Shoshone"), assets to a private utility. Shoshone, a
member of Tri-State rural electrification cooperative, had a long term
requirements contract with Tri-State, effective until the year 2005. The
district court set aside the jury verdict in favor of Tri-State, granted a
new trial, and denied Tri-State's request for a permanent injunction.
Tri-State subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit stated that it had jurisdiction to review the dis-
trict court's denial of the permanent injunction, even though it was in-
terlocutory. The court concluded that the issues could be decided
without further development of the record. Moreover, the court stated
that it would be a waste of judicial resources to not review the district
court's ruling. The court ruled that Shoshone had an implied obligation
to remain in business and not eliminate its service as long as there were
members in the Shoshone system requiring electric power. Therefore,
the court held that Shoshone breached its requirements contract when it
attempted to sell its member's subscriptions and cease business. Conse-
quently, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court in
denying the permanent injunction. A new trial on damages was re-
quired, however. As a result, the order denying the permanent injunc-
tion was vacated.
Unrwrfiters at Lloyds of London v. North American Van Lines, 890 F.2d
1112
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, North American Van Lines ("North American"), ap-
pealed the district court's denial of its motion for a partial summary
judgment restricting its liability to the amount stated in its bill of lading.
Shippers contracted with North American to transport personal belong-
ings and household items. The shippers obtiined the lowest amount of
coverage offered by North American, which amount was reflected in
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North American's bill of lading. Shippers then obtained an insurance
policy for the full value of the goods from plaintiff, Lloyds of London
("Lloyds"). The goods were destroyed during shipment. Lloyd's paid
on its policy and then, pursuant to its subrogation rights, filed suit
against North American for the entire amount of the loss, regardless of
the limit of liability contained in the bill of lading. Lloyds alleged com-
mon law negligence by North American reasoning that a cause of action
in tort is completely different from an action on the bill of lading.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Carmack Amendments to the Inter-
state Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11707 and 10730, preempt state
common law remedies for negligent damage to goods shipped by com-
mon carriers under a lawful bill of lading. North American's liability for
damages to the shippers was limited to the amount stated in the bill of
lading. The court stated that to the extent its prior decisions held other-
wise, those decisions were overruled. The district court's judgment was
vacated and the case remanded.
Williams v. Maremont Corp., 875 F.2d 1476
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Williams, sued defendant, Maremont Corporation
("Maremont"), for wrongful discharge after being fired from his job for
alleged sexual harassment. Maremont appealed the jury verdict and
judgment in favor of Williams and the district court's denial of
Maremont's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the
alternative, for a new trial.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's reliance on tort, not
contract, principles was erroneous. The court therefore found error in
the award of punitive damages and damages for injury to reputation be-
cause these damages are recoverable in tort actions only.
Williams claimed breach of contract, alleging that the employee
handbook constituted a contract between Maremont and himself. The
court found that Williams presented insufficient evidence to support his
breach of contract claim to the jury and held that the motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. In its deci-
sion to reverse, the court also relied on public policy considerations
favoring elimination of sexual harassment in the workplace.
Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F.2d 1463
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Plaintiff, Wylie, brought an action against defendant, Marley, claim-
ing breach of an employment agreement. Wylie also asked the district
court for a declaratory judgment for breach of contract. The district
court awarded Wylie compensatory damages. Marley appealed, claiming
error in jury instructions, and exclusion of testimony. Marley also ar-
gued that the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on
the total amount of the verdict.
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First, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in in-
structing the jury that written resignation must be found. The court rea-
soned that under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6302 (A), a written resignation is
not the mandatory and exclusive form for officer resignation. Second,
the court held that the district court erred in failing to give jury instruc-
tions on affirmative defenses. The court reasoned that these instructions
must be given on retrial if supported by evidence. Third, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by granting Wylie's motion in limine to
suppress testimony of Marley's General counsel on the grounds of attor-
ney-dient privilege. Fourth, the district court erred in awarding pre-
judgment interest on the amount of the verdict not yet due prior to the
entry of judgment. The court reasoned that under Kansas law, a claim
becomes liquidated for prejudgment interest purposes when the total
amount is due, or when specific amounts prior to entry ofjudgment be-
come due as provided for in the employment agreement. Because of the
above findings, the court reversed the judgment on the contract claim
and the declaratory judgment and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Zenith Drilling Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 869 F.2d 560
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Zenith Drilling Corporation ("Zenith"), leased oil rigs to
defendants, two oil exploration companies, ("Internorth"). The parties
agreed by "Letter of Agreement" ("Agreement") to reduce the charges
for the rigs. Zenith sought to rescind the Agreement because In-
ternorth's continuing failure to pay the charges constituted a material
breach. Zenith also sued Internorth under contracts formed prior to the
Agreement in 1981. The district court granted Zenith's summary judg-
ment for breach of contract.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court properly treated the
Agreement as an executory accord which did not extinguish Internorth's
prior obligations under the 1981, contracts unless its terms were satis-
fied. Moreover, the court determined that. Internorth materially
breached the Agreement, and therefore, breached the original contracts,
when they intentionally failed to pay the charges owed to Zenith. Thus,
the court held that summary judgment in Zenith's favor was proper.
The court affirmed the district court's denial of punitive damages
because Oklahoma law, which governed this case, generally prohibits
such awards in contract actions. Instead, punitive damages are allowed
only if the breaching party commits an "independent, willful tort." The




Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Aviles, brought this action alleging defamation and tor-
tious interference with employment rights against several government
agencies and various individuals acting within the scope of their govern-
ment employment. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding
that Aviles's action was barred under the doctrines of sovereign immu-
nity, res judicata, and absolute immunity. Aviles appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims against the government agencies. A claim for
money damages against the United States can proceed only if Congress
has waived sovereign immunity and consented to the action. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) waives the government's immunity from tort actions against
the United States, but not against agencies of the United States.
Although under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) the United States must be
substituted as the defendant for individuals acting within the scope of
their government employment, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 exempts from the pro-
visions of section 1346(b) any claim arising out of libel, slander, or inter-
ference with contract rights. The district court, therefore, also lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the individuals.
The judgment was affirmed, but remanded with instructions to
enter judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Burghart v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 865 F.2d 1162
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Burghart and Gosselin ("Burghart"), brought a successful
action for breach of lease against their commercial tenant, defendant,
Frisch's Restaurants, Inc ("Frisch"). The district court awarded recovery
of the premises, but no interest or damages. Frisch appealed, and the
district court entered a stay of execution of the judgment. The court also
ordered the posting of a supersedeas bond, the terms of which required
the continuation of the monthly rental payments provided in the lease.
Following the Tenth Circuit Court's affirmation of the judgment,
Burghart filed a motion to vacate stay and for supplemental relief.
Burghart attempted to cover the losses caused by Frisch's retention of
the property pending the appeal since the premises could have been re-
rented at a higher rate. The district court vacated the stay, but denied
supplemental relief holding that neither the original judgment nor the
order fixing the bond on appeal provided for post-judgment relief
broader than possession and receipt of the monthly rental.
On appeal from denial of relief, the Tenth Circuit stated that uncer-
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tainty about the bond's scope cannot subject a party defending an ap-
peal a judgment in its favor to a reduced judgment. Moreover, if
Burghart thought the terms of the bond inadequate, he had a duty to ask
the district court to condition the stay on an obligation greater than the
rental payment required. The court's affirmance of the district court's
refusal for supplemental relief was not based on the failure to object.
Rather, it was based on recognition that the request was outside the re-
lief already granted by the court's original judgment.
Cayman Exploration Cop. v. United Gas Pipeline Corp., 873 F.2d 1357
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Cayman Exploration ("Cayman"), appealed the district
court's dismissal of its claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6), against
United Gas Pipeline Corporation ("United"), for violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). The district court held that Cayman failed to allege facts
sufficient that, if proved, would entitle Cayman to relief.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling. The court held
that Cayman failed to establish that United practiced unreasonable re-
straint on trade. Moreover, Cayman did not establish that United was
guilty of vertical or horizontal price-fixing. The court reasoned that Cay-
man failed to allege facts showing that the parties agreed to set a price
at which the other would resell to third parties. The court also held that
there were insufficient facts to show a conspiracy to establish horizontal
price-fixing. Cayman did not identify the alleged conspirators. More-
over, Cayman did not establish that any companies had acted in a way
contrary to the best interests of their business. In addition, the court
found that Cayman's RICO claim failed. The court stated that a RICO
claim must allege conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. Cayman failed to allege racketeering activity with suffi-
cient particularity.
United States ex rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Enterprise
Management Consultants, Inc., 883 F.2d 886
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe ("Tribe"), brought
an action against defendant, Enterprise Management, Inc. ("Enter-
prise"), seeking a declaration that two bingo management contracts
were void. The Tribe subsequently ejected Enterprise from the bingo
premises. The district court then granted Enterprise's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, ordering the Tribe to return the bingo premises and
prohibiting any future interference. The Tribe appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, holding that
the district court's order contained no finding of fact or legal conclusion
supporting its holding that Enterprise would suffer irreparable harm if
the Tribe was not enjoined. Moreover, the district court did not balance
the hardships or address Enterprise's likelihood of success on the mer-
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its. Finally, because Enterprise failed to raise substantial and doubtful
questions about the merits of the Tribe's claim, it was proper for the
court to vacate the injunction rather than remand.
Coal Corporation Operating Co. of America v. Hodel, 876 F.2d 860
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs, Coal Corporation Operating Co. of America ("Coal Cor-
poration"), filed this action in December 1985 to challenge the April
1984 decision by the Secretary of the Interior, Hodel, whereby the fed-
eral government assumed responsibility for the surface coal mining in-
spection and enforcement program of Oklahoma. The district court
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Coal Cor-
poration appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that section 525(a) of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a), requires that
a petition for review of such action be filed within sixty days from the
date of the Secretary's order. The court concluded that the sixty-day
limitation period is jurisdictional and that Coal Corporation's action was
time-barred.
Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen
Construction Co. and Bank IV, Topeka, N.A. v. Regional Transportation
District, 879 F.2d 809
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Regional Transportation District ("RTD"), appealed a
postjudgment order holding that the security interest of plaintiff, Bank
IV, Topeka, N.A. ("Bank IV"), had priority over RTD's security interest.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the appealability of the magistrate's
postjudgment order under 29 U.S.C. § 1291. The court held that
although the district court undoubtedly had power to enter a final ap-
pealable order, this jurisdiction could not be conferred on a magistrate.
Section 636 of the Magistrates Act authorizes a magistrate to enter final
judgments only where the district court designates the magistrate to do
so and where both parties consent. The merits of RTD's appeal from the
postjudgment proceedings could not be addressed until the district
court had reviewed the magistrate's proposed ruling in favor of Bank IV.
The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 890
Author: Judge Seymour (dissented -in part as to sanctions)
Plaintiff, Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. ("EMCI"),
brought suit against defendants, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe
("Tribe"), and officials of the United States government, seeking injunc-
tive relief. EMCI sought an injunction to prevent the Tribe from enforc-
ing disapproval of a bingo management contract, which the Bureau of
Indian Affairs found in violation of 25 U.S.C. § 81.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case.
The court found that the suit against the Tribe was barred by the sover-
eign immunity doctrine. In addition, the Tribe did not consent to be
sued. The court also found that EMCI's action could not be maintained
for failure to join the Tribe as an indispensable party. The court rea-
soned that the action would affect the Tribe's interest in the contract.
The court determined that even though the indispensable party issue
was not previously raised, the issue could not be waived. Moreover, the
court had a duty to raise the issue sua sponte. Finally, the court denied
the Tribe's request for sanctions under FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Farmer's Insurance Co. v. Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565
Author: Judge Barrett
Defendant, Hubbard, was a former agent of plaintiff, Farmer's In-
surance Company ("Farmer's"). The district court found that Farmer's
had terminated Hubbard's employment in bad faith and denied
Farmer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alterna-
tively, a new trial. On appeal, Farmer's attempted to raise agency issues
not raised to the district court.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that issues not addressed by the
district court will not be considered on appeal. The court found that it
was Farmer's duty to raise all theories, arguments, and issues at the trial
level. Moreover, the court found the jury had sufficient actual evidence
to reach its conclusion and that the conclusion was reasonable.
United States v. Garcia, 879 F.2d 803
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Garcia, pleaded guilty to possessing and distributing a
controlled substance of less than one kilogram in 1986. The district
court subsequently sentenced Garda, requiring him to serve a term of
special parole. Garcia appealed, arguing that the term of special parole
was illegal.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court
explained that the applicable penalty provision for Garcia's offense was
18 U.S.C. § 1841 (b)(1)(A). This provision required offenders to serve a
term of special parole. In 1984, however, Congress deleted the special
parole term. Congress stated that the deletion of special parole would
become effective November 1, 1987, for offenses involving under one
kilogram. For offenses involving over one kilogram, the deletion of spe-
cial parole would become effective in 1984. Following Congress' guide-
lines, the court held that Garcia must serve a term of special parole. The
court reasoned that Garcia's offense involved under one kilogram, and
further, Garcia committed the offense in 1986.
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Glenn v. First National Bank, 868 F.2d 368
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claim against defendant,
First National Bank, alleging that the district court erred in not allowing
them to amend their complaint.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding
that plaintiffs failed to exercise their right to amend their complaint
prior to dismissal and failed to move for a leave to amend their com-
plaint after dismissal.
Harvey v. United Transportation Union, 878 F.2d 1235
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Harvey, appealed the district court's findings regarding the
legality of defendant, Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway Company's
("Railway"), seniority system. Specifically, Harvey claimed that collat-
eral estoppel prevented the Railway from relitigating the issue. Harvey
also appealed arguing that the district court used erroneous legal stan-
dards in determining whether the seniority system was legal.
The Tenth Circuit previously determined that Harvey's issue pre-
clusion claim was. never raised formally until over a year after trial, which
was simply too late. The court stated that the notice requirement was
especially important here due to the use of offensive issue preclusion.
Moreover, the court found that the district court made clear legal errors.
In particular, the district court erred in its application of four factors: (1)
whether the seniority system discouraged employees equally from trans-
ferring between seniority units; (2) whether the seniority units are in the
same bargaining units; (3) whether the seniority system had its genesis
in racial discrimination; and (4) whether the seniority system was negoti-
ated and whether it has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.
In addition, the district court failed to consider relevant evidence
outside the four factors. The court reiterated the importance of consid-
ering the totality of circumstances, even if they are not relevant to the
four factors.
Hilst v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 725
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Hilst, a physician, brought a Bivens action against defend-
ant, Bowen. Hilst sought damages for a prior judicial determination that
his due process rights were violated when he was suspended from partic-
ipating in the Medicare reimbursement program. Hilst alleged that both
the regulations themselves and the acts of Bowen's employees violated
his due process rights. Bowen moved to dismiss on grounds that the suit
against him in his official capacity was barred by sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, he alleged that the doctrine of respondeat superior was
inapplicable to a Bivens action because there was no allegation of his
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personal involvement. The district court dismissed the claim, holding
that it was against Bowen personally. Hilst appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision but on differ-
ent grounds. The court ruled that a Bivens action for due process viola-
tions is not available against certain government officials. In particular,
it is not available against officials who administer the Medicare program
when a comprehensive remedy is provided to physicians suspended
from participating in the program. Remedies available to Hilst included
an elaborate administrative hearing and judicial review. Although the
remedial framework did not provide Hilst with consequential damages,
the remedies were found to be adequate and meaningful safeguards.
Jordan v. Shattuck National Bank, 868 F.2d 383
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Jordan, appealed a directed verdict for defendants on his
claims for tortious breach of a confidential relationship and interference
with contract.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in taking from
the jury the issues of misuse of confidential information, malicious inter-
ference with Jordan's contract, and damages. The court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
Klein v. Commissioner, 880 F.2d 260
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Petitioner, Klein, appealed the tax court's decision sustaining defi-
ciencies in income tax and civil fraud penalties under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6653(b) for the years 1966-1970. The tax court applied the well-estab-
lished principle that Klein's conviction collaterally estops Klein from de-
nying fraud for purposes of a civil tax case involving the same years.
The Tenth Circuit held that the tax court properly applied the re-
quirements for the application of collateral estoppel. Moreover, the
court stated that new evidence regarding Klein's mental condition which
could have been discovered at the criminal trial did not significantly
change the controlling facts and did not warrant an exception to the
normal rules of preclusion. The court also found that it was within the
tax court's discretion to conclude that the undisclosed suspicion that
Klein was financing narcotics deals did not constitute a special circum-
stance warranting an exception to the application of collateral estoppel.
The court affirmed the tax court's decision sustaining deficiencies in in-
come tax and civil fraud penalties.
Kunkel v. Continental Casualty Co., 866 F.2d 1269
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Continental Casualty Co. ("Continental"), appealed the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction in rendering a declaratory judg-
ment. The declaratory judgment stated the limits of plaintiff, Kunkel's,
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professional liability coverage, even though such coverage was depen-
dent upon the outcome of a collateral suit which charged Kunkel with
securities law violations.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that pursuant to the DedaratoryJudg-
ment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1948), the district court properly exercised
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the district court's construction of
Kunkel's policy limits not only clarified the legal relations of the parties,
but it also clarified Continental's obligations.
Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance v. Dole, 871 F.2d 943
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Lake Hefner Open Space Alliance ("Lake Heftier"), sought
a reversal of a federal highway administrative decision allowing the con-
struction of a six-lane urban freeway in Oklahoma City. The district
court granted a motion for summary judgment for defendants', Eliza-
beth Dole, joined by the City of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma City Mu-
nicipal Improvement Authority. Lake Hefner appealed, arguing that the
district court erred in finding that Lake Hefner had some burden of
proof.
The Tenth Circuit agreed that, in resisting a motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party has a burden to identify genuine issues of
material fact. In response to Oklahoma City's motion, Lake Hefner did
not set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Moreover,
the court was not persuaded that Lake Hefier's issues raised grounds
for reversing the district court decision. The court therefore affirmed
the summary judgment.
Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 878 F.2d 1271
Author: Judge Brorby
Lowell Staats Mining Company ("Staats"), brought suit against de-
fendant, Philadelphia Electric Company and other electric companies
("Electric"), to enforce a judgment. Staats' suit was brought under sev-
eral theories: alter ego, instrumentality, agency, successor corporation,
and receipt of fraudulent conveyances. The district court removed the
case from Colorado state district court because it found diversity juris-
diction. The district court subsequently dismissed the claims against all
defendants. The court reasoned that the claims were barred by resjudi-
cata. Staats brought two separate appeals which were eventually
consolidated.
The Tenth Circuit upheld all of the dismissals by the district court.
The dismissals against the corporate officers, Robinson, Smith and Cul-
ver were upheld because the Officers were found to be in privity with
parties from the first case. Thus, res judicata prevented relitigation of
those claims. The dismissals in favor of the corporations, Minerals Cor-
poration, Pioneer Corporation, Pioneer Nuclear, Inc., and Mesa Operat-
ing Limited Partnerships were upheld based on the same principles of
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resjudicata. Moreover, the court upheld the district court's dismissal in
the cases of Umetco and Philadelphia Electric Company, based on the
principle of defensive collateral estoppel. Finally, the court summarily
affirmed the district court's removal of the case to federal court.
Magic Circle Energy 1981-A Drilling Program v. Lindsey (In re Magic Circle
Energy Corp.), 889 F.2d 950
Author: Judge Brorby
The district court denied petitioners' writ of prohibition to prohibit
the bankruptcy court from exercising in personam jurisdiction over the
petitioners. Petitioners appealed the denial of the writ.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The
court concluded that the district court's denial of the writ was not an
adjudication of the merits of the petitioners' claim and therefore not a
final order subject to appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), the courts of
appeal have jurisdiction over appeals only from final orders of the dis-
trict courts.
Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373
Author: Judge Brorby
A jury awarded plaintiffs, the Marshalls, $350,050 for diminution of
property, $50,000 for nuisance damages and $5,000,000 in punitive
damages relating to improper drilling and plugging of an oil and gas
well on the Marshalls' property. Defendants, El Paso Natural Gas Com-
pany and Meridian Oil Production, Inc. ("Meridian"), appealed, asser-
ting errors in three areas by the district court. First, Meridian asserted
that the district court erred in refusing to refer factual issues to the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission ("Commission"), under the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction. Second, Meridian asserted that the district
court improperly excluded evidence critical to its defense. Third, Merid-
ian asserted errors relating to the award of punitive damages. Meridian
first claimed that the award of punitive damages in excess of actual dam-
ages required the Marshalls to prove the necessary elements by clear
and convincing evidence. Meridian next contended that the punitive
damages bore no relation to the Marshalls' injuries. Meridian reasoned
that the Commission might intervene and order Meridian to correct the
problems on the Marshalls' property.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court stated that the district court is not required to defer factual
issues to an agency under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction if the is-
sues are routinely considered by the court or if the issues would be
within the conventional knowledge of judges and jurors. Second, the
court was persuaded that the district court did not abuse its broad dis-
cretion in determining that the probative value of the offered evidence
was outweighed by its potential to confuse the jury. Third, the court
held that the amended Oklahoma statute required the Marshalls to pass
a threshold test of clear and convincing evidence prior to submitting the
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issue of punitive damages to the jury. Once this threshold was met, the
issue was properly submitted to the jury under the standard of prepon-
derance of the evidence to determine the amount of punitive damages.
Moreover, the court held that the district court was without discretion to
reduce or eliminate punitive damages on the basis of events that might
occur after the trial. The court affirmed the decision of the district court.
Martinez v. Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751
Author: Judge Seth
In 1973, the district court enjoined defendants, Sullivan, Secretary
of the United States Department of Heath and Human Services, and
Blue Cross of New Mexico ("Sullivan"), from terminating benefits with-
out an evidentiary hearing. After Sullivan failed to comply, the district
court issued a remedial order to enforce implementation of its previous
order. Plaintiffs Martinez and others similarily situated ("Martinez")
filed a FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to clarify, alter or amend the reme-
dial order. With the motion still pending, Sullivan filed a notice of ap-
peal with the Tenth Circuit for review of the remedial order. Thereafter,
the district court denied Sullivan's Rule 59(e) motion.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate juris-
diction. The court held that Sullivan's notice of appeal was a nullity
under Rule 4(a)(4) because it was fied before the disposition of the Rule
59(e) motion. Moreover, Sullivan failed to fie a separate notice of ap-
peal following denial of the motion.
Maxey v. Fulton, 890 F.2d 279
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiffs, Maxey and Cole, two former residents of a state institu-
tion for the mentally retarded, alleged violations of their constitutional,
statutory and common law rights against defendant, Borren, the super-
intendent of the institution. Borren filed a motion for protection from
discovery and a motion for summary judgment on the grounds of quali-
fied immunity. Maxey and Cole moved to compel discovery. Hearings
on all motions were referred to a magistrate. The district court adopted
the magistrate's recommendation that Borren's motion for summary
judgment be denied and that protective orders be considered if discov-
ery became abusive or overly broad. Borren contended that the district
court's order infringed upon his qualified immunity interests and he was
therefore entitled to an appeal of right.
The Tenth Circuit recognized three situations in which denials of
qualified immunity are appealable: (1) where the defendant dearly vio-
lated established law and is not entitled to immunity; (2) where, if the
facts are as asserted by plaintiff, defendant is not immune; or (3) where
there is a finding that a disputed material fact exists in the case. The
court held that the order was not appealable on any of these grounds
because the magistrate had merely temporarily denied Borren's motions
in order to allow the parties to develop an adequate factual record on
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which to resolve Borren's immunity claim. The magistrate specifically
stated that Borren could reurge his motion at any time. However, the
court also found that the district court's order did not adequately limit
discovery to the question of qualified immunity. The court reversed the
denial of a protective order and remanded with directions to limit dis-
covery to the qualified immunity issue.
McGeorge v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 871 F.2d 952
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, McGeorge, daimed that defendant, Continental Airlines,
violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Federal Aviation Act by requir-
ing her and her guide dog to sit in a seat other than that originally as-
signed to her. McGeorge also asserted four pendent state claims arising
from her removal from the airplane. McGeorge sought review of orders
from two separate district courts. The district court for the District of
Columbia dismissed McGeorge's federal claim, three of her four state
claims, and transferred venue to the Western District of Oklahoma. The
Oklahoma district court dismissed the remaining claim.
The Tenth Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction over the appeal
from the District of Columbia court and dismissed that portion of the
appeal. The court's jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1),
which directs that appeals from reviewable decisions be taken to the
court of appeals for a circuit embracing the district. The District of Co-
lumbia is not within the territory of the Tenth Circuit. Though the order
of the District of Columbia court was not immediately appealable, pend-
ing disposition of the Oklahoma claim, it was a reviewable decision
within section 1294(1).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Oklahoma district court's dismissal
of McGeorge's state battery claim. McGeorge failed to show that the po-
lice officer who allegedly committed the battery during her removal
from the airplane was an agent of Continental Airlines. The court also
held that the district court's decision to deny leave to amend the com-
plaint to add a defamation claim was not an abuse of discretion. Mc-
George's request came four years after her original complaint, and her
argument that the defamation theory was implicit in the case failed to
convince the district court.
McNickle v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 888 F.2d 678
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, McNickle, appealed from the district court's denial of
McNickle's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) motion to order defendant, Bankers
Life and Casualty Co. ("Bankers"), to pay prejudgment interest.
The Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred by mis-
characterizing the Rule 60(a) motion as an original request for prejudg-
ment interest. The court reasoned that the motion was not an original
request because the complaint requested "interest" relief. Moreover,
[Vol. 67:4
COURTS & PROCEDURE
McNickle's motion for supersedeas bond put Bankers on notice of their
specific claim to prejudgment interest under Okla. Stat. tit. 36,
§ 3629(B) (Supp. 1986). Also, the district court erred in failing to deter-
mine a date certain from which Bankers' liability for prejudgment inter-
est could accrue. Section 3629(B), which establishes the interest period
to be "from the date the loss was payable pursuant to the provisions of
the contract to the date of the verdict," together with the "Stipulated
Facts" and the insurance policy, provided sufficient record from which
to determine the date certain. The court concluded that these errors
constituted an abuse of discretion. The court reversed and remanded
for calculation and for award of prejudgment interest.
Mullen v. Household Bank-Federal Savings Bank, 867 F.2d 586
Per Curiarn
The district court granted the defendant Household Bank-Federal
Savings Bank's ("Household"), motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction based on nondiversity. Plaintiff, Mullen, moved for
leave to amend their complaint and to dismiss the nondiverse defend-
ants. The district court denied the motion on the ground that even if
diversity was established, Mullen's fraud claim was insufficiently stated.
Mullen appealed the denial of their motion to amend.
The Tenth Circuit stated that leave to dismiss nondiverse parties
should be granted freely, unless such amendment would be futile. The
court found that district court had not abused its discretion in denying
the motion. The court also denied Household's motion for injunctive
relief to prevent further action by Mullen because Household failed to
first seek relief in the district court. The court affirmed the district
court's judgment and remanded for determination of the amount of
sanctions to be awarded for Mullen's legally frivolous appeal.
Pytlik v. Professional Resources, Ltd., 887 F.2d 1371
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Pytlik, brought this action against defendant, Professional
Resources, Ltd. ("Professional"), and several others, including an Ital-
ian corporation. The district court dismissed the action against the Ital-
ian corporation for lack of personal jurisdiction and granted
Professional's motion for a directed verdict on its wrongful discharge
claim. Pytlik appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
the defendants' favor on the remainder of Pytlik's claims.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Italian corporation.
In a diversity suit, the plaintiff has the duty to support jurisdictional alle-
gations in a complaint by competent proof of the supporting facts if the
jurisdictional allegations are challenged by an appropriate pleading. Pyt-
lik's complaint failed to allege any facts in support of its conclusory
statement that the Italian corporation was conducting business in
Oklahoma.
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The court affirmed summary judgment on the remaining claims,
finding no evidence to support any of Pytlik's allegations. The court fur-
ther held that the directed verdict of Pytlik's wrongful discharge claim
was improper. A nexus was established between Pytlik's termination and
his hiring of an attorney to pursue his worker's compensation claim.
Thus, the evidence established a prima fade case of retaliatory dis-
charge. The order granting Professional's motion for directed verdict
was reversed and remanded.
Robinson v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 600
Per Curiam
Defendant, Bowen, appealed the district court's decision to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff, Robinson. The Tenth Circuit
held that the district court violated Rule 36.3 of the Rules of Court for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by relying
upon an unpublished opinion. The court held, however, that the error
was harmless and that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Ac-
cordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision.
Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Oklahoma, 874 F.2d 709
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Oklahoma, brought an action in state court to enjoin
plaintiffs, Seneca-Cayuga and Quapaw tribes (the "Tribes"), from oper-
ating high-stake bingo games on Indian trust lands. Oklahoma alleged
that the bingo games violated state gaming laws. The Tribes subse-
quently brought an action in federal district court seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. Oklahoma then moved the district court to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction because of the pending state action. The
district court denied the motion and enjoined Oklahoma from proceed-
ing with the state court suit against the Tribes and from interfering with
the operation of the bingo games. Oklahoma appealed, asserting that
under the abstention doctrine, the district court should have abstained
from exercising jurisdiction.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit ruled
that the abstention doctrine was not appropriate. The court reasoned
that the activities at issue were primarily of federal interest and out-
weighed state interests. Hence, the state court lacked jurisdiction. In ad-
dition, the court noted that the Tribes were sovereign entities.
Consequently, the state suit was barred because the Tribes did not waive
their sovereign immunity.
Slade v. United States Postal Service, 875 F.2d 814
Per Curiam
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's holding that plain-
tiff, Slade's, amendment to his complaint did not relate back to the origi-
nal filing date pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), leading to the district
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court's dismissal of the action because it was time barred. Slade failed
originally to name the proper party defendant, the Postmaster General,
until after the limitations period had passed.
The Tenth Circuit found that notice of Slade's claim was imputed to
the Postmaster General upon serving the Attorney General within the
limitations period. The court reversed and remanded the case, holding
that Slade could amend his complaint, consistent with the 1966 amend-
ment to Rule 15(c). The amendment's purpose was to address problems
raised when plaintiffs inadvertently named an improper party in suits
against government agencies or officials. The Tenth Circuit found that
service upon the Attorney General was complete upon mailing, which
had been accomplished one day before the end of limitations period.
Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902
Author: Judge Logan
Petitioners, Smith, filed suit against the state, county, city and vari-
ous officials alleging violation of the civil rights of Smith's decedent,
who died while in custody in the county jail. After settlement or dismis-
sal of the actions against most of the defendants, the petitioners and
remaining defendants fied a Stipulation for Confidentiality Order and a
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41 (a) (1) (ii). Defendant, Judge Phillips granted the order of dismissal but
denied the confidentiality order. Judge Phillips then ordered that the
terms of the settlement be made public.
The Tenth Circuit stayed the orders compelling disclosure of the
settlement terms. The court held that the stipulated dismissal required
no exercise of discretion by the district court, and such unconditional
dismissal divested the district court ofjurisdiction to order disclosure of
the settlement terms. The court granted the writ of mandamus and or-
dered the sealed settlement document returned to counsel.
Sommermeyer v. Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming, 871 F.2d 111
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Sommermeyer, appealed a court order which upheld rules
of the Wyoming Supreme Court. These rules required an attorney be a
Wyoming resident to be eligible for admission to the bar on motion in-
stead of by taking a bar examination. Sommermeyer argued that the
residency requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution.
The Tenth Circuit held Wyoming Supreme Court Rule 5(c) to be
unconstitutional. The case was reversed and remanded with instructions
that Wyoming admit Sommermeyer to the bar of the state.
Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Tripati, brought an action in district court against defend-
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ant, Beaman, the clerk of the court. Tripati contended that Beaman was
not properly processing his papers. The district court dismissed
Tripati's action, finding that Tripati was abusing the court system by
harassing opponents. The district court, therefore placed restrictions on
Tripati's future filings. In particular, the district court directed Beaman
to not file further complaints or pleadings without leave of the court.
Furthermore, if leave were not granted in ten days, Beaman was to re-
turn the papers to Tripati.
The Tenth Circuit stated that litigants who have lengthy histories of
abusing the court system must be given notice of and an opportunity to
oppose in writing the district court's order before it is instituted. The
court stated that the district court's injunction did not provide for notice
and an opportunity to oppose the order. Consequently, the court va-
cated and remanded the district court's judgment which imposed re-
strictions on Tripati's future filings.
Vaughan v. Smithson, 883 F.2d 63
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Vaughan, brought a breach of contract action in district
court against the defendant, Smithson, for failing to provide their illegit-
imate child with material and financial support. The district court held
for Vaughan, and Smithson subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Vaughan's claim, while framed in terms
of contract, was nevertheless barred by the domestic relations exception
to diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that the claim required
consideration of the child's personal needs and finances and the level of
support required of the father. The court stated that state courts, with
their knowledge in domestic relation matters, are better suited to make
such determinations. Consequently, the court vacated the district court
judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273
Author: Judge Phillips, sitting by designation
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of defen-
dant, Spinharney's, motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. The court held that whether the defendant police officer's use
of deadly force in arresting the deceased was objectively reasonable in
light of the circumstances confronting him was a question for the jury.
Given the discrepancies in the testimony, the court concluded that genu-
ine issues of material fact precluded judicial determination of whether
Officer Spinharney's conduct was objectively reasonable.
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Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Lowell Staats Mining Company ("Staats"), the judgment-
creditor from an earlier suit, appealed the district court's grant of a di-
rected verdict in favor of third-party defendants Pioneer Corporation
("Pioneer"), and Pioneer Nuclear Inc. ("Nuclear"). Staats also appealed
the district court's denial of prejudgment interest.
The Tenth Circuit found that Staats was not entitled to reversal of
the directed verdict against Nuclear or Pioneer. The court found that
Staats was not able to pierce the corporate veil ihrough the alter ego,
instrumentality, or agency theories because the complaint failed to state
a claim for relief. The court considered many factors in making its deter-
mination: ownership of stock, common directors and officers, and inade-
quate capital on the part of the subsidiary. The court also considered
whether the subsidiary retains substantially no business except that with
the parent corporation. The court decided that the district court acted
properly in directing verdicts in favor of Pioneer and Nuclear. In addi-
tion, the court reversed the district court's denial of prejudgment inter-
est. The court held that the district court should have followed
previously decided Colorado cases that allowed for prejudgment inter-




United States v. Bonnett, 877 F.2d 1450
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Bonnett, was convicted on one count of conspiracy to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 371, and fifty-six counts of bank fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1344. Bonnett appealed, contending that counts two
through forty-seven, could not stand because they were based on im-
plied representation of adequate funds. Second, Bonnett argued that
the district court erred by admitting into evidence a letter from Moore,
who received loans on behalf of Bonnett, to the FDIC. Bonnett also as-
serted error in admitting evidence of other wrongful acts committed by
him. Finally, he contended that the trial court prejudicially denied him
the opportunity to impeach two witnesses.
The Tenth Circuit first explained that since Bonnett was charged
with violating both subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the United States,
as plaintiff, must prove that Bonnett knowingly executed a scheme or
artifice. In particular, the United States must prove that: (1) the scheme
defrauded the financial institution; and (2) the scheme enabled the de-
fendant to obtain property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises. Using these guidelines, the court held that
passing a series of worthless checks for the purpose of obtaining illegal
loans could constitute a scheme to defraud a financial institution. Imme-
diately crediting a depositor's account while knowing that the checks are
drawn on insufficient funds constitutes false representation. Conse-
quently, the court stated that the evidence supported a conviction under
either or both subsections. Second, the court upheld the district court's
decision to allow into evidence a letter from Moore to the FDIC. The
court found that the letter was properly admitted on the terms of a stip-
ulation. Third, the court held that evidence of Bonnett's wrongful con-
duct was admissible to show that he had an established pattern, practice,
and demonstrated his knowledge and intent. Fourth, the court held that
Bonnett was not entitled to question an F.B.I. agent regarding an incon-
sistent statement made by a prosecution witness. The court reasoned
that the statement was not given under oath in a prior proceeding in
accordance with FED. R. EvID. 801 (D)(1). Furthermore, the witness was
not first confronted with the allegedly inconsistent statement as re-
quired by FED. R. EvID. 613 (B). The court reviewed the district court's
ruling on the admission and exclusion of evidence under the "abuse of
discretion" standard. The court found no abuse and, therefore, affirmed
the decision of the district court.
United States v. Bouck, 877 F.2d 828
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendants, Bouck and Day, appealed convictions of conspiracy,
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three separate counts of possession of cocaine with an intent to dis-
tribute, and one count of unlawful use of the telephone. Bouck and Day
contended that: (1) the government alleged one conspiracy but that its
evidence established multiple conspiracies, constituting a misjoinder
and necessitating a dismissal of the conspiracy count; (2) the govern-
ment engaged in outrageous conduct, therefore, tainting the conspiracy
indictment; and (3) the court improperly admitted hearsay statements.
The Tenth Circuit held that the evidence showed only one conspir-
acy. The court also held that the government's use of an infiltrator did
not constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to fatally taint the conspir-
acy indictment. Moreover, the court held that in determining whether a
conspiracy has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence, hearsay
statements may be considered. Finally, the court found that the evidence
presented was sufficient to sustain Bouck's conviction of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute.
United States v. Cardens, 864 F.2d 1528
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendants Cardenas and Rivera-Chacon appealed their convic-
tions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and carrying a gun.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed their convictions. The court held that in
the absence of any evidence of tampering or alteration, the chain of cus-
tody of the seized cocaine was sufficiently established to support its ad-
mission into evidence, despite the unavailability of a custodial officer to
testify. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port a conviction for carrying a firearm. The court reasoned that Carde-
nas had placed the gun in the truck within inches of his hand, and
attempted to conceal it. These facts were sufficient to establish power of
dominion and control over a firearm.
United States v. DeMasters, 866 F.2d 327
Author: Judge Bright, sitting by designation
The district court dismissed indictments against defendant, DeMas-
ters, for violating provisions of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)
(1982) ("Act"), relating to the unlawful sale of wildlife taken in violation
of state law.
Affirming the district court's dismissal of the indictment, the Tenth
Circuit held that DeMasters's furnishing of guide services for hunting
wildlife did not constitute the "sale of wildlife" within the meaning of
the Act. The court reiterated that criminal provisions are to be con-
strued narrowly, and that legislative history may not be used to bring
within a criminal statute conduct that is not clearly encompassed within
the ordinary meaning of the provision. Although DeMasters, through
exclusive lease arrangements with the landowners, controlled the prop-
erty on which the hunt was conducted, and obtained an additional fee
conditioned on the successful killing of wildlife, the wild animals were
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not under his control so as to make him their seller. The Act was
amended in 1988 to specifically include guide services, but its prospec-
tive application does not affect the outcome of this case.
United States v. Harting, 879 F.2d 765
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Harting, sought reversal of his conviction for failing to
file federal income tax returns. Harting claimed that the district court
erred by incorrectly instructing the jury. First, Harting argued that the
jury should have been instructed on the element of willfulness alleging
that in good faith he misunderstood his duty to file. Second, Harting
claimed that the district court erred in its- instructions regarding the
privilege against self-incrimination.
The Tenth Circuit held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction
as to any recognized defense, and the district court must instruct sepa-
rately on the defense of good faith. The court reasoned-that since the
evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to accept Harting's
good faith defense, the failure to separately instruct the jury constituted
reversible error. The court, therefore, remanded for a new trial. In addi-
tion, the court held that the district court's instruction regarding the
privilege against self-incrimination was properly applied. The court rea-
soned that the privilege did not protect Harting from disclosing the
amount of his income.
United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendants ("Lane"), were convicted of interfering with the enjoy-
ment of private employment because of race, color, religion or national
origin, under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(C). The conviction was based on
Lane's involvement in the slaying, of Jewish talk show host Alan Berg.
Lane appealed, arguing: (1) sectiori 245(b)(2)(C) was unconstitutional in
its application to the case; (2) the prosecution and conviction for killing
Berg in violation of the RICO statute barred any subsequent prosecu-
tion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 245; (3) there was insufficient evidence, as
required by the due process clause, of certain elements of a section
245(b)(2)(C) violation; and (4) he was prejudiced by a joint trial.
In affirming the district court's finding, the Tenth Circuit held that
section 245(b)(2)(C) was sufficiently supported by the commerce power
of Congress. Consequently, the court held the statute constitutional,
even though it was unclear whether Congress also relied on the four-
teenth amendment in its enactment. The court also held that prior con-
victions of RICO offenses did not bar, under a theory of double
jeopardy, prosecution under section 245(b)(2)(C). The court further
held that there-was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was motivated because of Berg's em-
ployment. Therefore, the evidence supported the convictions. Finally,
the court held that Lane did not establish he was prejudiced by a joint
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trial. The court determined that there was no prejudice because the
weight of the evidence against Lane and the other defendant was ap-
proximately the same. Moreover, the court concluded that the jury
properly followed the instructions against one defendant, and not
against the other.
United States v. Levario, 877 F.2d 1483
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Levario, appealed a conviction for conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and pos-
session of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Levario also appealed an order to serve a term of super-
vised release following his prison term, claiming the district court lacked
statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit held that the government failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed because
the jury was asked to draw a contrary inference from the same evidence
supporting the conviction for possession with intent to distribute.
Therefore, the conspiracy charge was reversed. With regard to the con-
viction for possession with intent to distribute, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the evidence supported the jury's finding that
Levario knowingly possessed a controlled substance with intent to dis-
tribute. Finally, the court vacated the district court's order to serve a
term of supervised release because the legislature intended the statute
to become effective on November 1, 1987, and the crime was committed
prior to that date.
Lopez v. McCotter, 875 F.2d 273
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Lopez, a bail bondsman, was convicted in New Mexico
district court of aggravated assault on a police officer, attempted aggra-
vated burglary, and aggravated assault on Antonio Ojinaga. Lopez
posted bond for Antonio's son, Rudy Ojinaga, who failed to satisfy the
conditions of his release on bond. The New Mexico Court of Appeals
affirmed the convictions, and Lopez petitioned the United States District
Court for habeas corpus relief. The district court granted habeas corpus
relief and plaintiff, McCotter, representing the Secretary of Corrections
for the State of New Mexico, appealed. First, McCotter asserted that
New Mexico's adoption of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
("UCEA"), eliminated the common-law authority of Lopez, as a bonds-
man, to retake Ojinaga without following specified procedures. Second,
McCotter contended that the bail bondsman's privilege cannot shield
Lopez's conduct in assaulting the police officer.
The Tenth Circuit held that the relevant provisions of the UCEA
were narrow. Moreover, the UCEA's coverage, in view of the particular
statute as to bondsmen and the common law, gave no adequate notice to
Lopez of the state court's current construction. The result of the deci-
sion of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was to retroactively render
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Lopez's conduct criminal by depriving him of his bail bondsman's privi-
lege. The court stated that this was a violation of the due process dause.
The court thus affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief
regarding Lopez's convictions for attempted aggravated burglary and
aggravated assault on Antonio Ojinaga. Second, the court held that the
district court's instruction to the jury adequately protected Lopez. The
court reasoned that the instruction allowed the jury to decide whether
Lopez knew the man was a police officer. Accordingly, the court re-
versed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief regarding Lopez's
conviction for aggravated assault of the police officer. The case was,
therefore, remanded for further proceedings.
United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866
Per Curiam
The defendants were convicted of bid-rigging in violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Sherman Act) and appealed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The defendants petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the district court
improperly admitted certain co-conspirator statements pertaining to
jobs unrelated to the defendants. The defendants also asserted that the
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding of a single, ongo-
ing conspiracy to rig bids.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had not abused its
discretion in admitting the statements of co-conspirators conditionally,
subject to their being connected up later. The court found that there
was ample evidence to prove the existence of a single, ongoing conspir-
acy and that the defendants were members of the conspiracy. Once the
defendants joined the conspiracy, they became criminally liable for all
acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, the government
was not restricted to asking questions which pertained solely to jobs
rigged by the defendants. The statements of co-conspirators regarding
jobs unrelated to the defendants were admissible to prove the mechan-
ics and ongoing nature of the conspiracy. The court reaffirmed the de-
fendants' conviction.
United States v. M.W., 890 F.2d 239
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, an Indian juvenile, appealed his adjudication as a delin-
quent for committing the crime of arson. Defendant contended on ap-
peal that the mens rea required under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 81, was intent to burn a building, and that the district court erred in
finding that knowing conduct was sufficient.
The Tenth Circuit held that "willfully and maliciously," within the
meaning of section 81, includes acts done with knowledge that burning
of a building is the practically certain result. Thus, the district court's
findings which established knowing conduct were sufficient to support
its conclusion that the defendant acted "willfully and maliciously." The
court also held that the jury could have found that the evidence estab-
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lished beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the req-
uisite mens tea. The defendant's efforts to stop or ameliorate the damage
did not establish that he did not know that the consequences of his ac-
tions were practically certain to occur.
United States v. Nichols, 877 F.2d 825
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Nichols, appealed convictions of conspiracy, continuing
criminal enterprise, twenty-one separate counts of possession of cocaine
with an intent to distribute, and eight separate counts of interstate travel
in aid of an unlawful enterprise. Nichols contended the district court
erred in refusing to give an entrapment instruction. Nichols also argued
that the informant's conduct was so shocking and outrageous that Nich-
ols' due process rights were violated.
The Tenth Circuit previously held that an entrapment instruction is
required when evidence of entrapment creates a factual issue as to "in-
ducement" by the government. The court upheld Nichols' conviction.
The court reasoned there was no factual issue because the evidence
showed Nichols participated in cocaine distribution before the govern-
ment informant arrived. The court also held that Nichols' due process
rights were not violated and consequently, no dismissal was warranted.
The court reasoned that a dismissal is only warranted where the conduct
of the informant is shocking, outrageous and has reached an intolerable
level. The court held that an intolerable level was not approached.
United States v. Pinelli, 887 F.2d 1461
Author: Judge Phillips
Defendants, ("Pinelli"), appealed their convictions of various gam-
bling and tax statute violations. The Tenth Circuit upheld all the
convictions.
First, the court found abundant evidence from which a reasonable
jury could convict. Second, the court held that neither 18 U.S.C. § 1995
nor the applicable Colorado gambling statutes were unconstitutionally
vague or too broad. Third, the court determined that the inadvertent
submission of non-evidentiary materials to the jury was harmless error.
Fourth, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's ad-
mission of the testimony of the government's expert witness. Fifth, the
court affirmed the district court's denial of Pinelli's motion to suppress
evidence obtained from a court authorized wiretap. Finally, the court
found the Pinelli's motion for severance was not timely and thus denial
was within the district court's discretion.
United States v. Protex Industries, Inc., 874 F.2d 740
Author: Judge Saffels, sitting by designation
Defendant, Protex Industries,Inc. ("Protex"), appealed its criminal
conviction under the "knowing endangerment" provision of the Re-
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source Conservation and Recovery Act, ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
On appeal, Protex contended that the district court: (1) rendered sec-
tion 6928(e) unconstitutionally vague by allowing the "knowing endan-
germent" counts to go to the jury even though there was no evidence
that the employees were placed in imminent danger of serious bodily
injury as specifically defined by 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(6); (2) rendered the
section unconstitutionally vague by improperly instructing the jury on
the meaning of "imminent danger" in the statute; and (3) erred in not
giving a requested jury instruction in Protex's defense that the govern-
ment failed to meet its statutory duty to provide results of on-site in-
spections to Protex.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court had not erred and
affirmed the verdict. The court conduded that: (1) the employees had
incurred severe physical effects from prolonged exposure to toxic chem-
icals that were sufficient to constitute "serious bodily injury" even
though the specific condition was not set forth in the statute; (2) the jury
instruction using the term "reasonable expectation" as opposed to
"substantial certainty" in defining "imminent danger" was proper and
did not prevent Protex from predicting whether its conduct would vio-
late RCRA, a necessary factor for unconstitutional vagueness; and
(3) the government's failure to notify Protex of its inspection results in-
dicating violations of RCRA did not provide a defense to the criminal
charges.
United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Record, was convicted of conspiracy charges involving
cocaine and marijuana and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison on
each of two counts. Record appealed alleging that: (1) the government's
evidence was insufficient to establish one continuous conspiracy and,
therefore, venue was improper; (2) the district court unduly emphasized
evidence harmful to the defense; and (3) the district court erroneously
admitted evidence of prior bad acts and inappropriately allowed the
government's closing argument to imply future crimes if acquitted.
In upholding one conspiracy, the Tenth Circuit ruled that venue
was proper because at least one overt act occurred in the district. Also,
the court held that Record failed to establish appropriate withdrawal
from the conspiracy. Moreover, the court ruled that evidence of prior
uncharged importation of marijuana was admissible because it was
highly probative and was admitted for a limited use, followed by a limit-
ing instruction. In addition, the court found the prosecutor's closing ar-
gument harmless because of its limited and indirect nature and because
there was ample evidence of guilt. The court, therefore, affirmed the
district court's conspiracy conviction.
1990]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Defendant, Stewart, was convicted on twenty-nine counts of mail
and wire fraud and on one count of conspiracy to defraud. Stewart ap-
pealed, arguing that: (1) the mail and wire fraud statutes are unconstitu-
tionally vague; (2) the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury
that the mail and wire statutes do not apply to intangible rights; (3) the
district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of com-
mon law fraud; (4) the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on certain provisions of antitrust laws; and (5) the restraining order is-
sued by the district court was so broad it interfered with Stewart's right
of access to potential witnesses.
First, the Tenth Circuit stated that the test for impermissible vague-
ness is whether a person of ordinary intelligence is given fair notice by
the statute that his conduct is forbidden. Moreover, the court stated that
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1341, specific intent must be shown. The re-
quirement of specific intent does not automatically rule out vagueness,
but it does eliminate objection of the accused being unaware of the stat-
ute's prohibition. The court found the indictment was sufficiently dear
to state an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Second, the district court
did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the mail and wire statutes
do not apply to intangible rights. The court reasoned that there were no
allegations in the indictment regarding intangible rights; only depriva-
tion of property rights were alleged. Third, the district court did not err
in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of common law fraud. The
court reasoned that it was not error, because the statute does not re-
quire successful completion of the scheme to defraud. Fourth, the dis-
trict court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on provisions of the
antitrust laws. The court reasoned that the provisions relating to non-
profit organizations were not applicable because even though Stewart
represented a nonprofit organization, the drugs were not being
purchased for the organizations own use. Fifth, the court held that if
there was error in the district court's granting of the temporary re-
straining order, it was harmless error. The judgment and convictions of
the district court were, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 1465
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Voigt, was convicted of one count of conspiracy pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), and forty-six counts of bank fraud in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. II 1984). Voigt appealed her
convictions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, jury disregard of
instructions, and admission of improper expert witness opinions.
Voigt asserted that she was inadequately represented by her coun-
sel because he was under the influence of Demerol during most of the
six week trial. Voigt argued that her counsel's impairment was demon-
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strated by his: (1) failure to argue for severance; (2) inability to commu-
nicate with co-counsel; (3) failure to cross-examine a key witness;
(4) failure to ask for a limiting instruction with regard to the Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) evidence; and (5) decision not to put on direct evidence or
to allow Voigt to testify.
Two elements must be established to demonstrate that counsel's
assistance was so defective as to require the reversal of a conviction.
First, it must be shown that counsel committed serious error so as to not
be functioning as comported by the sixth amendment. Second, it must
be established that but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.
The Tenth Circuit held that Voigt did not establish that her counsel
failed to exercise the skill, judgment, and diligence of a reasonable de-
fense attorney. She also did not meet her burden of demonstrating a
reasonable probability that but for counsel's constitutionally defective
representation the result of the trial would have been different.
The court concluded that Voigt was not entitled to a new trial based
on jury misconduct. The court reasoned that Voigt supported her posi-
tion with only the affidavit of a codefendant's counsel. Moreover, the
affidavit stated that according to one juror, Voigt's conviction was due to
her failure to testify. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) provides that ajuror may not
testify as to any matter occurring during jury deliberations or to the ef-
fect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind. The court refused
to disregard Rule 606(b) and looked upon this inquiry with disfavor.
Upholding the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that Voigt
failed to point out any error committed by the trial court regarding the
expert witness testimony. The verdict of the jury and the actions of the




United States v. Allen, 892 F.2d 66
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Allen, used a false name on his financial affidavit in or-
der to seek court-appointed counsel in another criminal proceeding
under 18 U.S.C. § 1542. The district court granted Allen's application
and appointed counsel to represent him during plea negotiations and
sentencing. In a subsequent arrest, Allen's true name was learned. As a
result, Allen was prosecuted in the present proceeding and found guilty
of perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2). Allen appealed, asserting that:
(1) his use of an alias in the financial affidavit did not constitute a materi-
ally false statement in violation of section 1621(2); and (2) the govern-
ment breached its plea agreement.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on the first issue, holding that the gov-
ernment failed to prove materiality, an essential element in establishing
perjury. The court explained that the test for materiality is whether the
false statement has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influ-
encing the decision required to be made. Materiality must be measured
against the purpose for which the allegedly false statement was made.
The purpose here was limited to Allen's indigence and not extended to
simultaneous inquiries for bail and other factors. The materiality inquiry
was thus limited solely to the impact of the false name on the determina-
tion of indigence. The court held that materiality was not shown. The
government failed to prove that the determination of indigence would
have changed had the Allen used his true name. Absent evidence of an
adverse effect on indigence, materiality failed. In addition, the court
failed to address the breach of agreement claim.
Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 709
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Archuleta, appealed his conviction of automobile bur-
glary and larceny. Archuleta claimed that the victims' identification of
him while he was sitting handcuffed in the police car was unnecessarily
suggestive and prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
The Tenth Circuit stated that even though the district court found
the procedure unnecessarily suggestive, the appropriate analysis for
constitutionality involves balancing the reliability of the identification it-
self against the "corruptive effect" of the identification procedure. After
weighing the totality of circumstances surrounding the identification,
the court held that the evidence was admissible because: (1) the victims
had ample opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the crime;
(2) the victims' attention was focused on the defendant; (3) the victims
were accurate and unequivocal in their description of the defendant; and
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(4) the identification occurred only thirty minutes after the crime. The
court affirmed dismissal of the habeas corpus petition.
United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Baggett, was convicted of simple possession of heroin
under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and of three counts of using a telephone to
facilitate the distribution of heroin under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Baggett
appealed on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict on the possession count, and that section 843(b) does not
apply to individuals who use the telephone to arrange drug purchases
for their own personal use.
The Tenth Circuit held that to support a conviction for possession
where there is no direct evidence of possession, circumstantial evidence
must be presented which is strong enough to support an inference that a
defendant actually possessed the drug in question. The circumstantial
evidence must include testimony linking the defendant to an observed
substance that a jury can infer to be a narcotic. Here, there was no evi-
dence that Baggett possessed a substance and that the substance was a
narcotic. Neither the detective nor the narcotics agent in the case saw
money or narcotics exchanged between Baggett and the suspected drug
dealer. The court found that because illegal possession of controlled
drugs by individuals for their own personal use is a misdemeanor rather
than a felony, Baggett could not be convicted for facilitation under sec-
tion 843(b). The court reasoned that Congress, in enacting the statute,
intended to distinguish between distributors and simple possessors.
Baggett's conviction was reversed.
United States v. Beryhil, 880 F.2d 275
Author: Judge Barrett
Concurrence: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Berryhill, appealed an order of the district court. Berry-
hill argued that the district court erred in: (1) sentencing him to 300
years with a minimum term of 99 years before eligibility for parole;
(2) failing to conduct adequate voir dire; (3) denying his motion for mis-
trial; and (4) failing to grant his motion to suppress in-court identifica-
tion evidence.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the 300-year sentence and minimum
term of 99 years before eligibility for parole because it was within the
prescribed statutory limits of 18 U.S.C. sections 1201 and 4205(b)(1).
The court further upheld the district court's voir dire and its ruling deny-
ing Berryhill's motion for mistrial. The court stated that the decision on
both issues was within the sound discretion of the district court and
would not be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion. In addition, the
court affirmed the district court's denial of Berryhill's motion to sup-
press in-court identification evidence of Berryhill by witnesses who had
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previously viewed photographic displays. The court found that the pho-
tographic displays were not impermissibly suggestive.
United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Bishop, appealed his conviction, daiming the district
court improperly denied: (1) his motion to suppress evidence because
the warrrant used to retrieve it had been obtained without probable
cause; (2) his motion for new trial because of the prosecution's late dis-
closure of impeachment evidence; and (3) his motion to acquit for insuf-
ficient evidence.
The Tenth Circuit declined to resolve whether there was probable
cause supporting the wan-ant, finding that the F.B.I. agents' conduct fell
within the "good faith exception" to the probable cause rule. With re-
gard to the impeachment evidence, the court held that there was no vio-
lation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which requires the
prosecution to turn over material evidence favorable to a defendant
when requested. There is no due process violation where the impeach-
ment evidence is disclosed to the defense during the trial and the de-
fendant makes a tactical decision not to use it. The court also affirmed
the district court's denial of Bishop's motion for acquittal, holding that a
reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The case was remanded for resen-
tencing under the new Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Bryant, 892 F.2d 1466
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Bryant, appealed his conviction for involuntary man-
slaughter. Bryant argued that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to define "wanton and reckless disregard for human life" as an
element of involuntary manslaughter. Bryant also contended that the
district court violated his rights under the double jeopardy clause when
it based its sentence on the trial judge's view of the evidence which was
contrary to that of the jury.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by allowing the jury to apply the common understanding of
"wanton and reckless." The court reasoned that this gave the jurors suf-
ficient guidance without Bryant's proposed jury instruction on the
meaning of the term. The court also stated that there is no substantial
authority for the proposition that Bryant's proposed instruction on a
"right to arm" bore a material relationship to the issue of guilt or inno-
cence. In addition, the court found that Bryant's double jeopardy rights
were not violated even though the sentencing judge disagreed with the
jury's determination. The court explained that there was no suggestion
that the trial judge considered non-existent or constitutionally invalid
prior convictions. The trial court, therefore, acted within its discretion in
sentencing Bryant to the statutory maximum period of incarceration al-
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lowable for involuntary manslaughter. The judgment and sentence were
affirmed.
United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Buchanan, was convicted of conspiracy and manufactur-
ing and possessing an unregistered firearm. The convictions were af-
firmed on appeal. Buchanan sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, alleging that failure of the United States to disclose a personal
relationship between an investigator from the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms, ("Tilley"), and Buchanan's former wife, Whitten,
was prejudicial error in violation of the Brady rule. The district court
granted Buchanan a new trial, and the United States appealed.
The Tenth Circuit, on de novo review, held that failure to disclose
the Tilley-Whitten relationship did not violate the Brady rule. The Brady
rule states that suppression of evidence by the prosecution favorable to
an accused, when it has been requested, violates due process when the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment regardless of whether
the prosecution acted in good faith. Buchanan requested, in discovery,
"any evidence which might be used for impeachment of any witness for
the prosecution at the time of trial." The court determined that since
neither Tilley nor Whitten was a chief witness, the failure to disclose
impeachment evidence did not warrant granting of a new trial. More-
over, the court reasoned that neither Tilley's nor Whitten's credibility
was material to the question of Buchanan's guilt. The district court's
decision to grant a new trial was reversed.
Buck v. Maschner, 878 F.2d 344
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Buck, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging im-
proper introduction of evidence from a prior alleged molestation of chil-
dren charge for which he had been tried and acquitted. The district
court denied Buck's petition. Buck appealed, asserting violation of his
constitutional rights.
The Tenth Circuit held that the collateral estoppel requirement of
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause barred the evidence from
admission in the instant case since the State impermissibly sought to
prove exactly what it failed to prove in the previous trial. The court re-
versed and remanded with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus.
United States v. Burton, 888 F.2d 682
Per Curian
Defendant, Burton, was convicted for distributing handbills without
a permit on property leased by the federal government. Burton admit-
ted committing the acts in violation of 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.309 (1986);
however, she argued that pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 318, the government
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was without jurisdiction to prosecute her for such acts since the property
was leased, and thus not owned, by the federal government. The district
court denied Burton's motion to dismiss.
The Tenth Circuit held that the government had jurisdiction to
prosecute. The court stated that the jurisdiction restriction of 40 U.S.C.
§ 318 was amended by an appropriations act, which expanded the gov-
ernment's jurisdiction to areas under its charge and control. Conse-
quently, the government could enforce regulations on property merely
leased by the United States. The court further held that the appropria-
tions act which expanded the government's ju'isdiction constituted a
proper exercise of power under the necessary and proper clause of the
United States Constitution. The act has a legitimate end, is within the
scope of the Constitution, and is plainly adapted to achieve its end. The
decision of the district court was, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436
Author: Judge Barrett
The United States appealed the district court's order granting de-
fendant Carreon's motion to suppress evidence. A United States Cus-
toms Inspector ("the Inspector") found approximately fifty kilograms of
marijuana in Carreon's truck during a search at the United States-Mex-
ico border. At issue was whether the search and seizure violated Car-
reon's fourth amendment rights.
The Tenth Circuit stated that a border search is an exception to the
fourth amendment probable-cause warrant requirement. Extension of a
routine border search is warranted if it is based on "reasonable suspi-
cion" justified by a particularized and objective basis. The court held
that the facts did establish a "reasonable suspicion" justifying the In-
spector's search and, therefore, the district court's order granting the
motion to suppress was clearly erroneous. The order was reversed and
the case was remanded for trial.
Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388
Author: Judge Anderson
Following his conviction, petitioner Case sought federal habeas re-
lief. The district court conditionally granted Case's petition on the
ground ofjury misconduct, finding that Case's constitutional rights were
violated when he was precluded from a post-verdict voir dire of the jury.
The district court, however, denied relief on a second issue, finding that
Case was properly denied a continuance which, if granted, would have
enabled him to introduce a newly-discovered witness. Respondent,
Mondragon, appealed the juror misconduct issue, and Case appealed
the continuance issue.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on the jury misconduct issue and af-
firmed on the continuance issue. The court held that a presumption of
correctness should be accorded to trial court findings on basic and pri-
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mary facts. Whether or not jurors made or heard improper comments is
a basic and primary fact and, therefore, the district court's findings
should have been given full deference. The district court should have
presumed insufficient proof ofjuror misconduct and denied Case relief.
The court further held that the district court failed to fulfill a require-
ment when it did not explain its reasons for avoiding the presumption.
Affirming the district court's decision to deny a continuance, the court
stated that Case did not prove whether the denial violated constitutional
principles of due process. Thus, the denial of the continuance was
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Davis, appealed from the district court's dismissal of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contended that his sixth amend-
ment right to a public trial was violated by the improper exclusion of the
general public and the press from his trial during which he was con-
victed of raping three sixteen-year-old girls. On request by the prosecu-
tion, the district court excluded the public and press during a
complaining witness' testimony without requiring evidence of the wit-
ness' condition and without interviewing the witness or her parents.
The district court reasoned that the victim's age required closure, that
Davis would still have the right to confrontation, and that the jury would
be present during the witness' testimony.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court had im-
properly violated Davis's sixth amendment right to a public trial by fail-
ing to articulate specific, reviewable findings adequate to support the
closure. The court stated that the overriding interest standard was not
met because the district court did not: (1) inquire into the factual basis
for the prosecution's assertion that the witness would be harmed unless
the press and public were excluded; and (2) narrowly tailor its order
since no alternatives to the blanket exclusion were considered. The case
was remanded for entry ofjudgment granting habeas relief and vacating
Davis's conviction if the state does not retry Davis within a reasonable
time.
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 884 F.2d 1343
Author: Judge Logan
Dissent: Judge Ebel
Various prisoners in state and federal institutions testified as wit-
nesses in separate criminal proceedings before federal tribunals. The
prisoners contended that the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)
and (b) (1978) mandated the payment of attendance fees to witnesses
regardless of whether they were incarcerated. The district court denied
the fees.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Congress never intended
section 1821 to apply to those incarcerated for criminal acts. Nowhere in
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the express language of the 1978 revision of section 1821 nor in its leg-
islative history did Congress indicate criminal inmates were entitled to a
fee. Additionally, prisoners do not incur financial loss serving as wit-
nesses. Allowing such fees could lead to abuses since inmates could file
suits and subpoena prison friends solely for the purpose of allowing the
witnesses to gain profit and free trips outside prison.
United States v. Dennison, 891 F.2d 255
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, United States ("government"), appealed from the district
court's dismissal of three indictments on the ground that the govern-
ment failed to comply with the district court's discovery orders. Defend-
ants were indicted for conspiring to defraud a savings and loan
association. Before and during trial the district court entered discovery
orders requiring the government to make available to defense counsel
exculpatory evidence.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found
that the prosecutor's failure to comply with the discovery orders was the
result of the prosecutor's inexperience rather than bad faith and that the
defendants had not been prejudiced by the prosecutor's actions. The
court noted that where a defendant moves in mid-trial for a mistrial or
dismissal on grounds unrelated to his guilt or innocence, as was the case
here, the government may appeal a ruling in favor of the defendant
without offending the double jeopardy clause.
United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Erwin, asserted on appeal that: (1) the district court
erred in holding that he lacked standing to challenge the stop and
search of a car in which he was a passenger; (2) the traffic stop was a
pretext to conduct an illegal drug search; and (3) his consent to the
search was involuntary.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. First, the
court held that Erwin, a passenger, had sufficient fourth amendment in-
terest to challenge the traffic stop. The court reasoned that passengers
also have interests against unreasonable seizure of their persons. Sec-
ond, the court held that Erwin lacked standing to challenge the search
because he failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
automobile. Thus, his fourth amendment rights were not violated by the
search. Third, the court held that the traffic stop was legal and not
pretextual: under identical circumstances, a reasonable officer would
have stopped a vehicle exceeding the speed limit by twelve miles solely
for the traffic violation. Based on the foregoing conclusions, the court
found it unnecessary to consider whether consent to the search was
voluntary.
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First National Bank of Tulsa v. United States, 865 F.2d 217
Author: Judge Barrett
The Freeman Educational Association ("FEA"), appealed the dis-
trict court's denial of its motions both to quash grand jury subpoenas
requesting bank acco'unt information and for return of property seized
by criminal investigators of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court held that since a presump-
tion of regularity attaches to grand jury subpoenas and since the FEA
did not meet its burden of showing irregularity, the district court pos-
sessed subject matter jurisdiction to issue the subpoenas. Further, the
government's need for the seized records in order to investigate crimi-
nal tax evasion charges was held to be compelling, and thus outweighed
the FEA's first amendment rights. Finally, the court held that since the
FEA was neither under arrest nor indictment, its case was not in esse.
Consequently, the district court's order denying FEA's motion for re-
turn of property was a final appealable order, properly heard by this
court.
United States v. Garcia, 879 F.2d 803
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant Garcia, pleaded guilty to possessing and distributing a
controlled substance of less than one kilogram in 1986. The district
court subsequently sentenced Garcia, requiring him to serve a term of
special parole. Garcia appealed, arguing that the term of special parole
was illegal.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court
explained that the applicable penalty provision for Garcia's offense was
18 U.S.C. § 1841 (b)(1)(A). This provision required offenders to serve a
term of special parole. In 1984, however, congress deleted the special
parole term. Congress stated that the deletion of special parole would
become effective November 1, 1987, for offenses involving under one
kilogram. For offenses involving over one kilogram, the deletion of spe-
cial parole would become effective in 1984. Following Congress' guide-
lines, the court held that Garcia must serve a term of special parole. The
court reasoned that Garcia's offense involved under one kilogram, and
further, Garcia committed the offense in 1986.
Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185
Author: Judge Conway, sitting by designation
Dissent: Judge Logan
Defendant, Hopkinson, who was sentenced to death for first degree
murder, petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The dis-
trict court dismissed the petition, and Hopkinson appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part, staying
Hopkinson's death warrant until the district court issued further orders.
The court held that prosecutor Shillinger's introduction of evidence of
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prior crimes, wrongs, or acts was properly admitted because it illus-
trated Hopkinson's motive. In addition, the court held that the confron-
tation clause was not violated when Shillinger introduced the murder
victims' out-of-court statements, which included threats by Hopkinson.
Also, the court stated that Shillinger's dosing comments declaring that
he thought Hopkinson, rather than the hired killer, was morally respon-
sible for the victim's death, was an improper statement. The court held,
however, that such a comment did not affect the fairness of the trial,
considering the overwhelming amount of proof against Hopkinson.
Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286
Author: Judge Anderson
Dissent: Judge Logan, with whom Chief Judge Holloway
and Judges McKay and Seymour join
Defendant, Hopkinson, was convicted on four counts of first degree
murder and two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.
Hopkinson's appeal to the district court was summarily dismissed. A
panel of the Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed on virtually all issues,
and affirmed with one dissent on the subject matter of this en bane re-
view. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1989), reh'g granted,
March 23, 1989. The Tenth Circuit thereafter agreed to consider en bane
whether remarks by the State in the deaih sentencing proceeding vio-
lated the rule set out in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). In
Caldwell, the Court held that it is constitutionally impermissible to mis-
lead the jury into thinking the ultimate determination of death rests with
someone else.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Caldwell decision, which was de-
cided after Hopkinson's death sentence became final, announced a "new
rule." The court stated that this "new rule" could only be applied retro-
actively to Hopkinson if it fell within one of tivo exceptions. The court
held that the "new rule" fell within the second exception and therefore
could be retroactively applied to Hopkinson. This exception requires
observance of "procedures that . . are 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty."' Teague v. Lane, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989). The court
reasoned that the jury's understanding of its function in a death sen-
tence proceeding is related to the concept of ordered liberty. Even
though the "new rule" applied to Hopkinson, the court was equally di-
vided as to whether the State's remarks violated the "new rule." In par-
ticular, the court was split as to whether the remarks shifted "the
responsibility for the sentencing decision away from the jury." Parks v.
Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1549 (10th Cir. 1988)(en bane), cert. granted, 109
S.Ct. 1930- (1989). The court ruled that its equal division had the effect
of affirming the district court's denial of Hopkinson's petition on this
issue. The court also added that Hopkinson's death sentence must not
be vacated because there was not a substantial possibility that the State's
remarks affected the jury's sentencing decision.
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United States v. Jenkins, 866 F.2d 331
Author: Judge Moore
The Government sought a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent,
Jenkins, to impose the mandatory enhanced sentence of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B) against defendant, Mendes, following his conviction for
possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The district
court based its refusal to apply the enhanced sentence provision on the
lack of a jury finding on the quantity of narcotics possessed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's refusal to apply the
minimum enhanced sentence Was a usurpation ofjudicial authority and
resulted in an illegal sentence. The court reasoned that since the quan-
tity requirement of section 841(b)(1)(B) applies only to sentencing and
is not an element of the substantive offense, the Government need not
prove essential quantities beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant
has no right to a finding by the jury that the fact has been established.
There was evidence that Mendes had immediate and constructive pos-
session of sufficient quantities of narcotics to satisfy the requirements of
the enhanced sentencing provision.
The court found that issuance of a writ was proper because the
crime was committed prior to the effective date of a statute providing for
direct appeal of sentences imposed in violation of law, and a motion to
correct the sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) would have been fruit-
less since the district court had already rejected the Government's
position.
Kaiser v. Lief 874 F.2d 732
Author: Judge O'Conner, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Kaiser, appealed the district court's order granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant, Lief. Kaiser appealed and argued
that: (1) the search of his home was conducted pursuant to an invalid
warrant; (2) furs were improperly seized during a search for drugs; and
(3) the district court improperly instructed the jury regarding Lief's lia-
bility for the acts of others while a detective lieutenant.
The Tenth Circuit held that the search warrant was valid. The court
found that the affidavit underlying the search warrant and the complaint
on which the arrest warrant was based provided sufficient indications
that the confidential informant was reliable. Together, the facts gave the
magistrate a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed.
On de novo review, the court held that seizure of the furs was proper
under the plain view doctrine. The doctrine applied because: (1) the
compartment searched could have contained the drugs sought; (2) Lief
did not intend to seize the furs when he applied for the warrant; and
(3) there was immediate probable cause to believe that the furs were
stolen. Finally, the court held that the district court's refusal of Kaiser's
proposed instruction was proper even though the instruction could have
resulted in Lief's liability for the acts of others.
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United States v. Keiswetter, 860 F.2d 992
Author: Judge Moore
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Keiswetter, sought to vacate his original guilty plea. The
district court denied the motion concluding that Keiswetter had not
stated a fair and just reason to allow withdrawal.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the record did not
contain the required factual basis for the plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11 (f). The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and held that a
guilty plea improvidently accepted by the district court without sufficient
factual basis for the plea must be vacated.
Klein v. United States, 880 F.2d 250
Author: Judge Holloway
Plaintiff, Klein, appealed the district court's denial of both a petition
for a writ of coram nobis and a FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) motion for a new
trial.
The petition for coram nobis relief was based upon new evidence
which showed that the government withheld its belief that Klein was fi-
nancing narcotics deals. Moreover, the evidence showed that Klein had a
mental condition in the Navy which would have assisted him in proving
he was not able to form an intent to evade taxes. The burden of proof
was on Klein to show that the errors to be corrected resulted in a com-
plete miscarriage of justice and that the new evidence would have re-
sulted in his acquittal.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's denial on procedural
grounds. On the merits, the court held Klein was not denied a fair trial
since the narcotics related evidence would have hindered his case. In
addition, Klein's history of mental incapacity was known to Klein prior
to trial. Klein's psychiatric witness indicated his testimony would be un-
changed even in light of that evidence. The court affirmed the district
court.
The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Klein's Rule
60(b)(5) motion for a new trial. Klein was disbarred prior to the tax eva-
sion trial and in 1988 was reinstated to the practice of law when it was
determined -that his mental health was restored. Although the disbar-
ment was introduced at the tax evasion trial, there was also other strong
evidence that Klein intended to evade taxes. The court upheld the dis-
trict court's ruling that the 1988 reinstatement did not affect the crimi-
nal case verdict. The court denied equitable relief under Rule 60(b)(6)
since Klein had not demonstrated that this was an extraordinary case
calling for relief under the rule.
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United States v. Koonce, 885 F.2d 720
Author: Judge Ebel
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Koonce, appealed the district court's denial of his mo-
tion to dismiss a federal indictment against him in Utah on the grounds
that some of the alleged criminal misconduct underlying the Utah prose-
cution was used to enhance Koonce's sentence for a prior conviction in
South Dakota.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, and found no violation of the fifth
amendment double jeopardy ban on multiple prosecutions or the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines because the Utah offense was different from
the one Koonce was convicted for in South Dakota. Though the South
Dakota district court inquired into the Utah offense during sentencing,
the court ruled that Koonce was never put in jeopardy for the Utah of-
fense during the South Dakota sentencing hearing. As for Koonce's ar-
gument that he was subject to multiple punishments in violation of the
double jeopardy clause, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the issue was not
ripe for review, unless or until Koonce was convicted in Utah.
United States v. Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713
Author: Judge Bratton, sitting by designation
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Kornegay, appealed his conviction for interstate trans-
portation and sale of a stolen farm tractor. Kornegay based his appeal
on the failure of the court to suppress evidence allegedly seized during
an illegal search, and the failure to grant his motion for a mistrial, based
on intentional misconduct by the prosecutor.
The first argument revolved around whether the impounding and
inventory search of Kornegay's vehicle was proper. The Tenth Circuit
ruled that simply because Koregay's car was legally parked did not
mean impoundment was unnecessary, and that the facts supported that
the impounding of the car was proper and reasonable. The court also
ruled that since the evidence in question resulted from an initial routine
inventory, to secure the vehicle and protect Kornegay's property, the
evidence was obtained in a proper and reasonable manner. The court
summarily disposed of the second claim because though there was
prosecutorial misconduct, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184
Author: Judge Wright, sitting by designation
Defendant, Laycock, plead guilty to armed robbery with a firearm
enhancement in exchange for dismissal of another charge. Laycock ap-
pealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief,
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and entry of an involuntary




The Tenth Circuit held that Laycock failed to prove that his attor-
ney materially misrepresented the consequences of the plea agreement.
Laycock signed the agreement, following an explanation by the trial
judge, and he denied that any other promises had been made in ex-
change for his plea. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Laycock
needed to establish that his attorney's performance was deficient and
that, but for counsel's errors, Laycock would have insisted on going to
trial. The court held that Laycock had failed to prove either of these
elements. Among its findings, the court concluded that the attorney's
advice to accept the plea bargain was reasonable, given that Laycock ad-
mitted committing the crimes charged, was identified by witnesses, and
had a prior record. The court also rejected Laycock's claims that his sen-
tence exceeded the statutory maximum and that he received an inade-
quate sentencing hearing. The court affirmed dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition.
United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444
Author: Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Maez, was suspected of being involved in a bank rob-
bery. Maez and his wife voluntarily left their home and surrendered to
the authorities when they realized their home was surrounded by police
officers. Maez was then placed under arrest. The police did not have an
arrest warrant, nor did they have a warrant to search his trailer and
truck. Rather, the police contended that Maez's wife consented to a
search of the trailer and truck. Maez motioned to suppress evidence
seized during the search, but it was denied. Maez subsequently ap-
pealed, arguing: (1) the warrantless arrest violated his fourth amend-
ment rights; and (2) the consent to search his trailer was not voluntary.
First, the Tenth Circuit stated that without consent police officers
cannot enter a home to make a warrantless routine felony arrest, even
with probable cause, in the absence of exigent circumstances. Even
though the officers did not enter Maez's home, the court reasoned that
Maez was coerced into leaving his home. The court found no exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless arrest. Second, the court stated
that Mrs. Maez's consent to search the trailer was an act of free will only
if there was a break in the casual connection between the illegality and
the evidence obtained. The court found no intervening events between
the time of Maez's arrest and the signing of the consent form. Conse-
quently, the court held that Mrs. Maez's consent to search the trailer was
not an act of free will. In addition, the court considered three factors in
determining whether Mrs. Maez consented to a search of their truck:
(1) the proximity of Maez arrest and consent given; (2) the effect of in-
tervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the offi-
cial misconduct. Based on these three factors, the court held the consent
was not sufficiently an act of free will.
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United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Mann, appealed conviction of four counts of mail fraud,
one count of wire fraud and three counts of willful failure to file income
tax returns, challenging the sufficiency of evidence on all counts.
The Tenth Circuit affir-med Mann's mail fraud conviction, holding
that substantial evidence existed whereby the jury could conclude that
Mann made false representations with knowledge of or indifference to
the possibility of their falsity. The court reversed the wire fraud convic-
tion, finding that the circumstantial evidence used to prove criminal in-
tent was too attenuated. The court reversed and remanded the willful
failure to fie conviction because although there was sufficient evidence
to convict, Mann was prejudiced by the district court's failure to instruct
the jury regarding Mann's "good-faith" defense.
The Tenth Circuit further ruled that the district court did not im-
properly refuse to admit magazines that supported Mann's legal posi-
tion, nor did it erroneously admit testimony of a summary witness for
the government. Moreover, Mann's prosecution was not impermissively
selective, and there was no evidence that governmental misconduct pre-
vented Mann from receiving a fair trial.
United States v. Martinez, 877 F.2d 1480
Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Martinez, was convicted of conspiracy to distribute her-
oin and to possess heroin with an intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and use of a telephone to facilitate the possession
and distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 3(b) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. Martinez appealed both counts.
The government conceded that because of faulty jury instructions
the conviction under the second count had to be reversed and the sen-
tence vacated.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the conspiracy conviction, holding
that the jury did not convict Martinez on a guilt-by-association basis, due
to her joint trial with other codefendants. The government's evidence,
both from testimony and recorded telephone conversations, was held
sufficient to establish Martinez's participation in the conspiracy. The
conduct of a fellow defendant was not adequately prejudical or irregular
to justify a separate retrial and the court affirmed Martinez's conviction
of conspiracy.
United States v. Martinez, 890 F.2d 1088
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Martinez, appealed from a conviction for failure to ap-
pear after being released on bail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2).
Martinez was convicted of conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine.
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After sentencing, Martinez was granted an appeal bond. His conviction
was later affirmed and the district court informed Martinez by letter of
his surrender date. Martinez failed to surrender and was later arrested.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that failure to appear is a con-
tinuing offense which need not be complete on the surrender date.
Therefore, the prosecutor was not required to prove an exact date for
the. offense. The court conduded that Martinez knowingly failed to ap-
pear since notice of his surrender date had been mailed to him by both
the district court and his attorney. Evidence of Martinez's prior convic-
tion for conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine and his pending
indictment for new cocaine charges was properly admitted by the district
court to show motive to commit the offense of bail jumping. The poten-
tial prejudice of this evidence to Martinez did not substantially outweigh
its probative value. Finally, the court considered two comments made by
the prosecutor during his dosing argument and concluded that neither
remark was improper when reviewed in the context of the entire record.
United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, McKinnell, was convicted for using a firearm during or
in relation to a drug trafficking crime and for possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. McKinnell appealed, arguing that: (1) the district
court erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained during a search of
his automobile in violation of his fourth amendment rights; (2) posses-
sion with intent to distribute is not a felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(2)(amended 1988) because it does not involve the actual distri-
bution, manufacture, or importation of drugs; (3) the mere presence of a
firearm constituted insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) because the statute penalizes a person who "uses
or carries" a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime; and
(4) the district court erred in admitting a prior criminal act into evidence
for the purpose of showing intent.
Affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit held that
the search of McKinnell's car was valid because it occurred pursuant to a
lawful custodial arrest. Therefore, it was also proper for the police to
examine the passenger compartment and any containers found within.
The court further held that possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute that substance is a valid predicate offense for the
purposes of the section 924(c)(1). Furthermore, the court stated that the
"uses" element of section 924(c)(1) was satisfied because McKinnell had
"ready access" to the firearm and it was an integral part of the criminal
undertaking. Finally, the court held that there was no error in admitting
a prior criminal act committed by McKinnell. Since intent was at issue,
testimony concerning McKinnell's recent and similar criminal activity
was probative of his intent.
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United States v. McNeal, 865 F.2d 1167
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, McNeal, was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113
which makes it a crime to take money by force from a "[s]tate-chartered
credit union the accounts of which are insured by the... National Credit
Union Administration ["NCUA"]." (emphasis added).
The Tenth Circuit held that use of the term "deposits" instead of
"accounts" in the indictment was not sufficient cause to grant a motion
to dismiss for failing to charge a crime. The court also held that proof of
federal insurance of the institution, in order to qualify for federal juris-
diction of the case, was adequately shown by an insurance certificate
from the NCUA to the credit union's predecessor, evidence that insur-
ance premiums were paid each year even though no updated certificate
was issued, and testimony from a senior vice-president that the institu-
tion was federally insured on the date of the robbery. In addition, an
instruction to the jury that if McNeal was found guilty of the robbery he
must also be found guilty of assault with a handgun was not plain error,
as is required on appeal when the objection was not first raised at trial.
Finally, the court held that the district court properly rejected as unnec-
essary an instruction regarding the possible infirmities of eyewitness tes-
timony where the case was supported by testimony of multiple witnesses
and other corroborating evidence.
United States v. McNeal, 865 F.2d 1173
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, McNeal, and his brother were both convicted of armed
robbery of a state-chartered credit union which had federally insured
deposits. McNeal appealed, asserting that: (1) the district court's failure
to sever his trial from his brother's trial was reversible error; and (2) the
district court erred in denying his post-trial motion for permission to
query the jurors.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's denial of McNeal's
motion to sever was not reversible error. The court stated that as a gen-
eral rule joint participants in a criminal act can expect to be tried to-
gether and indicted together. This holds true even if the joint
participants are brothers. The court further held that the district court
did not err in denying McNeal's motion to query the jury without hold-
ing a hearing. The court stated that pursuant to local rule, a hearing
need not be held when such a motion is insufficient on its face. The
court addressed additional matters in its opinion for the appeal of Mc-
Neal's brother at 865 F.2d 1167.
United States v. Miller, 869 F.2d 1418
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, the United States, appealed from an order of the district
court granting defendant Miller's motion for a new trial under Fed. R.
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Crim. P. 33. Miller, convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, filed a mo-
tion 'for reconsideration twenty-one months after the final judgment,
asking the district court to reconsider its prior denial of a motion for a
new trial. Believing Miller had received ineffective assistance of counsel,
the district court granted the motion.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the order and held that pur-
suant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, Miller was required to file a petition to
reconsider the denial of a motion for a new trial within ten days of entry
of the judgment or order, absent a showing that evidence of the alleged
ineffectiveness was not available to Miller at the time of trial. Finding
that the facts showing the adequacy of trial preparation were available to
Miller at the time of trial, the court found the motion defective for lack
of jurisdiction.
United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866
Per Curiam
Defendants, Mobile Materials, Inc. ("Mobile"), Mobile Materials
Co. ("Partnership"), and Philpot, were indicted on seven counts for con-
spiracy to submit rigged bids to, or withhold from, the Oklahoma De-
partment of Transportation and the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, in
violation of the Sherman Act. The district court dismissed the indict-
ment against Mobile and the Partnership on the ground that they were
dissolved more than two years prior. After appeal to the Tenth Circuit,
contesting the dismissal, the district court was ordered to conduct fur-
ther proceedings in the prosecution of Mobile, the Partnership, and
Philpot. Philpot and Mobile were subsequently convicted of violating
the Sherman Act, and were convicted of one count of making false and
fraudulent statements to the United States Department of Transporta-
tion. Philpot and Mobile raised four issues on appeal: (1) whether the
case should have been submitted to the jury on a theory of grand con-
spiracy to rig bids; (2) whether the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 161-
317(e), was violated by the protracted length of the prosecution;
(3) whether the trial judge's attitude and demeanor convinced the jury
that the judge thought the defendants were guilty; and (4) whether the
sentences were grossly disproportionate.
First, the Tenth Circuit found that all of the essential elements of a
conspiracy under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were established
to allege an antitrust violation. Second, the court examined the course
of the proceedings prior to trial, tracking the excludable and non-ex-
dudable days under the Speedy Trial Act. The court explained that judi-
cial economy and procedural fairness permitted Philpot, based on his
relationship with Mobile and the Partnership, ajoint trial. Moreover, the
delay in prosecution was held to be both reasonable and mathematically
correct (50 elapsed days of the 70 limit). Third, in absence of a complete
transcript, the court was not able to rule on the allegations of judicial
misconduct. Finally, in a review of the severity of the sentence imposed,
the court found no abuse of the district court's discretion in meting out
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punishment, finding the sanctions all within contemplation of statutory
provisions of the Sherman Act. The district court's decision was, there-
fore, affirmed.
Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Nieto, appealed the district court's order dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for assault,
battery, and armed robbery.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that testimony by the arresting
officer which made reference to mug shots did not deny Nieto of a fair
trial in light of his own testimony that he had been previously arrested
and was presently incarcerated. The prosecutor's statements regarding
an "object focus" phenomenon did not deprive Nieto of due process
because his counsel disavowed any objection to the phenomenon and
used it to defendant's advantage. Additionally, the prosecutor's refer-
ences to another alleged victim who did not testify did not deny Nieto a
fair trial because the prosecutor's comments were in response to de-
fense counsel's closing remarks, the jury was properly instructed, and an
objection was properly sustained by the trial court. The trial judge had a
substantial reason for partial closure, and properly conducted a hearing
where the circumstances were discussed. Therefore, the court held that
the closure of the court to Nieto's relatives during the testimony of the
victim did not deny Nieto a fair trial.
United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1470
Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Nunez, was convicted for conspiracy to possess and dis-
tribute heroin and for using the telephone to facilitate the crime. Nunez
appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence from a wiretap on his brother's phone; (2) the evi-
dence showed two conspiracies, entitling Nunez to two separate trials;
(3) the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial.
The Tenth Circuit stated that wiretap authorizations are presumed
proper, and the defendant has the burden of overcoming the presump-
tion. Nunez was unable to prove that there was no probable cause, nor
any need for the wiretap. Second, the court rejected Nunez's claim that
the evidence showed two conspiracies. The court held that there was a
single conspiracy based on the finding that all participants shared a com-
mon goal: to possess and distribute heroin for profit. Third, the court
upheld the district court's denial of Nunez's motion for mistrial. The
court held that the ousting of Nunez's brother from the courtroom for
improper behavior was not prejudicial to his case. The court found no
abuse of discretion by the district court. Finally, the court found that
there was sufficient evidence to support Nunez's conviction.
[Vol. 67:4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475
Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge McKay
Defendant, Nunez, argued that the district court violated his fifth
amendment rights when he was removed from trial for disruptive con-
duct. Nunez also argued that his sixth amendment rights were violated
when the district court refused to remove appointed counsel, and pre-
cluded Nunez from appearing pro se.
The Tenth Circuit held that Nunez's fifth amendment rights were
not violated. The court reasoned that a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing can waive his right to be present at trial if his disruptive behavior
continues following a judge's warning. The court also found that it was
too late to appoint new counsel. Moreover, had Nunez been allowed to
proceed pro se and been removed, he would have been unrepresented.
The district court's decision was, therefore, affirmed.
Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Peters, was arrested in Colorado on a British warrant alleg-
ing theft by deception and forgery. The United States Magistrate or-
dered his extradition and the district court denied Peters' petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Peters appealed the denial, and argued that there
was not probable cause to extradite him, and that the doctrine of dual
criminality was not satisfied.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the committing mag-
istrate must decide whether there is competent evidence to justify hold-
ing the accused to await trial. The magistrate need not determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction. The habeas
corpus review of the magistrate's finding of probable cause is narrow: ap-
peal must fail if there is any evidence of probable cause.
The Tenth Circuit held there was sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for both charges. The court also upheld the lower
courts' finding that the theft by deception statute was substantially
analogous to federal securities laws.
United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844
Author: Judge Holloway
Dissent: Judge Saffels, sitting by designation
Three appeals were consolidated for argument. First, defendant,
Hines, appealed his five-count conviction for violating and conspiring to
violate narcotics laws and traveling in interstate commerce to promote
narcotics manufacturing. Hines argued that the district court's failure to
declare a mistrial was prejudicial because the jury heard evidence of his
prior felony conviction. In addition, Hines claimed that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the
"Travel Act"). Moreover, Hines argued that the district court abused its
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discretion after granting a continuance as a sanction for the govern-
ment's violation of discovery orders, rather than imposing a more ex-
treme sanction.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's denial of Hines' mo-
tion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that
the jury was given a cautionary instruction. Moreover, Hines gave testi-
mony regarding his record. The court concluded that there was suffi-
dent evidence for the jury to find Hines guilty of violating the Travel
Act. Finally, the court ruled that the district court's use of the less ex-
treme sanction of continuance was not an abuse of discretion, where
there was no evidence of prejudice to Hines.
Second, defendant, Peveto, appealed his conviction for conspiracy.
Peveto claimed that evidence found in A search of his apartment should
have been suppressed because the affidavit in support of the warrant was
insufficient to establish probable cause. Moreover, Peveto contended
that the executing officers used excessive force. Pevet6 also challenged
the admission of testimony by a co-conspirator and the admission of a
traffic ticket which tied him to the conspiracy. Peveto argued that there
was insufficient evidence to establish that he was a member of the
conspiracy.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly denied
Peveto's motion to dismiss. The court found that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the
warrant. Also, there was a substantial basis for conduding that the po-
lice did not use excessive force. The court ruled that the co-conspirator
testimony was properly admitted. The court reasoned that the testimony
at issue may be considered in making the determination to admit, sub-
ject to being connected up later. The court concluded that the evidence,
although circumstantial, was sufficient for the jury to find that Peveto
knowingly joined the conspiracy. The court found that the traffic ticket,
offered as circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy, and not to prove
the truth of the facts asserted, was not hearsay.
Third, defendant, Rodgers, appealed his four-count conviction for
violating and conspiring to violate narcotics laws. Rodgers claimed that
the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever
under FED. R. CRim. P. 14. The court found that Hines' and Rodgers'
defenses were so antagonistic as to be mutually exdusive, and that the
district court's failure to grant a severance denied Rodgers a fair trial.
The court concluded that this was prejudicial error.
Finally, all three defendants challenged the sufficiency of proof as to
the existence of a single conspiracy. The court ruled, however, that the
jury could reasonably have found that the evidence established a single
conspiracy. The convictions of Hines and Peveto were affirmed. Rod-
gers' conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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United States v. Pogue, 865 F.2d 226
Per Curiam
Defendant, Pogue, appealed the denial without hearing of his mo-
tion to vacate conviction or correct sentence. Pogue's sentence imposed
restitution far in excess of the maximum fine of which he was informed
during the plea-bargaining stage. Pogue insisted he would not have pled
guilty if he had been warned by the district court prior to sentencing that
he could be required to pay restitution. Further, Pogue claimed he did
not withdraw his guilty plea because he believed a change of plea was
impermissible.
The Tenth Circuit held that Pogue was entitled to an explanation of
the possibility of restitution prior to entering his guilty plea, and that he
had demonstrated a substantial violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. There-
fore, the court vacated the denial of Pogue's motion and remanded this
issue to the district court. The court held, however, that the district
court's imposition of restitution was not a breach of the plea agreement,
which provided that the government would bring no further charges but
contained no provision regarding sentencing. In addition, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in calculating restitution since Pogue
had stipulated on record to the amount imposed.
United States v. Prichard, 875 F.2d 789
Per Curiam
Defendant, Prichard, moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sen-
tence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Prichard alleged: (1) a violation of
FED. R. CGlM. P. 23(A), which resulted in his nonvoluntary waiver of a
jury trial; (2) the application of "attempt" was unconstitutionally vague
as applied; and (3) a misapplication of the relevant legal standards in
determining his guilt. The district court denied Prichard's motion to va-
cate, set aside or correct his sentence. Prichard subsequently appealed
and reasserted the same grounds for relief. Prichard further asked for
recusal of the district judge.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the lack of a document memorial-
izing Prichard's waiver of ajury trial did not result in anything less than
a knowing, intelligent waiver. The court also held that Prichard's second
and third issues on appeal were fairly encompassed in his direct appeal.
Absent an intervening change in the law of a circuit, issues disposed of
on direct appeal generally will not be considered on a collateral attack
by a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Moreover, the court held that
Prichard's allegations of bias and prejudice, because of the judge's prior
judicial contacts with Prichard, were insufficient to support recusal. The
judgment of the district court was, therefore, affirmed.
United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Rising, was convicted of murder with premeditation and
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malice aforethought and unlawful possession'of a knife in a penitentiary.
Rising appealed the convictions, presenting twelve various grounds for
reversal. Rising's major contention was that the district court judge
committed reversible error by refusing to allow two fellow inmates to
testify as to threats made by the victim against Rising. The purpose of
this testimony was to establish Rising's claim of self-defense.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that since the district court had allowed
other inmates to testify as to communicated threats by the victim on Ris-
ing's life, the evidence would have been cumulative. The court held that
the district court had not abused its discretion to exclude the cumulative
evidence. Finding no reversible error, the court affirmed the district
court's judgment.
United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261
Author: Judge A. Anderson, sitting by designation
Defendant, Rivera, appealed his conviction for possession of co-
caine with intent to distribute, alleging that: (1) the police officer
stopped the vehicle as a pretext, without probable cause for the stop or
highway search; and (2) the search was invalid for failing to meet the
legal standards for a search incident to an arrest.
Affirming the district court's denial of Rivera's motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the highway search, the Tenth Circuit held that
the initial stop and investigation for a traffic violation was lawfully made.
This stop occurred after a truck driver notified the officer that a car was
tailgating him. During the stop the officer noticed a smell associated
with cocaine. The officer then asked for and received consent to search
the car. The search turned up several packages of cocaine. The court
concluded that this highway search could not be upheld as a search inci-
dent to an arrest because probable cause was not present until the
search and seizure produced evidence of drugs. However, the highway
search was properly performed following Rivera's voluntary verbal con-
sent. The court also held that the district court was not clearly erroneous
in denying suppression of evidence from the highway search even
though written consent for a subsequent gas station search was found to
be invalid.
United States v. Shunk, 881 F.2d 917
Per Curiam
Defendant, Shunk, was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
felon. On appeal, Shunk argued: (1) that the district court erred in ad-
mitting into evidence a videotape of his admissions before the govern-
ment's establishment of the corpus delicti, and (2) that the videotape of
the sting officer's conversation with Shunk's brother, even if not inad-
missible hearsay, failed to corroborate Shunk's admissions.
In upholding the conviction, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the corpus
delicti issue was irrelevant because of the nature of the crime: there was
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no tangible injury or loss and the occurrence of the crime was insepara-
ble from the identity of the specific defendant. The court instead applied
the corroboration rule, requiring the prosecution to present evidence
establishing the trustworthiness of the extrajudicial statements, but not
requiring that the corroborating evidence be sufficient independently to
establish the corpus delicti. The court held that the government had
presented sufficient corroborating evidence.
Affirming the conviction, the court ruled that a reasonable jury
could find that Shunk had knowingly possessed a firearm and that
Shunk's brother's statements were admissible as statements offered
against a party which are made by the party's agent.
United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245
Author: Judge Moore
Trooper Moore stopped defendant, Silkwood, for speeding and
then saw a loaded gun in Silkwood's glove compartment. The district
court denied Silkwood's motion to suppress the gun, and Silkwood ap-
pealed. Silkwood also appealed the district court's decision to prevent
him from examining Moore's personnel file. In addition, Silkwood ar-
gued that he did not waive his right to counsel when he decided to ap-
pear pro se rather than accept appointed counsel.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err is
refusing to suppress evidence of the gun. The court stated that the dis-
trict court's decision was proper under the plain view exception to the
fourth amendment. Second, the court upheld the district court's deci-
sion to prevent Silkwood from examining Moore's personnel fie. Third,
the court stated that if a defendant waives his sixth amendment right to
counsel, the court must conduct a penetrating and comprehensive in-
quiry into his reasons for the waiver. Moreover, the court must question
the defendant on the record to be certain that waiver of counsel was
truly knowing and voluntary. The court found that Silkwood did not
knowingly and volutarily waive his right to counsel. The court explained
that the district court failed to inquire adequately into Silkwood's under-
standing of his waiver.
United States v. Smith, 888 F.2d 720
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Smith, appealed his conviction of bank robbery on the
ground that the district court erred by not giving a cautionary jury in-
struction regarding the testimony of a paid informant. Smith also ap-
pealed the sentence imposed by the district court, which departed form
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Smith argued that he
did not receive notice of the grounds for departure, and he argued that
the departure was unreasonable.
First, the Tenth Circuit upheld Smith's conviction. The court rea-
soned that even if the rejection of the defendant's instruction was erro-
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neous, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the
substantial evidence identifying Smith as the bank robber. Second, the
court vacated and remanded for resentencing because of the district
court's insufficient statement of the reasons for its departure from the
Guidelines. The court stated that specificity of reason is mandated by 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c). The court failed to comment on the notice or unrea-
sonableness issues.
United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Thomas, convicted of possession -with intent to dis-
tribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana, appealed his sentence,
daiming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 991 et. seq. vio-
lated his fifth amendment due process rights.
The Tenth Circuit held that the guidelines did not violate Thomas'
rights. First, there is no constitutional right to have a judge make a dis-
cretionary individualized sentence determination. Congress has the
power to divest the courts of their sentencing discretion and to establish
exact mandatory sentences for all sentences. Second, the guidelines do
not deprive defendants of meaningful participation in the sentencing
process because they allow defendants to appear, offer evidence and
challenge the government's evidence. Third, although a prosecutor has
the discretion to determine what charges to bring, the guidelines do not
grant him improper control of a defendant's sentence simply because
the evidence will support conviction under more than one statute.
Thomas' sentence was affirmed.
Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877
Per Curiam
Defendant, Tucker, appealed the denial of a writ of habeas corpus af-
ter he was convicted of robbery and kidnapping at successive trials.
Tucker's appeal raised three principal issues: whether his successive tri-
als arising from the same transaction violated double jeopardy; whether
the introduction of "other crimes" evidence violated due process; and
whether the decision by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals not to apply
remedial state precedent violated a constitutional right.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding
that successive trials arising from separate crimes stemming from the
same transaction may have violated the "fundamental fairness" stan-
dards for successive prosecutions. This violated due process and double
jeopardy, thereby necessitating a reversal of the district court's findings
as to these claims. The court further held that on remand the district
court should consider whether evidence of other crimes or wrongs was
introduced at Tucker's trials. Finally, the court affirmed the district court
decision not, to retroactively apply Oklahoma remedial precedent which
allows joinder of indictments. The application of this precedent was a
state law issue not to be disturbed on review.
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United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Walraven, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. This plea, however, was conditional. Wal-aven
maintained the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence found in a warrantless search of his car. Walraven
argued that the initial registration check of his out-of-state vehicle vio-
lated the privileges and immunities-clause. He also contended that the
initial stop of his vehicle, undertaken when the dispatcher mistakenly
checked the wrong license plate number, was an unreasonable mistake
of fact, or merely support for a pretextual stop. Further, Walraven ar-
gued that even if the initial stop of his car was lawful, its continued de-
tention after discovery of the mistake, was not. Finally, Walraven
asserted that he did not consent to the search of his car.
The Tenth Circuit held that a random registration check of an out-
of-state vehicle does not violate the privileges and immunities clause.
The court reasoned that the check neither unreasonably burdens nor
restricts interstate travel. The court also found that the initial stop of
Walraven's car was not an unlawful seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment. The court reasoned that the officer's failure to notice and
correct the dispatcher's mistake was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. The court held that the continued detention of Wal-
raven's car was an investigative detention which was reasonable in light
of Walraven's suspicious behavior. Governmental interests in crime pre-
vention and detection outweigh the minimally intrusive character of the
detention. Finally, the court declined to review the question of whether
Walraven consented to the search of his car. The court reasoned that
this was a question of fact for the trial judge who heard the witnesses'
testimony. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Walraven's
motion to suppress.
United States v. Willis, 890 F.2d 1099
Author: Judge Henley, sitting by designation
Defendant, Willis, appealed his conviction for conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2, and his conviction for unlawful use of a telephone to facilitate distri-
bution of cocaine under 21 U.S.C § 843(b). Willis contended that the
district court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress a wiretap;
(2) denying his motion for acquittal; (3) overruling his objection to the
prosecution's introduction of rebuttal evidence; and (4) instructing the
jury on the application of complicity law to conspiracy.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision in all re-
spects. The use of wiretaps in the case was acceptable because the mini-
mization effort by the government had been reasonable. In considering
Willis' motion for acquittal, the court found that Willis had enough
knowledge to connect him to part of the conspiracy and that evidence of
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his use of the telephone during a specific conversation was sufficient to
sustain his conviction for unlawful use of the telephone. The court
found that the admission of rebuttal testimony did not constitute an
abuse of discretion by the district court. The proper standard of review
on jury instructions is whether the jury, considering the instructions as a
whole, was misled. The court found no likelihood that the jury was mis-
led, and refused to disturb the district court's determination on the
instructions.
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Coleman, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder.
At a separate sentencing hearing, the jury determined that all five of the
statutory aggravating circumstances were present and sentenced Cole-
man to death. The "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating
circumstance was subsequently declared unconstitutional. Coleman filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging he was sentenced under an
unconstitutional jury instruction. The district court denied the petition,
and Coleman appealed. The State argued. that Coleman's complaint
should not be heard because he failed to bring forth the aggravating
circumstance challenge in his first federal habeas action.
The Tenth Circuit held that Coleman acted reasonably in not chal-
lenging the aggravating circumstance instruction in his first habeas peti-
tion. The court stated that Coleman had no reason to previously raise
the claim because the courts had not given any indication the instruction
was unconstitutional. The court further held that even though the aggra-
vated circumstance instruction was unconstitutionally applied, it
amounted to harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rea-
soned that the remaining four aggravating circumstances were strongly
supported by the evidence. Consequently, the jury would have convicted
Coleman despite the unconstitutional jury instruction. The court also
held that an instruction which precluded the jury from considering sym-
pathy in determining its sentence did not impair Coleman's rights. Fur-
thermore, the State's discussion of the victim during closing argument at
the guilt stage did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The court,
therefore, affirmed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus.
United States v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158
Per Curiam
The United States appealed the denial of its motion brought pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. § 3148 to revoke defendant Cook's release pending his
appeal of a drug conviction.
The Tenth Circuit stated that when the government presented evi-
dence to establish probable cause that Cook had committed a felony
while on release, a rebuttable presumption arose. The presumption was
that no condition or combination of conditions would assure that Cook
would not pose a danger to the safety of any other person in the commu-
nity. Once probable cause is established, it is appropriate that the bur-
den rest on the defendant to come forward with evidence indicating that
this condusion is not warranted in his case. Once the burden of produc-
tion is met, the presumption does not disappear, but remains as a factor
for consideration in the ultimate release determination. Because the dis-
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trict court ignored the presumption after the government established
probable cause that Cook had committed a felony, the Tenth Circuit
held there was error. The case was reversed and remanded.
Fiumara v. O'Brien, 889 F.2d 254
Author: Judge Phillips, sitting by designation
Prior to the sentencing of plaintiff, Fiumara, on tax fraud and other
charges, the government prosecutor had properly brought Fiumara's al-
leged involvement in four murders to the attention of the Probation De-
partment. Fiumara was never charged or tried on these murders, but the
Parole Commission ("Commission") based its decision not to grant pa-
role in part on these allegations. The district court denied Fiumara's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that the Commission did not
abuse its discretion in denying parole. Fiumara appealed, claiming the
Commission's finding that he was responsible for four murders was arbi-
trary and capricious and that the murders should not have been used to
determine his eligibility for parole because the murders were uncon-
nected to the charges on which he Was convicted.
In upholding the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found
that the Commission is not limited to the consideration of formally adju-
dicated crimes and was entitled to consider evidence from prosecutors
and other parties when making its determination. The Commission
based its findings that Fiumara was responsible for the murders and that
there was a nexus between the murders and his conviction on informa-
tion contained in the sentencing hearing transcript and letters from two
prosecutors. The court held that these findings and the Commission's
denial of parole were neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of
discretion.
United States v. Goldbaum, 879 F.2d 811
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Goldbaum, was sentenced by the district court following
a guilty plea to the charge of unlawful escape from custody. Goldbaum's
sentence was increased pursuant to the United States Sentencing Com-
mission's Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") because he committed
the offense while under a criminal justice sentence. The district court
denied Goldbaum's motion declaring the Guidelines invalid on constitu-
tional grounds. On appeal, Goldbaum argued that "confinement" and
"imprisonment" are substantive elements of the crime of escape, and
should not also be considered as enhancement factors for the purposes
of section 4Al.1(d) or (e) of the Guidelines.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence, ruling that the Guidelines
must be interpreted as if they were a statute or a court rule; thus, the
court must follow their Clear, unambiguous language if there is no mani-
festation of contrary intent. The Guidelines unambiguously call for the
additional time if the offense was committed while under a criminal jus-
tice sentence. The court affirmed the sentence.
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United States v. Jack, 868 F.2d 1186
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Jack, was convicted of assault by striking, beating, or
wounding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(d), for which the penalty is a
fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six
months or both. The district court sentenced Jack to six months impris-
onment, suspended the entire sentence, and imposed a three-year pro-
bation under 18 U.S.C. § 3651, conditioned on Jack's residency for the
first six months in a community treatment center. On appeal, Jack al-
leged that the probation was an illegal split sentence, arguing that a split
sentence can be imposed only when an offense is punishable by more
than six months imprisonment.
Affirming the district court's probation order, the Tenth Circuit
ruled that Jack's residency in the community treatment center as a con-
dition of probation was not a split sentence. The court stated that trial
courts have wide latitude in establishing conditions for probation and
that the legislative history of section 3651 did not preclude imposing a
residency requirement as a condition.
United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 247
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Jordan, appealed his conviction for knowingly making a
false statement to an insured savings and loan to obtain a loan. On ap-
peal, Jordan asserted the following errors: (1) The district court errone-
ously instructed the jury on the republication of a false statement;
(2) the indictment was multiplicitous; (3) the district court abused its
discretion in ordering restitution as a condition of probation; and (4) the
district court abused its discretion in ordering that Jordan incur no new
debts as a condition of probation.
The Tenth Circuit found that Jordan failed to object at trial to the
jury instructions and that there was no "plain error" to justify raising the
issue for the first time on appeal. Second, the court found Jordan's
double jeopardy claim without merit. Jordan presented the fictitious
statement on four separate occasions, giving -rise to the four separate
counts. Third, the court held that actual damages from a crime for which
the defendant is convicted may be ordered as restitution when the
amount has been judicially determined pursuant to notice and hearing,
such as were afforded Jordan. Finally, the court dismissed Jordan's con-
tention that the prohibition of debt Was unnecessarily harsh and exces-
sive, stating that federal district courts are accorded broad discretion
and this condition served the goals of both rehabilitating the defendant
and protecting the public.
Lewis v. Martin, 880 F.2d 288
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Lewis, filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
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(1982), which was denied by the district court. Lewis daimed that the
Sentencing Reform Act, U.S.C. § 3551, et seq. (Supp. V 1987) ("Act"),
which abolished the Parole Commission, required the Commission to
set a release date for individuals in its jurisdiction the day before the
expiration of five years after the Act's effective date. Lewis argued that
his release must be within that guideline range, and that he was entitled
to immediate release because he was already incarcerated beyond that
range.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Act did not apply to prisoners
whose maximum sentence under the old law ran beyond five years from
the effective date of the Act, but who would be on parole five years from
the effective date. The Act applies only to persons who will be in prison
on November 1, 1992 (five years from the effective date of the Act). Be-
cause Lewis would be on parole on that date, the Act did not apply to
him, and he was not entitled to release within the guideline range.
United States v. Parker, 881 F.2d 945
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Parker, pled guilty to a single count of kidnapping. The
district court sentenced Parker to a prison term of seventy-five years and
ordered, under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) (1982), that he would become
eligible for parole after serving a minimum term of twenty-five years.
Parker moved for correction of the sentence, contending that his sen-
tence is illegal because the term he must serve before becoming eligible
for parole exceeds the legal maximum allowed under section 4205(a).
Parker appealed the district court's denial of this motion.
The Tenth Circuit noted that section 4205(a) provides that a pris-
oner automatically becomes eligible for release on parole after serving
one-third of his sentence, or ten years, whichever is less. The court then
construed section 4205(a) to apply to a prisoner who is serving time but
whose parole eligibility date was not set by the sentencing court. Since
the district court set Parker's parole eligibility date at the time of sen-
tencing, section 4205(b)(1) applies. That subsection allows the trial
judge to avoid the operation of subsection (a)'s automatic eligibility pro-
vision by designating a parole eligibility term of not more than one-third
of the maximum sentence imposed. The court held that the parole eligi-
bility term ordered by the district court complied with 18 U.S.C. § 4205
and affirmed the sentence.
United States v. Reber, 876 F.2d 81
Author: Judge Seymour
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's order revoking de-
fendant Reber's probation finding that the district court had abused its
discretion. The district court stated as grounds for its order that Reber
had failed provide the court with financial information for purposes of
determining restitution to Reber's victims. The Tenth Circuit found no
evidence supporting this allegation of failure to cooperate and re-
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manded the case with instructions to release Reber under the terms of
the original order of probation.
United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253
Author: Judge Logan
Prior to her conviction, defendant Shorteeth had entered into a
written plea agreement which read in part "no separate federal prosecu-
tions will be instituted against [defendant] ... for conduct and acts com-
mitted by her related to information she provides the Government
during... debriefings." The district court, when determining her sen-
tence, considered information that Shorteeth disclosed in the course of
cooperation with the government. Shorteeth appealed from the
sentence.
In a de novo review, the Tenth Circuit held that Federal Sentencing
Guidelines § lB1.8 require a plea agreement to specifically mention the
court's ability to consider defendant's disclosures during debriefing in
calculating the appropriate sentencing range before the court may do
so. The statement in Shorteeth's plea agreement that "[t]here are no
agreements whatsoever regarding what sentence your client will or
should receive" was an insufficient disclosure. The sentence was vacated
and remanded.
United States v. Vance, 868 F.2d 1167
Author: Judge Tacha
Dissent: Judge Logan
Defendant, Vance, pleaded guilty to two of six counts of bank fraud
and received a restitution order for the total losses to two -banks. On
appeal, Vance argued that the restitution should be limited to the
amounts directly associated with the two counts of the indictment to
which he pleaded guilty.
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the restitution order, found no abuse
of discretion by the district court when it ordered restitution for the en-
tire amount Vance obtained in his fraudulent scheme. The court con-
cluded that when the indictment charged a fraudulent scheme, the
restitution order may encompass all losses related to the scheme and
need not be limited to those associated with the counts to which the
defendant pleaded guilty. Therefore, the court held that the scheme
furthered by Vance's separate acts of failing to report sales in violation
of agreements with the banks could be treated as a unitary offense to
determine restitution under the Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (re-
pealed effective November 1, 1987). The court further held that the dis-
trict court's assumed failure to inform Vance of the possibility of
restitution was harmless error because Vance's attorney had informed
him of the possibility.
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United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Woods, appealed the denial of credit on his prison sen-
tence for time spent on bond in a "halfway house." Woods argued that
(1) 18 U.S.C. § 3585 entitled him to credit for pre-sentence custody in a
conditional release environment, and (2) the denial of credit violated his
constitutional right to equal protection.
The Tenth Circuit held that Woods was not entitled to pre-sentence
credit because under 18 U.S.C. § 3585 credit is given only when there is
full physical incarceration. Although Woods resided in a halfway house,
this did not equal the deprivation of liberty experienced by a person
detained in jail. The court further held that Woods was not deprived of
equal protection because pre-sentence and post-sentence residents at a
halfway house are not similarily situated; post-sentence residents are
serving their sentences whereas pre-sentence residents are only on con-
ditional release to assure their presence at trial and sentencing. The dis-
trict court's decision was, therefore, affirmed.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Brothers v. Custis, 886 F.2d 1282
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Brothers, brought a Bivens action (Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)) against
the defendants seeking damages for alleged interference with the exer-
cise of Brothers's first amendment rights. Brothers was denied a perma-
nent staff position at the Veterans Administration Medical Center,
allegedly in retaliation for her "whistle-blowing" activities regarding
certain practices at the medical center. The defendants appealed the
jury verdict in favor of Brothers.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that a Bivens action was not
a remedy available to Brothers. Brothers had the right to petition the
Office of the Special Counsel in connection with her claim that she was
denied permanent employment in violation of her constitutional rights.
The court stated that it, along with other courts; is reading broadly
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) by cutting back significantly on
the availability of Bivens actions.
Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Ebert, and other former employees appealed a decision of
the district court finding in favor of their employer, defendant Lamar
Truck Plaza. The court found that there was (1) no discriminatory sexual
harassment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et. seq.; and (2) no viola-
tion of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The district court found
that the evidence presented of sexual harassment was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and to create
an abusive working environment. The issue on appeal was whether the
critical findings of the district court were dearly erroneous.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's findings were not
clearly erroneous. The court also found the district court's conclusion
that the evidence supporting the employer's pay scale demonstrated non
pretextual legitimate business reasons was not clearly erroneous.
Jackson v. Pool Mortgage Co., 868 F.2d 1178
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Jackson, brought suit against defendant, Harmon, for sex-
ual and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The jury awarded
actual and punitive damages. The district court affirmed the judgment
forJackson, but vacated the award of punitive damages. On appeal, Har-
mon argued that the actual damages awarded were excessive as a matter
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of law because they exceeded the limits of back pay liability applicable
under Tide VII and section 1981. In a cross-appeal, Jackson asserted
that the district court erred in vacating the jury's punitive damage
award.
The Tenth Circuit held that under section 1981, actual damages are
not limited solely to back pay and that damages for pain, suffering, and
physical and emotional distress are allowed. The court found sufficient
evidence in the record for physical and emotional damages in addition
to back-pay and affirmed the total award. On the punitive damages issue,
the court noted that even though the district court had inappropriately
relied on Oklahoma law rather than federal standards to determine pu-
nitive damages, the district court's decision to vacate the punitive dam-
ages was appropriate.
Pitts v. Board of Education, 869 F.2d 555
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Board of Education, passed a resolution not to renew
plaintiff's, Pitts, contract as a tenured teacher. Pitts indicated that he
wished to exercise his right to a pretermination hearing but proceeded
to file suit prior to the hearing. Consequently, Pitts waived his right to a
pretermination hearing, and the Board finalized its determination not to
renew the contract. Pitts brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 al-
leging his property and liberty interests were violated when he was dis-
charged without due process. The district court granted summary
judgment, and Pitts appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to dismiss the
complaint. The court found that Kansas law provided adequate adminis-
trative due process in tenured teacher dismissal proceedings. By filing
suit before exhausting these procedures, Pitts waived the right to argue
that he was denied due process.
Smith v. Department of Human Services, 876 F.2d 832
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Smith's, employment was terminated by defendant Depart-
ment of Human Services ("DHS") when he was 59 years of age. There-
after, Smith filed a state court action under the Age Discrimination
Employment Act ("ADEA"), and was awarded reinstatement of his for-
mer position, all back pay, and benefits accruing since his discharge.
Smith's federal district court action prayed for liquidated damages,
available under ADEA if the evidence showed willfulness by the defend-
ant employer. Smith died and his widow was substituted as plaintiff. The
district court ruled in favor of the DHS.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not reach the issue of willfulness.
Instead, it held that Smith's action for liquidated damages was penal,
such that it does not survive Smith's death. Under federal common law
(barring a statutory expression to the contrary), a suit for damages
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which is penal in nature will not survive the plaintiff's death. Although
the ADEA is not primarily a penal statute, the damages prayed for in this
case were penal. The court remanded to the district court for dismissal.
Wall v. United States, 871 F.2d 1540
Author: Judge McWilliams
Dissent: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Wall, filed an action in district court based on age discrimi-
nation and handicap discrimination following termination of his employ-
ment from the Department of Health and Human Services
("Department"). Wall sought review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board's ("Board") holding that Wall "voluntarily" left his employment
with the Department. The Board dismissed Wall's claim for lack ofjuris-
diction because voluntary retirement is not an adverse action which is
appealable. Wall appealed the district court's subsequent dismissal of
his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit found that Wall's voluntary retirement gave the
court exclusive jurisdiction to review the Board's ruling, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. §§ 7702-7703(b)(1)-(2). Affirming the decree, the court found
that the district court properly construed the statutes, and properly dis-




Environmental Defense Fund v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 866 F.2d
1263
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF"), challenged defen-
dant, Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC"), order which estab-
lished criteria regulating mill tailings at active uranium and thorium mill
sites. EDF argued that the-NRC lacked authority to issue a license which
does not comply with Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") stan-
dards. Alternatively, EDF argued that the EPA's concurrence was neces-
sary in order to validate such an issued license.
The Tenth Circuit found that the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA")
§ 84(c) permits the NRC to approve licensee-proposed site-specific al-
ternatives which are less stringent than EPA standards,, when the con-
trary is not practicable because of language in 84(c) allowing proposed
alternatives when such are "equivalent to, to the extent practica-
ble... level which would be achieved" by Commission standards and
those of the EPA.
In affirming the NRC's order, the court held that the AEA allows
the NRC to approve licenses containing site-specific alternatives to the
EPA's standards. Moreover, the court stated that such power exists
when literal compliance with such standards is not practicable, and that
EPA's concurrence is not necessary in order for NRC's approval of such
licenses.
Quivera Mining Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 866 F.2d 1246
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Quivera, challenged regulations promulgated in 1985 by
defendant, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"). These regula-
tions established standards to be followed by the NRC in licensing ura-
nium mills and mill tailing sites.
Finding that the NRC's cost determinations bore a reasonable
relationship to the benefits under the guidelines proposed, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) the NRC conducted cost-benefit ra-
tionalization before promulgating the criteria of 1980; (2) the revised
criteria were adequately supported by cost-benefit analysis; (3) the statu-
tory "site-specific flexibility" requirement for individual licensing deci-
sions was met; (4) the thorium criteria were adequately supported by
cost-benefit analysis; (5) the promulgation of the thorium criteria was
properly conducted as rulemaking; (6) criterion which established a min-
imum charge to cover the costs of long-term surveillance of each tailing
site was a proper implementation of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radia-
tion Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(x) (1978).

EVIDENCE
United States v. Bernard, 877 F.2d 1463
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Bernard, was convicted of conspiracy and bank fraud.
He was also convicted of making false entries as a bank officer. Bernard
appealed, asserting that the district court erred in permitting his attor-
ney to testify, and in determining that he had waived his attorney-client
privilege.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Bernard sacrificed his at-
torney-dient privilege by voluntarily disclosing confidential communica-
tions to a nonparty in an effort to induce the nonparty into action. The
court stated that the attorney-dient privilege need not be allowed when
the party claiming it is attempting to utilize it in a manner that is incon-
sistent with the privilege.
Moreover, under Fed. R. Evid. 103, an error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right is affected. The court concluded that no substantial right was af-
fected by the attorney's testimony, and the assertion of error was with-
out merit.
Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032
Author: Judge Brorby
Plaintiff, Boren, brought this action against his plant manager, de-
fendant, Sable. Boren appealed ajury verdict in favor of Sable, contend-
ing that the district court erred in finding statements made by Boren's
co-workers inadmissible hearsay.
Affirming the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that the
co-workers' statements did not qualify as admissions of a party-oppo-
nent under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (d). Application of Rule 801(d) (2) (d)
requires a three-part showing. First, the existence of the employment
relationship must be established independent of the declarant's state-
ment. Second, the statement must be made during the existence of the
declarant's agency or employment. Third, the statement must concern a
matter within the scope of declarant's employment. Where a party-op-
ponent controls the operations of the corporate employer and controls
the daily tasks of the declarant, an agency relationship is established for
purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(d). Boren failed to establish that such con-
trol existed.
United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Eufracio-Torres ("Torres"), appealed his convictions
for transporting illegal aliens, claiming the district court erred in admit-
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ting into evidence deposition testimony of material witnesses and
Torres's prior convictions for illegal entry into the United States.
The Tenth Circuit found that the witnesses' fifth amendment rights
against being detained when charged with no crimes outweighed
Torres's sixth amendment right to confrontation. Finding the govern-
ment's efforts to produce the witnesses "reasonable" and in "good
faith," the court affirmed that the witnesses were "unavailable" for trial
under Fed. R. Evid. 804(a). Thus, the district court properly admitted
the deposition testimony.
The court further held that the introduction of evidence regarding
Torres's prior convictions was proper for the limited purpose of show-
ing his knowledge of the aliens' illegal presence pursuant to Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b). The court noted that the limiting instructions to the jury
prevented undue prejudice.
Head v. Lithonia Corporation, 881 F.2d 941
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Lithonia Corporation ("Lithonia"), appealed from a
judgment on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, Head. Lithonia claimed
that the district court abused its discretion in permitting Head's expert
to testify in an area outside his expertise, and in admitting evidence
based on data that is not reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
The Tenth Circuit found that the record did not sufficiently estab-
lish the trustworthiness of certain medical testing (topographical brain
mapping), or its acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Thus,
the court held, the district court abused its discretion in failing to ad-
dress Lithonia's objection to the introduction of testimony based on
topographical brain mapping without a proper foundation. The court
vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 319
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Marsee, brought a products liability action against defend-
ant, United States Tobacco Company ("Tobacco"), a manufacturer of
snuff tobacco products. Marsee initiated the action on behalf of dece-
dent who died of oral cancer. The district court held for Tobacco and
Marsee appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the verdict. It ruled that: (1) a video-
taped deposition of a severely disfigured cancer patient was overly prej-
udicial and inadmissible in the absence of evidence that the witness' oral
cancer was in fact caused by the use of snuff, (2) the district court's hear-
say exclusion of certain cases not alluded to in the doctor's direct testi-
mony, but used as a basis for his opinions, was not sufficiently erroneous
to set aside the jury verdict in favor of the defendant; (3) rebuttal testi-
mony of the decedent's physicians, as well as scientific charts, were
properly excluded as needlessly cumulative; (4) reports published by
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non-governmental health agencies were properly excluded as repetitive;
and (5) articles introduced by Tobacco to show that decedent had notice
of the dangers of tobacco products were properly admitted into
evidence.
New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 888 F.2d 646
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, New England Mutual Life Insurance Company ("New Eng-
land"), sought a declaratory judgment that defendant, Anderson, had
fraudulently procured an insurance policy. New England attempted to
enter into evidence a newspaper article in which Anderson had made
certain admissions. The district court refused entry of the article, hold-
ing that it represented inadmissible hearsay. New England appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the article was hearsay because the ad-
missions were actually statements of a third-party reporter who was un-
available for cross-examination and the statements were offered to
prove the truth of the matters asserted. The court further held that
newspaper articles do not inherently satisfy any of the exceptions or ex-
clusions to the hearsay rule. The article does not rise to the level of an
adoptive admission under Fed. R. Evid. § 801(d)(2) merely because An-
derson failed to dispute, contradict, or protest its contents. Newspaper
articles are also not self-authenticating under Fed. R. Evid. § 902(6).
Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250
Author: Judge Seymour
During Plaintiff, Nichols' criminal trial, two of the State's witnesses
referred to Nichols' prior incarceration despite the judge's orders to
avoid such testimony. In district court, Nichols alleged that references to
prior convictions violated his right to due process, fair trial, and his due
process right to an impartial judge. The district court dismissed with
prejudice Nichols' petition for a writ of habeas corpus and Nichols ap-
pealed. The State argued, however, that Nichols' habeas corpus petition
should not be heard because Nichols had not presented his due process
challenge in state court and, thus, had not exhausted state remedies.
The Tenth Circuit found that Nichols had cited the fifth amendment
due process clause as a basis for his claim to the state court. Conse-
quently, Nichols exhausted his state remedies. The court also held that
Nichols' due process rights were not denied because references to Nich-
ols' past convictions were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mis-
trial. Further due process was afforded Nichols when the judge offered
to give a cautionary instruction to the jury. Also, the court stated that
evidence of prior convictions could have been admitted for purposes of
impeachment when Nichols took the stand. Nichols, therefore, did not
suffer prejudice of a constitutional dimension. The court also held that
Nichols was not denied due process simply because the sentencing
judge had knowledge of Nichols' past convictions. The court stated
there was no evidence of "actual bias" or "likelihood of bias or appear-
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ance of bias" on the part of the sentencing judge. The order of the dis-
trict court dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed.
United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Porter, appealed his conviction of bank burglary, claim-
ing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting certain bad
acts evidence and by refusing to admit certain hearsay testimony. Porter
also alleged that the district court improperly gave an Allen instruction
and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's admission of bad
acts evidence without specifically articulating the grounds was not an
abuse of discretion because its purpose was apparent from the record.
The district court's exclusion of a hearsay statement was permissible be-
cause the statement failed to satisfy the trustworthiness rationale of Fed.
R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The court found that the Allen instruction was not
unduly coercive, but was a proper exercise of the judge's duty to guide
the jury. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence in the
record to support the jury's verdict. The judgment was affirmed.
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Asbuty v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276
Author: Judge Parker
Defendants, Brougham and Chauvin, appealed ajury verdict award-
ing compensatory and punitive damages to plaintiff, Asbury. Asbury, a
minority, brought a fair housing action against Brougham and Chauvin
after being denied the opportunity to rent, inspect, or negotiate thee
rental of a townhouse or apartment at Brougham Estates, even though
there were vacancies.
In affirming the district court's denial of Brougham's motion for a
new trial, the Tenth Circuit held that there was substantial evidentiary
support and a reasonable basis for the jury's award of both compensa-
tory and punitive damages.

INDIAN LAW
Akers v. Hodel, 871 F.2d 924
Author: Judge Anderson
Tribal affiliations of Victor Akers, a deceased Indian with both
Osage and Pawnee property interests bequeathed to his wife and two
grown children, subjected Akers' will to the approval of the defendant
Hodel, the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary"). After a hearing on
the will, an Osage field solicitor found that Akers' refusal to acknowl-
edge an illegitimate son as his child was the result of an insane delusion
that materially affected the terms of. the will. When the southwest re-
gional solicitor of the Interior Department, acting for the Secretary, up-
held the finding, the plaintiffs, Akers' children and widow (the "Akers"),
sought reversal in federal court. The Akers asserted that because Victor
Akers did not meet the legal definition of an Osage Indian, the Osage
Agency did not havejurisdiction over his will. The Akers argued alterna-
tively that if jurisdiction was proper, then the Secretary erred in finding
Akers to be under an insane delusion which. affected the terms of his
will. The district court accepted the magistrate's recommendations that
the Secretary's actions be upheld.
In addressing the issue of the appropriate agency to exercise the
Secretary's jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit -considered whether Victor
Akers was an Osage or a Pawnee Indian. The court reviewed original
federal law regulating the property and affairs of Osage Indians and its
amendments, and found neither legal error in the Osage Agency inter-
pretation of the term Osage Indian nor factual error in the determina-
tion that Victor Akers fit the legal definition. The court, however, did
hold that the Secretary's finding of insane delusion was both legally er-
roneous and against the dear weight of the evidence. The court found
that Akers expressed a clear intention to exclude any others from a
share of his property. The court reversed the district court's decision.




Plaintiff, Cotton Petroleum Corporation, an oil and gas lessee with a
well on restricted Indian allotment land, sought review of an administra-
tive rejection of a proposed communitization agreement. The district
court granted summary judgment for the allotted owners and Cotton
appealed.
Reversing and remanding to the district court, the Tenth Circuit
held that the Secretary of the Interior's rejection of the communitization
agreement was arbitrary and capricious where theSecretary failed to dis-
cuss or analyze all of the relevant factors mandated under his own guide-
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lines, did not explain his failure to do so, and inconsistently awarded
allotted owners benefits of the communitization agreement which he
otherwise rejected.
In noting that unitization is a conservation measure which benefits
both lessor and lessee and tends to prevent waste of a natural resource,
the court concluded that while rejection of the communitization agree-
ment and termination of the lease might serve the economic "best inter-
ests" of the allotted owners by allowing them to renegotiate their lease
for a greater amount, it ignored the possible adverse effect the decision
might have on the remaining Indian land owners in relation to long-
term mineral development.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937
Author: Judge McKay
Dissent: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
successfully brought suit to enforce an administrative subpoenea duces
tecum directing defendant, Cherokee Nation, to produce documents
pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"). The Cherokee Nation appealed, maintaining that tribal sov-
ereign immunity precluded EEOC jurisdiction absent specific congres-
sional intent to bring tribes under ADEA coverage.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's enforcement of the
subpoena, asserting that the district court overlooked the fact that nor-
mal rules of construction do not apply when Indian treaty rights or mat-
ters involving Indians are at issue. Because of ambiguity and no dear
indication of congressional intent to abrogate Indian sovereignty rights,
the court held that the special canons of construction were to be applied
to the benefit of Indian interests.
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Adams-Arapahoe Joint School District v. Continental Insurance Co., 891 F.2d
772
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Continental Insurance Company ("Continental"), ap-
pealed the district court's decision that it was liable under an insurance
policy for expenses incurred after the partial collapse of the school's
roof.
The Tenth Circuit held that losses from defective design or con-
struction are risks of physical peril and are covered under all-risk poli-
cies if they are fortuitous and neither party expected them. The court
would not consider Continental's reference to a latent defect exclusion
on appeal because Continental did not raise the issue adequately in the
district court or preserve it for appeal. Further, the court did consider
the issue of whether the corrosion exclusion applied to only normal or
natural corrosion. Consequently, the court held that corrosion, in an all-
risk policy, refers to all corrosion, however it occurred. The court also
considered, however, the exclusion clause in the policy and ruled that
the corrosion exclusion applied only to naturally occurring corrosion,
affirming the district court's decision that if the loss were fortuitous, it
was covered. In addition, the court considered the jury instructions
given by the district court. The court stated that the substance of jury
instructions in a diversity case is a matter of state law, but the question
of whether an error is harmless is one of federal law. The court held that
the instruction stating that Continental had the burden of proving the
affirmative defense that Adams-Arapahoe had previous knowledge of
the defect was prejudicial error. Accordingly, the court reversed and re-
manded the case.
Kelley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 882 F.2d 453
Author: Judge Wright, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Kelley, filed suit against Sears, Roebuck & Company
("Sears"), and Allstate Life Insurance Company ("Allstate"), for bad
faith handling of his Worker's Compensation and long term disability
claims. A jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages against the
defendants. Kelley's claims were based on Colorado's common law of
bad faith insurance practices.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment against Allstate, holding
that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") pre-
empted Kelley's cause of action. Colorado's common law of bad faith
did not "regulate' insurance, and thereby save the claim from preemp-
tiori pursuant to 29 U.S.C. sec.1 144(b) (2) (A); because it neither spread
policy-holder risk nor controlled substantive insurance contract terms.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Moreover, the bad faith law conflicts with ERISA's exclusive civil en-
forcement provisions.
The court affirmed the finding of liability against Sears, but granted
a new trial on the issue of damages. Since the defendants engaged in
separate acts of bad faith, the jury's failure to apportion compensatory
damages required that Sears be granted a new trial on that issue. The
court based its reversal of the punitive award against Sears on three fac-
tors: (1) insufficient evidence to support a finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, of Sears' evil intent or reckless disregard for Kelley's rights; (2)
the uncertainty of the relationship between punitive damages and the
undetermined actual damages; and (3) the dramatic size of the award,
suggesting jury passion and prejudice. The court also reversed and re-
manded the award of prejudgment interest.
Oakley v. City of Longmont, 890 F.2d 1128
Author: Judge Moore
After termination by defendant City of Longmont ("City"), plaintiff
Oakley elected to continue his group health insurance for eighteen
months by maintaining the premium payments himself. The City, how-
ever, refused coverage because Oakley was covered under his wife's pre-
existing group plan. The district court, construing 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-
2(2)(D)(i), granted the City's motion for summary judgment. Oakley
appealed.
Reversing the district court ruling, the Tenth Circuit-held that 42
U.S.C. § 300bb-2(2)(D)(i) did not apply. That provision states that con-
tinuation coverage ends on the date "the qualified beneficiary first be-
comes, after the date of election-(i) covered under any other group
health plan (as an employee or otherwise) .... ." The plain meaning of
this subsection cannot be construed to include a spouse's preexisting
group plan as a condition to terminate continuation coverage. This
holding was premised on a contemporaneous congressional history and
a reading of the statute as a whole.
Phico Insurance Co. v. Providers Insurance Co., 888 F.2d 663
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, Phico Insurance Company ("Phico"), and defendant, Prov-
iders Insurance Company ("Providers"), both provide professional lia-
bility insurance to the University of Kansas Medical Center ("Center").
A negligence suit was filed against the Center, and the Center subse-
quently filed a written claim with Phico and an oral claim with Providers.
Phico and Providers both agreed to contribute $100,000 toward the
claim. Both also agreed, however, that if one company was determined
to have exclusive coverage, that company would reimburse the other. In
this declaratory judgment action, the district court ruled that Phico had
standing to bring an indemnity action against Providers. The district
court also determined, however, that Phico's policy covered the claim
and, therefore, summary judgment for Providers was warranted. The
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district court reasoned that no written notice was received by Providers
as required in its policy. The issue on appeal was which of the two insur-
ance companies should be responsible for providing the primary cover-
age of $200,'000 to the Center.
The Tenth Circuit held that Phico had standing to bring an indem-
nity action against Providers, even though Phico was not a party to the
insurance contract between Providers and the Center. The court further
held that the Center's failure to give written notice to Providers did not
preclude coverage. The court reasoned that there was no express forfei-
ture clause, the Center gave adequate oral notice to Providers, and Prov-
iders acted on this notice by undertaking an investigation. Thus, the
court concluded that Providers had a duty to show actual prejudice for
denial of coverage and, therefore, reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Rush v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 891 F.2d 267
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Ray and Shellie Rush, (the "Rushes"), ,Oklahoma resi-
dents, brought an action against defendant, Travelers Indemnity Com-
pany, ("Travelers"). The Rushes attempted to recover benefits under
the uninsured motorist coverage included in their policy, after Shellie
Rush was inyolved in an Arkansas car accident. The insurance policy was
issued and executed in Oklahoma. The district court found that the
terms of the policy required application of Arkansas' $25,000 minimum
requirement for uninsured motorist coverage, rather than Oklahoma's
$10,000 requirement. Travelers appealed, arguing that an endorsement
in the policy replaced the original provision which required application
of Arkansas' requirement. The district court also determined that the
Rushes could not increase their recovery by "stacking" their coverage,
as permitted by Oklahoma law. Consequently, the Rushes appealed, ar-
guing that while Arkansas law governed the dollar amount to be as-
signed to their uninsured motorist coverage, Oklahoma law governed
the interpretation of their policy as a whole. Therefore, the Rushes con-
tended that stacking should be permitted.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court was correct in inter-
preting the terms of the insurance policy to require application of Ar-
kansas' higher minimum coverage for uninsured vehicles. The court
reasoned that the endorsement did not replace the policy's original lan-
guage and could be read cooperatively with it. The court held, however,
that the district court erred whenit determined that language in the pol-
icy required that it be interpreted as a whole under Arkansas law. The
policy's language did not constitute a "specific manifestation" of the
parties intent to be bound by the laws of a particular jurisdiction. The




Boehm v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiffs, power company linemen, sought overtime compensation
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 for
time spent "on call." The linemen argued that they should be paid over-
time compensation twenty-four hours a day (in excess of their base forty
hours per week) because the defendant power company required them
to be available on a standby basis to work during emergencies. The dis-
trict court entered a directed verdict against certain plaintiffs and a jury
verdict for others.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the linemen were not enti-
tled to overtime compensation for the time they spent "on call." The
court concluded that the power company linemen were free to leave the
employer's premises. They were also free to utilize their off-duty time as
they wished, provided they could be contacted and report for work one-
third of the time that they were so called. The court determined that
under these conditions, overtime compensation was not required under
the FLSA. The decision of the district court was affirmed in part, re-
versed in part and remanded.
Delling v. National Labor Relations Board, 869 F.2d 1397
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant, Delling, owned and operated several grocery stores.
Unionization attempts were made at one of the stores. General manage-
ment ordered Kelley, a store manager, to fire five employees because
they had signed union cards. Kelley did so, and was later ordered to
falsify termination slips giving pretextual reasons for the firings after
one of the employees filed an unfair labor practice. Kelley refused to do
so, and he was subsequently fired. Plaintiff, National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB"), ordered Kelley's reinstatement, and Delling appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the NLRB's decision. Delling's argument
that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to supervisory em-
ployees was found to be incorrect in situations such as this. Where the
termination of a supervisory employee directly interferes with the rights
of nonsupervisory employees, the termination is unlawful. If Kelley had
written the termination slips with the pretextual reasons on them, for
example, he would have directly affected the fired employees' rights in
their efforts to seek redress under the law.
Dole v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 891 F.2d 1495
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Secretary of Labor ("Dole"), appealed a decision of the Occu-
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pational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHA"). Dole ar-
gued that OSHA erred in vacating her citation of CF&I Steel
Corporation ("CF&I"), for violating regulations regarding employee ex-
posure to coke oven emissions. The Tenth Circuit found that require-
ments of the Occupational Safety and Health Act could reasonably be
interpreted more than one way. The court held that when Dole and
OSHA have conflicting interpretations of statutes, deference will be
given to OSHA, if its interpretation is reasonable. The court explained
that normally an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute is
entitled to considerable deference and should be disturbed only if un-
reasonable. Moreover, the court examined legislative history and de-
cided that Congress had reserved adjudicative power for OSHA and
prosecutorial power for the Secretary, Dole. The court stressed that
Dole's regulatory interpretations should be given substantial weight by
OSHA and contravened only if dearly wrong or ambiguous.
Forest Products Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 888 F.2d 72
Author: Judge Baldock
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") held that Forest Prod-
ucts Company ("Forest") violated the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") by refusing to match funds withheld from certain employees'
wages under its Christmas savings program because those employees
were engaged in an economic strike on the program's disbursement
date. Forest petitioned for review of the NLRB's decision and order.
The Tenth Circuit held that the NLRB's decision was not supported
by substantial evidence. Specifically, the court held that Forest did not
violate the NLRA because it presented a "legitimate and substantial
business justification" for withholding the matching funds. By retaining
the strikers' contributions to the fund, Forest maintained its eligibility
for matching funds until the distribution date. The court further held
that Forest's withholding of the funds was not "inherently destructive of
employee interests." The court stated that there was insufficient evi-
dence to prove that Forest hindered the union's bargaining position or
its members' rights. The court set aside the NLRB's decision since the
NLRB failed to prove anti-union intent.
Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 882 F.2d 461
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiffs, Griess and Pate, brought suit alleging retaliatory dis-
charge by defendant, Consolidated Freightways ("CF"). The district
court granted CF's motion for summaryjudgment, holding that the Wy-
oming Supreme Court would not recognize a cause of action for retalia-
tory discharge on two grounds: (1) federal labor law, 29 U.S.C. § 185,
preempted the state law claim, and (2) the collective bargaining agree-
ment supplied plaintiffs with a remedy. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found that plaintiffs' state retaliatory discharge
claim again CF was not preempted by 29 U.S.C. § 185. The Wyoming
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Supreme Court affirmed that Wyoming recognizes the tort of retaliatory
discharge where, as here, the employee is not covered by the collective
bargaining agreement. Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs must
be permitted to pursue their retaliatory discharge claim against CF in
the district court. The court reversed and remanded to the district
court.
Harey v. United Transportation Union, 878 F.2d 1235
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiffs ("Harvey"), appealed the district court's findings regard-
ing the legality of defendants', Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway
Company's ("Railway"), seniority system. Specifically, Harvey claimed
that collateral estoppel prevented the Railway from relitigating the is-
sue. Harvey also appealed arguing that the district court used erroneous
legal standards in determining whether the seniority system was legal.
The Tenth Circuit previously determined that Harvey's issue preclusion
claim was never raised formally until over a year after trial, which was
simply too late. The court stated that the notice requirement was espe-
dally important here due to the use of offensive issue preclusion. More-
over, the court found that the district court made dear legal errors. In
particular, the district court erred in its application of four factors: (1)
whether the seniority system discouraged employees equally from trans-
ferring between seniority units; (2) whether the seniority units are in the
same bargaining units; (3) whether the seniority system had its genesis
in racial discrimination; (4) whether the seniority system was negotiated
and whether it has been maintained free from any illegal purpose. In
addition, the district court failed to consider relevant evidence outside
the four factors. The court reiterated the importance of considering the
totality of circumstances, even if they are not relevant to the four factors.
International Association of Fire Fighters Local 2203 v. West Adams County
Fire Protection District, 877 F.2d 814
Author: Judge O'Connor District
The plaintiff, International Association of Fire Fighters Local 2203
("Local 2203"), brought an action against the defendant, West Adams
County Fire Protection District ("District"), seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the District was wrongfully providing its employees with com-
pensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay. Local 2203 argued that the
District was in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (1985). The district court entered sum-
mary judgment for Local 2203, and the District appealed. The Tenth
Circuit held that the phrase "employees not covered," contained in the
FLSA and allowing compensatory time only, applies to employees who
do not have designated representatives. It does not apply to situations
where the employer refuses to recognize the designated representative.
The court further held that the FLSA provision which precludes employ-
ers from substituting compensatory time off for overtime pay unless the
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substitution is pursuant to an agreement between the employer and em-
ployee representative, does not violate the tenth amendment. Attorney
fees were not granted because no appellate court had previously inter-
preted section 207 and the District's appeal was reasonable. The district
court's decision was affirmed.
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 890 F.2d 1573
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Lear Siegler, Inc. ("Lear"), sought review of a National
Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB"), decision. The NLRB held that Lear
violated sections 8 (a) (1) and 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (the "Act"), by unilaterally modifying the terms
of employment under two collective bargaining agreements. In addition,
the NLRB found that Lear violated the Act by: (1)threatening to replace
employees if they participated in a strike; (2)refusing to provide infor-
mation to the unions; and (3)threatening an employee regarding his
union activities.
The Tenth Circuit found that the record supported the NLRB's
conclusion regarding the first contract. The court found enough evi-
dence showing that Lear insisted to impasse on a decrease in the total
wage package under one contract where the contract's reopener provi-
sion was limited to negotiating a wage increase. Lear's subsequent uni-
lateral modification of this contract was, therefore, unlawful. The court
also found substantial evidence to support the NLRB's finding that:
(1)Lear threatened reprisals against workers who participated in a legal
strike; (2)refused, without adequate justification, to supply information
to the unions; and (3)threatened to discharge an employee if he filed a
grievance. The court did not find, however, support in the record for the
NLRB's conclusion regarding the second contract. In essence, there
was no evidence demonstrating that an impasse had been caused by
Lear's insistence on renegotiating terms not included in the contract's
reopener provision. Lear was entitled to make a proposal outside the
terms of the reopener clause, as long as it did not insist to impasse upon
inclusion of the proposal in the contract. The court concluded that the
impasse was due entirely to Lear's insistence on negotiating a decrease
in the total wage package, which was consistent with the reopener clause
of the contract. Therefore, upon reaching an impasse unilaterally, Lear
was entitled to adopt the proposed provision. Lear was not entitled,
however, to modify terms outside the scope of the reopener clause. The
court granted in part the NLRB's petition for enforcement of its order.




Plaintiff filed a grievance with defendant, Litvak Packing Company
("Litvak") on behalf of an employee who had been fired on the day fol-
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lowing his failure to perform part of his job. Pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement, the case was heard before an arbitrator, who
ruled in favor of the employee and rescinded the discharge. The district
court affirmed the arbitrator's award and Litvak appealed.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision of the district court, refusing
to vacate the award because, where the parties have contracted for an
arbitrator to resolve their disputes and the award draws its essence from
such collective bargaining agreement, the courts cannot substitute their
interpretation of the contract for the arbitrator's interpretation.
Manders v. Department of Mental Health, 875 F.2d 263
Author: Judge O'Connor, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Manders, a female state employee, appealed the district
court's ruling concerning three separate actions filed under section 1983
and Title VII. The actions were filed against Manders' supervisor, em-
ployer, and state agency for sexual harassment by the supervisor. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the supervisor in
his individual capacity. The court reasoned that Manders failed to estab-
lish evidence of sexual harassment within the two year statute of limita-
tion period for section 1983 claims. The district court also dismissed
Manders' Title VII sexual harassment claims for failure to state a claim.
Moreover, the district court denied Manders' request for attorney's fees
generated when she pursued her complaint internally.
In affirming the district court ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that
Manders' section 1983 sexual harassment claims were barred by the ap-
plicable two year statute of limitations. The court reasoned that
Manders conceded that the supervisor's advances ended before the ap-
plicable date. Furthermore, no evidence was presented to establish sex-
ual harassment within the applicable two year period. The court ruled
Manders' complaint failed to state a claim of sexual harassment under
Title VII because compensatory damages were pled, and Tide VII pro-
vides for equitable remedies only. The court found that the internal
grievance procedure was an optional proceeding and not a prerequisite
to the plaintiff pursuing a Tide VII court action. Consequently, it was
not covered by the attorney's fee provision of the statute.
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers' Union v. Amoco Oil Co., 885 F.2d 697
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendant, Amoco Oil Company ("Amoco"), unilaterally imple-
mented an employee drug-testing program (with the propensity for "at-
will" management testing for low drug and alcohol levels). Plaintiff, Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers' Union, was granted an injunction by the
district court pending the outcome of the arbitration remedy which was
prescribed in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Amoco's
claim on appeal was that the Norris La Guardia Act forbids such injunc-
tions and, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant it.
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Affirming the district court decision, the Tenth Circuit held that this
case falls within the ambit of a narrow exception to the Norris La
Guardia Act because this employer breach of the collective bargaining
agreement threatened the very process of arbitration itself. Injunctions
in such instances are proper when (1) the ordinary principles of equity
support the granting of the injunction; (2) the moving party will suffer
irreparable injury in the absence of injunction and the movant has a
probable chance for success in arbitration; (3) the balance of hardship
on the parties favors granting the injunction; and (4) the labor contract
prescribes mandatory arbitration and the matter in dispute is the real
issue at hand and not a collateral one.
St. Anthony Hospital Systems, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 884
F.2d 518
Author: Judge Moore
St. Anthony Hospital Systems, Inc. ("Hospital") petitioned the
Tenth Circuit for review of a National Labor Relations Board ("Board")
decision ordering the Hospital to bargain with the St. Anthony Federa-
tion of Nurses and Health Professionals. The Hospital claimed the
Board's all-technical bargaining unit does not satisfy the "disparity of
interests" test adopted by the court in earlier decisions. In addition, the
Hospital contended a new election is necessary because the radiologic
technologists and registered respiratory therapist positions included in
the technical unit more appropriately belong in the professional unit.
The court upheld the Board's findings that since there were sharper
than usual differences between the interests of the technical and service/
maintenance employees, the all-technical unit is appropriate. In af-
firming the Board's conclusion that the radiologic technologist and re-
spiratory therapist positions did not satisfy the strict requirements of a
"professional" under 29 U.S.C. § 152(12), the court noted that any
changes in the job responsibilities of the positions in question would be
more appropriately addressed in a unit darification proceeding.
Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Sutton, 868 F.2d 352
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Sutton, brought suit against defendant, Southwest Forest
Industries, alleging retaliatory discharge for filing worker's compensa-
tion claims. At the time of trial, only the Kansas Court of Appeals had
ruled on the issue, allowing at-will employees to maintain actions in tort
for retaliatory discharge. After a jury verdict for Sutton and pending
appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled in a separate case that an em-
ployee covered by a collective bargaining agreement could not maintain
an action for retaliatory discharge. The Tenth Circuit thus granted de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment. The Kansas Supreme Court
subsequently overruled its decision, holding that employees covered by
collective bargaining agreements could maintain tort actions for retalia-
tory discharge.
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The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's decision for Sutton,
holding that the Kansas Supreme Court would give retroactive effect to
its decision.
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 7R v. Safeway Stores, 889 F.2d
940
Author: Judge Tacha
Dissent: Judge McKay (dissenting in part)
Cortez had grieved the failure of her employer, Safeway, to recall
her to another position after she was laid off. Plaintiff, United Food and
Commercial Workers Local Union ("the Union"), delayed arbitration in
Cortez's behalf. The arbitrator found that defendant Safeway had vio-
lated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to recall Cortez, but
due to the Union's delay in bringing the matter to arbitration, a portion
of the back pay award was assessed against the Union. The Union ap-
pealed the district court's denial of its motion to vacate the award, daim-
ing (1) Cortez had no standing to seek to enforce the. award; (2) the
arbitrator exceeded his authority in assessing part of the back pay award
against the Union; and (3) the district court erred in enforcing a mone-
tary judgment against the Union.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that Cortez did have standing to sue under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act wherein employees
can sue only if they have exhausted any grievance procedures provided
in the collective bargaining agreement. The court concluded that the
Union ceased to act as Cortez's representative by refusing to pay its por-
tion of Cortez's back pay. Thus, Cortez had exhausted her remedies
under the collective bargaining agreement and was therefore entitled to
sue under section 301. The court further held that the arbitrator had not
exceeded his authority in awarding back pay against the Union because
the issue submitted to the arbitrator failed to expressly restrict the party
from whom relief would be available. The dissent, however, asserted
that the Union's liability was not one of the issues submitted to the arbi-
trator because the Union was not a defendant. The court reversed in
part, finding that the district court had exceeded its authority in entering
a monetary judgment because the arbitration award was silent as to the
amount of damages. The court directed the district court to remand the
dispute regarding the amount of back pay to the arbitrator.
United States Department of Energy v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 880
F.2d 1163
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Western Area Power Administration ("WAPA"), petitioned
for review of an order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
("FLRA") which determined that WAPA had committed unfair labor
practices by refusing to bargain over wages with certain supervisors
within a recognized bargaining unit. The FLRA made its decision based
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on section 704 of the Civil Service and Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat.
1218, 5 U.S.C. § 5343.
The Tenth Circuit held that reclassified supervisory employees
could not be included in a mixed bargaining unit of supervisory and
nonsupervisory employees. Generally, when the FLRA interprets federal
labor relations law, it is entitled to "special deference." Special defer-
ence to the FLRA's interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 5343 was not required
in this case, however, since that section was not part of the federal ser-
vice labor-management relations statute which FLRA was charged with
interpreting. The court determined that FLRA had improperly certified
a mixed unit of supervisory and nonsupervisory employees and, there-
fore, reversed the FLRA's unfair labor practice decision.
Zimmerman v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 888 F.2d 660
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Zimmerman, brought suit against defendant, Atchison, To-
peka & Santa Fe Railway Company ("Railway"), alleging that he was dis-
charged in violation of protective agreements with the Railway and in
bad faith. The district court granted the Railway summary judgment,
stating that the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB") had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over this "minor dispute" pursuant to the Railway
Labor Act ("Act"). Zimmerman appealed arguing that this was a "major
dispute" and, therefore, should be heard in district court.
The Tenth Circuit held that the dispute was a minor one and, thus,
the NRAB has excusivejurisdiction. The court stated that because Zim-
merman's complaint was based on the rights of parties to a collective
bargaining agreement, it was a "minor dispute" and therefore subject to
the Act. The court further held that alleging wrongful discharge did not
prevent the dispute from falling under the exclusive arbitration provi-




Silbrico Corp. v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 333
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Silbrico, as titleholder of a perlite processing mill, insti-
tuted this suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment as to the legal effect of the mill's surface encroachment upon an
unpatented lode mining claim owned by defendant, Ortiz. Ortiz ap-
pealed the district court's decision that he had no standing to complain
of the encroachment in view of the Multiple Use Mining Act of 1955, 30
U.S.C. § 612 ("Act"). Ortiz also requested legal fees and expenses
under an indemnification clause in the lease with Silbrico.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly applied the
Act, rather than the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 26. Ortiz's pur-
ported 1957 amendment changing two placer claims to what were more
properly classified as eight lode claims could not relate back to the 1955
Act. The Act's legislative history indicated that surface uses which do
not impede the claim owner's mining operations are permitted. Because
Ortiz suffered no injury due to the processing mill's encroachment, he
was entitled to neither equitable nor legal relief. The court also deter-
mined that the lease between the parties expired prior to Silbrico's ac-
tion, so Ortiz could not recover attorney's fees and costs thereunder.




Doelle v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, 872 F.2d 942
Per Cuiam
Plaintiff, Doelle, brought a trespass action in district court against
defendant, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph (Mountain Bell),
for construction of a substation on his property. Doelle appealed ajudg-
ment granting a permanent easement by condemnation. Doelle chal-
lenged the district court's findings of fact regarding the need for the
substation and the valuation of his property, and failure to find that
Mountain Bell intended to damage his property. The Tenth Circuit de-
termined that the district court's findings were not dearly erroneous and
upheld the findings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Doelle challenged the district court's ruling under Fed. R. Civ. P.
13, permitting Mountain Bell to counterclaim for condemnation. The
Tenth Circuit held that federal law governs counterclaim procedures in
federal diversity cases, and thus a Utah Supreme Court ruling that a de-
fendant in a trespass action may not counterclaim for condemnation did
not bar Mountain Bell's counterclaim in federal district court.
The court found the remainder of Doelle's contentions either un-
persuasive or extraneous to the district court's determination that
Mountain Bell was entitled to an easement by condemnation.
Hill v. Department of the Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318
Per Curiam
Defendant, Britt, moved to quash a notice of lis pendens placed by
plaintiff, Hill, on Britt's residence. The district court denied the motion
and Britt appealed.
In reversing the district court order, the Tenth Circuit noted N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 38-1-14 (1987), which states that a notice oflispendens may
be filed in actions affecting the title, to real estate. Since Hill filed an
action seeking damages against Britt and not an action including Britt's
property, the court found his filing of a notice of lis pendens in anticipa-
tion.of a money judgment impermissible under the New Mexico statute.




United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656
Author: Judge McKay
Defendants appealed their convictions in the district court for mail
fraud, wire fraud, the interstate transportation of money taken by fraud,
bankruptcy fraud, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act ("RICO").
The Tenth Circuit held that double jeopardy does not apply to suc-
cessive prosecutions where the statutory provisions for one crime re-
quire proof of a fact which the other does not. The court further held
that severance is not a matter of right and the district court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to grant it. The court reversed the mail
fraud conviction because use of the United States mail was not an inte-
gral part of the scheme and thus not within the scope of the statute.
Finally, the court held that the reversal of the mail fraud convictions did
not warrant dismissal of the RICO convictions as a predicate offense
might, since ample independent grounds existed to sustain the RICO
convictions.
Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipeline Corp., 873 F.2d 1357
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Cayman Exploration ("Cayman"), appealed the district
court's dismissal of its daim under FED. R. Crv. P. 12(B)(6), against
United Gas Pipeline Corporation ("United"), for violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). The district court held that Cayman failed to allege facts
sufficient that, if proved, would entitle Cayman to relief.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling. The court held
that Cayman failed to establish that United practiced unreasonable re-
straint on trade. Cayman also did not establish that United was guilty of
vertical or horizontal price-fixing. The court reasoned that Cayman
failed to allege facts showing that the parties agreed to set a price at
which the other would resell to third parties. The court also held that
there were insufficient facts to show a conspiracy to establish horizontal
price-fixing. Cayman did not identify the alleged conspirators. More-
over, Cayman did not establish that any companies had acted in a way
contrary to the best interests of their business. In addition, the court
found that Cayman's RICO claim failed. The court stated that a RICO
claim must allege conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. Cayman failed to allege racketeering activity with suffi-
cient particularity.
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Edwards v. First National Bank, 872 F.2d 347
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. Plain-
tiffs also asserted a pendent state claim based on intentional tort. Plain-
tiffs' claims arose in connection with bank loans obtained for purchasing
cattle. The district court granted the defendants, First National Bank,
Fairview State Bank, and bank officers, summary judgment and dis-
missed the RICO claim and the state tort claim.
The Tenth Circuit held that the banks' conduct did not constitute a
pattern of racketeering activity giving rise to a claim under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c). Two incidents of threatening statements by the bank officers
that the plaintiffs would go to jail if they did not fully pay their loans at
once were insufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. The
court stated that proof of two acts, without more, does not establish a
pattern. Continuity, shown by a threat of ongoing illegal activity, must
also be proven.
Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Grider, who held an interest in a group of oil and gas wells,
brought suit against the wells' developers under the RICO Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. Grider claimed damages from two fraudulent
schemes and from conspiracies based thereon.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal of Grider's Complaint for
failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that Grider's complaint
failed to specifically allege that he was injured from the use or invest-
ment of racketeering income. Moreover, the court held that the damage
claims for conspiracies was based upon insufficient substantive allega-
tions and, therefore, could not survive a motion to dismiss.
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United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendant, Stone, appealed a conviction of possession with intent
to distribute methaqualone and aiding and abetting. Stone challenged
the district court's denial of his motion to suppress narcotics seized and
statements made by him following a police search of his car which he
argued was unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
The Tenth Circuit held that under the "automobile exception" to
the search warrant requirement, the police had probable cause to search
Stone's car and its contents after a police dog "keyed" on a particular
part of the car containing narcotics. The court, therefore, affirmed the
district court's decision and held that the search of the car and duffle bag
were not unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Consequently, the
narcotics and statements were not inadmissible.

SECURITIES
Coffey v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 891 F.2d 261
Author: Judge Logan
Dissent: Judge Baldock (dissenting in part)
Plaintiff, Coffey, appealed from the district court's order compelling
arbitration of her claim brought under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and from the subsequent confirmation of an arbi-
tral award in favor of defendants, Dean Witter Reynolds ("Dean Wit-
ter") and Hines, a Dean Witter account executive. Coffey contended that
there was no agreement between the parties to arbitrate and that, even if
such an arbitration agreement existed, it was modified by SEC Rule
15c2-2, -17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2, rescinded, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,216.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that an arbitration agreement existed
between the parties by virtue of a customer's agreement signed in con-
junction with an earlier account of Coffey's deemed to be applicable to
all subsequent accounts between Coffey and Dean Witter. SEC Rule
15c2-2 made agreements to arbitrate future disputes between a broker
or dealer and a public customer illegal. This rule was rescinded after the
instant case was filed. The court, however, did not apply the rescission
retroactively. Rather, it held that Coffey was entitled to litigate rather
than arbitrate her claim because Rule 15c2-2 was in effect at the time she
instituted the instant litigation. The case was reversed and remanded.
Grubb v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 868 F.2d 1151
Author: Judge Bright, sitting by designation
Defendant, Federal Deposit Insurance Company ("FDIC"), succes-
sor-in-interest to First National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma
City ("First National"), appealed the district court's decision in favor of
plaintiff, Grubb. Grubb's complaint alleged fraud in violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, as well as Oklahoma state law.
Among the issues on appeal were whether Grubb acted recklessly so as
to render erroneous the jury's award, and wh ether the alleged misrepre-
sentations by First National caused Grubb's consequential damages.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
ordered a new trial on damages unless Grubb agreed to a remittitur.
The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that Grubb af-
firmatively established reliance; however, undisputed evidence showed
that Grubb failed to prove causation between First National's initial mis-
representations and his later decision to'invest.
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Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendants, Republic Bancorporation, Inc. ("RBI"), a nonbank
holding company, and its nonbank subsidiaries, Republic Trust & Sav-
ings ("RTS"), and Republic Financial Corporation ("RFC"), filed for
bankruptcy after issuing thrift certificates and passbook savings certifi-
cates to plaintiffs, Holloway and others. Holloway appealed the district
court's summary judgment arguing that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Holloway reasoned that RTS's certificates were not securities
within the meaning of the federal securities laws.
The Tenth Circuit first applied the commercial/investment test,
which favors economic reality over form and errs in favor of protetting
investors. The court found that Congress intended the securities acts to
protect investors, such as Holloway, who are seeking a passive return
from instruments issued to raise capital for general financing of RTS.
The court concluded that the certificates issued were "notes" or "evi-
dence of indebtedness", notwithstanding their demand character, and
thus were investment, rather than commercial, instruments. Contrary to
the district court's holding, the supremacy clause does not permit state
regulation to preempt the protection afforded by federal law.
Moreover, the court agreed with the district court's finding that
prior to becoming a nonbank holding company, RBI and its subsidiaries
were covered by Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") regulations. FRB regu-
lations protect depositors through federal deposit insurance but not
with the required protection which would exclude them from also being
covered by securities act protection. The court reversed the district
court and found that the instruments issued by RTS were securities pro-
tected by the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. The
court affirmed the district court's decision which found RFC's certifi-
cates to be covered by the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. The court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Holloway
and remanded to the district court.
Maritan v. Birmingham Properties, 875 F.2d 1451
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Maritan, appealed from an adverse summary judgment dis-
missing his action under the federal securities laws, and pendent state
law claims, against defendant Birmingham Properties. Maritan claimed
that his investment in a limited partnership, formed to construct and sell
homes, constituted an "investment contract" under the federal securi-
ties laws and as such was entitled to the protections of the Securities Act
of 1933.
Referring to the three-prong test used in S.E.C. v. Howey, 328 U.S.
293 (1946), to distinguish an investment contract from other commer-
cial dealings, the district court found that Maritan's role could not be
considered passive considering his access to critical information about
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the venture, his power to hold title to property under the agreement and
his active involvement in the project which gave him control over the
ultimate expectation of profits. Accordingly, the district court entered
summary judgment in favor of Birmingham Properties.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment, finding that
Maritan's investor's interest in the partnership was not an "investment
contract" under the federal securities laws given his active involvement
in the project.
MidAmerica Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249
Author: Judge Tacha
On appeal, defendant, Shearson/American Express, Inc. ("Shear-
son"), alleged that the district court erred in denying motions for di-
rected verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, various jury
instructions, failing to order a new trial, and denying compelled
arbitration.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The motion for summary judgment
arose from the claim that where an oral omission induced the purchase
of securities, knowledge of the information by a latter written communi-
cation should be imputed to the purchaser. The Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed, stating that both section 408(a)(2) of the Oklahoma Securities
Act and section 12(2) of the federal Securities Act of 1933 make it clear
that plaintiff need show only lack of knowledge of an omission in order
to prevail. Section 12(2) on its face makes actionable misleading omis-
sions from either oral communications or written prospectuses, and
there is no requirement of justifiable reliance by the purchaser.
The Tenth Circuit also held there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury's conclusion that a fiduciary relationship existed, that Shearson
took unfair advantage of that relationship in the breach of fiduciary du-
ties, that Shearson's actions showed an intent to waive its right to arbi-




Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Ray, appealed the district court's order which affirmed a
decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny Ray her
social security disability benefits. The administrative law judge
("A.L.J."), found that Ray's arthritis, which prevented her from per-
forming work she had done in the past as a maid, did not prevent her
from performing sedentary work.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court agreed that
an individual is only disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act if she is unable to engage in any other type of gainful work. The
court upheld the A.LJ.'s finding that Ray suffered from no impairment
serious enough to limit the range of available non-exertion jobs. More-
over, the court held that the A.LJ. properly relied on medical-vocational
guidelines to determine whether work existed which Ray was capable of
performing.
Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d 706
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Sorenson, appealed the district court's affirmation of the
denial of Sorenson's application for Social Security benefits.
The Tenth Circuit reversed. The court held that even though the
district court correctly utilized a heightened standard of review, it erred
in finding that the treating physician's testimony was overcome by the
reviewing physicians' evaluations. In the Tenth Circuit, substantial
weight must be given to the evidence and opinion of the claimant's
treating physician, unless specific, legitimate reasons are given for re-
jecting it. The court found that no legitimate reasons were given for
rejecting Sorenson's claims. Consequently, the court held that Sorenson




Atkinson v. O'Neill, 867 F.2d 589
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Atkinson, appealed the district court's granting of sum-
mary judgment for the defendants on the ground that defendants, em-
ployees of the Internal Revenue Service, were entitled to absolute and
qualified immunity.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding Atkinson sued the defendants
in their official, rather than individual, capacity and therefore Atkinson
sued the United States in essence. Since sovereign immunity was not
waived, the suit was barred. The court awarded damages and double
costs for Atkinson's legally frivolous appeal.
United States v. Cache Valley Bank, 866 F.2d 1242
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, United States, appealed the district court's ruling of sum-
mary judgment in favor of defendant, Cache Valley, after the govern-
ment filed an action to enforce a tax lien against a taxpayer's account.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the government's tax lien
had attached prior to Cache Valley's exercise of its right to offset the
taxpayer's debt against the bank deposits, and therefore, Cache Valley
took the deposits subject to the lien.
United States v. Church of World Peace, 878 F.2d 1281
Author: Judge Anderson
Petitioner, Church of World Peace ("Church"), turned over tax
records to respondent, United States, pursuant to a district court order
enforcing an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") summons. The Tenth
Circuit later set aside the enforcement order in its entirety and re-
manded. On remand, the Church moved for return of all records and
copies thereof from the United States. The United States moved for
enforcement of the summons to the extent of the copied documents in
its possession. Both motions were denied. Both sides appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that both of the appeals were moot since the
Church had complied with the summons. Compliance with an IRS sum-
mors renders any appeal of a district court enforcement order moot.
Taxpayers who have complied with a summons may adequately protect
their asserted interest by challenging the IRS procedure if and when the
government attempts to make further use of the information obtained
by the summons.
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Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, 888 F.2d 1303
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma
("Tribe"), sought to enjoin defendant, Oklahoma Tax Commission
("Commission"), from enforcing a $2.7 million tax assessment against
the Tribe for cigarettes sold in a tribal convenience store. The store is
located on land which is held in trust by the federal government for the
Tribe. The Commission asserted a counterdaim for declaratory and in-
junctive relief. The Tribe moved to dismiss the counterclaim, contend-
ing that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Tribe argued that it
enjoys sovereign immunity and, therefore, cannot be sued unless it
consents.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Tribe's
motion to dismiss and remanded with directions to dismiss. The court
held that the Tribe is immune from suit and the district court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the counterclaim. The court also reversed the
district court's denial of the Tribe's request for injunction. Instead, the
court issued a remand to the district court for an entry of a permanent
injunction on behalf of the Tribe. The court held that because the con-
venience store is located on land over which the Tribe retains sovereign
powers, the Commission had no authority to tax the store's transactions
unless the Commission received an independent jurisdictional grant of
authority from Congress.
United States v. Colorado, 872 F.2d 338
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, United States ("Government"), appealed a summary judg-
ment granted in favor of defendant, State of Colorado ("State"), hold-
ing that the State's purchase of seized property at a tax sale did not
extinguish state tax liens and that state tax liens retain priority over fed-
eral liens despite the State's failure to give notice to the Government
prior to the sale. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The Government argued that the State's purchase of the property
extinguished the State's senior lien by merging that lien with fee title to
the property, thereby elevating the Government's lien to first priority.
Merger occurs when a greater and a lesser estate coincide in the same
person, without any intermediate estate, unless a contrary intent ap-
pears. Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the State's
interest plainly supported its intent to preserve its lien.
The Government further contended that regardless of merger,
I.R.C. § 7425 requires that the State should lose its senior lien priority
for failure to give the Government notice of the sale. The court held
that section 7425 merely prevents federal tax liens from being extin-
guished through sale of the underlying collateral, but does not other-
wise alter federal priority rules. Federal law governs the priority of a tax
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lien against other claims to property. Under federal law, the Govern-
ment's lien is preserved and the State's lien remains senior to the Gov-
ernment's lien.
Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242
Author: Judge Tacha
Law enforcement officials seized property as proceeds of illegal
drug trafficking. The federal Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), and the Colorado Department of
Revenue ("CDR"), all made claims on the property.
The district court found the CDR's claim valid for the state income
tax lien. The court, however, denied the liens for state sales tax and the
Regional Transportation District tax because the state did not show the
sale was retail rather than wholesale. The district court held the state
income tax lien had priority over the federal lien because the state filed
first. The DEA's claim was under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982)..The district
court denied the DEA's claim because the, forfeiture did not relate back
to the time of the offense.
In reversing the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982), provides for immediate forfeiture of all property
at the time the illegal act is committed. The forfeiture divests all rights
of subsequent ienholders except for innocent owners as provided in 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1982). The court held the state of Colorado was not
entitled to the. sales tax portion because the innocent owner exception
only applies to interest which vests before the illegal act. The sales tax
did not exist until the vendor received value from the purchaser. There-
fore, the Colorado Department of Revenue was not an innocent owner.
Estate of Bruning v. Commissioner, 888 F.2d 657
Per Curiam
Petitioner, Bruning, as personal representative of the decedent's es-
tate, brought suit in the Tax Court against the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue ("Commissioner"). Bruning sought a redetermination of a de-
ficiency in estate tax asserted by the Commissioner. The Tax Court held
that Bruning was entitled to an unlimited marital estate tax deduction.
The Commissioner appealed, arguing that Bruning should be allowed
only a limited marital deduction.
Affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit permitted
Bruning to claim an unlimited marital estate tax deduction. The court
stated that the purpose of section 403(e)(3) of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 is to preserve the testator's intent, and the trust estab-
lished under the decedent's will did not contain a maximum marital de-
duction formula clause. Thus, the testator's intent was to minimize
estate taxes rather than to limit the amount of marital deduction. The
testator's will, therefore, qualified for an unlimited marital deduction.
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United States v. Hays, 877 F.2d 843
Author: Judge Ebel
The district court found that under Colorado's Uniform Partnership
Act, one partner's agreement with the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"), to pay the dissolved partnership's past-due employment taxes
does not discharge the other partner from liability for those taxes. The
court found that although the IRS negotiated with one partner, Hays, to
pay the taxes, it never purported to release its claims against the second
partner, Manley.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's finding. The court
conduded that the agreement between the IRS and Hays was not a "ma-
terial alteration" in the nature of the already-due tax obligation. Rather,
it was a simple forbearance on the IRS's part to collect the taxes. More-
over, liability was not discharged under general surety principles. The
court reasoned that the IRS continued to reserve its rights against Man-
ley throughout its negotiations with Hays. The court, therefore, held
that because there was no material change in the underlying debt that
Manley and Hays owed to the IRS, section 36(3) of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act did not discharge Manley's liability.
Jackson v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1521
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff Jackson's deduction for lease amortization and advertising
expenses was disallowed by the tax court and penalties were imposed for
failure to timely file returns.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that a taxpayer's legal capabil-
ity to sell licensed goods, without actual efforts to sell them, was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish a legitimate business deduction. The court
reasoned that the deduction did not meet the "carrying on of a trade or
business" requirement. The court further held that a taxpayer's reliance
upon his accountant's advice that he need not comply with the law be-
cause no penalty will occur is not a reasonable excuse for late filing.
Jay v. United States, 865 F.2d 1175
Author: Judge Bright, sitting by designation
Dissent: Judge McWilliams
The district court held defendant, Jay, personally liable as a matter
of law for failure to pay taxes withheld from employee paychecks to the
federal government. On appeal, Jay, the company comptroller, argued
that he was not the responsible person for payment of the withholding
taxes under I.R.C. § 6672. Rather, Jay claimed that the company presi-
dent was the responsible person for directing Jay to pay creditors other
than the federal government.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for a trial on the
merits, finding that the record did not establish Jay's liability as a matter
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of law. The jury must determine if Jay possessed enough authority to
make him a responsible person for the payment of taxes.
Leder v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 237
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff's decedent, Leder, purchased an insurance policy two years
prior to his death, naming his wife owner and beneficiary. Months
before his death, Leder's wife transferred the policy to herself as trustee
of an inter vivos trust. Leder satisfied all payments on the policy, and
therefore, his wife gave no consideration. Defendant, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue ("Commissioner"), determined that the proceeds of
the policy were properly induded in Leder's gross estate under the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 2042. Leder's estate, however chal-
lenged the determination in tax court. The tax court held that the policy
proceeds could not be included in Leder's gross estate under Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 2035(d), where the decedent never pos-
sessed any of the incidents of ownership in the policy under section
2042.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed ihe district court. The court reasoned
that this is a statutory construction case of first impression regarding
pertinent sections of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
("ERTA"). Although section 2035(a), generally requires that any prop-
erty transferred by the decedent within three years of death, for less
than full consideration, be included in the decedent's gross estate,
ERTA changed the law. ERTA added section 2035(d), for estates of
decedents dying after 1981. The court held that the plain language of
section 2035(d)(2), specifically cross-references the definition of "inci-
dents of ownership" set out in section 2042. The court refused to apply
the constructive transfer doctrine as judicial gloss. The court reasoned
that under section 2042, payment of premiums is irrelevant in determin-
ing whether the decedent retained any "incidents of ownership" in the
policy proceeds.
Pollei v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 838
Author: Judge Seymour
Defendants, Pollei and Patrick, appealed a United States Tax Court
decision upholding deficiencies assessed against their federal income tax
return for 1981. At issue was whether Pollei and Patrick could deduct as
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses, maintenance and operat-
ing costs arising from their use of personally-owned, unmarked police
cars to travel between their residences and police headquarters when
they were required to be on dutr. The tax court concluded that such
travel constituted nondeductible personal commuting. The Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed.
Since the tax court applied the law to undisputed facts, the court
determined that de novo review was appropriate. The court found that
because Pollei and Patrick were required to be on duty while traveling to
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and from work, they were allowed to deduct maintenance and operating
costs on the cars as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses.
Wall v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 812
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Wall, appealed a decision of United States Tax Court hold-
ing that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not barred from is-
suing Wall a notice of deficiency almost six years after Wall had
executed Form 872-A, an indefinite waiver of the three-year limitations
period on income tax assessments. The issue on appeal was whether the
Commissioner should be estopped to assess the deficiency because he
made it within an allegedly unreasonable period of time after Wall had
executed Form 872-A.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's refusal to apply a
reasonable time limitation to the validity of the indefinite waiver signed
by Wall. The court stated that to rule otherwise would subject the courts
to increased litigation to determine what time period constitutes "rea-
sonable." The court also noted that Wall failed to execute Form 872-T,
which would have terminated his waiver. In extreme cases, such as
where twenty years has passed without contact with the taxpayer by the
Internal Revenue Service, the court stated it might find the government
is barred from issuing a notice of deficiency.
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Ascot Dinner Theatre, Ltd. v. Small Business Administration, 887 F.2d 1024
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
In this case of first impression, defendant Small Business Adminis-
tration ("SBA") appealed a district court decision awarding damages to
plaintiff, Ascot Dinner Theatre ("Ascot"). SBA argued that sovereign
immunity predudes the award of damages against the SBA for losses to
Ascot when it was denied loan assistance on the basis of an agency regu-
lation subsequently held unconstitutional by the district court.
The Tenth Circuit reversed. Though Ascot argued that 15 U.S.C.
§ 634(b)(1) provided an unrestricted waiver of immunity, the court held
that such a "sue and be sued" statute applied to nontort actions, and
Ascot's original claim was an alleged constitutional tort controlled by
the Federal Torts Claims Act. The express language of 28 U.S.C.
§ § 2679-80 barred Ascot's damages claim as a challenge to the unconsti-
tutional agency regulation premised on tort theory. In addition, the
court rejected Ascot's argument that there was a waiver of sovereign
immunity and right to recover on a contractual theory. The court found
the record devoid of any oral or written contract by the SBA or its per-
sonnel, and therefore Ascot's claim was tortious.
Ayala v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 877 F.2d 846
Author: Judge McKay
Following an explosion in a coal mine, plaintiff, Ayala, sued the
United States and the mining machine manufacturer, Joy Manufacturing
Company, under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). The district
court dismissed Ayala's complaint against the United States for failure to
state a claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6). The district court found that
the Mining Safety Health Administration ("MSHA") inspector had acted
within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's order,
finding that Ayala pled sufficient facts to withstand the motion to dis-
miss. Ayala had asserted that the MSHA inspectors' actions involved
technical assistance, not policy-making choices; therefore, invocation of
the discretionary function exception to dismiss Ayala's claim was im-
proper. The court remanded for further proceedings.
Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895
Author: Judge Logan
Dissent: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Boyd, brought suit against the United States following the
death of her husband at a recreation area leased to the state of
Oklahoma by the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The district
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court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the suit
barred by the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"), and finding inapplicable both an Oklahoma rec-
reational use statute and a federal flood control statute.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the failure
to warn of hazards in a public recreation area was a direct omission by
the government, not an exercise of discretion involving a policy deci-
sion. Congress did not intend to shield the government from liability
when the initial discretionary decision must be separated from the duty
to warn. The court found the connectionbetween flood control activity
and recreational use too attenuated to warrant invocation of the immu-
nity provision of the federal flood control statute. Thus, neither federal
statute barred action against the United States. The court directed the
district court on remand to resolve the issue of liability under the state
recreational use statute.
Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540
Author: Judge Russell, sitting by designation
While piloting his aircraft from the rear seat, plaintiff, Edward
Charles Cleveland ("Cleveland"), collided with a vehicle parked across
the runway during take off. Cleveland sued defendant Piper Aircraft
Corporation ("Piper"), alleging that inadequate rear-seat visibility
caused the collision and lack of a rear-seat shoulder harness caused
Cleveland's injuries. Cleveland then appealed, based on the district
court's failure to enter judgment on the crashworthiness claim rather
than on the forward visibility claim.
The Tenth Circuit held that the special verdict form used by the
district court was erroneous because it did not permit the jury to deter-
mine whether the negligence of original tortfeasors was a proximate
cause of Cleveland's enhanced injuries. Nor did the forr allow a com-
parison of the negligence of any original tortfeasors found to be a proxi-
mate cause of the enhanced injuries to the negligence of any
crashworthiness tortfeasors found to have proximately caused Cleve-
land's enhanced injuries. Holding that the district court's failure to al-
low the jury to make these determinations was contrary to New Mexico
law, the case was vacated and remanded for new trial.
Cox v. United States, 881 F.2d 893
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Cox, sued the United States for negligence under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). The district court directed a verdict for
the United States, holding that Oklahoma's recreational use statute
shielded the United States from liability for injuries sustained on prop-
erty owned and operated by the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
The Tenth Circuit held that Congress, in enacting the FTCA, lim-
ited the scope of the federal government's tort liability, shielding the
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United States from liability when a private person would be so shielded.
Thus, because a private person would not be liable under the Oklahoma
statute, neither is the United States. The intent of the Oklahoma legisla-
ture is not relevant to the issue of the government's liability.
Durant v. Neneman, 884 F.2d 1350
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiffs, Sandra Durant and James Tassin, filed suit for damages
against defendant, Neneman, in his individual capacity, alleging that
Neneman's negligence caused the. death of Charles Durant and physical
injuries to Tassin when the vehicle Neneman was driving struck them. At
the time of the accident, Neneman was wearing a military uniform and
driving his private vehicle to a duty assignment, and Durant and Tassin
were engaged in a training exercise ii military formation at a military
base. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), granted tort immunity to Neneman because
the injured parties were engaged in military activity at the time of the
accident.
While the original Feres immunity doctrine applied only to actions
brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
("true" Feres cases), a Feres rationale decrying the propriety of civilian
courts delving into military matters has been applied to claims outside
the Federal Tort Claims Act and an outgrowth of this has come to be
known as the "doctrine of intramilitary immunity." The Tenth Circuit
held that even this expanded zone of immunity, however, was never in-
tended to protect individual acts which in no way implicate the function
or authority of the military. The court reversed and remanded.
Farrell v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F.2d 1294
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Farrell, an iron worker, brought-a products liability action
against defendant, Klein Tools, Inc. ("Klein"), manufacturer of the
safety belt and lanyard Farrell used for fall protection. Farrell appealed
the jury verdict in favor of Klein, alleging that the district court erred in
giving jury instructions on abnormal use of the product and assumption
of risk.
The Tenth Circuit held that there was insufficient evidence to war-
rant ajury instruction on the defense of abnormal use. The court based
its decision on the evidence which showed it was foreseeable that the
safety equipment would be used in such a way and that the equipment
was given to Farrell for such use. The court also held that the general
verdict could not stand because it could not be determined with abso-
lute certainty that the jury was not influenced by the submission of the
abnormal use instruction. The court, therefore, reversed and remanded
for a new trial.
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Florom v. Elliott Manufacturing, 867 F.2d 570
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Plaintiff, Florom, suffered injuries while using a crane manufactured
and sold by a predecessor corporation of defendant, Elliott Equipment
Corporation ("New Elliott"). Florom argued that: (1) an issue of mate-
rial fact existed as to whether New Elliott, a successor corporation of
Old Elliott, was liable for Florom's tort claims; (2) New Elliott could be
held liable for defective products manufactured by a predecessor under
both the product line theory and a continuity of enterprise theory; and
(3) the district court should not have summarily rejected his claim that
New Elliott had an independent duty to warn of unreasonable dangers
of Old Elliott's products.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
held that New Elliott did not demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to a successor corporation's nonliability.
The court stated that there was disagreement as to whether New Elliott
would assume Old Elliott's tort liabilities. Consequently, summaryjudg-
ment on this claim was reversed. The court further held that the product
line theory and the expanded continuity of enterprise theory should not
be adopted as further exceptions to successor corporation nonliability.
As a result, summary judgment on this claim was upheld. Finally, there
was dispute as to whether New Elliott had an independent duty to warn
about the use of Old Elliott's products. The court stated that this duty
stems from a relationship between the successor corporation and the
predecessor's customers. This issue was, therefore, reversed and re-
manded for further proceedings.
Florom v. Elliott Manufacturing, 879 F.2d 801
Per Curiam
Defendant, Elliott Manufacturing ("New Elliott"), petitioned for
rehearing and argued that a corporate successor has no duty to warn.
New Elliott argued that the duty to warn is based only on negligence
principles and does not arise from strict liability under section 402(A) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. New Elliott also argued that, under a
strict liability theory, a duty to warn would apply only if it had agreed to
assume the liabilities of its predecessor.
The Tenth Circuit stated that despite adherence to the traditional
rule of nonliability for successor corporations, a continuing relationship
existed which established a duty to warn. -The court also ruled that Col-
orado law does not bar recovery for breach of a duty to warn on strict
liability principles. The court held that the plaintiff's claims could be
based on both negligence and strict liability in tort theories. Finally, the
court determined that the duty to warn is an independent duty unrelated
to any contractual agreement between successive corporations. New El-
liot's petition for rehearing was, therefore, denied.
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Henry v. Merck & Co., 877 F.2d 1489
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiffs, the Henrys, brought this action against defendants, Merck
& Company and its wholly owned subsidiary Kelco (jointly referred to as
"Kelco") to recover damages for injuries sustained when an employee of
Kelco stole sulfuric acid from the company and threw it in Ms. Henry's
face. Plaintiffs alleged that Kelco negligently stored the acid. The district
court entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor. Kelco appealed.
Interpreting Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit ruled that, absent
special circumstances, no duty is imposed on a party to anticipate and
prevent the intentional or criminal acts of a third party. Since Kelco had
no relationship whatsoever with Ms. Henry and had no way of anticipat-
ing the employee's criminal action, no special circumstances existed.
Consequently, Kelco had no duty to prevent the employee from stealing
the acid and throwing it on Ms. Henry.
The court further held that Kelco's actions were not the proximate
cause of Ms. Henry's injuries. Instead, the employee's criminal acts of
stealing the acid and throwing it on Ms. Henry constituted a superseding
cause. The court reversed the judgment with instructions to direct a ver-
dict in favor of Kelco.
Hokansen v. United States, 868 F.2d 372
Author: Judge Anderson
Dissent: ChiefJudge Holloway
Plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Torts Claim Act,
alleging that defendant, Veterans Administration Medical Center
("VAMC"), had negligently breached a duty to victims of a shooting by
releasing Garcia from voluntary inpatient treatment. Plaintiffs appealed
the district court's order granting summary judgment to the United
States.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
found that under the Kansas statutes the VAMC was not required to
make a determination of "no longer dangerous to himself or others" for
a voluntary inpatient. In addition, the court held that the issue of
whether the VAMC had a duty to warn the public was not properly
before the court because plaintiffs had failed to allege a "special rela-
tionship." Even if the issue had been properly raised, the court found
nothing in Kansas law to suggest that such an affirmative duty would be
imposed.
Kitts v. General Motors Corp. and Richart v. Ford Motor Co., 875 F.2d 787
Author: Judge McKay
Several district courts previously reached opposite conclusions as to
whether section 1392(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (the "Act"), preempts state tort claims. In
particular, the courts considered whether the Act preempts state claims
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against automobile manufacturers who comply with federal motor vehi-
cle safety standards, but who fail to install air bags. Consequently, the
Tenth Circuit, on its own motion, consolidated two cases to address this
preemption issue.
The court found that state action is impliedly preempted. The
court reasoned that if there were state action, this would circumvent sec-
tion 1392(d)'s prohibition of nonidentical state standards which cover
the same aspect of performance as a federal safety standard. This would,
in turn, conflict with Congress' goal of establishing uniformity.
Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F.2d 1349
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Lamb, appealed a summary judgment granted by the dis-
trict court to defendant, W-Energy, Inc., held to be statutory employers,
in a tort action involving injuries sustained by Lamb, an employee, in an
explosion. The Utah workers' compensation statute had provided for
such employer immunity.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings
because in the summer of 1989 the Utah Supreme Court overruled its
prior precedent in this regard, saying the statute shall no longer be con-
strued to provide tort immunity to employers who have not been re-
quired to pay benefits to the injured worker. The court reasoned that
since Utah favors a retroactivity rule with respect to overruling prior de-
cisions, the same should apply here.
Lilly v. Fieldstone, 876 F.2d 857
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Fieldstone, a private physician, performed emergency
surgery on plaintiff, Lilly, at Irwin Army Hospital. The district court
substituted the United States ("Government") as defendant for Field-
stone. The district court reasoned that under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the Government is the proper party defendant in any civil action
against a government employee for damage or injury. The district court
subsequently dismissed the complaint. The district court based its deci-
sion on the governmental immunity doctrine. Under this doctrine, the
government is granted full immunity for injuries to military personnel
which arise out of, or are incident to, service. The propriety of the dis-
trict court's substitution depended on whether Fieldstone was a govern-
ment employee or an independent contractor when he performed Lilly's
surgery.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Fieldstone
was an independent contractor. The court found that the Government
did not supervise the day-to-day operations of Fieldstone. Therefore,
the government did not have enough "control" over Fieldstone to
render him a government employee. The court noted that physicians, in
the exercise of professional judgment, cannot permit others to control
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the detailed physical performance of their duties. Physicians may be held
as employees, however, whenever the evidence manifests an intent or
express agreement to consider the doctor an.employee, subject to other
permissible forms of control. The court found no such evidence in this
case.
Q.E.R., Inc., v. Hickerson, 880 F.2d 1178
Per" Curiam
Plaintiff, Q.E.R., Inc. ("Q.E.R."), brought this action against de-
fendant, Hickerson, for intentional interference in contractual relations
and for aiding and abetting general partner's breach of fiduciary duty to
Q.E.R. The district court directed a verdict in favor of Hickerson, and
Q.E.R. appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Colorado law would recognize a claim
for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty and that there was
sufficient evidence for a jury to sustain such a finding. The court also
determined that although the evidence regarding the intentional inter-
ference of contractual relations was not conclusive, it raised an issue of
fact, and the jury must conduct a balancing test to determine whether
the alleged interference was warranted under the circumstances. Be-
cause a court may grant a directed verdict only if the evidence points but
one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may sup-
port the opposing party's position, the court reversed and remanded the
case for a new trial.
Richards v. Platte Valley Bank, 866 F.2d 1576
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Platte Valley Bank ("Bank"), appealed the district
court's decision in favor of plaintiff, Richards, on his claim for breach of
fiduciary duty. The Bank claimed that the district court improperly in-
structed the jury on the issue of liability by applying the standard of
"actual notice" of the facts, rather than "actual knowledge" as required
by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for dismissal of Rich-
ards's claim against the Bank. The court held that the proper standard
was actual knowledge or bad faith. Finding no evidence of either, the
court held that the district court erred in failing to direct a verdict for
the Bank.
Smith v. Pinner, 891 F.2d 784
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Smith, brought an action against defendants, his immedi-
ate supervisor, Pinner, and his employer, Loffland Brothers Company
("Loffiand"), for injuries suffered in a car accident. Smith was a passen-
ger in the car, which was owned and operated by Pinner. Smith con-
tended that Loffland was liable for his injuries under the theories of
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vicarious liability and negligent entrustment. The district court dis-
missed the negligent entrustment claim and rejected the vicarious liabil-
ity claim as outside the scope of employment. Smith subsequently
appealed the district court's rejection of the vicarious liability claim.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court,
however, disagreed with the district court's reasoning. The district court
reasoned that Loffland's reimbursement to Pinner for travel expenses,
without more, would not bring Pinner within the scope of employment.
The court disagreed with this reasoning, and held that in worker's com-
pensation cases, employer reimbursement of travel expenses brings an
employee within the scope of employment. The court stated that
worker's compensation cases apply to vicarious liability claims. The
court held, however, that the facts failed to place the accident within the
scope of employment. First, Loffland reimbursed Pinner for only a por-
tion of the trip, and the accident occurred on an unreimbursed portion.
Second, even on a reimbursed portion, Loffiand's ridesharing status
prevented vicarious liability. The court stated that CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-
41-104, eliminates application of the travel reimbursement rule to a re-
imbursed employee who is ridesharing.
Tafoya v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 884 F.2d 1330
Author: ChiefJudge Holloway
Plaintiff, Tafoya, was awarded a $150,000 jury verdict based on
strict products liability after his hand was caught in the blades of a riding
lawnmower. The jury found Tafoya fifty percent at fault, thereby reduc-
ing his award to $75,000. The seller, defendant Sears Roebuck and
Company ("Sears"), was found twenty percent at fault and the manufac-
turer, defendant Roper Corporation ("Roper"), was found thirty per-
cent at fault. Sears and Roper appealed the denial of their motions for a
new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of defendants' motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court found that Sears could
constitute a "manufacturer" under Colorado's strict liability statute
since it owned Roper in part. Additionally, the district court correctly
instructed the jury that a presumption of nondefectiveness, pursuant to
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403, could be rebutted by a preponderance of
evidence. The court further held that the crashworthiness or enhanced
injury doctrine was applicable, and there was sufficient evidence to es-
tablish the enhancement of Tafoya's injuries due to the lawnmower's
lack of a "deadman" device. There was also sufficient evidence to sup-
port an inference that the lawnmower was unreasonably dangerous. Fi-
nally, the court held that the jury was entitled to find that Tafoya did not
voluntarily assume the risk of injury.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of defendants' motion for a
new trial because the verdict was not dearly or decidedly against the
weight of evidence.
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Weiss v. United States, 889 F.2d 937
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiffs' claims arose when a helicopter piloted by Joseph Weiss
crashed in the Pike National Forest after striking an aerial tramway cable
suspended above the ground. The plaintiffs sued the United States
("government") for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA"), basing their claims on negligence and premises liability. The
district court dismissed the claim under the discretionary function ex-
ception to the FTCA, and dismissed the premises liability claim on
grounds that Colorado law imposed no duty on the United States Forest
Service ("USFS") to remove the cable or warn of its existence. On ap-
peal, the court found that a Colorado landowner could have a duty to
warn of or remove the cable and reinstated the premises liability claim.
On remand, the government raised the discretionary function exception
and the district court dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed, con-
tending that section 5714.16 of the Forest Service Manual created a
mandatory, rather than discretionary, duty to remove the tramway cable
or make it safe.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found
that, when read in its entirety, section 5714.16 of the Forest Service
Manual applied only to operations conducted by the USFS or its con-
tractors and thus did not govern the plaintiffs' situation. The court fur-
ther held that USFS policy regarding what objects should be removed





Airporter of Colorado, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 866 F.2d 1238
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Airporter of Colorado, Inc. ("Airporter"), sought reversal
of defendant, Interstate Commerce Commission's ("ICC"), order au-
thorizing the transportation of passengers in interstate and intrastate
commerce by a competing passenger motor carrier. Airporter argued
that the ICC was without jurisdiction to grant certification absent a find-
ing that the intrastate service of the carrier bore a proper relation to its
interstate service. According to the ICC, there was no requirement of
proportionality between the two under 49 U.S.C. § 10922(c)(2)(J) (1982
& Supp. 1987).
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the ICC. The court held
that the decision was not in accordance with the law, which makes the
proportion of intrastate to interstate traffic relevant to the issue of inter-
state service needed to support intrastate authority. The court re-
manded the matter to the ICC for a determination of the proper
relationship.
The court also affirmed, without prejudice, the ICC's denial of




Underwood v. Servicemen's Group Insurance, 893 F.2d 242
Per Curiam
Plaintiff's decedent, Underwood, was discharged from the United
States Army on November 18, 1985. He was 100% disabled. As of that
date, his insurance policy limitation, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 765(a), was
$35,000. On December 3, 1985, congress amended the statute to in-
crease the policy limits to $50,000, effective January 1, 1986. Under-
wood died on January 30, 1986. Defendant, Servicemen's Group
Insurance, ("Servicmen's"), refused to remit more than $35,000 to Un-
derwood's estate. Servicemen's contended that since Underwood was
not on active duty when the policy increase became effective, his benefi-
ciary was not entitled to receive the increase. The district court held that
the policy increase inures to the benefit of the policy holder who holds
the policy when the increase becomes effective. The court held that this
occurs regardless of whether the insured is eligible for a policy at the
time of the increase.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the inter-
pretation of 38 U.S.C. § 765,,is a question of law subject to de novo re-
view. The court stated that even though the Veteran's Administration
had not yet promulgated the corresponding regulation to the statute at
the time of the district court's ruling, it has since published its interpre-
tive regulation parallel to the statute. Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 9.4, the
$50,000 coverage does not apply to members released prior to January
1, 1986. The administrative regulation is based upon the plain language
of the statute. This language says that the increase will have no effect on
individuals not in active service at the time of the increase. Furthermore,
the court reasoned that if Congress intended the statute to be retroac-
tive, it would have stated this in the statute.

WORKERS COMPENSATION
Black v. Cabot Petroleum Corp., 877 F.2d 822
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiffs, the widow and surviving children of Glen L. Black ("the
Blacks"), filed a negligence and products liability suit in district court
against defendant, Cabot Petroleum Corp. ("Cabot"). Black died while
working for Cleo Keith, a subcontractor of Cabot. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Cabot, and the Black's appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Colorado
workers' compensation laws applied to the case. Colorado statute pro-
vides that general contractors, including Cabot, are immune from suit
for injuries to employees of the subcontractors, as long as the subcon-
tractors maintain workers' compensation insurance. The court stated
that if a downstream subcontractor obtains workers' compensation in-
surance, then all upstream subcontractors and general contractors are
immune from suit. Because it is undisputed the subcontractor, Cleo
Keith, had workers' compensation at the time of the accident, the Blacks
can have no suit against Cabot.

